Remove UHPPOTE/ZKTeco; Dingtian is the only access driver

Neither UHPPOTE nor ZKTeco is used — the Dingtian relay controller was chosen and verified. Remove their code and re-scope the wiki. Code: - delete access-uhppote.ts, uhppoted.d.ts, access.ts (zkteco/esp32-relay stubs), and the three uhppote-*.mjs hardware test scripts. - remove the `uhppoted` npm dependency from @parking/devices and @parking/server. - unregister uhppote/zkteco/esp32-relay from the driver registry; drop their exports. Catalog access drivers = dingtian only. Build green (5/5). - refresh now-stale example comments (registry/interfaces/setup/api) to use current examples; keep the two "UHPPOTE blocker" references that explain why the precondition capability exists. Wiki (kept pages, re-scoped): - uhppote-controller, zkteco-controller -> rejected/historical with callouts; uhppote-vs-esp32 -> historical (detection-vs-prevention lens still useful). - re-point all "current device" framing (standing-decisions, bom, overview, open-questions, device-registry, device-discovery, index) to dingtian-relay. - transferable concepts (network-isolation, event-log-ingestion, barrier-not-a- door, threat-model) untouched. Raw source immutable. Links lint clean.
2026-06-14 14:28:52 +02:00
parent 1b55e2034d
commit 355026dcf7
26 changed files with 106 additions and 711 deletions
@@ -21,8 +21,7 @@
    "@parking/shared": "workspace:*",
    "bcrypt": "6.0.0",
    "fastify": "5.8.5",
-    "fastify-plugin": "6.0.0",
+    "fastify-plugin": "6.0.0"
    "uhppoted": "0.9.0"
  },
  "devDependencies": {
    "@types/bcrypt": "6.0.0",
@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
 // Shared helpers for the UHPPOTE hardware test scripts.
 // Run directly against the device (independent of the HTTP server).
 //
 //   node apps/server/scripts/uhppote-listen.mjs
 //   node apps/server/scripts/uhppote-relay.mjs
 //
 // Env overrides:
 //   UHPPOTE_SERIAL   controller serial   (default 225088491)
 //   UHPPOTE_HOST     controller IP       (default 10.0.10.3)
 //   UHPPOTE_BCAST    Config broadcast    (default derived from HOST subnet)
 //   HOST_IP          this host's IP the controller pushes events to
 //                    (default: auto-detected interface on the controller's subnet)
 import { networkInterfaces } from "node:os";
 import { createRequire } from "node:module";
 const require = createRequire(import.meta.url);
 const uhppoted = require("uhppoted");
 export const SERIAL = Number(process.env.UHPPOTE_SERIAL ?? 225088491);
 export const HOST = process.env.UHPPOTE_HOST ?? "10.0.10.3";
 /** Subnet-directed broadcast for the interface that owns `ip`. */
 function broadcastForHost(ip) {
  const o = ip.split(".").map(Number);
  for (const ifaces of Object.values(networkInterfaces())) {
    for (const i of ifaces ?? []) {
      if (i.family !== "IPv4" || i.internal) continue;
      const a = i.address.split(".").map(Number);
      const m = i.netmask.split(".").map(Number);
      if (o.every((x, k) => (x & m[k]) === (a[k] & m[k]))) {
        return a.map((x, k) => (x & m[k]) | (~m[k] & 0xff)).join(".");
      }
    }
  }
  return "255.255.255.255";
 }
 /** This host's own IP on the controller's subnet (where it should push events). */
 export function hostIpOnControllerSubnet(ip = HOST) {
  if (process.env.HOST_IP) return process.env.HOST_IP;
  const o = ip.split(".").map(Number);
  for (const ifaces of Object.values(networkInterfaces())) {
    for (const i of ifaces ?? []) {
      if (i.family !== "IPv4" || i.internal) continue;
      const a = i.address.split(".").map(Number);
      const m = i.netmask.split(".").map(Number);
      if (o.every((x, k) => (x & m[k]) === (a[k] & m[k]))) return i.address;
    }
  }
  return null;
 }
 export const BCAST = process.env.UHPPOTE_BCAST ?? broadcastForHost(HOST);
 export function makeCtx(timeoutMs = 5000) {
  return {
    config: new uhppoted.Config(
      "parking",
      "0.0.0.0",
      `${BCAST}:60000`,
      "0.0.0.0:60001",
      timeoutMs,
      [],
      false,
    ),
    locale: "en-US",
  };
 }
 export const controller = { id: SERIAL, address: HOST, protocol: "udp" };
 export { uhppoted };
@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
 // Live button/event listener for the UHPPOTE controller.
 //
 // Points the controller's event listener at THIS host, then prints each pushed
 // event in real time. Press the door buttons on the controller and watch them
 // appear. Ctrl-C to stop.
 //
 //   node apps/server/scripts/uhppote-listen.mjs
 import {
  controller,
  hostIpOnControllerSubnet,
  makeCtx,
  uhppoted,
 } from "./uhppote-common.mjs";
 const ctx = makeCtx();
 const hostIp = hostIpOnControllerSubnet();
 if (!hostIp) {
  console.error("Could not determine this host's IP on the controller's subnet.");
  console.error("Set HOST_IP=<your-ip-on-the-controller-LAN> and retry.");
  process.exit(1);
 }
 console.log(`controller : ${controller.id} @ ${controller.address}`);
 console.log(`this host   : ${hostIp} (events will be pushed here on :60001)`);
 // 0) Remember the controller's current listener so we can restore it on exit
 //    (it was pointing somewhere else, e.g. 10.0.10.241).
 let prevListener = null;
 try {
  prevListener = await uhppoted.getListener(ctx, controller);
  console.log(`prior listener: ${prevListener.address}:${prevListener.port} (will restore on exit)`);
 } catch (e) {
  console.warn("getListener (non-fatal):", e.code ?? e.message);
 }
 // 1) Tell the controller to push events to us.
 try {
  const r = await uhppoted.setListener(ctx, controller, hostIp, 60001);
  console.log("setListener:", JSON.stringify(r));
 } catch (e) {
  console.error("setListener failed:", e.code ?? e.message);
  process.exit(1);
 }
 // 2) (Best-effort) ensure door open/close + button events are recorded.
 try {
  await uhppoted.recordSpecialEvents(ctx, controller, true);
  console.log("recordSpecialEvents: enabled");
 } catch (e) {
  console.warn("recordSpecialEvents (non-fatal):", e.code ?? e.message);
 }
 console.log("\n── listening — press the door buttons on the controller ──\n");
 function describe(ev) {
  const e = ev?.state?.event ?? ev?.event;
  const buttons = ev?.state?.buttons;
  const doors = ev?.state?.doors;
  const parts = [];
  if (e) {
    parts.push(
      `event#${e.index} type=${e.type?.event ?? e.type?.code} door=${e.door} granted=${e.granted} reason="${e.reason?.reason ?? e.reason?.code}" @${e.timestamp}`,
    );
  }
  if (buttons) {
    const pressed = Object.entries(buttons).filter(([, v]) => v).map(([k]) => k);
    parts.push(`buttons=[${pressed.join(",") || "none"}]`);
  }
  if (doors) {
    const open = Object.entries(doors).filter(([, v]) => v).map(([k]) => k);
    parts.push(`doorsOpen=[${open.join(",") || "none"}]`);
  }
  return parts.join("  ");
 }
 uhppoted.listen(
  ctx,
  (event) => {
    console.log(`[${new Date().toISOString()}] ${describe(event)}`);
  },
  (err) => {
    console.error("listen error:", err?.message ?? err);
  },
 );
 process.on("SIGINT", async () => {
  // Restore the controller's previous listener so we don't hijack it.
  if (prevListener && prevListener.address && prevListener.address !== "0.0.0.0") {
    try {
      await uhppoted.setListener(ctx, controller, prevListener.address, prevListener.port);
      console.log(`\nrestored listener -> ${prevListener.address}:${prevListener.port}`);
    } catch (e) {
      console.warn("\ncould not restore listener:", e.code ?? e.message);
    }
  }
  console.log("stopped.");
  process.exit(0);
 });
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
 // Guarded relay (door-open) test for the UHPPOTE controller.
 //
 // Prompts before firing each relay so a door only opens when you're ready and
 // watching. This is a 2-door controller, so it tests doors 1 and 2 by default.
 //
 //   node apps/server/scripts/uhppote-relay.mjs           # doors 1,2 (prompted)
 //   node apps/server/scripts/uhppote-relay.mjs 1          # only door 1
 //   YES=1 node apps/server/scripts/uhppote-relay.mjs      # no prompts (fires!)
 //
 // SAFETY: openDoor only expresses INTENT to open. The controller / barrier
 // operator owns the close timing and anti-crush — we never time a close.
 import { createInterface } from "node:readline/promises";
 import { stdin, stdout } from "node:process";
 import { controller, makeCtx, uhppoted } from "./uhppote-common.mjs";
 const ctx = makeCtx();
 const doors = process.argv.slice(2).map(Number).filter((n) => n >= 1 && n <= 4);
 const targets = doors.length ? doors : [1, 2];
 const autoYes = process.env.YES === "1";
 console.log(`controller : ${controller.id} @ ${controller.address}`);
 console.log(`testing doors: ${targets.join(", ")}${autoYes ? " (auto, no prompts)" : ""}\n`);
 const rl = autoYes ? null : createInterface({ input: stdin, output: stdout });
 for (const door of targets) {
  if (rl) {
    const ans = await rl.question(`Open door ${door}? [y/N] `);
    if (ans.trim().toLowerCase() !== "y") {
      console.log(`  skipped door ${door}`);
      continue;
    }
  }
  try {
    const res = await uhppoted.openDoor(ctx, controller, door);
    console.log(`  door ${door}: openDoor -> ${JSON.stringify(res)}`);
  } catch (e) {
    console.log(`  door ${door}: ERROR ${e.code ?? e.message}`);
  }
 }
 rl?.close();
 console.log("\ndone.");
@@ -28,14 +28,14 @@ export async function setupRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, db: Db): Promise<void> {
  const adminGuard = requireRole("admin");
  // Catalog of selectable drivers per category (no secrets — schema only).
-  // `discoverable` flags drivers that can scan the LAN (e.g. UHPPOTE).
+  // `discoverable` flags drivers that can scan the LAN.
  app.get("/api/setup/catalog", async () => {
    const catalog = registry.catalog();
    const discoverable = registry.list().filter(isDiscoverable).map((d) => d.id);
    return { ...catalog, discoverable };
  });
-  // Scan the LAN for devices a driver can discover (UHPPOTE UDP broadcast, etc).
+  // Scan the LAN for devices a driver can discover (UDP broadcast, etc).
  // Each found device is health-checked so the admin sees reachability before
  // assigning. Admin-only. See wiki/concepts/device-discovery.md.
  app.get<{ Params: { driverId: string } }>(
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ export interface DiscoveredDevice {
  health: { status: string; detail?: string };
 }
-/** Scan the LAN for devices a driver can discover (e.g. UHPPOTE). Admin-only. */
+/** Scan the LAN for devices a driver can discover. Admin-only. */
 export async function discoverDevices(driverId: string): Promise<DiscoveredDevice[]> {
  const body = await apiFetch<{ devices: DiscoveredDevice[] }>(
    `/api/setup/discover/${driverId}`,
@@ -18,8 +18,7 @@
    "lint": "tsc --noEmit"
  },
  "dependencies": {
-    "@parking/shared": "workspace:*",
+    "@parking/shared": "workspace:*"
    "uhppoted": "0.9.0"
  },
  "devDependencies": {
    "@types/node": "25.9.3",
@@ -1,263 +0,0 @@
 import { networkInterfaces } from "node:os";
 import uhppoted, { type Controller, type Ctx } from "uhppoted";
 import type { AccessControlDevice, DeviceHealth } from "../interfaces.js";
 import type {
  AccessDriver,
  DeviceConfig,
  DiscoveredDevice,
 } from "../registry.js";
 import { hostField, stubLog } from "./common.js";
 // `uhppoted` is CommonJS — import the default and destructure (named ESM imports
 // don't resolve off a CJS module under NodeNext).
 const { Config, getDevices, getStatus, openDoor } = uhppoted;
 // Every uhppoted call binds a UDP listener on :60001 for replies. Concurrent
 // calls collide on that port (EACCES / dropped replies → spurious timeouts), so
 // we serialize ALL controller I/O through one queue. UDP request/response is
 // fast, so serial throughput is fine for a parking host. This is why parallel
 // discovery + health checks were timing out.
 let chain: Promise<unknown> = Promise.resolve();
 function serialize<T>(fn: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {
  const run = chain.then(fn, fn);
  // keep the chain alive regardless of this call's outcome
  chain = run.then(
    () => undefined,
    () => undefined,
  );
  return run;
 }
 /**
 * Compute subnet-directed broadcast addresses (e.g. 10.0.10.255) for every
 * non-internal IPv4 interface.
 *
 * Why this matters: the uhppoted lib only enables SO_BROADCAST when the target
 * matches a *subnet-directed* broadcast of a local interface — it does NOT
 * recognise the global 255.255.255.255, so broadcasting there fails with EACCES.
 * We must broadcast to the per-interface address (e.g. 10.0.10.255) instead.
 */
 interface Iface {
  network: number[]; // ip & mask, per octet
  mask: number[];
  broadcast: string;
 }
 function localIfaces(): Iface[] {
  const out: Iface[] = [];
  for (const ifaces of Object.values(networkInterfaces())) {
    for (const i of ifaces ?? []) {
      if (i.family !== "IPv4" || i.internal) continue;
      const ip = i.address.split(".").map(Number);
      const mask = i.netmask.split(".").map(Number);
      if (ip.length !== 4 || mask.length !== 4) continue;
      out.push({
        network: ip.map((o, k) => o & mask[k]!),
        mask,
        broadcast: ip.map((o, k) => (o & mask[k]!) | (~mask[k]! & 0xff)).join("."),
      });
    }
  }
  return out;
 }
 function subnetBroadcastAddrs(): string[] {
  return localIfaces().map((i) => i.broadcast);
 }
 /** Broadcast target for discovery: explicit override, else first subnet bcast. */
 function discoveryBroadcast(): string {
  return (
    process.env.UHPPOTE_BROADCAST ?? subnetBroadcastAddrs()[0] ?? "255.255.255.255"
  );
 }
 /**
 * The subnet-directed broadcast for the interface that `host` belongs to. The
 * uhppoted Config's broadcast address governs reply routing even for unicast
 * ops, so it must match the TARGET's subnet (not just the first interface) or
 * the reply is missed → timeout.
 */
 function broadcastForHost(host: string): string {
  const ip = host.split(".").map(Number);
  if (ip.length === 4) {
    for (const i of localIfaces()) {
      if (ip.every((o, k) => (o & i.mask[k]!) === i.network[k])) return i.broadcast;
    }
  }
  return discoveryBroadcast();
 }
 // Real UHPPOTE access-control driver, backed by the official `uhppoted` lib.
 // Implements AccessControlDevice (intent-only relay — "a barrier is not a door";
 // the controller/barrier operator owns physical safety). See
 // wiki/entities/uhppote-controller.md and wiki/concepts/barrier-not-a-door.md.
 //
 // SECURITY: the UHPPOTE protocol is unauthenticated UDP (port 60000). This driver
 // assumes the controller sits on an isolated VLAN reachable only by the host.
 // See wiki/concepts/uhppote-udp-protocol.md and network-isolation.md.
 /**
 * uhppoted context broadcasting to a specific address on :60000, listening for
 * replies on :60001.
 */
 function buildCtxFor(broadcast: string, timeoutMs = 5000): Ctx {
  return {
    config: new Config(
      "parking",
      "0.0.0.0",
      `${broadcast}:60000`,
      "0.0.0.0:60001",
      timeoutMs,
      [],
      false,
    ),
    locale: "en-US",
  };
 }
 /** Default context for non-discovery ops (status/open use a unicast host). */
 function buildCtx(timeoutMs = 5000): Ctx {
  return buildCtxFor(discoveryBroadcast(), timeoutMs);
 }
 /**
 * Broadcast targets to try for discovery. An explicit UHPPOTE_BROADCAST wins;
 * otherwise every local subnet-directed broadcast (a host may have several
 * interfaces — LAN, VPN, docker — and the controller is on only one).
 */
 function discoveryBroadcasts(): string[] {
  const override = process.env.UHPPOTE_BROADCAST;
  if (override) return [override];
  const addrs = subnetBroadcastAddrs();
  return addrs.length > 0 ? addrs : ["255.255.255.255"];
 }
 class UhppoteAccessControl implements AccessControlDevice {
  readonly driverId = "uhppote";
  readonly #controller: Controller;
  readonly #ctx: Ctx;
  constructor(config: DeviceConfig) {
    const serial = Number(config.serial);
    const address = config.host ? String(config.host) : undefined;
    const protocol = config.protocol === "tcp" ? "tcp" : "udp";
    // Addressable descriptor when a host is given; otherwise rely on UDP
    // broadcast discovery by serial.
    this.#controller = address ? { id: serial, address, protocol } : serial;
    // The Config broadcast must match the target host's subnet (it governs
    // reply routing even for unicast), else replies are missed → timeout.
    const timeoutMs = config.timeoutMs ? Number(config.timeoutMs) : 5000;
    this.#ctx = address
      ? buildCtxFor(broadcastForHost(address), timeoutMs)
      : buildCtx(timeoutMs);
  }
  async connect(): Promise<void> {
    // No persistent socket to open (request/response over UDP); verify reachability.
    await this.healthCheck();
  }
  async disconnect(): Promise<void> {
    stubLog(this.driverId, "disconnect (stateless udp — nothing to close)");
  }
  async healthCheck(): Promise<DeviceHealth> {
    try {
      await serialize(() => getStatus(this.#ctx, this.#controller));
      return { status: "ready" };
    } catch (err) {
      return { status: "offline", detail: (err as Error).message };
    }
  }
  /**
   * Express intent to open a door (1–4). NEVER timed/forced closed against a
   * vehicle — auto-close/anti-crush is the barrier operator's firmware.
   */
  async pulseOpen(doorId: number): Promise<void> {
    const res = await serialize(() =>
      openDoor(this.#ctx, this.#controller, doorId),
    );
    if (!res.opened) {
      throw new Error(`uhppote: door ${doorId} not opened (deviceId ${res.deviceId})`);
    }
  }
  async getDoorStatus(): Promise<"open" | "closed"> {
    // The UHPPOTE status payload carries per-door state; without a confirmed
    // wiring of door sensors we report the safe default until the real status
    // mapping is added. (Status is fetched to prove reachability.)
    await serialize(() => getStatus(this.#ctx, this.#controller));
    return "closed";
  }
 }
 export const uhppoteDriver: AccessDriver & {
  discover(): Promise<DiscoveredDevice[]>;
 } = {
  id: "uhppote",
  category: "access",
  label: "UHPPOTE controller",
  description:
    "UHPPOTE Wiegand 26/34 network controller via the official uhppoted lib. Unauthenticated UDP — isolate the VLAN.",
  transports: ["udp", "tcp"],
  // UDP broadcast discovery (get-devices): every controller on the LAN answers
  // with its serial, IP, and firmware. Broadcasts on every local subnet (the
  // controller is on only one interface) and dedupes by serial.
  // See wiki/concepts/device-discovery.md.
  async discover(): Promise<DiscoveredDevice[]> {
    const bySerial = new Map<number, DiscoveredDevice>();
    // Serial, not parallel: each getDevices binds :60001, so concurrent scans
    // across interfaces collide (EACCES / dropped replies).
    for (const bcast of discoveryBroadcasts()) {
      let found;
      try {
        found = await serialize(() => getDevices(buildCtxFor(bcast, 3000)));
      } catch {
        continue; // a dead interface shouldn't fail the whole scan
      }
      for (const d of found) {
        bySerial.set(d.device.serialNumber, {
          id: String(d.device.serialNumber),
          label: `UHPPOTE ${d.device.serialNumber} @ ${d.device.address}`,
          config: { serial: d.device.serialNumber, host: d.device.address, protocol: "udp" },
          info: {
            address: d.device.address,
            netmask: d.device.netmask,
            gateway: d.device.gateway,
            MAC: d.device.MAC,
            firmware: d.device.version,
          },
        });
      }
    }
    return [...bySerial.values()];
  },
  configFields: [
    {
      key: "serial",
      label: "Controller serial number",
      type: "number",
      required: true,
      help: "Printed on the controller (e.g. 405419896).",
    },
    { ...hostField, required: false, help: "Optional: target a specific IP instead of UDP broadcast. Isolated VLAN only." },
    {
      key: "protocol",
      label: "Protocol",
      type: "select",
      required: false,
      default: "udp",
      options: [
        { value: "udp", label: "UDP (default)" },
        { value: "tcp", label: "TCP (newer firmware)" },
      ],
    },
    { key: "doors", label: "Door count", type: "number", required: true, default: 4 },
    { key: "timeoutMs", label: "Timeout (ms)", type: "number", required: false, default: 5000 },
  ],
  create: (c) => new UhppoteAccessControl(c),
 };
@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
 import type { AccessControlDevice, DeviceHealth } from "../interfaces.js";
 import type { AccessDriver, DeviceConfig } from "../registry.js";
 import { hostField, portField, stubLog } from "./common.js";
 // Access-control drivers. Each implements AccessControlDevice (intent-only relay
 // — "a barrier is not a door"). STUBS: connect/log only, no real protocol yet.
 class StubAccessControl implements AccessControlDevice {
  constructor(
    readonly driverId: string,
    protected readonly config: DeviceConfig,
  ) {}
  async connect(): Promise<void> {
    stubLog(this.driverId, `connect ${this.config.host}:${this.config.port}`);
  }
  async disconnect(): Promise<void> {
    stubLog(this.driverId, "disconnect");
  }
  async healthCheck(): Promise<DeviceHealth> {
    return { status: "ready", detail: "stub" };
  }
  async pulseOpen(doorId: number): Promise<void> {
    // Intent only — never times/forces a close against a vehicle.
    stubLog(this.driverId, `pulseOpen door=${doorId}`);
  }
  async getDoorStatus(): Promise<"open" | "closed"> {
    return "closed";
  }
 }
 export const zktecoDriver: AccessDriver = {
  id: "zkteco",
  category: "access",
  label: "ZKTeco controller",
  description: "ZKTeco network access controller (TCP/IP). Reader + relay.",
  transports: ["tcp-ip"],
  configFields: [hostField, portField(4370), { key: "doors", label: "Door count", type: "number", required: true, default: 4 }],
  create: (c) => new StubAccessControl("zkteco", c),
 };
 export const esp32RelayDriver: AccessDriver = {
  id: "esp32-relay",
  category: "access",
  label: "ESP32 relay controller",
  description: "Simple ESP32-based relay controller over the network.",
  transports: ["tcp-ip"],
  configFields: [hostField, portField(80), { key: "doors", label: "Relay channels", type: "number", required: true, default: 1 }],
  create: (c) => new StubAccessControl("esp32-relay", c),
 };
@@ -2,9 +2,7 @@
 // module wires the catalog. Add a new device by registering it here.
 import { registry } from "../registry.js";
 import { esp32RelayDriver, zktecoDriver } from "./access.js";
 import { dingtianDriver } from "./access-dingtian.js";
 import { uhppoteDriver } from "./access-uhppote.js";
 import { dahuaDriver, hikvisionDriver } from "./camera.js";
 import { tcpipReaderDriver, wiegandReaderDriver } from "./reader.js";
@@ -14,10 +12,7 @@ let registered = false;
 export function registerBuiltinDrivers(): void {
  if (registered) return;
  registered = true;
  registry.register(uhppoteDriver);
  registry.register(dingtianDriver);
  registry.register(zktecoDriver);
  registry.register(esp32RelayDriver);
  registry.register(wiegandReaderDriver);
  registry.register(tcpipReaderDriver);
  registry.register(hikvisionDriver);
@@ -25,10 +20,7 @@ export function registerBuiltinDrivers(): void {
 }
 export {
  uhppoteDriver,
  dingtianDriver,
  zktecoDriver,
  esp32RelayDriver,
  wiegandReaderDriver,
  tcpipReaderDriver,
  hikvisionDriver,
@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
 // Minimal ambient types for the `uhppoted` CommonJS module (no bundled types).
 // Only the surface we use; extend as we adopt more of the API.
 // Upstream: https://github.com/uhppoted/uhppoted-lib-nodejs
 declare module "uhppoted" {
  export class Config {
    constructor(
      name?: string,
      bindAddr?: string,
      broadcastAddr?: string,
      listenAddr?: string,
      timeout?: number,
      controllers?: unknown[],
      debug?: boolean,
    );
  }
  /** Either a bare controller serial, or an addressable descriptor. */
  export type Controller =
    | number
    | { id: number; address?: string; protocol?: "udp" | "tcp" };
  export interface Ctx {
    config: Config;
    locale?: string;
  }
  export interface DiscoveredController {
    deviceId: number;
    device: {
      serialNumber: number;
      address: string;
      netmask: string;
      gateway: string;
      MAC: string;
      version: string;
      date: string;
    };
  }
  /** UDP broadcast discovery — returns every controller answering on the LAN. */
  export function getDevices(ctx: Ctx): Promise<DiscoveredController[]>;
  export function openDoor(
    ctx: Ctx,
    controller: Controller,
    door: number,
  ): Promise<{ deviceId: number; opened: boolean }>;
  export function getStatus(
    ctx: Ctx,
    controller: Controller,
  ): Promise<Record<string, unknown>>;
  export function getEvent(
    ctx: Ctx,
    controller: Controller,
    index: number,
  ): Promise<Record<string, unknown>>;
  export function getEventIndex(
    ctx: Ctx,
    controller: Controller,
  ): Promise<{ deviceId: number; index: number }>;
  export function setListener(
    ctx: Ctx,
    controller: Controller,
    address: string,
    port: number,
  ): Promise<unknown>;
  // CommonJS default export (module.exports = { ... }). Destructure from this.
  const uhppoted: {
    Config: typeof Config;
    getDevices: typeof getDevices;
    openDoor: typeof openDoor;
    getStatus: typeof getStatus;
    getEvent: typeof getEvent;
    getEventIndex: typeof getEventIndex;
    setListener: typeof setListener;
  };
  export default uhppoted;
 }
@@ -10,10 +10,7 @@ export { setDeviceLogSink, type DeviceLogSink } from "./drivers/common.js";
 // hardware test scripts and any direct/programmatic device access).
 export {
  registerBuiltinDrivers,
  uhppoteDriver,
  dingtianDriver,
  zktecoDriver,
  esp32RelayDriver,
  wiegandReaderDriver,
  tcpipReaderDriver,
  hikvisionDriver,
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ export type DeviceCategory = "access" | "reader" | "camera" | "printer";
 /** Lifecycle shared by every device adapter. */
 export interface Device {
-  /** Stable id of the driver that produced this instance (e.g. "zkteco"). */
+  /** Stable id of the driver that produced this instance (e.g. "dingtian"). */
  readonly driverId: string;
  connect(): Promise<void>;
  disconnect(): Promise<void>;
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ export interface DeviceHealth {
 }
 // --- Access control (barrier relay) --------------------------------------
-// ZKTeco, an ESP32 relay controller, UHPPOTE, etc. all implement this.
+// The Dingtian relay board (and any future relay controller) implements this.
 export interface AccessControlDevice extends Device {
  /** Express intent to open. NEVER timed/forced closed against a vehicle. */
  pulseOpen(doorId: number): Promise<void>;
@@ -35,9 +35,9 @@ export type DeviceConfig = Record<string, string | number | boolean>;
 * fields the admin must supply, and a factory that builds a live adapter.
 */
 export interface DeviceDriver<T extends Device = Device> {
-  readonly id: string; // stable, e.g. "zkteco", "esp32-relay", "hikvision"
+  readonly id: string; // stable, e.g. "dingtian", "hikvision"
  readonly category: DeviceCategory;
-  readonly label: string; // human name for the picker, e.g. "ZKTeco controller"
+  readonly label: string; // human name for the picker, e.g. "Dingtian relay controller"
  readonly description: string;
  /** Transports/notes surfaced in the UI, e.g. ["tcp-ip"], ["wiegand"]. */
  readonly transports: readonly string[];
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ export type PrinterDriver = DeviceDriver<PrinterDevice>;
 /** A device found on the LAN by a driver's discovery scan. */
 export interface DiscoveredDevice {
-  /** Identifier to pre-fill (e.g. UHPPOTE serial number). */
+  /** Identifier to pre-fill (e.g. a serial number). */
  readonly id: string;
  readonly label: string;
  /** Config values to auto-fill into the setup form (host, serial, …). */
@@ -63,9 +63,10 @@ export interface DiscoveredDevice {
 }
 /**
- * Optional capability: a driver that can find devices on the LAN. UHPPOTE
+ * Optional capability: a driver that can find devices on the LAN (e.g. UDP
- * implements this via the protocol's UDP broadcast discovery (get-devices);
+ * broadcast discovery). No bundled driver implements this yet — the Dingtian
- * cameras (ONVIF) and others may add it later. See wiki/concepts/device-discovery.md.
+ * board uses a fixed IP; cameras (ONVIF) or other UDP-discoverable devices may
 * add it later. See wiki/concepts/device-discovery.md.
 */
 export interface DiscoverableDriver {
  discover(): Promise<DiscoveredDevice[]>;
@@ -50,9 +50,6 @@ importers:
      fastify-plugin:
        specifier: 6.0.0
        version: 6.0.0
      uhppoted:
        specifier: 0.9.0
        version: 0.9.0
    devDependencies:
      '@types/bcrypt':
        specifier: 6.0.0
@@ -122,9 +119,6 @@ importers:
      '@parking/shared':
        specifier: workspace:*
        version: link:../shared
      uhppoted:
        specifier: 0.9.0
        version: 0.9.0
    devDependencies:
      '@types/node':
        specifier: 25.9.3
@@ -1262,9 +1256,6 @@ packages:
  once@1.4.0:
    resolution: {integrity: sha512-lNaJgI+2Q5URQBkccEKHTQOPaXdUxnZZElQTZY0MFUAuaEqe1E+Nyvgdz/aIyNi6Z9MzO5dv1H8n58/GELp3+w==}
  os@0.1.2:
    resolution: {integrity: sha512-ZoXJkvAnljwvc56MbvhtKVWmSkzV712k42Is2mA0+0KTSRakq5XXuXpjZjgAt9ctzl51ojhQWakQQpmOvXWfjQ==}
  path-scurry@2.0.2:
    resolution: {integrity: sha512-3O/iVVsJAPsOnpwWIeD+d6z/7PmqApyQePUtCndjatj/9I5LylHvt5qluFaBT3I5h3r1ejfR056c+FCv+NnNXg==}
    engines: {node: 18 || 20 || >=22}
@@ -1467,10 +1458,6 @@ packages:
    engines: {node: '>=14.17'}
    hasBin: true
  uhppoted@0.9.0:
    resolution: {integrity: sha512-7VDPNg4x31TETgMD3xp9NwVr+NvmZJ6CO8gTpyuRrdHu/UBGXw9/9kq8yiB0vR4opaUQPdvR8Gj373Ac/QWPwQ==}
    engines: {node: '>=14.18.3'}
  undici-types@7.24.6:
    resolution: {integrity: sha512-WRNW+sJgj5OBN4/0JpHFqtqzhpbnV0GuB+OozA9gCL7a993SmU+1JBZCzLNxYsbMfIeDL+lTsphD5jN5N+n0zg==}
@@ -2357,8 +2344,6 @@ snapshots:
    dependencies:
      wrappy: 1.0.2
  os@0.1.2: {}
  path-scurry@2.0.2:
    dependencies:
      lru-cache: 11.5.1
@@ -2586,10 +2571,6 @@ snapshots:
  typescript@6.0.3: {}
  uhppoted@0.9.0:
    dependencies:
      os: 0.1.2
  undici-types@7.24.6: {}
  util-deprecate@1.0.2: {}
@@ -20,17 +20,23 @@ device carries an `id`, a `label`, a `config` blob to **auto-fill** the setup fo
 (firmware, MAC, …). The [[device-registry]]'s `isDiscoverable()` guard lets the system treat it
 as optional; the setup catalog returns a `discoverable` list of driver ids.
-## UHPPOTE discovery
+> **No current driver implements discovery.** The [[dingtian-relay]] board uses a fixed IP
 > (entered/known at setup). The capability remains for future UDP-discoverable devices (cameras
 > via ONVIF, etc.). The worked example below is the (removed) UHPPOTE driver — kept because the
 > **broadcast gotchas are transferable** to any UDP discovery we add later.
-The [[uhppote-controller]] supports discovery natively: a **UDP broadcast** (`get-devices` on
+## UHPPOTE discovery (historical example)
 The [[uhppote-controller]] supported discovery natively: a **UDP broadcast** (`get-devices` on
 port `60000`) that **every controller on the LAN answers** with its serial, IP, netmask, gateway,
-MAC, firmware version, and date. The official `uhppoted` lib exposes this as `getDevices(ctx)`;
+MAC, firmware version, and date. The `uhppoted` lib exposed this as `getDevices(ctx)`; the
-the `uhppote` driver maps each result into a `DiscoveredDevice` (serial → id, IP → host).
+(now-removed) `uhppote` driver mapped each result into a `DiscoveredDevice` (serial → id, IP →
-**Verified on real hardware** (serial 225088491).
+host). **Was verified on real hardware** (serial 225088491).
 ### Broadcast gotchas (learned the hard way — see [[wsl-dev-networking]])
-These cost real debugging time; the `uhppote` driver now handles all three:
+These cost real debugging time; the (removed) `uhppote` driver handled all three, and any future
 UDP-discovery driver will need to as well:
 1. **Broadcast to the *subnet-directed* address, not the global `255.255.255.255`.** The
   `uhppoted` lib only calls `setBroadcast(true)` when the target matches a **local interface's
@@ -38,7 +38,8 @@ driver; **no business-logic change** — this is the [[device-adapter-pattern]]
 - Config is **validated against the driver's declared fields** before persisting.
 - Selections persist in the `lane_devices` table and drive runtime adapter construction.
 - Drivers may optionally implement **[[device-discovery]]** (`discover()`), so the admin can scan
-  the LAN instead of typing connection details — UHPPOTE does this today.
+  the LAN instead of typing connection details — no current driver uses it (the UHPPOTE did,
  before removal; the [[dingtian-relay]] uses a fixed IP).
 Cameras are modelled as **snapshot-on-event**: the host requests an image at entry/exit; it's
 stored and referenced from the signed event as an **independent record** — a fraud-control input
@@ -7,6 +7,11 @@ updated: 2026-06-14
 # UHPPOTE vs. Custom ESP32 — Detection vs. Prevention
 > **Historical comparison.** Neither is the current device — the [[uhppote-controller]] was
 > **rejected** (entry-flow blocker → [[dingtian-relay]] chosen) and the [[esp32-custom-controller]]
 > is **deferred**. Kept because the **detection-vs-prevention** framing on the [[trust-boundary]]
 > fork is a durable lens that applies to any access device.
 A head-to-head on the [[trust-boundary]] fork: the off-the-shelf [[uhppote-controller]] versus
 the [[esp32-custom-controller]]. (Synthesized from [[parking-system-architecture]] §6–7.)
@@ -23,9 +28,10 @@ the [[esp32-custom-controller]]. (Synthesized from [[parking-system-architecture
 ## Bottom line
- The UHPPOTE is the **current choice**: good enough as a detection/audit layer **when only the
+- The UHPPOTE was the **detection-grade** option: good enough as a detection/audit layer **when
-  host can reach it** (isolation) and every event lands in the [[append-only-event-chain]].
+  only the host can reach it** (isolation) and every event lands in the [[append-only-event-chain]]
- The ESP32 is the **documented upgrade** when you need a control path that holds even against an
+  — but it was rejected for the entry lane (the button blocker).
-  attacker on the wire. They're **mixable per lane**.
+- The ESP32 is the **prevention-grade** option when you need a control path that holds even against
  an attacker on the wire. Deferred.
 - Both still rely on host-side integrity ([[append-only-event-chain]]) and external
  [[reconciliation]] as the ultimate anti-fraud control.
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ status: open
   later" currently leaves a disk failure as **total revenue-history loss**.
 6. **Secure-element integration.** Confirm [[atecc608]] wiring/usage on the host (event
   signing). The [[esp32-custom-controller]] command-authentication use is **deferred — not
-   being implemented for now** (access control stays on the [[uhppote-controller]] behind
+   being implemented for now** (access control is the [[dingtian-relay]] behind
   [[network-isolation]]); revisit only if prevention-grade device auth becomes a requirement.
 7. **JWT signing: symmetric vs. asymmetric key.** _(Raised by the commit security review, not the
   source doc.)_ Auth currently uses a symmetric HMAC secret (`@fastify/jwt`, see
@@ -19,10 +19,12 @@ The decisions treated as settled in the design notes. (See [[parking-system-arch
 - **Integrity:** append-only, hash-chained, [[atecc608]]-signed event log
  ([[append-only-event-chain]]); **[[reconciliation]] is the anti-fraud control**; encryption
  protects only at-rest (see [[threat-model]]).
- **Access control:** [[uhppote-controller]] for now, on an **isolated VLAN**
+- **Access control:** the **[[dingtian-relay]]** relay+input controller, on an **isolated VLAN**
-  ([[network-isolation]]); event log used as a tamper-evident audit source with host-side index
+  ([[network-isolation]]). Chosen because its **inputs are decoupled from its relays**, enabling
-  tracking ([[event-log-ingestion]]). The [[esp32-custom-controller]] is the documented
+  host-in-the-loop ticket-first entry — the resolution to [[access-controller-button-flow]].
-  prevention-grade upgrade path (the [[trust-boundary]] fork).
+  (The [[uhppote-controller]] and [[zkteco-controller]] were evaluated and **rejected** — kept as
  historical record. The [[esp32-custom-controller]] remains the documented prevention-grade
  alternative — the [[trust-boundary]] fork.)
 - **Readers:** prefer [[wiegand]]-into-controller for permit holders (autonomous); host-in-the-loop
  for [[lpr-camera|LPR]]/QR/pure-network readers; both can share a relay (see
  [[entry-exit-readers]]).
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ payment terminal is dictated by the acquiring bank. (See [[parking-system-archit
 | --- | --- | --- |
 | Barrier operator | Magnetic Autocontrol / FAAC / CAME / Nice | Owns physical safety in firmware ([[barrier-not-a-door]]) |
 | Induction loops | Feig / BEA / EMX | Safety + free-exit detection |
-| Access controller | [[uhppote-controller]] now → ZKTeco later | Reader + relay; **isolate the VLAN** ([[network-isolation]]) |
+| Access controller | [[dingtian-relay]] relay+input board | Decoupled inputs (host-in-the-loop); **isolate the VLAN** ([[network-isolation]]). ([[uhppote-controller]]/[[zkteco-controller]] rejected) |
 | Permit readers | Nedap/Kathrein UHF, or Mifare → [[wiegand]] | Hands-free, or autonomous offline decisions |
 | Casual identity | [[lpr-camera]] (Milesight, edge AI) | Plate = ticket + independent record |
 | Ticket dispenser | Custom VKP80 | Parking-grade thermal/ESC-POS |
@@ -1,33 +1,37 @@
 ---
 type: entity
-tags: [parking, hardware, access-control, current-choice]
+tags: [parking, hardware, access-control, rejected, historical]
 sources: [parking-system-architecture]
 updated: 2026-06-15
 ---
-# UHPPOTE Controller (current choice)
+# UHPPOTE Controller (rejected — historical)
-The starting access-control hardware: a **UHPPOTE Wiegand 26/34 network controller (4-door)** —
+> **❌ NOT USED. Replaced by the [[dingtian-relay]] controller** (and its driver/test code
-a cheap reader-plus-relay frontend, acceptable **provided you understand its limits**. The plan
+> removed). Kept as the record of *why* — its firmware-fixed push-button blocker
-is UHPPOTE now → ZKTeco later (see [[bom]]). (See [[parking-system-architecture]] §6.)
+> ([[access-controller-button-flow]]) is what drove the switch to a board with decoupled inputs.
 > The transferable lessons below (network isolation, append-only log ingestion, "a barrier is not
 > a door") still apply to any access device.
-> **⚠️ Entry-flow blocker (verified on hardware):** the push-button input **auto-opens the relay
+The original starting hardware: a **UHPPOTE Wiegand 26/34 network controller (4-door)** — a cheap
-> in firmware** — there's no command to make it report-without-opening — so it **cannot** do
+reader-plus-relay frontend. (See [[parking-system-architecture]] §6.)
-> ticket-first entry (`button → print → open`). Fine as a host-**commanded relay** and for
+
-> [[wiegand]]/permit lanes, but **not** the button-driven entry lane as wired. Full detail and
+> **⚠️ The fatal limit (verified on hardware):** the push-button input **auto-opens the relay in
-> options: [[access-controller-button-flow]].
+> firmware** — no command makes it report-without-opening — so it **cannot** do ticket-first entry
 > (`button → print → open`). This is *the* reason it was dropped: full detail and the resolution in
 > [[access-controller-button-flow]].
 >
-> **Verified working on the real unit** (serial 225088491, fw 09120): host-commanded `openDoor`
+> **What was verified on the real unit** (serial 225088491, fw 09120) before retiring it:
-> on doors 1 & 2 (physically actuated, `reason="remote open door"`); button presses captured live
+> host-commanded `openDoor` on doors 1 & 2 (physically actuated, `reason="remote open door"`);
-> (`reason="push button ok"`); [[device-discovery]] scan. Test scripts: `apps/server/scripts/`.
+> button presses captured live (`reason="push button ok"`); UDP-broadcast [[device-discovery]].
 > The driver, `uhppoted` dependency, and test scripts have since been removed from the codebase.
-> **Implementation:** integrated via the official **`uhppoted`** npm package (MIT, by the
+> **Past implementation (removed):** was integrated via the official **`uhppoted`** npm package
-> `uhppoted` org — `github.com/uhppoted/uhppoted-lib-nodejs`), added to `@parking/devices` as the
+> (MIT — `github.com/uhppoted/uhppoted-lib-nodejs`) as the `uhppote` access driver. It exposed
-> `uhppote` access driver ([[device-registry]]). It exposes exactly the protocol commands this
+> exactly the protocol commands the design needs: `openDoor`, `getStatus`, and the event-log set
-> design needs: `openDoor`, `getStatus`, and the event-log set (`getEvent`, `getEventIndex`,
+> (`getEvent`, `getEventIndex`, `setEventIndex`, `recordSpecialEvents`) plus `setListener`/`listen`
-> `setEventIndex`, `recordSpecialEvents`) plus `setListener`/`listen` for auto-push — see
+> for auto-push — see [[event-log-ingestion]]. Transport defaulted to **UDP** (broadcast `…:60000`),
-> [[event-log-ingestion]]. Transport defaults to **UDP** (broadcast `…:60000`), with optional
+> with optional per-call TCP on newer firmware. The driver also implemented **[[device-discovery]]**
 > per-call TCP on newer firmware. The driver also implements **[[device-discovery]]**
 > (`getDevices` broadcast) so the setup wizard can scan for controllers. Note: the lib pulls one
 > trivial extra dep (the npm `os` shim) and uses UDP broadcast, which needs socket broadcast
 > permission on the host.
@@ -1,20 +1,24 @@
 ---
 type: entity
-tags: [parking, hardware, access-control]
+tags: [parking, hardware, access-control, rejected, historical]
 sources: [parking-system-architecture]
 updated: 2026-06-15
 ---
-# ZKTeco Controller
+# ZKTeco Controller (rejected — historical)
-A network access controller (C3 / inBio families) — the documented "UHPPOTE now → ZKTeco later"
+> **❌ NOT USED.** Was considered as the access controller; the **[[dingtian-relay]]** board was
-upgrade in the [[bom]]. A `zkteco` driver **stub** exists in the [[device-registry]] but the
+> chosen instead (decoupled inputs, already verified). The `zkteco` driver **stub** has been
-**real protocol is not implemented** (see below).
+> **removed** from the codebase. Kept for the record of the comparison below.
-## Relevance to the entry-flow blocker
+A network access controller (C3 / inBio families), originally the documented "UHPPOTE now →
 ZKTeco later" upgrade in the [[bom]].
 ## Why it was a contender (vs. UHPPOTE)
 ZKTeco is **better positioned** than the [[uhppote-controller]] for host-in-the-loop entry (the
-[[access-controller-button-flow]] blocker), but this is **unverified on our hardware**:
+[[access-controller-button-flow]] blocker) — but it was **never verified on our hardware**, and the
 Dingtian solved the problem first with less effort:
 - Its **auxiliary inputs** have **programmable linkage** (ZKBioSecurity software / PULL SDK) and
  are **not** hardwired to "open door" — so a button on an *aux* input can raise a host event
@@ -32,13 +32,13 @@ Counts: 1 source · 14 entities · 10 concepts · 2 decision records.
 - [[logto-zitadel-oidc]] — OIDC providers ruled out by offline-first.
 ## Entities — hardware & devices
- [[uhppote-controller]] — current access controller; cheap, tamper-evident, open-UDP, fixed firmware.
+- [[uhppote-controller]] — ❌ rejected/historical; firmware auto-open blocker drove the switch to Dingtian.
 - [[esp32-custom-controller]] — prevention-grade upgrade; device-level auth.
 - [[atecc608]] — secure element; non-extractable signing key (host events + controller auth).
 - [[wiegand]] — reader standard feeding the controller directly (autonomous permit-holder path).
 - [[lpr-camera]] — edge-AI plate recognition; host-side casual-identity source.
- [[zkteco-controller]] — C3/inBio controller; aux-input path may enable host-in-the-loop (driver TBD).
+- [[zkteco-controller]] — ❌ rejected/historical; aux-input path was a contender, not pursued.
- [[dingtian-relay]] — relay+input board; inputs decoupled from relays → solves the button blocker (driver TBD).
+- [[dingtian-relay]] — ✅ CHOSEN access controller; decoupled inputs solve the button blocker (driver verified on hardware).
 - [[bom]] — reference bill of materials (barrier, loops, controller, readers, payment, host, network).
 ## Concepts — foundational forces
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ Counts: 1 source · 14 entities · 10 concepts · 2 decision records.
 - [[device-adapter-pattern]] — business logic talks to interfaces; swap hardware → new adapter.
 - [[device-registry]] — catalog of selectable drivers per category (admin-configurable).
 - [[first-run-setup]] — admin assigns devices per lane from the catalog at install.
- [[device-discovery]] — optional driver capability to scan the LAN (UHPPOTE UDP broadcast).
+- [[device-discovery]] — optional driver capability to scan the LAN (no current driver uses it; UHPPOTE was the example).
 - [[barrier-not-a-door]] — never timed-close a barrier; safety lives in barrier firmware.
 - [[trust-boundary]] — the core fork: network vs. device; auditable vs. unforgeable.
 - [[fail-state-safety]] — entry fails closed, exit fails open; manual override; watchdog.
@@ -118,3 +118,16 @@ works. The [[access-controller-button-flow]] blocker is RESOLVED. Gotcha recorde
 (GET omits it) or the write silently no-ops. Added httpPort config field (port 8080 ≠
 default 80). Test script apps/server/scripts/dingtian-test.mjs. Next: input HTTP-push
 endpoint + wiring input→ticket→pulseOpen.
 ## [2026-06-15] cleanup | Remove UHPPOTE/ZKTeco code; wiki → rejected/historical
 Neither UHPPOTE nor ZKTeco is used (Dingtian chosen). Removed their code:
 deleted access-uhppote.ts, uhppoted.d.ts, access.ts (zkteco/esp32 stubs), the
 three uhppote-*.mjs scripts; dropped the `uhppoted` npm dep from both packages;
 unregistered uhppote/zkteco/esp32-relay from the driver registry; updated example
 comments. Catalog access drivers now = dingtian only. Build green.
 Wiki: kept the pages but marked [[uhppote-controller]] + [[zkteco-controller]]
 rejected/historical, [[uhppote-vs-esp32]] historical; re-pointed all "current
 device" framing (standing-decisions, bom, overview, open-questions) to
 [[dingtian-relay]]; noted no current driver uses [[device-discovery]]. Transferable
 concepts (network-isolation, event-log-ingestion, barrier-not-a-door, threat-model)
 kept as-is. Links lint clean; raw source untouched (immutable).
@@ -29,11 +29,12 @@ deployed on-site at a parking facility. Two forces shape nearly every decision:
  rest ([[disk-os-hardening]]) defends a secondary threat.
 - **Devices** sit behind a [[device-adapter-pattern]] (swap hardware → new adapter only), with
  the [[barrier-not-a-door]] safety principle keeping physical safety in barrier-operator firmware.
- **Access control** hinges on the [[trust-boundary]] fork:
+- **Access control** today is the **[[dingtian-relay]]** relay+input controller behind
-  [[uhppote-vs-esp32|detection vs. prevention]]. Today: [[uhppote-controller]] behind
+  [[network-isolation]] — chosen because its inputs are **decoupled from its relays**, enabling
-  [[network-isolation]], its open [[uhppote-udp-protocol]] contained, its log made trustworthy by
+  host-in-the-loop ticket-first entry (resolving [[access-controller-button-flow]]). The
-  [[event-log-ingestion]]. Upgrade path: the [[esp32-custom-controller]] with
+  [[uhppote-controller]] and [[zkteco-controller]] were evaluated and **rejected** (historical).
-  [[challenge-response-auth]] and [[fail-state-safety]].
+  The deeper fork is still the [[trust-boundary]] ([[uhppote-vs-esp32|detection vs. prevention]]);
  the [[esp32-custom-controller]] remains the prevention-grade alternative.
 - **Readers** split two ways ([[entry-exit-readers]]): permit holders via [[wiegand]]
  (autonomous), casual/transient via host-side [[lpr-camera]] / QR; both can share a relay.
 - A reference [[bom]] lists recommended devices.
@@ -47,6 +48,6 @@ modes (fail-open on exit)**, the **reconciliation channel**, and **backup/durabi
 - *Security-first:* [[threat-model]] → [[append-only-event-chain]] → [[reconciliation]] →
  [[uhppote-vs-esp32]].
- *Hardware-first:* [[bom]] → [[uhppote-controller]] → [[entry-exit-readers]] →
+- *Hardware-first:* [[bom]] → [[dingtian-relay]] → [[access-controller-button-flow]] →
-  [[esp32-custom-controller]].
+  [[entry-exit-readers]].
 - *Stack-first:* [[technology-stack]] → [[offline-first]] → [[device-adapter-pattern]].