Remove UHPPOTE/ZKTeco; Dingtian is the only access driver

Neither UHPPOTE nor ZKTeco is used — the Dingtian relay controller was chosen
and verified. Remove their code and re-scope the wiki.

Code:
- delete access-uhppote.ts, uhppoted.d.ts, access.ts (zkteco/esp32-relay stubs),
  and the three uhppote-*.mjs hardware test scripts.
- remove the `uhppoted` npm dependency from @parking/devices and @parking/server.
- unregister uhppote/zkteco/esp32-relay from the driver registry; drop their
  exports. Catalog access drivers = dingtian only. Build green (5/5).
- refresh now-stale example comments (registry/interfaces/setup/api) to use
  current examples; keep the two "UHPPOTE blocker" references that explain why
  the precondition capability exists.

Wiki (kept pages, re-scoped):
- uhppote-controller, zkteco-controller -> rejected/historical with callouts;
  uhppote-vs-esp32 -> historical (detection-vs-prevention lens still useful).
- re-point all "current device" framing (standing-decisions, bom, overview,
  open-questions, device-registry, device-discovery, index) to dingtian-relay.
- transferable concepts (network-isolation, event-log-ingestion, barrier-not-a-
  door, threat-model) untouched. Raw source immutable. Links lint clean.
This commit is contained in:
2026-06-14 14:28:52 +02:00
parent 1b55e2034d
commit 355026dcf7
26 changed files with 106 additions and 711 deletions
+1 -2
View File
@@ -21,8 +21,7 @@
"@parking/shared": "workspace:*",
"bcrypt": "6.0.0",
"fastify": "5.8.5",
"fastify-plugin": "6.0.0",
"uhppoted": "0.9.0"
"fastify-plugin": "6.0.0"
},
"devDependencies": {
"@types/bcrypt": "6.0.0",
-72
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@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
// Shared helpers for the UHPPOTE hardware test scripts.
// Run directly against the device (independent of the HTTP server).
//
// node apps/server/scripts/uhppote-listen.mjs
// node apps/server/scripts/uhppote-relay.mjs
//
// Env overrides:
// UHPPOTE_SERIAL controller serial (default 225088491)
// UHPPOTE_HOST controller IP (default 10.0.10.3)
// UHPPOTE_BCAST Config broadcast (default derived from HOST subnet)
// HOST_IP this host's IP the controller pushes events to
// (default: auto-detected interface on the controller's subnet)
import { networkInterfaces } from "node:os";
import { createRequire } from "node:module";
const require = createRequire(import.meta.url);
const uhppoted = require("uhppoted");
export const SERIAL = Number(process.env.UHPPOTE_SERIAL ?? 225088491);
export const HOST = process.env.UHPPOTE_HOST ?? "10.0.10.3";
/** Subnet-directed broadcast for the interface that owns `ip`. */
function broadcastForHost(ip) {
const o = ip.split(".").map(Number);
for (const ifaces of Object.values(networkInterfaces())) {
for (const i of ifaces ?? []) {
if (i.family !== "IPv4" || i.internal) continue;
const a = i.address.split(".").map(Number);
const m = i.netmask.split(".").map(Number);
if (o.every((x, k) => (x & m[k]) === (a[k] & m[k]))) {
return a.map((x, k) => (x & m[k]) | (~m[k] & 0xff)).join(".");
}
}
}
return "255.255.255.255";
}
/** This host's own IP on the controller's subnet (where it should push events). */
export function hostIpOnControllerSubnet(ip = HOST) {
if (process.env.HOST_IP) return process.env.HOST_IP;
const o = ip.split(".").map(Number);
for (const ifaces of Object.values(networkInterfaces())) {
for (const i of ifaces ?? []) {
if (i.family !== "IPv4" || i.internal) continue;
const a = i.address.split(".").map(Number);
const m = i.netmask.split(".").map(Number);
if (o.every((x, k) => (x & m[k]) === (a[k] & m[k]))) return i.address;
}
}
return null;
}
export const BCAST = process.env.UHPPOTE_BCAST ?? broadcastForHost(HOST);
export function makeCtx(timeoutMs = 5000) {
return {
config: new uhppoted.Config(
"parking",
"0.0.0.0",
`${BCAST}:60000`,
"0.0.0.0:60001",
timeoutMs,
[],
false,
),
locale: "en-US",
};
}
export const controller = { id: SERIAL, address: HOST, protocol: "udp" };
export { uhppoted };
-100
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@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
// Live button/event listener for the UHPPOTE controller.
//
// Points the controller's event listener at THIS host, then prints each pushed
// event in real time. Press the door buttons on the controller and watch them
// appear. Ctrl-C to stop.
//
// node apps/server/scripts/uhppote-listen.mjs
import {
controller,
hostIpOnControllerSubnet,
makeCtx,
uhppoted,
} from "./uhppote-common.mjs";
const ctx = makeCtx();
const hostIp = hostIpOnControllerSubnet();
if (!hostIp) {
console.error("Could not determine this host's IP on the controller's subnet.");
console.error("Set HOST_IP=<your-ip-on-the-controller-LAN> and retry.");
process.exit(1);
}
console.log(`controller : ${controller.id} @ ${controller.address}`);
console.log(`this host : ${hostIp} (events will be pushed here on :60001)`);
// 0) Remember the controller's current listener so we can restore it on exit
// (it was pointing somewhere else, e.g. 10.0.10.241).
let prevListener = null;
try {
prevListener = await uhppoted.getListener(ctx, controller);
console.log(`prior listener: ${prevListener.address}:${prevListener.port} (will restore on exit)`);
} catch (e) {
console.warn("getListener (non-fatal):", e.code ?? e.message);
}
// 1) Tell the controller to push events to us.
try {
const r = await uhppoted.setListener(ctx, controller, hostIp, 60001);
console.log("setListener:", JSON.stringify(r));
} catch (e) {
console.error("setListener failed:", e.code ?? e.message);
process.exit(1);
}
// 2) (Best-effort) ensure door open/close + button events are recorded.
try {
await uhppoted.recordSpecialEvents(ctx, controller, true);
console.log("recordSpecialEvents: enabled");
} catch (e) {
console.warn("recordSpecialEvents (non-fatal):", e.code ?? e.message);
}
console.log("\n── listening — press the door buttons on the controller ──\n");
function describe(ev) {
const e = ev?.state?.event ?? ev?.event;
const buttons = ev?.state?.buttons;
const doors = ev?.state?.doors;
const parts = [];
if (e) {
parts.push(
`event#${e.index} type=${e.type?.event ?? e.type?.code} door=${e.door} granted=${e.granted} reason="${e.reason?.reason ?? e.reason?.code}" @${e.timestamp}`,
);
}
if (buttons) {
const pressed = Object.entries(buttons).filter(([, v]) => v).map(([k]) => k);
parts.push(`buttons=[${pressed.join(",") || "none"}]`);
}
if (doors) {
const open = Object.entries(doors).filter(([, v]) => v).map(([k]) => k);
parts.push(`doorsOpen=[${open.join(",") || "none"}]`);
}
return parts.join(" ");
}
uhppoted.listen(
ctx,
(event) => {
console.log(`[${new Date().toISOString()}] ${describe(event)}`);
},
(err) => {
console.error("listen error:", err?.message ?? err);
},
);
process.on("SIGINT", async () => {
// Restore the controller's previous listener so we don't hijack it.
if (prevListener && prevListener.address && prevListener.address !== "0.0.0.0") {
try {
await uhppoted.setListener(ctx, controller, prevListener.address, prevListener.port);
console.log(`\nrestored listener -> ${prevListener.address}:${prevListener.port}`);
} catch (e) {
console.warn("\ncould not restore listener:", e.code ?? e.message);
}
}
console.log("stopped.");
process.exit(0);
});
-44
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@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
// Guarded relay (door-open) test for the UHPPOTE controller.
//
// Prompts before firing each relay so a door only opens when you're ready and
// watching. This is a 2-door controller, so it tests doors 1 and 2 by default.
//
// node apps/server/scripts/uhppote-relay.mjs # doors 1,2 (prompted)
// node apps/server/scripts/uhppote-relay.mjs 1 # only door 1
// YES=1 node apps/server/scripts/uhppote-relay.mjs # no prompts (fires!)
//
// SAFETY: openDoor only expresses INTENT to open. The controller / barrier
// operator owns the close timing and anti-crush — we never time a close.
import { createInterface } from "node:readline/promises";
import { stdin, stdout } from "node:process";
import { controller, makeCtx, uhppoted } from "./uhppote-common.mjs";
const ctx = makeCtx();
const doors = process.argv.slice(2).map(Number).filter((n) => n >= 1 && n <= 4);
const targets = doors.length ? doors : [1, 2];
const autoYes = process.env.YES === "1";
console.log(`controller : ${controller.id} @ ${controller.address}`);
console.log(`testing doors: ${targets.join(", ")}${autoYes ? " (auto, no prompts)" : ""}\n`);
const rl = autoYes ? null : createInterface({ input: stdin, output: stdout });
for (const door of targets) {
if (rl) {
const ans = await rl.question(`Open door ${door}? [y/N] `);
if (ans.trim().toLowerCase() !== "y") {
console.log(` skipped door ${door}`);
continue;
}
}
try {
const res = await uhppoted.openDoor(ctx, controller, door);
console.log(` door ${door}: openDoor -> ${JSON.stringify(res)}`);
} catch (e) {
console.log(` door ${door}: ERROR ${e.code ?? e.message}`);
}
}
rl?.close();
console.log("\ndone.");
+2 -2
View File
@@ -28,14 +28,14 @@ export async function setupRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, db: Db): Promise<void> {
const adminGuard = requireRole("admin");
// Catalog of selectable drivers per category (no secrets — schema only).
// `discoverable` flags drivers that can scan the LAN (e.g. UHPPOTE).
// `discoverable` flags drivers that can scan the LAN.
app.get("/api/setup/catalog", async () => {
const catalog = registry.catalog();
const discoverable = registry.list().filter(isDiscoverable).map((d) => d.id);
return { ...catalog, discoverable };
});
// Scan the LAN for devices a driver can discover (UHPPOTE UDP broadcast, etc).
// Scan the LAN for devices a driver can discover (UDP broadcast, etc).
// Each found device is health-checked so the admin sees reachability before
// assigning. Admin-only. See wiki/concepts/device-discovery.md.
app.get<{ Params: { driverId: string } }>(
+1 -1
View File
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ export interface DiscoveredDevice {
health: { status: string; detail?: string };
}
/** Scan the LAN for devices a driver can discover (e.g. UHPPOTE). Admin-only. */
/** Scan the LAN for devices a driver can discover. Admin-only. */
export async function discoverDevices(driverId: string): Promise<DiscoveredDevice[]> {
const body = await apiFetch<{ devices: DiscoveredDevice[] }>(
`/api/setup/discover/${driverId}`,
+1 -2
View File
@@ -18,8 +18,7 @@
"lint": "tsc --noEmit"
},
"dependencies": {
"@parking/shared": "workspace:*",
"uhppoted": "0.9.0"
"@parking/shared": "workspace:*"
},
"devDependencies": {
"@types/node": "25.9.3",
@@ -1,263 +0,0 @@
import { networkInterfaces } from "node:os";
import uhppoted, { type Controller, type Ctx } from "uhppoted";
import type { AccessControlDevice, DeviceHealth } from "../interfaces.js";
import type {
AccessDriver,
DeviceConfig,
DiscoveredDevice,
} from "../registry.js";
import { hostField, stubLog } from "./common.js";
// `uhppoted` is CommonJS — import the default and destructure (named ESM imports
// don't resolve off a CJS module under NodeNext).
const { Config, getDevices, getStatus, openDoor } = uhppoted;
// Every uhppoted call binds a UDP listener on :60001 for replies. Concurrent
// calls collide on that port (EACCES / dropped replies → spurious timeouts), so
// we serialize ALL controller I/O through one queue. UDP request/response is
// fast, so serial throughput is fine for a parking host. This is why parallel
// discovery + health checks were timing out.
let chain: Promise<unknown> = Promise.resolve();
function serialize<T>(fn: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {
const run = chain.then(fn, fn);
// keep the chain alive regardless of this call's outcome
chain = run.then(
() => undefined,
() => undefined,
);
return run;
}
/**
* Compute subnet-directed broadcast addresses (e.g. 10.0.10.255) for every
* non-internal IPv4 interface.
*
* Why this matters: the uhppoted lib only enables SO_BROADCAST when the target
* matches a *subnet-directed* broadcast of a local interface — it does NOT
* recognise the global 255.255.255.255, so broadcasting there fails with EACCES.
* We must broadcast to the per-interface address (e.g. 10.0.10.255) instead.
*/
interface Iface {
network: number[]; // ip & mask, per octet
mask: number[];
broadcast: string;
}
function localIfaces(): Iface[] {
const out: Iface[] = [];
for (const ifaces of Object.values(networkInterfaces())) {
for (const i of ifaces ?? []) {
if (i.family !== "IPv4" || i.internal) continue;
const ip = i.address.split(".").map(Number);
const mask = i.netmask.split(".").map(Number);
if (ip.length !== 4 || mask.length !== 4) continue;
out.push({
network: ip.map((o, k) => o & mask[k]!),
mask,
broadcast: ip.map((o, k) => (o & mask[k]!) | (~mask[k]! & 0xff)).join("."),
});
}
}
return out;
}
function subnetBroadcastAddrs(): string[] {
return localIfaces().map((i) => i.broadcast);
}
/** Broadcast target for discovery: explicit override, else first subnet bcast. */
function discoveryBroadcast(): string {
return (
process.env.UHPPOTE_BROADCAST ?? subnetBroadcastAddrs()[0] ?? "255.255.255.255"
);
}
/**
* The subnet-directed broadcast for the interface that `host` belongs to. The
* uhppoted Config's broadcast address governs reply routing even for unicast
* ops, so it must match the TARGET's subnet (not just the first interface) or
* the reply is missed → timeout.
*/
function broadcastForHost(host: string): string {
const ip = host.split(".").map(Number);
if (ip.length === 4) {
for (const i of localIfaces()) {
if (ip.every((o, k) => (o & i.mask[k]!) === i.network[k])) return i.broadcast;
}
}
return discoveryBroadcast();
}
// Real UHPPOTE access-control driver, backed by the official `uhppoted` lib.
// Implements AccessControlDevice (intent-only relay — "a barrier is not a door";
// the controller/barrier operator owns physical safety). See
// wiki/entities/uhppote-controller.md and wiki/concepts/barrier-not-a-door.md.
//
// SECURITY: the UHPPOTE protocol is unauthenticated UDP (port 60000). This driver
// assumes the controller sits on an isolated VLAN reachable only by the host.
// See wiki/concepts/uhppote-udp-protocol.md and network-isolation.md.
/**
* uhppoted context broadcasting to a specific address on :60000, listening for
* replies on :60001.
*/
function buildCtxFor(broadcast: string, timeoutMs = 5000): Ctx {
return {
config: new Config(
"parking",
"0.0.0.0",
`${broadcast}:60000`,
"0.0.0.0:60001",
timeoutMs,
[],
false,
),
locale: "en-US",
};
}
/** Default context for non-discovery ops (status/open use a unicast host). */
function buildCtx(timeoutMs = 5000): Ctx {
return buildCtxFor(discoveryBroadcast(), timeoutMs);
}
/**
* Broadcast targets to try for discovery. An explicit UHPPOTE_BROADCAST wins;
* otherwise every local subnet-directed broadcast (a host may have several
* interfaces — LAN, VPN, docker — and the controller is on only one).
*/
function discoveryBroadcasts(): string[] {
const override = process.env.UHPPOTE_BROADCAST;
if (override) return [override];
const addrs = subnetBroadcastAddrs();
return addrs.length > 0 ? addrs : ["255.255.255.255"];
}
class UhppoteAccessControl implements AccessControlDevice {
readonly driverId = "uhppote";
readonly #controller: Controller;
readonly #ctx: Ctx;
constructor(config: DeviceConfig) {
const serial = Number(config.serial);
const address = config.host ? String(config.host) : undefined;
const protocol = config.protocol === "tcp" ? "tcp" : "udp";
// Addressable descriptor when a host is given; otherwise rely on UDP
// broadcast discovery by serial.
this.#controller = address ? { id: serial, address, protocol } : serial;
// The Config broadcast must match the target host's subnet (it governs
// reply routing even for unicast), else replies are missed → timeout.
const timeoutMs = config.timeoutMs ? Number(config.timeoutMs) : 5000;
this.#ctx = address
? buildCtxFor(broadcastForHost(address), timeoutMs)
: buildCtx(timeoutMs);
}
async connect(): Promise<void> {
// No persistent socket to open (request/response over UDP); verify reachability.
await this.healthCheck();
}
async disconnect(): Promise<void> {
stubLog(this.driverId, "disconnect (stateless udp — nothing to close)");
}
async healthCheck(): Promise<DeviceHealth> {
try {
await serialize(() => getStatus(this.#ctx, this.#controller));
return { status: "ready" };
} catch (err) {
return { status: "offline", detail: (err as Error).message };
}
}
/**
* Express intent to open a door (1–4). NEVER timed/forced closed against a
* vehicle — auto-close/anti-crush is the barrier operator's firmware.
*/
async pulseOpen(doorId: number): Promise<void> {
const res = await serialize(() =>
openDoor(this.#ctx, this.#controller, doorId),
);
if (!res.opened) {
throw new Error(`uhppote: door ${doorId} not opened (deviceId ${res.deviceId})`);
}
}
async getDoorStatus(): Promise<"open" | "closed"> {
// The UHPPOTE status payload carries per-door state; without a confirmed
// wiring of door sensors we report the safe default until the real status
// mapping is added. (Status is fetched to prove reachability.)
await serialize(() => getStatus(this.#ctx, this.#controller));
return "closed";
}
}
export const uhppoteDriver: AccessDriver & {
discover(): Promise<DiscoveredDevice[]>;
} = {
id: "uhppote",
category: "access",
label: "UHPPOTE controller",
description:
"UHPPOTE Wiegand 26/34 network controller via the official uhppoted lib. Unauthenticated UDP — isolate the VLAN.",
transports: ["udp", "tcp"],
// UDP broadcast discovery (get-devices): every controller on the LAN answers
// with its serial, IP, and firmware. Broadcasts on every local subnet (the
// controller is on only one interface) and dedupes by serial.
// See wiki/concepts/device-discovery.md.
async discover(): Promise<DiscoveredDevice[]> {
const bySerial = new Map<number, DiscoveredDevice>();
// Serial, not parallel: each getDevices binds :60001, so concurrent scans
// across interfaces collide (EACCES / dropped replies).
for (const bcast of discoveryBroadcasts()) {
let found;
try {
found = await serialize(() => getDevices(buildCtxFor(bcast, 3000)));
} catch {
continue; // a dead interface shouldn't fail the whole scan
}
for (const d of found) {
bySerial.set(d.device.serialNumber, {
id: String(d.device.serialNumber),
label: `UHPPOTE ${d.device.serialNumber} @ ${d.device.address}`,
config: { serial: d.device.serialNumber, host: d.device.address, protocol: "udp" },
info: {
address: d.device.address,
netmask: d.device.netmask,
gateway: d.device.gateway,
MAC: d.device.MAC,
firmware: d.device.version,
},
});
}
}
return [...bySerial.values()];
},
configFields: [
{
key: "serial",
label: "Controller serial number",
type: "number",
required: true,
help: "Printed on the controller (e.g. 405419896).",
},
{ ...hostField, required: false, help: "Optional: target a specific IP instead of UDP broadcast. Isolated VLAN only." },
{
key: "protocol",
label: "Protocol",
type: "select",
required: false,
default: "udp",
options: [
{ value: "udp", label: "UDP (default)" },
{ value: "tcp", label: "TCP (newer firmware)" },
],
},
{ key: "doors", label: "Door count", type: "number", required: true, default: 4 },
{ key: "timeoutMs", label: "Timeout (ms)", type: "number", required: false, default: 5000 },
],
create: (c) => new UhppoteAccessControl(c),
};
-49
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@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
import type { AccessControlDevice, DeviceHealth } from "../interfaces.js";
import type { AccessDriver, DeviceConfig } from "../registry.js";
import { hostField, portField, stubLog } from "./common.js";
// Access-control drivers. Each implements AccessControlDevice (intent-only relay
// — "a barrier is not a door"). STUBS: connect/log only, no real protocol yet.
class StubAccessControl implements AccessControlDevice {
constructor(
readonly driverId: string,
protected readonly config: DeviceConfig,
) {}
async connect(): Promise<void> {
stubLog(this.driverId, `connect ${this.config.host}:${this.config.port}`);
}
async disconnect(): Promise<void> {
stubLog(this.driverId, "disconnect");
}
async healthCheck(): Promise<DeviceHealth> {
return { status: "ready", detail: "stub" };
}
async pulseOpen(doorId: number): Promise<void> {
// Intent only — never times/forces a close against a vehicle.
stubLog(this.driverId, `pulseOpen door=${doorId}`);
}
async getDoorStatus(): Promise<"open" | "closed"> {
return "closed";
}
}
export const zktecoDriver: AccessDriver = {
id: "zkteco",
category: "access",
label: "ZKTeco controller",
description: "ZKTeco network access controller (TCP/IP). Reader + relay.",
transports: ["tcp-ip"],
configFields: [hostField, portField(4370), { key: "doors", label: "Door count", type: "number", required: true, default: 4 }],
create: (c) => new StubAccessControl("zkteco", c),
};
export const esp32RelayDriver: AccessDriver = {
id: "esp32-relay",
category: "access",
label: "ESP32 relay controller",
description: "Simple ESP32-based relay controller over the network.",
transports: ["tcp-ip"],
configFields: [hostField, portField(80), { key: "doors", label: "Relay channels", type: "number", required: true, default: 1 }],
create: (c) => new StubAccessControl("esp32-relay", c),
};
-8
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@@ -2,9 +2,7 @@
// module wires the catalog. Add a new device by registering it here.
import { registry } from "../registry.js";
import { esp32RelayDriver, zktecoDriver } from "./access.js";
import { dingtianDriver } from "./access-dingtian.js";
import { uhppoteDriver } from "./access-uhppote.js";
import { dahuaDriver, hikvisionDriver } from "./camera.js";
import { tcpipReaderDriver, wiegandReaderDriver } from "./reader.js";
@@ -14,10 +12,7 @@ let registered = false;
export function registerBuiltinDrivers(): void {
if (registered) return;
registered = true;
registry.register(uhppoteDriver);
registry.register(dingtianDriver);
registry.register(zktecoDriver);
registry.register(esp32RelayDriver);
registry.register(wiegandReaderDriver);
registry.register(tcpipReaderDriver);
registry.register(hikvisionDriver);
@@ -25,10 +20,7 @@ export function registerBuiltinDrivers(): void {
}
export {
uhppoteDriver,
dingtianDriver,
zktecoDriver,
esp32RelayDriver,
wiegandReaderDriver,
tcpipReaderDriver,
hikvisionDriver,
-83
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@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
// Minimal ambient types for the `uhppoted` CommonJS module (no bundled types).
// Only the surface we use; extend as we adopt more of the API.
// Upstream: https://github.com/uhppoted/uhppoted-lib-nodejs
declare module "uhppoted" {
export class Config {
constructor(
name?: string,
bindAddr?: string,
broadcastAddr?: string,
listenAddr?: string,
timeout?: number,
controllers?: unknown[],
debug?: boolean,
);
}
/** Either a bare controller serial, or an addressable descriptor. */
export type Controller =
| number
| { id: number; address?: string; protocol?: "udp" | "tcp" };
export interface Ctx {
config: Config;
locale?: string;
}
export interface DiscoveredController {
deviceId: number;
device: {
serialNumber: number;
address: string;
netmask: string;
gateway: string;
MAC: string;
version: string;
date: string;
};
}
/** UDP broadcast discovery — returns every controller answering on the LAN. */
export function getDevices(ctx: Ctx): Promise<DiscoveredController[]>;
export function openDoor(
ctx: Ctx,
controller: Controller,
door: number,
): Promise<{ deviceId: number; opened: boolean }>;
export function getStatus(
ctx: Ctx,
controller: Controller,
): Promise<Record<string, unknown>>;
export function getEvent(
ctx: Ctx,
controller: Controller,
index: number,
): Promise<Record<string, unknown>>;
export function getEventIndex(
ctx: Ctx,
controller: Controller,
): Promise<{ deviceId: number; index: number }>;
export function setListener(
ctx: Ctx,
controller: Controller,
address: string,
port: number,
): Promise<unknown>;
// CommonJS default export (module.exports = { ... }). Destructure from this.
const uhppoted: {
Config: typeof Config;
getDevices: typeof getDevices;
openDoor: typeof openDoor;
getStatus: typeof getStatus;
getEvent: typeof getEvent;
getEventIndex: typeof getEventIndex;
setListener: typeof setListener;
};
export default uhppoted;
}
-3
View File
@@ -10,10 +10,7 @@ export { setDeviceLogSink, type DeviceLogSink } from "./drivers/common.js";
// hardware test scripts and any direct/programmatic device access).
export {
registerBuiltinDrivers,
uhppoteDriver,
dingtianDriver,
zktecoDriver,
esp32RelayDriver,
wiegandReaderDriver,
tcpipReaderDriver,
hikvisionDriver,
+2 -2
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ export type DeviceCategory = "access" | "reader" | "camera" | "printer";
/** Lifecycle shared by every device adapter. */
export interface Device {
/** Stable id of the driver that produced this instance (e.g. "zkteco"). */
/** Stable id of the driver that produced this instance (e.g. "dingtian"). */
readonly driverId: string;
connect(): Promise<void>;
disconnect(): Promise<void>;
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ export interface DeviceHealth {
}
// --- Access control (barrier relay) --------------------------------------
// ZKTeco, an ESP32 relay controller, UHPPOTE, etc. all implement this.
// The Dingtian relay board (and any future relay controller) implements this.
export interface AccessControlDevice extends Device {
/** Express intent to open. NEVER timed/forced closed against a vehicle. */
pulseOpen(doorId: number): Promise<void>;
+7 -6
View File
@@ -35,9 +35,9 @@ export type DeviceConfig = Record<string, string | number | boolean>;
* fields the admin must supply, and a factory that builds a live adapter.
*/
export interface DeviceDriver<T extends Device = Device> {
readonly id: string; // stable, e.g. "zkteco", "esp32-relay", "hikvision"
readonly id: string; // stable, e.g. "dingtian", "hikvision"
readonly category: DeviceCategory;
readonly label: string; // human name for the picker, e.g. "ZKTeco controller"
readonly label: string; // human name for the picker, e.g. "Dingtian relay controller"
readonly description: string;
/** Transports/notes surfaced in the UI, e.g. ["tcp-ip"], ["wiegand"]. */
readonly transports: readonly string[];
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ export type PrinterDriver = DeviceDriver<PrinterDevice>;
/** A device found on the LAN by a driver's discovery scan. */
export interface DiscoveredDevice {
/** Identifier to pre-fill (e.g. UHPPOTE serial number). */
/** Identifier to pre-fill (e.g. a serial number). */
readonly id: string;
readonly label: string;
/** Config values to auto-fill into the setup form (host, serial, …). */
@@ -63,9 +63,10 @@ export interface DiscoveredDevice {
}
/**
* Optional capability: a driver that can find devices on the LAN. UHPPOTE
* implements this via the protocol's UDP broadcast discovery (get-devices);
* cameras (ONVIF) and others may add it later. See wiki/concepts/device-discovery.md.
* Optional capability: a driver that can find devices on the LAN (e.g. UDP
* broadcast discovery). No bundled driver implements this yet — the Dingtian
* board uses a fixed IP; cameras (ONVIF) or other UDP-discoverable devices may
* add it later. See wiki/concepts/device-discovery.md.
*/
export interface DiscoverableDriver {
discover(): Promise<DiscoveredDevice[]>;
-19
View File
@@ -50,9 +50,6 @@ importers:
fastify-plugin:
specifier: 6.0.0
version: 6.0.0
uhppoted:
specifier: 0.9.0
version: 0.9.0
devDependencies:
'@types/bcrypt':
specifier: 6.0.0
@@ -122,9 +119,6 @@ importers:
'@parking/shared':
specifier: workspace:*
version: link:../shared
uhppoted:
specifier: 0.9.0
version: 0.9.0
devDependencies:
'@types/node':
specifier: 25.9.3
@@ -1262,9 +1256,6 @@ packages:
once@1.4.0:
resolution: {integrity: sha512-lNaJgI+2Q5URQBkccEKHTQOPaXdUxnZZElQTZY0MFUAuaEqe1E+Nyvgdz/aIyNi6Z9MzO5dv1H8n58/GELp3+w==}
os@0.1.2:
resolution: {integrity: sha512-ZoXJkvAnljwvc56MbvhtKVWmSkzV712k42Is2mA0+0KTSRakq5XXuXpjZjgAt9ctzl51ojhQWakQQpmOvXWfjQ==}
path-scurry@2.0.2:
resolution: {integrity: sha512-3O/iVVsJAPsOnpwWIeD+d6z/7PmqApyQePUtCndjatj/9I5LylHvt5qluFaBT3I5h3r1ejfR056c+FCv+NnNXg==}
engines: {node: 18 || 20 || >=22}
@@ -1467,10 +1458,6 @@ packages:
engines: {node: '>=14.17'}
hasBin: true
uhppoted@0.9.0:
resolution: {integrity: sha512-7VDPNg4x31TETgMD3xp9NwVr+NvmZJ6CO8gTpyuRrdHu/UBGXw9/9kq8yiB0vR4opaUQPdvR8Gj373Ac/QWPwQ==}
engines: {node: '>=14.18.3'}
undici-types@7.24.6:
resolution: {integrity: sha512-WRNW+sJgj5OBN4/0JpHFqtqzhpbnV0GuB+OozA9gCL7a993SmU+1JBZCzLNxYsbMfIeDL+lTsphD5jN5N+n0zg==}
@@ -2357,8 +2344,6 @@ snapshots:
dependencies:
wrappy: 1.0.2
os@0.1.2: {}
path-scurry@2.0.2:
dependencies:
lru-cache: 11.5.1
@@ -2586,10 +2571,6 @@ snapshots:
typescript@6.0.3: {}
uhppoted@0.9.0:
dependencies:
os: 0.1.2
undici-types@7.24.6: {}
util-deprecate@1.0.2: {}
+12 -6
View File
@@ -20,17 +20,23 @@ device carries an `id`, a `label`, a `config` blob to **auto-fill** the setup fo
(firmware, MAC, …). The [[device-registry]]'s `isDiscoverable()` guard lets the system treat it
as optional; the setup catalog returns a `discoverable` list of driver ids.
## UHPPOTE discovery
> **No current driver implements discovery.** The [[dingtian-relay]] board uses a fixed IP
> (entered/known at setup). The capability remains for future UDP-discoverable devices (cameras
> via ONVIF, etc.). The worked example below is the (removed) UHPPOTE driver — kept because the
> **broadcast gotchas are transferable** to any UDP discovery we add later.
The [[uhppote-controller]] supports discovery natively: a **UDP broadcast** (`get-devices` on
## UHPPOTE discovery (historical example)
The [[uhppote-controller]] supported discovery natively: a **UDP broadcast** (`get-devices` on
port `60000`) that **every controller on the LAN answers** with its serial, IP, netmask, gateway,
MAC, firmware version, and date. The official `uhppoted` lib exposes this as `getDevices(ctx)`;
the `uhppote` driver maps each result into a `DiscoveredDevice` (serial → id, IP → host).
**Verified on real hardware** (serial 225088491).
MAC, firmware version, and date. The `uhppoted` lib exposed this as `getDevices(ctx)`; the
(now-removed) `uhppote` driver mapped each result into a `DiscoveredDevice` (serial → id, IP →
host). **Was verified on real hardware** (serial 225088491).
### Broadcast gotchas (learned the hard way — see [[wsl-dev-networking]])
These cost real debugging time; the `uhppote` driver now handles all three:
These cost real debugging time; the (removed) `uhppote` driver handled all three, and any future
UDP-discovery driver will need to as well:
1. **Broadcast to the *subnet-directed* address, not the global `255.255.255.255`.** The
`uhppoted` lib only calls `setBroadcast(true)` when the target matches a **local interface's
+2 -1
View File
@@ -38,7 +38,8 @@ driver; **no business-logic change** — this is the [[device-adapter-pattern]]
- Config is **validated against the driver's declared fields** before persisting.
- Selections persist in the `lane_devices` table and drive runtime adapter construction.
- Drivers may optionally implement **[[device-discovery]]** (`discover()`), so the admin can scan
the LAN instead of typing connection details — UHPPOTE does this today.
the LAN instead of typing connection details — no current driver uses it (the UHPPOTE did,
before removal; the [[dingtian-relay]] uses a fixed IP).
Cameras are modelled as **snapshot-on-event**: the host requests an image at entry/exit; it's
stored and referenced from the signed event as an **independent record** — a fraud-control input
+10 -4
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,11 @@ updated: 2026-06-14
# UHPPOTE vs. Custom ESP32 — Detection vs. Prevention
> **Historical comparison.** Neither is the current device — the [[uhppote-controller]] was
> **rejected** (entry-flow blocker → [[dingtian-relay]] chosen) and the [[esp32-custom-controller]]
> is **deferred**. Kept because the **detection-vs-prevention** framing on the [[trust-boundary]]
> fork is a durable lens that applies to any access device.
A head-to-head on the [[trust-boundary]] fork: the off-the-shelf [[uhppote-controller]] versus
the [[esp32-custom-controller]]. (Synthesized from [[parking-system-architecture]] §6–7.)
@@ -23,9 +28,10 @@ the [[esp32-custom-controller]]. (Synthesized from [[parking-system-architecture
## Bottom line
- The UHPPOTE is the **current choice**: good enough as a detection/audit layer **when only the
host can reach it** (isolation) and every event lands in the [[append-only-event-chain]].
- The ESP32 is the **documented upgrade** when you need a control path that holds even against an
attacker on the wire. They're **mixable per lane**.
- The UHPPOTE was the **detection-grade** option: good enough as a detection/audit layer **when
only the host can reach it** (isolation) and every event lands in the [[append-only-event-chain]]
— but it was rejected for the entry lane (the button blocker).
- The ESP32 is the **prevention-grade** option when you need a control path that holds even against
an attacker on the wire. Deferred.
- Both still rely on host-side integrity ([[append-only-event-chain]]) and external
[[reconciliation]] as the ultimate anti-fraud control.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ status: open
later" currently leaves a disk failure as **total revenue-history loss**.
6. **Secure-element integration.** Confirm [[atecc608]] wiring/usage on the host (event
signing). The [[esp32-custom-controller]] command-authentication use is **deferred — not
being implemented for now** (access control stays on the [[uhppote-controller]] behind
being implemented for now** (access control is the [[dingtian-relay]] behind
[[network-isolation]]); revisit only if prevention-grade device auth becomes a requirement.
7. **JWT signing: symmetric vs. asymmetric key.** _(Raised by the commit security review, not the
source doc.)_ Auth currently uses a symmetric HMAC secret (`@fastify/jwt`, see
+6 -4
View File
@@ -19,10 +19,12 @@ The decisions treated as settled in the design notes. (See [[parking-system-arch
- **Integrity:** append-only, hash-chained, [[atecc608]]-signed event log
([[append-only-event-chain]]); **[[reconciliation]] is the anti-fraud control**; encryption
protects only at-rest (see [[threat-model]]).
- **Access control:** [[uhppote-controller]] for now, on an **isolated VLAN**
([[network-isolation]]); event log used as a tamper-evident audit source with host-side index
tracking ([[event-log-ingestion]]). The [[esp32-custom-controller]] is the documented
prevention-grade upgrade path (the [[trust-boundary]] fork).
- **Access control:** the **[[dingtian-relay]]** relay+input controller, on an **isolated VLAN**
([[network-isolation]]). Chosen because its **inputs are decoupled from its relays**, enabling
host-in-the-loop ticket-first entry — the resolution to [[access-controller-button-flow]].
(The [[uhppote-controller]] and [[zkteco-controller]] were evaluated and **rejected** — kept as
historical record. The [[esp32-custom-controller]] remains the documented prevention-grade
alternative — the [[trust-boundary]] fork.)
- **Readers:** prefer [[wiegand]]-into-controller for permit holders (autonomous); host-in-the-loop
for [[lpr-camera|LPR]]/QR/pure-network readers; both can share a relay (see
[[entry-exit-readers]]).
+1 -1
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ payment terminal is dictated by the acquiring bank. (See [[parking-system-archit
| --- | --- | --- |
| Barrier operator | Magnetic Autocontrol / FAAC / CAME / Nice | Owns physical safety in firmware ([[barrier-not-a-door]]) |
| Induction loops | Feig / BEA / EMX | Safety + free-exit detection |
| Access controller | [[uhppote-controller]] now → ZKTeco later | Reader + relay; **isolate the VLAN** ([[network-isolation]]) |
| Access controller | [[dingtian-relay]] relay+input board | Decoupled inputs (host-in-the-loop); **isolate the VLAN** ([[network-isolation]]). ([[uhppote-controller]]/[[zkteco-controller]] rejected) |
| Permit readers | Nedap/Kathrein UHF, or Mifare → [[wiegand]] | Hands-free, or autonomous offline decisions |
| Casual identity | [[lpr-camera]] (Milesight, edge AI) | Plate = ticket + independent record |
| Ticket dispenser | Custom VKP80 | Parking-grade thermal/ESC-POS |
+24 -20
View File
@@ -1,33 +1,37 @@
---
type: entity
tags: [parking, hardware, access-control, current-choice]
tags: [parking, hardware, access-control, rejected, historical]
sources: [parking-system-architecture]
updated: 2026-06-15
---
# UHPPOTE Controller (current choice)
# UHPPOTE Controller (rejected — historical)
The starting access-control hardware: a **UHPPOTE Wiegand 26/34 network controller (4-door)** —
a cheap reader-plus-relay frontend, acceptable **provided you understand its limits**. The plan
is UHPPOTE now → ZKTeco later (see [[bom]]). (See [[parking-system-architecture]] §6.)
> **❌ NOT USED. Replaced by the [[dingtian-relay]] controller** (and its driver/test code
> removed). Kept as the record of *why* — its firmware-fixed push-button blocker
> ([[access-controller-button-flow]]) is what drove the switch to a board with decoupled inputs.
> The transferable lessons below (network isolation, append-only log ingestion, "a barrier is not
> a door") still apply to any access device.
> **⚠️ Entry-flow blocker (verified on hardware):** the push-button input **auto-opens the relay
> in firmware** — there's no command to make it report-without-opening — so it **cannot** do
> ticket-first entry (`button → print → open`). Fine as a host-**commanded relay** and for
> [[wiegand]]/permit lanes, but **not** the button-driven entry lane as wired. Full detail and
> options: [[access-controller-button-flow]].
The original starting hardware: a **UHPPOTE Wiegand 26/34 network controller (4-door)** — a cheap
reader-plus-relay frontend. (See [[parking-system-architecture]] §6.)
> **⚠️ The fatal limit (verified on hardware):** the push-button input **auto-opens the relay in
> firmware** — no command makes it report-without-opening — so it **cannot** do ticket-first entry
> (`button → print → open`). This is *the* reason it was dropped: full detail and the resolution in
> [[access-controller-button-flow]].
>
> **Verified working on the real unit** (serial 225088491, fw 09120): host-commanded `openDoor`
> on doors 1 & 2 (physically actuated, `reason="remote open door"`); button presses captured live
> (`reason="push button ok"`); [[device-discovery]] scan. Test scripts: `apps/server/scripts/`.
> **What was verified on the real unit** (serial 225088491, fw 09120) before retiring it:
> host-commanded `openDoor` on doors 1 & 2 (physically actuated, `reason="remote open door"`);
> button presses captured live (`reason="push button ok"`); UDP-broadcast [[device-discovery]].
> The driver, `uhppoted` dependency, and test scripts have since been removed from the codebase.
> **Implementation:** integrated via the official **`uhppoted`** npm package (MIT, by the
> `uhppoted` org — `github.com/uhppoted/uhppoted-lib-nodejs`), added to `@parking/devices` as the
> `uhppote` access driver ([[device-registry]]). It exposes exactly the protocol commands this
> design needs: `openDoor`, `getStatus`, and the event-log set (`getEvent`, `getEventIndex`,
> `setEventIndex`, `recordSpecialEvents`) plus `setListener`/`listen` for auto-push — see
> [[event-log-ingestion]]. Transport defaults to **UDP** (broadcast `…:60000`), with optional
> per-call TCP on newer firmware. The driver also implements **[[device-discovery]]**
> **Past implementation (removed):** was integrated via the official **`uhppoted`** npm package
> (MIT — `github.com/uhppoted/uhppoted-lib-nodejs`) as the `uhppote` access driver. It exposed
> exactly the protocol commands the design needs: `openDoor`, `getStatus`, and the event-log set
> (`getEvent`, `getEventIndex`, `setEventIndex`, `recordSpecialEvents`) plus `setListener`/`listen`
> for auto-push — see [[event-log-ingestion]]. Transport defaulted to **UDP** (broadcast `…:60000`),
> with optional per-call TCP on newer firmware. The driver also implemented **[[device-discovery]]**
> (`getDevices` broadcast) so the setup wizard can scan for controllers. Note: the lib pulls one
> trivial extra dep (the npm `os` shim) and uses UDP broadcast, which needs socket broadcast
> permission on the host.
+11 -7
View File
@@ -1,20 +1,24 @@
---
type: entity
tags: [parking, hardware, access-control]
tags: [parking, hardware, access-control, rejected, historical]
sources: [parking-system-architecture]
updated: 2026-06-15
---
# ZKTeco Controller
# ZKTeco Controller (rejected — historical)
A network access controller (C3 / inBio families) — the documented "UHPPOTE now → ZKTeco later"
upgrade in the [[bom]]. A `zkteco` driver **stub** exists in the [[device-registry]] but the
**real protocol is not implemented** (see below).
> **❌ NOT USED.** Was considered as the access controller; the **[[dingtian-relay]]** board was
> chosen instead (decoupled inputs, already verified). The `zkteco` driver **stub** has been
> **removed** from the codebase. Kept for the record of the comparison below.
## Relevance to the entry-flow blocker
A network access controller (C3 / inBio families), originally the documented "UHPPOTE now →
ZKTeco later" upgrade in the [[bom]].
## Why it was a contender (vs. UHPPOTE)
ZKTeco is **better positioned** than the [[uhppote-controller]] for host-in-the-loop entry (the
[[access-controller-button-flow]] blocker), but this is **unverified on our hardware**:
[[access-controller-button-flow]] blocker) — but it was **never verified on our hardware**, and the
Dingtian solved the problem first with less effort:
- Its **auxiliary inputs** have **programmable linkage** (ZKBioSecurity software / PULL SDK) and
are **not** hardwired to "open door" — so a button on an *aux* input can raise a host event
+4 -4
View File
@@ -32,13 +32,13 @@ Counts: 1 source · 14 entities · 10 concepts · 2 decision records.
- [[logto-zitadel-oidc]] — OIDC providers ruled out by offline-first.
## Entities — hardware & devices
- [[uhppote-controller]] — current access controller; cheap, tamper-evident, open-UDP, fixed firmware.
- [[uhppote-controller]] — ❌ rejected/historical; firmware auto-open blocker drove the switch to Dingtian.
- [[esp32-custom-controller]] — prevention-grade upgrade; device-level auth.
- [[atecc608]] — secure element; non-extractable signing key (host events + controller auth).
- [[wiegand]] — reader standard feeding the controller directly (autonomous permit-holder path).
- [[lpr-camera]] — edge-AI plate recognition; host-side casual-identity source.
- [[zkteco-controller]] — C3/inBio controller; aux-input path may enable host-in-the-loop (driver TBD).
- [[dingtian-relay]] — relay+input board; inputs decoupled from relays → solves the button blocker (driver TBD).
- [[zkteco-controller]] — ❌ rejected/historical; aux-input path was a contender, not pursued.
- [[dingtian-relay]] — ✅ CHOSEN access controller; decoupled inputs solve the button blocker (driver verified on hardware).
- [[bom]] — reference bill of materials (barrier, loops, controller, readers, payment, host, network).
## Concepts — foundational forces
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ Counts: 1 source · 14 entities · 10 concepts · 2 decision records.
- [[device-adapter-pattern]] — business logic talks to interfaces; swap hardware → new adapter.
- [[device-registry]] — catalog of selectable drivers per category (admin-configurable).
- [[first-run-setup]] — admin assigns devices per lane from the catalog at install.
- [[device-discovery]] — optional driver capability to scan the LAN (UHPPOTE UDP broadcast).
- [[device-discovery]] — optional driver capability to scan the LAN (no current driver uses it; UHPPOTE was the example).
- [[barrier-not-a-door]] — never timed-close a barrier; safety lives in barrier firmware.
- [[trust-boundary]] — the core fork: network vs. device; auditable vs. unforgeable.
- [[fail-state-safety]] — entry fails closed, exit fails open; manual override; watchdog.
+13
View File
@@ -118,3 +118,16 @@ works. The [[access-controller-button-flow]] blocker is RESOLVED. Gotcha recorde
(GET omits it) or the write silently no-ops. Added httpPort config field (port 8080 ≠
default 80). Test script apps/server/scripts/dingtian-test.mjs. Next: input HTTP-push
endpoint + wiring input→ticket→pulseOpen.
## [2026-06-15] cleanup | Remove UHPPOTE/ZKTeco code; wiki → rejected/historical
Neither UHPPOTE nor ZKTeco is used (Dingtian chosen). Removed their code:
deleted access-uhppote.ts, uhppoted.d.ts, access.ts (zkteco/esp32 stubs), the
three uhppote-*.mjs scripts; dropped the `uhppoted` npm dep from both packages;
unregistered uhppote/zkteco/esp32-relay from the driver registry; updated example
comments. Catalog access drivers now = dingtian only. Build green.
Wiki: kept the pages but marked [[uhppote-controller]] + [[zkteco-controller]]
rejected/historical, [[uhppote-vs-esp32]] historical; re-pointed all "current
device" framing (standing-decisions, bom, overview, open-questions) to
[[dingtian-relay]]; noted no current driver uses [[device-discovery]]. Transferable
concepts (network-isolation, event-log-ingestion, barrier-not-a-door, threat-model)
kept as-is. Links lint clean; raw source untouched (immutable).
+8 -7
View File
@@ -29,11 +29,12 @@ deployed on-site at a parking facility. Two forces shape nearly every decision:
rest ([[disk-os-hardening]]) defends a secondary threat.
- **Devices** sit behind a [[device-adapter-pattern]] (swap hardware → new adapter only), with
the [[barrier-not-a-door]] safety principle keeping physical safety in barrier-operator firmware.
- **Access control** hinges on the [[trust-boundary]] fork:
[[uhppote-vs-esp32|detection vs. prevention]]. Today: [[uhppote-controller]] behind
[[network-isolation]], its open [[uhppote-udp-protocol]] contained, its log made trustworthy by
[[event-log-ingestion]]. Upgrade path: the [[esp32-custom-controller]] with
[[challenge-response-auth]] and [[fail-state-safety]].
- **Access control** today is the **[[dingtian-relay]]** relay+input controller behind
[[network-isolation]] — chosen because its inputs are **decoupled from its relays**, enabling
host-in-the-loop ticket-first entry (resolving [[access-controller-button-flow]]). The
[[uhppote-controller]] and [[zkteco-controller]] were evaluated and **rejected** (historical).
The deeper fork is still the [[trust-boundary]] ([[uhppote-vs-esp32|detection vs. prevention]]);
the [[esp32-custom-controller]] remains the prevention-grade alternative.
- **Readers** split two ways ([[entry-exit-readers]]): permit holders via [[wiegand]]
(autonomous), casual/transient via host-side [[lpr-camera]] / QR; both can share a relay.
- A reference [[bom]] lists recommended devices.
@@ -47,6 +48,6 @@ modes (fail-open on exit)**, the **reconciliation channel**, and **backup/durabi
- *Security-first:* [[threat-model]] → [[append-only-event-chain]] → [[reconciliation]] →
[[uhppote-vs-esp32]].
- *Hardware-first:* [[bom]] → [[uhppote-controller]] → [[entry-exit-readers]] →
[[esp32-custom-controller]].
- *Hardware-first:* [[bom]] → [[dingtian-relay]] → [[access-controller-button-flow]] →
[[entry-exit-readers]].
- *Stack-first:* [[technology-stack]] → [[offline-first]] → [[device-adapter-pattern]].