docs(wiki): settle on-site encrypted backup + disaster-recovery design
New concept page backup-recovery.md resolving the design half of open-question #5. Driving scenario: a stolen/destroyed PC whose LUKS+TPM disk is unrecoverable by design — recovery stands up a NEW PC, restores a backup, and keeps signing the SAME chain. Settled: admin-driven encrypted full-DB backup (SQLite online-backup/VACUUM INTO, snapshots included) to local/USB, SMB/NFS, or SFTP targets; manual button + an in-process daily timer; keep-last-N + dailies retention; restore is admin-only / out-of-band (operator-adversary surface). A restored copy must still verifyChain. Key custody (the load-bearing decision, bears on #6): three independent keys — EVENT_SIGNING_KEY kept an extractable, escrowed software key DECOUPLED from the TPM so the ledger survives total hardware loss (the conscious trade: a TPM-sealed signing key would be unforgeable but permanently unverifiable after the machine dies); a NEW dedicated park_buzi_backup_key in Komodo for backup encryption, separate from the signing key; the LUKS/TPM disk key, appliance-only and deliberately non-recoverable. Keys are never inside the backup they unlock. Updated open-questions #5 (design SETTLED) + #10 note; disk-os-hardening deploy runbook (why the signing key is not sealed + park_buzi_backup_key); index catalog + concept count. Design only — not yet built. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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# Index
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Content catalog for the wiki. Start at [[overview]]. Maintained on every ingest.
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Counts: 4 sources · 19 entities · 45 concepts · 7 decision records.
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Counts: 4 sources · 19 entities · 46 concepts · 7 decision records.
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## Overview & navigation
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- [[overview]] — the top-level synthesis and entry point.
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- [[append-only-event-chain]] — append-only + hash chain + ATECC608 signing = unforgeable log.
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- [[reconciliation]] — the real anti-fraud control; what remote sync actually is.
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- [[disk-os-hardening]] — LUKS/GRUB/Secure Boot; worthwhile but not the main event.
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- [[backup-recovery]] — admin-driven encrypted full-DB backup (local/SMB/SFTP) + DR; signing key escrowed & decoupled from TPM so the ledger survives total hardware loss; restore is admin-only.
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## Concepts — device architecture & safety
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- [[device-adapter-pattern]] — business logic talks to interfaces; swap hardware → new adapter.
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