Append-only signed event log; persist Dingtian input pushes

Implement the core anti-fraud primitive: an append-only, hash-chained,
signed event log (the schema + types predated this; the writer/signer are new).

- EventLog (apps/server): serialized append, monotonic index, prevHash chain,
  signature; verifyChain() detects tamper/reorder/delete. No update/delete paths.
- Signer abstraction (packages/shared) over the ATECC608 secure element, with a
  SoftwareSigner (HMAC, EVENT_SIGNING_KEY) shipped now since the chip is still
  open-question #6. Documented: software signer is tamper-evident but NOT
  unforgeable-by-owner.
- Add ParkingEventType "input_received" for raw device inputs (not yet a
  vehicle_entry, which the entry flow will append later).
- Read API: GET /api/events; integrity self-check: GET /api/events/verify (admin).

Verified on hardware: shorting the Dingtian inputs produced signed, chained
input_received events; verifyChain ok; direct DB tamper/delete detected.

NOTE: the log captures host-originated actions only. Out-of-band relay
actuation (sniffed relay_pw, string protocol, ip_watchdog) produces no event
by design -- the control is reconciliation vs. an independent witness, which is
not yet built. See wiki/concepts/append-only-event-chain.md.
This commit is contained in:
2026-06-15 11:29:23 +02:00
parent 39d4bac419
commit add5fc0166
5 changed files with 294 additions and 1 deletions
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import type { FastifyInstance } from "fastify";
import { desc, events, type Db } from "@parking/db";
import { requireRole } from "../auth.js";
import type { EventLog } from "../event-log.js";
// Read access to the append-only signed event log. NO write/update/delete routes
// exist by design — events are only ever appended internally (entry flow, device
// pushes). Corrections are new appended events, never edits. See
// wiki/concepts/append-only-event-chain.md.
export async function eventRoutes(
app: FastifyInstance,
db: Db,
eventLog: EventLog,
): Promise<void> {
// Any authenticated role may read the log (it's the audit trail).
const guard = requireRole("admin", "operator", "cashier", "readonly");
// Recent events, newest first. `limit` caps the page (default 100, max 1000).
app.get<{ Querystring: { limit?: string } }>(
"/api/events",
{ preHandler: guard },
async (req) => {
const limit = Math.min(Math.max(Number(req.query.limit) || 100, 1), 1000);
const rows = db.select().from(events).orderBy(desc(events.index)).limit(limit).all();
return { events: rows };
},
);
// Integrity self-check: walk the chain and verify hashes + signatures. Admin-
// only (it's an audit action). Returns the first break, or ok. This is what a
// reconciliation job / "is the log intact?" check calls.
app.get(
"/api/events/verify",
{ preHandler: requireRole("admin") },
async () => eventLog.verifyChain(),
);
}