feat(logs): app log store — backend pino DB sink + frontend error collection

Add a third data stream (app_logs), distinct from the signed ledger and device
telemetry, for operational/diagnostic logs — an offline appliance has no Sentry to
ship to, so the host is the log store.

Backend: a pino stream tees warn/error/fatal into app_logs (info/debug stay
stdout-only) with no call-site change; the DB is built before Fastify so the logger
has its sink. Frontend (lib/logger.ts): ships failed API requests (minus 401 churn),
window.onerror, unhandledrejection, and a top-level React ErrorBoundary; console
warn/error forwarded only at debug/trace. Batched/throttled POST, sendBeacon on
pagehide, loop-safe (never logs the /api/logs call), best-effort everywhere.

POST /api/logs (any signed-in user, CSRF, tolerant) + GET /api/logs gated by a new
log:read permission (new `log` RBAC resource; admin holds it). Retention: pruned by
age + row cap, hourly + at startup. UI: a Logs screen under /setup (filter
level/source/since, expand to context+stack), sq+en. Migration 0009_app_logs.

Verified end-to-end via app.inject: login -> POST 204 -> GET 200 with the record;
backend warn/error persisted, info dropped; non-admin GET 403 / POST 204.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
This commit is contained in:
2026-06-19 12:54:22 +02:00
parent 0074e82a2a
commit bfb6ab0b36
20 changed files with 1064 additions and 9 deletions
+236
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@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
import { and, appLogs, desc, eq, sql, type Db } from "@parking/db";
import {
LOG_LEVEL_ORDER,
type AppLogRecord,
type ClientLogInput,
type LogLevel,
type LogSource,
} from "@parking/shared";
// Application/diagnostic LOG SINK — the host-side store behind the third log stream
// (app_logs), distinct from the signed ledger and device telemetry. It persists:
// - BACKEND warn/error/fatal, fed by a pino stream (see pinoDbStream) so any
// app.log.warn/error lands in the DB without changing call sites.
// - FRONTEND errors POSTed to /api/logs (failed requests, uncaught errors).
// Everything here is UNSIGNED + prunable. Pruned by age AND a row cap so an offline
// appliance with finite disk can't be filled by a log storm. See
// wiki/concepts/app-logs.md, decisions/event-streams-split.md.
/** Only warn and above are persisted from the backend (info/debug stay stdout-only). */
const BACKEND_PERSIST_MIN: LogLevel = "warn";
/** Defensive caps so one runaway log can't bloat a row (chars). */
const MAX_MESSAGE = 4_000;
const MAX_STACK = 16_000;
const MAX_CONTEXT_JSON = 16_000;
export interface LogRetention {
/** Delete logs older than this many days. */
readonly maxAgeDays: number;
/** Hard cap on total rows — the oldest beyond this are pruned. */
readonly maxRows: number;
}
export const DEFAULT_RETENTION: LogRetention = {
maxAgeDays: Number(process.env.LOG_RETENTION_DAYS ?? 30),
maxRows: Number(process.env.LOG_RETENTION_MAX_ROWS ?? 50_000),
};
function clamp(s: string | null | undefined, max: number): string | null {
if (s == null) return null;
return s.length > max ? s.slice(0, max) : s;
}
/** Serialize context to JSON, bounded — never throw on a circular/huge object. */
function safeContext(ctx: Record<string, unknown> | null | undefined): Record<string, unknown> | null {
if (ctx == null) return null;
try {
const json = JSON.stringify(ctx);
if (json.length <= MAX_CONTEXT_JSON) return ctx;
return { _truncated: true, preview: json.slice(0, MAX_CONTEXT_JSON) };
} catch {
return { _unserializable: true };
}
}
export class LogService {
readonly #db: Db;
readonly #retention: LogRetention;
/** Reentrancy guard: never let persisting a log itself emit a persisted log. */
#writing = false;
constructor(db: Db, retention: LogRetention = DEFAULT_RETENTION) {
this.#db = db;
this.#retention = retention;
}
/** Low-level insert. Best-effort: a logging failure must never break a request or
* recurse (a DB error here would otherwise log → insert → error → log …). */
#insert(row: {
level: LogLevel;
source: LogSource;
message: string;
context?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
httpStatus?: number | null;
path?: string | null;
stack?: string | null;
userId?: string | null;
userAgent?: string | null;
createdAt?: string;
}): void {
if (this.#writing) return;
this.#writing = true;
try {
this.#db
.insert(appLogs)
.values({
id: randomUUID(),
level: row.level,
source: row.source,
message: clamp(row.message, MAX_MESSAGE) ?? "",
context: safeContext(row.context),
httpStatus: row.httpStatus ?? null,
path: clamp(row.path, 512),
stack: clamp(row.stack, MAX_STACK),
userId: row.userId ?? null,
userAgent: clamp(row.userAgent, 512),
createdAt: row.createdAt ?? new Date().toISOString(),
})
.run();
} catch {
// Swallow — diagnostics must never take down the path they observe. (Can't log
// it; that's the recursion we're guarding against.)
} finally {
this.#writing = false;
}
}
/** Persist a BACKEND log line (called by the pino stream). Below warn is dropped. */
recordBackend(level: LogLevel, message: string, context?: Record<string, unknown> | null): void {
if (LOG_LEVEL_ORDER[level] < LOG_LEVEL_ORDER[BACKEND_PERSIST_MIN]) return;
this.#insert({ level, source: "backend", message, context });
}
/** Persist a FRONTEND-reported log (from POST /api/logs). The server stamps the
* user + receive time; the client supplies level/message/context. */
recordClient(
input: ClientLogInput,
meta: { userId?: string | null; userAgent?: string | null },
): void {
this.#insert({
level: input.level,
source: "frontend",
message: input.message,
context: input.context ?? null,
httpStatus: input.httpStatus ?? null,
path: input.path ?? null,
stack: input.stack ?? null,
userId: meta.userId ?? null,
userAgent: meta.userAgent ?? null,
// Keep the client's capture time in context for ordering; createdAt is server time.
createdAt: new Date().toISOString(),
});
}
/** Read recent logs, newest first, with optional level/source/since filters. */
query(opts: {
limit: number;
level?: LogLevel;
source?: LogSource;
since?: string;
}): AppLogRecord[] {
const conds = [];
if (opts.level) conds.push(eq(appLogs.level, opts.level));
if (opts.source) conds.push(eq(appLogs.source, opts.source));
if (opts.since) conds.push(sql`${appLogs.createdAt} >= ${opts.since}`);
const rows = this.#db
.select()
.from(appLogs)
.where(conds.length ? and(...conds) : undefined)
.orderBy(desc(appLogs.createdAt))
.limit(opts.limit)
.all();
return rows as unknown as AppLogRecord[];
}
/** Prune by age then by row cap. Returns how many rows were deleted. Safe to call
* on a timer; cheap (indexed on created_at). */
prune(): number {
let deleted = 0;
try {
const cutoff = new Date(Date.now() - this.#retention.maxAgeDays * 86_400_000).toISOString();
const byAge = this.#db.delete(appLogs).where(sql`${appLogs.createdAt} < ${cutoff}`).run();
deleted += byAge.changes ?? 0;
// Row cap: keep the newest maxRows, delete the rest. One subquery — find the
// created_at boundary of the keep-window, delete older.
const total = this.#db.select({ c: sql<number>`count(*)` }).from(appLogs).get();
const count = total?.c ?? 0;
if (count > this.#retention.maxRows) {
const boundary = this.#db
.select({ createdAt: appLogs.createdAt })
.from(appLogs)
.orderBy(desc(appLogs.createdAt))
.limit(1)
.offset(this.#retention.maxRows - 1)
.get();
if (boundary) {
const byCap = this.#db
.delete(appLogs)
.where(sql`${appLogs.createdAt} < ${boundary.createdAt}`)
.run();
deleted += byCap.changes ?? 0;
}
}
} catch {
// best-effort
}
return deleted;
}
}
/**
* A pino-compatible write stream that forwards BACKEND warn+ lines into the LogService.
* Pino writes one JSON object per line to this stream; we parse, map the numeric level
* to a name, and persist. Returned as `{ write }` so it can be passed as pino's stream.
* stdout still receives the same line (we tee), so console logging is unchanged.
*/
export function pinoDbStream(
service: LogService,
tee: NodeJS.WritableStream,
): { write: (line: string) => void } {
const NUM_TO_LEVEL: Record<number, LogLevel> = {
10: "trace",
20: "debug",
30: "info",
40: "warn",
50: "error",
60: "fatal",
};
return {
write(line: string): void {
// Always tee to the original destination first (don't lose stdout logging).
try {
tee.write(line);
} catch {
/* ignore */
}
try {
const obj = JSON.parse(line) as {
level?: number;
msg?: string;
err?: { stack?: string; message?: string };
[k: string]: unknown;
};
const level = NUM_TO_LEVEL[obj.level ?? 30] ?? "info";
if (LOG_LEVEL_ORDER[level] < LOG_LEVEL_ORDER[BACKEND_PERSIST_MIN]) return;
// Strip pino's noisy standard fields from the persisted context.
const { level: _l, time: _t, pid: _p, hostname: _h, msg, ...rest } = obj;
service.recordBackend(level, typeof msg === "string" ? msg : "", rest);
} catch {
// A non-JSON line (shouldn't happen with pino) — ignore for persistence.
}
},
};
}
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import type { FastifyInstance } from "fastify";
import type { AppLogRecord, ClientLogInput, LogLevel } from "@parking/shared";
import { requireAuth, requirePermission } from "../auth.js";
import type { LogService } from "../log-service.js";
// Application/diagnostic logs (app_logs) — see wiki/concepts/app-logs.md. Two ends:
// - POST /api/logs : the FRONTEND ships its errors here (failed requests, uncaught
// exceptions). Any signed-in user may write (it's their own
// browser's diagnostics); CSRF still applies (mutation).
// - GET /api/logs : read the store — gated by `log:read` (admin/diagnostic role).
// Writes go through the shared LogService (bounded, best-effort, reentrancy-guarded);
// the DB sink for BACKEND warn+ is wired at the pino stream, not here.
const LEVELS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(["trace", "debug", "info", "warn", "error", "fatal"]);
/** Cap a single ingest batch so a misbehaving client can't flood the store. */
const MAX_BATCH = 50;
function isValidEntry(e: unknown): e is ClientLogInput {
if (!e || typeof e !== "object") return false;
const o = e as Record<string, unknown>;
return typeof o.message === "string" && typeof o.level === "string" && LEVELS.has(o.level);
}
export async function logRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, logService: LogService): Promise<void> {
// INGEST — accept one entry or a small batch ({ entries: [...] }). Returns 204.
// Deliberately tolerant: it never 4xx's on a malformed entry (a client erroring
// while reporting an error shouldn't get a second error) — invalid items are skipped.
app.post<{ Body: ClientLogInput | { entries?: unknown[] } }>(
"/api/logs",
{ preHandler: requireAuth },
async (req, reply) => {
const body = req.body as ClientLogInput | { entries?: unknown[] };
const raw = Array.isArray((body as { entries?: unknown[] }).entries)
? (body as { entries: unknown[] }).entries
: [body];
const userId = req.user?.sub ?? null;
const userAgent = req.headers["user-agent"] ?? null;
for (const entry of raw.slice(0, MAX_BATCH)) {
if (!isValidEntry(entry)) continue;
logService.recordClient(entry, { userId, userAgent });
}
reply.code(204).send();
},
);
// READ — newest first, with optional level/source/since filters + a limit. The
// booth Logs viewer calls this. Gated by log:read.
app.get<{ Querystring: { limit?: string; level?: string; source?: string; since?: string } }>(
"/api/logs",
{ preHandler: requirePermission("log:read") },
async (req): Promise<{ logs: AppLogRecord[] }> => {
const limit = Math.min(Math.max(Number(req.query.limit) || 200, 1), 2000);
const level = (req.query.level ?? "").trim();
const source = (req.query.source ?? "").trim();
const since = (req.query.since ?? "").trim();
const logs = logService.query({
limit,
level: LEVELS.has(level) ? (level as LogLevel) : undefined,
source: source === "frontend" || source === "backend" ? source : undefined,
since: since || undefined,
});
return { logs };
},
);
}
+28 -4
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@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ import { CredentialCapture } from "./credential-capture.js";
import { PrinterMonitor } from "./printer-monitor.js"; import { PrinterMonitor } from "./printer-monitor.js";
import { DeviceMonitor } from "./device-monitor.js"; import { DeviceMonitor } from "./device-monitor.js";
import { buildSigner, buildVerifier } from "./signer.js"; import { buildSigner, buildVerifier } from "./signer.js";
import { LogService, pinoDbStream } from "./log-service.js";
import { logRoutes } from "./routes/logs.js";
import { authRoutes } from "./routes/auth.js"; import { authRoutes } from "./routes/auth.js";
import { userRoutes } from "./routes/users.js"; import { userRoutes } from "./routes/users.js";
import { roleRoutes } from "./routes/roles.js"; import { roleRoutes } from "./routes/roles.js";
@@ -43,12 +45,20 @@ export interface BuildOptions {
} }
export async function buildServer(opts: BuildOptions = {}): Promise<FastifyInstance> { export async function buildServer(opts: BuildOptions = {}): Promise<FastifyInstance> {
const app = Fastify({ // DB first — the logger's DB sink needs it before Fastify is constructed.
logger: { level: process.env.LOG_LEVEL ?? "info" },
});
const db = opts.db ?? createDb(); const db = opts.db ?? createDb();
// Application-log store: a pino stream tees warn+ lines into app_logs (and still
// writes them to stdout), so backend warnings/errors are queryable from the booth
// alongside frontend errors. See log-service.ts + wiki/concepts/app-logs.md.
const logService = new LogService(db);
const app = Fastify({
logger: {
level: process.env.LOG_LEVEL ?? "info",
stream: pinoDbStream(logService, process.stdout),
},
});
// Wire the RBAC permission resolver to this DB (route guards resolve a user's // Wire the RBAC permission resolver to this DB (route guards resolve a user's
// role → permission set through it). See auth.ts. // role → permission set through it). See auth.ts.
initAuth(db); initAuth(db);
@@ -188,6 +198,20 @@ export async function buildServer(opts: BuildOptions = {}): Promise<FastifyInsta
// at capacity) is in the entry flow. See wiki/concepts/capacity-occupancy.md. // at capacity) is in the entry flow. See wiki/concepts/capacity-occupancy.md.
await siteRoutes(app, db); await siteRoutes(app, db);
// Application logs: ingest frontend errors (POST /api/logs, any signed-in user) +
// read the store (GET /api/logs, log:read). See wiki/concepts/app-logs.md.
await logRoutes(app, logService);
// Periodic retention prune (age + row cap) so the log table stays bounded on the
// offline appliance. Runs hourly; unref'd so it never holds the process open.
const pruneTimer = setInterval(() => {
const n = logService.prune();
if (n > 0) app.log.debug(`pruned ${n} app_log rows`);
}, 60 * 60 * 1000);
pruneTimer.unref();
logService.prune(); // once at startup
app.addHook("onClose", async () => clearInterval(pruneTimer));
const unsubscribeInput = deviceEvents.onInput((e) => { const unsubscribeInput = deviceEvents.onInput((e) => {
// Record every input edge as unsigned telemetry, keyed to the device that fired // Record every input edge as unsigned telemetry, keyed to the device that fired
// (provenance). No lane — the pool-of-spaces model has none. The entry flow // (provenance). No lane — the pool-of-spaces model has none. The entry flow
+159
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@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
import { useState } from "react";
import { useTranslation } from "react-i18next";
import { useQuery } from "@tanstack/react-query";
import { fetchLogs, type AppLogRecord, type LogLevel } from "./api.js";
import { formatRelativeDateTime } from "./lib/format.js";
// Diagnostic log viewer (app_logs) — backend warn+ and frontend errors in one place.
// Gated by log:read server-side. Filter by level / source / since; each row expands to
// the structured context + stack. Read-only — logs are an evidence/diagnostic stream,
// never edited. See wiki/concepts/app-logs.md.
const LEVELS: LogLevel[] = ["trace", "debug", "info", "warn", "error", "fatal"];
/** Terminal-theme colour per level. */
const LEVEL_COLOR: Record<LogLevel, string> = {
trace: "text-term-muted",
debug: "text-term-muted",
info: "text-term-cyan",
warn: "text-term-amber",
error: "text-term-red",
fatal: "text-term-red",
};
function LogRow({ log }: { log: AppLogRecord }) {
const { t } = useTranslation();
const [open, setOpen] = useState(false);
const hasDetail = (log.context && Object.keys(log.context).length > 0) || log.stack;
return (
<div className={`border-b border-term-border/50 ${log.level === "error" || log.level === "fatal" ? "bg-term-red/5" : ""}`}>
<button
type="button"
onClick={() => hasDetail && setOpen((v) => !v)}
className={`grid w-full grid-cols-[auto_4rem_5rem_1fr_auto] items-center gap-x-3 px-1 py-1 text-left text-[12px] ${
hasDetail ? "hover:bg-term-panel-2" : "cursor-default"
}`}
>
<span className="text-term-muted tabular-nums">{formatRelativeDateTime(log.createdAt, t)}</span>
<span className={`font-semibold uppercase ${LEVEL_COLOR[log.level]}`}>{log.level}</span>
<span className="text-term-muted">{t(log.source === "frontend" ? "logs.frontend" : "logs.backend")}</span>
<span className="truncate text-term-text">{log.message}</span>
<span className="text-term-muted tabular-nums">{log.httpStatus ?? ""}</span>
</button>
{open && hasDetail && (
<div className="border-t border-term-border/40 bg-term-bg px-3 py-2">
{log.path && (
<div className="mb-1 text-[11px] text-term-muted">
{t("logs.path")}: <code className="text-term-text">{log.path}</code>
</div>
)}
{log.context && Object.keys(log.context).length > 0 && (
<pre className="mb-2 overflow-x-auto rounded-term border border-term-border bg-term-panel-2 p-2 text-[11px] text-term-text">
{JSON.stringify(log.context, null, 2)}
</pre>
)}
{log.stack && (
<pre className="overflow-x-auto rounded-term border border-term-border bg-term-panel-2 p-2 text-[11px] text-term-red/90">
{log.stack}
</pre>
)}
</div>
)}
</div>
);
}
export function LogsViewer() {
const { t } = useTranslation();
const [level, setLevel] = useState("");
const [source, setSource] = useState("");
const [since, setSince] = useState("");
const [applied, setApplied] = useState<{ level?: string; source?: string; since?: string }>({});
const q = useQuery({
queryKey: ["logs", applied],
queryFn: () => fetchLogs({ ...applied, limit: 500 }),
refetchInterval: 15_000, // keep the booth view roughly live without a WS
});
const logs = q.data?.logs ?? [];
function apply() {
setApplied({
level: level || undefined,
source: source || undefined,
since: since ? new Date(`${since}T00:00:00`).toISOString() : undefined,
});
}
function clear() {
setLevel("");
setSource("");
setSince("");
setApplied({});
}
return (
<div className="mx-auto max-w-5xl">
<div className="mb-3 flex items-center justify-between">
<h1 className="text-sm font-bold uppercase tracking-widest text-term-amber">{t("logs.title")}</h1>
<button type="button" className="btn btn-ghost btn-sm" onClick={() => q.refetch()}>
{t("logs.refresh")}
</button>
</div>
<div className="card mb-3 flex flex-wrap items-end gap-3 p-3">
<div className="field">
<span className="label">{t("logs.level")}</span>
<select className="select w-32" value={level} onChange={(e) => setLevel(e.target.value)}>
<option value="">{t("logs.allLevels")}</option>
{LEVELS.map((l) => (
<option key={l} value={l}>
{l}
</option>
))}
</select>
</div>
<div className="field">
<span className="label">{t("logs.source")}</span>
<select className="select w-36" value={source} onChange={(e) => setSource(e.target.value)}>
<option value="">{t("logs.allSources")}</option>
<option value="frontend">{t("logs.frontend")}</option>
<option value="backend">{t("logs.backend")}</option>
</select>
</div>
<div className="field">
<span className="label">{t("logs.since")}</span>
<input type="date" className="input w-40" value={since} onChange={(e) => setSince(e.target.value)} />
</div>
<button type="button" className="btn btn-primary btn-sm" onClick={apply}>
{t("logs.apply")}
</button>
<button type="button" className="btn btn-ghost btn-sm" onClick={clear}>
{t("logs.clear")}
</button>
</div>
<div className="card p-2">
{q.isLoading ? (
<div className="p-3 text-[12px] text-term-muted">{t("common.loading")}</div>
) : logs.length === 0 ? (
<div className="p-3 text-[12px] text-term-muted">{t("logs.empty")}</div>
) : (
<>
<div className="grid grid-cols-[auto_4rem_5rem_1fr_auto] gap-x-3 border-b border-term-border px-1 pb-1 text-[10px] uppercase tracking-wider text-term-muted">
<span>{t("logs.time")}</span>
<span>{t("logs.level")}</span>
<span>{t("logs.source")}</span>
<span>{t("logs.message")}</span>
<span>{t("logs.status")}</span>
</div>
{logs.map((log) => (
<LogRow key={log.id} log={log} />
))}
</>
)}
</div>
</div>
);
}
+30 -2
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@@ -5,6 +5,9 @@
// CSRF cookie back in the X-CSRF-Token header (double-submit). See // CSRF cookie back in the X-CSRF-Token header (double-submit). See
// wiki/entities/local-jwt-auth.md. // wiki/entities/local-jwt-auth.md.
import { logFailedRequest } from "./lib/logger.js";
import type { AppLogRecord } from "@parking/shared";
const CSRF_COOKIE = "parking_csrf"; const CSRF_COOKIE = "parking_csrf";
const CSRF_HEADER = "X-CSRF-Token"; const CSRF_HEADER = "X-CSRF-Token";
@@ -27,7 +30,14 @@ export async function apiFetch<T>(path: string, init: RequestInit = {}): Promise
const res = await fetch(path, { ...init, headers, credentials: "include" }); const res = await fetch(path, { ...init, headers, credentials: "include" });
if (!res.ok) { if (!res.ok) {
const msg = (await res.json().catch(() => ({}))) as { error?: string }; const msg = (await res.json().catch(() => ({}))) as { error?: string };
throw new ApiError(msg.error ?? `${path}: ${res.status}`, res.status); const error = msg.error ?? `${path}: ${res.status}`;
// Ship the failed request to the backend log store (best-effort, loop-safe — the
// logger itself never logs the /api/logs call). 401s are normal pre-login churn,
// so we don't report them as errors. See lib/logger.ts.
if (res.status !== 401) {
logFailedRequest({ path, method, status: res.status, error });
}
throw new ApiError(error, res.status);
} }
if (res.status === 204) return undefined as T; if (res.status === 204) return undefined as T;
return res.json() as Promise<T>; return res.json() as Promise<T>;
@@ -160,6 +170,23 @@ export function deleteRole(id: string): Promise<{ ok: boolean }> {
return apiFetch(`/api/roles/${id}`, { method: "DELETE" }); return apiFetch(`/api/roles/${id}`, { method: "DELETE" });
} }
// --- Application logs (app_logs) ------------------------------------------
/** Read recent diagnostic logs (gated server-side by log:read). */
export function fetchLogs(params: {
limit?: number;
level?: string;
source?: string;
since?: string;
} = {}): Promise<{ logs: AppLogRecord[] }> {
const q = new URLSearchParams();
if (params.limit) q.set("limit", String(params.limit));
if (params.level) q.set("level", params.level);
if (params.source) q.set("source", params.source);
if (params.since) q.set("since", params.since);
const qs = q.toString();
return apiFetch(`/api/logs${qs ? `?${qs}` : ""}`);
}
// --- Device setup --------------------------------------------------------- // --- Device setup ---------------------------------------------------------
export interface ConfigField { export interface ConfigField {
@@ -632,7 +659,8 @@ export function fetchDeviceStatus(): Promise<{ devices: DeviceStatus[] }> {
/** A persisted ledger row. Re-exported from shared so UI code has one source of /** A persisted ledger row. Re-exported from shared so UI code has one source of
* truth for the event shape (the same type the WS pushes). */ * truth for the event shape (the same type the WS pushes). */
export type { LedgerEvent } from "@parking/shared"; export type { LedgerEvent, LogLevel, LogSource } from "@parking/shared";
export type { AppLogRecord };
/** Recent ledger events, newest first (default 100, max 1000). Used for the /** Recent ledger events, newest first (default 100, max 1000). Used for the
* booth feed's initial load; live updates then arrive over the WS. `since` (ISO) * booth feed's initial load; live updates then arrive over the WS. `since` (ISO)
+50
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@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
import { Component, type ErrorInfo, type ReactNode } from "react";
import { logClient } from "./logger.js";
// Top-level React error boundary: catches a render/lifecycle crash anywhere in the
// tree, reports it to the backend log store (app_logs), and shows a minimal recovery
// screen instead of a white page. A booth must never be left staring at a blank
// screen with no trace of why. See wiki/concepts/app-logs.md.
interface State {
hasError: boolean;
message?: string;
}
export class ErrorBoundary extends Component<{ children: ReactNode }, State> {
override state: State = { hasError: false };
static getDerivedStateFromError(err: Error): State {
return { hasError: true, message: err.message };
}
override componentDidCatch(err: Error, info: ErrorInfo): void {
logClient({
level: "fatal",
message: err.message || "React render error",
stack: err.stack,
path: typeof location !== "undefined" ? location.pathname : undefined,
context: { kind: "react_error_boundary", componentStack: info.componentStack },
});
}
override render(): ReactNode {
if (!this.state.hasError) return this.props.children;
// Intentionally un-i18n'd + dependency-free: the app tree just crashed, so we can't
// assume providers (i18n/router/query) are healthy.
return (
<div style={{ padding: "2rem", fontFamily: "monospace", color: "#e5e5e5", background: "#0a0a0a", minHeight: "100vh" }}>
<h1 style={{ color: "#ef4444" }}>Something went wrong</h1>
<p>The screen crashed and has been reported. Try reloading.</p>
{this.state.message && <pre style={{ color: "#a3a3a3" }}>{this.state.message}</pre>}
<button
type="button"
onClick={() => location.reload()}
style={{ marginTop: "1rem", padding: "0.5rem 1rem", cursor: "pointer" }}
>
Reload
</button>
</div>
);
}
}
+19
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@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ export const en: Catalog = {
users: "Users", users: "Users",
roles: "Roles", roles: "Roles",
shifts: "Shifts", shifts: "Shifts",
logs: "Logs",
}, },
status: { status: {
live: "LIVE", live: "LIVE",
@@ -482,6 +483,24 @@ export const en: Catalog = {
cashRemoved: "Cash removed", cashRemoved: "Cash removed",
loadFailed: "Failed to load shifts.", loadFailed: "Failed to load shifts.",
}, },
logs: {
title: "System logs",
refresh: "Refresh",
level: "Level",
source: "Source",
since: "Since",
apply: "Apply",
clear: "Clear",
allLevels: "All levels",
allSources: "All sources",
frontend: "Frontend",
backend: "Backend",
time: "Time",
message: "Message",
status: "Status",
path: "Path",
empty: "No logs.",
},
pay: { pay: {
ticket: "Ticket", ticket: "Ticket",
entry: "Entry", entry: "Entry",
+19
View File
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ export const sq = {
users: "Përdoruesit", users: "Përdoruesit",
roles: "Rolet", roles: "Rolet",
shifts: "Turnet", shifts: "Turnet",
logs: "Regjistrat",
}, },
status: { status: {
live: "LIVE", live: "LIVE",
@@ -495,6 +496,24 @@ export const sq = {
cashRemoved: "Para të hequra", cashRemoved: "Para të hequra",
loadFailed: "Ngarkimi i turneve dështoi.", loadFailed: "Ngarkimi i turneve dështoi.",
}, },
logs: {
title: "Regjistrat e sistemit",
refresh: "Rifresko",
level: "Niveli",
source: "Burimi",
since: "Që nga",
apply: "Apliko",
clear: "Pastro",
allLevels: "Të gjitha nivelet",
allSources: "Të gjitha burimet",
frontend: "Ndërfaqja",
backend: "Serveri",
time: "Koha",
message: "Mesazhi",
status: "Statusi",
path: "Rruga",
empty: "Asnjë regjistër.",
},
pay: { pay: {
ticket: "Bileta", ticket: "Bileta",
entry: "Hyrja", entry: "Hyrja",
+198
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@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
// Frontend error/log collector. Ships failed requests, uncaught errors, and rejected
// promises to the backend (POST /api/logs → app_logs), so a booth problem is
// diagnosable from the host instead of needing the operator's devtools. See
// wiki/concepts/app-logs.md.
//
// Design notes:
// - BATCHED + THROTTLED: entries queue and flush on a short timer (and on page hide
// via sendBeacon), so a burst of errors is one request, not hundreds.
// - LOOP-SAFE: a failure of the /api/logs request itself is NEVER re-logged (that
// would be an infinite error → log → error spiral). We also never recurse through
// apiFetch — the flush uses raw fetch/sendBeacon.
// - LEVEL-GATED noise: console.warn/error are only forwarded when the client log
// level is debug/trace (off by default) — they're noisy (3rd-party chatter). The
// high-signal sources (failed requests, uncaught errors) are always captured.
import { LOG_LEVEL_ORDER, type ClientLogInput, type LogLevel } from "@parking/shared";
const ENDPOINT = "/api/logs";
const FLUSH_MS = 4000;
const MAX_QUEUE = 100; // drop oldest beyond this (bounded memory on a long-lived booth)
const CSRF_COOKIE = "parking_csrf";
const CSRF_HEADER = "X-CSRF-Token";
/** The client capture threshold. Entries below this level are dropped before queueing.
* Default `info`: failed requests (error) + uncaught errors (error) always pass;
* console.warn/error forwarding is wired separately and only ON at debug/trace. */
let clientLevel: LogLevel = (import.meta.env.VITE_LOG_LEVEL as LogLevel) || "info";
export function setClientLogLevel(level: LogLevel): void {
clientLevel = level;
}
export function getClientLogLevel(): LogLevel {
return clientLevel;
}
/** Are console.warn/error forwarded? Only when the client level is debug or trace. */
function consoleForwardEnabled(): boolean {
return LOG_LEVEL_ORDER[clientLevel] <= LOG_LEVEL_ORDER.debug;
}
const queue: ClientLogInput[] = [];
let timer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | null = null;
/** Set true only while flushing, so the flush's own network activity is never logged. */
let flushing = false;
function readCookie(name: string): string | null {
const m = document.cookie.match(new RegExp(`(?:^|; )${name}=([^;]*)`));
return m ? decodeURIComponent(m[1]!) : null;
}
function scheduleFlush(): void {
if (timer != null) return;
timer = setTimeout(() => {
timer = null;
void flush();
}, FLUSH_MS);
}
/** Enqueue an entry. Drops it if below the client level or if it concerns the log
* endpoint itself (loop guard). */
export function logClient(entry: ClientLogInput): void {
if (LOG_LEVEL_ORDER[entry.level] < LOG_LEVEL_ORDER[clientLevel]) return;
if (flushing) return; // don't log anything produced by the flush itself
if (entry.path && entry.path.startsWith(ENDPOINT)) return; // never log the log call
queue.push({ ...entry, at: entry.at ?? new Date().toISOString() });
if (queue.length > MAX_QUEUE) queue.splice(0, queue.length - MAX_QUEUE);
scheduleFlush();
}
/** POST the queued entries. Raw fetch (not apiFetch) so a failure can't recurse. A
* failed flush silently re-queues nothing — diagnostics are best-effort, never fatal. */
async function flush(): Promise<void> {
if (queue.length === 0) return;
const entries = queue.splice(0, queue.length);
flushing = true;
try {
const headers: Record<string, string> = { "content-type": "application/json" };
const csrf = readCookie(CSRF_COOKIE);
if (csrf) headers[CSRF_HEADER] = csrf;
await fetch(ENDPOINT, {
method: "POST",
headers,
credentials: "include",
body: JSON.stringify({ entries }),
keepalive: true,
});
} catch {
// Drop on failure — we must not re-log (loop) nor grow unbounded.
} finally {
flushing = false;
}
}
/** Best-effort synchronous flush on page hide (sendBeacon survives unload). */
function flushBeacon(): void {
if (queue.length === 0) return;
const entries = queue.splice(0, queue.length);
try {
const blob = new Blob([JSON.stringify({ entries })], { type: "application/json" });
// sendBeacon can't set the CSRF header; the server accepts the ingest for any
// signed-in session (cookie sent automatically). If CSRF later guards it strictly,
// this path degrades to "lost on unload" — acceptable for diagnostics.
navigator.sendBeacon(ENDPOINT, blob);
} catch {
/* ignore */
}
}
/** Record a FAILED API request (called from apiFetch's error path). Always high-signal. */
export function logFailedRequest(info: {
path: string;
method: string;
status: number;
error?: string;
requestId?: string;
}): void {
logClient({
level: "error",
message: `${info.method} ${info.path} → ${info.status}${info.error ? `: ${info.error}` : ""}`,
httpStatus: info.status,
path: info.path,
context: { kind: "request_failed", method: info.method, requestId: info.requestId },
});
}
let installed = false;
/** Wire global handlers once, at app startup. Idempotent. */
export function installClientLogging(): void {
if (installed || typeof window === "undefined") return;
installed = true;
// Uncaught runtime errors.
window.addEventListener("error", (e: ErrorEvent) => {
logClient({
level: "error",
message: e.message || "uncaught error",
stack: e.error?.stack,
path: location.pathname,
context: {
kind: "window_error",
filename: e.filename,
line: e.lineno,
col: e.colno,
},
});
});
// Unhandled promise rejections.
window.addEventListener("unhandledrejection", (e: PromiseRejectionEvent) => {
const reason = e.reason;
const message =
reason instanceof Error ? reason.message : typeof reason === "string" ? reason : "unhandled rejection";
logClient({
level: "error",
message,
stack: reason instanceof Error ? reason.stack : undefined,
path: location.pathname,
context: { kind: "unhandled_rejection" },
});
});
// console.warn / console.error → only forwarded at debug/trace (noisy otherwise).
const origWarn = console.warn.bind(console);
const origError = console.error.bind(console);
console.warn = (...args: unknown[]) => {
origWarn(...args);
if (consoleForwardEnabled()) {
logClient({ level: "warn", message: stringifyArgs(args), path: location.pathname, context: { kind: "console" } });
}
};
console.error = (...args: unknown[]) => {
origError(...args);
if (consoleForwardEnabled()) {
logClient({ level: "error", message: stringifyArgs(args), path: location.pathname, context: { kind: "console" } });
}
};
// Flush on tab hide / unload.
window.addEventListener("visibilitychange", () => {
if (document.visibilityState === "hidden") flushBeacon();
});
window.addEventListener("pagehide", flushBeacon);
}
function stringifyArgs(args: unknown[]): string {
return args
.map((a) => (a instanceof Error ? a.message : typeof a === "string" ? a : safeStringify(a)))
.join(" ")
.slice(0, 2000);
}
function safeStringify(v: unknown): string {
try {
return JSON.stringify(v);
} catch {
return String(v);
}
}
+8
View File
@@ -3,12 +3,20 @@ import { createRoot } from "react-dom/client";
import "./index.css"; import "./index.css";
import "./lib/i18n/index.js"; // initialize i18next before the app renders import "./lib/i18n/index.js"; // initialize i18next before the app renders
import { App } from "./App.js"; import { App } from "./App.js";
import { ErrorBoundary } from "./lib/ErrorBoundary.js";
import { installClientLogging } from "./lib/logger.js";
// Capture uncaught errors / rejections / console noise → backend log store, before
// the app mounts so even an early crash is reported. See lib/logger.ts.
installClientLogging();
const rootEl = document.getElementById("root"); const rootEl = document.getElementById("root");
if (!rootEl) throw new Error("root element not found"); if (!rootEl) throw new Error("root element not found");
createRoot(rootEl).render( createRoot(rootEl).render(
<StrictMode> <StrictMode>
<ErrorBoundary>
<App /> <App />
</ErrorBoundary>
</StrictMode>, </StrictMode>,
); );
+12
View File
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ import { SiteSettings } from "./SiteSettings.js";
import { UsersManager } from "./UsersManager.js"; import { UsersManager } from "./UsersManager.js";
import { RolesManager } from "./RolesManager.js"; import { RolesManager } from "./RolesManager.js";
import { ShiftsHistory } from "./ShiftsHistory.js"; import { ShiftsHistory } from "./ShiftsHistory.js";
import { LogsViewer } from "./LogsViewer.js";
// Code-based TanStack Router (no file-based codegen — the app is small enough that // Code-based TanStack Router (no file-based codegen — the app is small enough that
// an explicit tree is clearer). The router context carries the signed-in user and // an explicit tree is clearer). The router context carries the signed-in user and
@@ -84,6 +85,7 @@ function SetupLayout() {
{show("user:read") && <SetupTab to="/setup/users" label={t("nav.users")} />} {show("user:read") && <SetupTab to="/setup/users" label={t("nav.users")} />}
{show("role:read") && <SetupTab to="/setup/roles" label={t("nav.roles")} />} {show("role:read") && <SetupTab to="/setup/roles" label={t("nav.roles")} />}
{show("shift:read") && <SetupTab to="/setup/shifts" label={t("nav.shifts")} />} {show("shift:read") && <SetupTab to="/setup/shifts" label={t("nav.shifts")} />}
{show("log:read") && <SetupTab to="/setup/logs" label={t("nav.logs")} />}
</nav> </nav>
<Outlet /> <Outlet />
</div> </div>
@@ -363,6 +365,7 @@ const SETUP_TABS: { to: string; perm: Permission }[] = [
{ to: "/setup/users", perm: "user:read" }, { to: "/setup/users", perm: "user:read" },
{ to: "/setup/roles", perm: "role:read" }, { to: "/setup/roles", perm: "role:read" },
{ to: "/setup/shifts", perm: "shift:read" }, { to: "/setup/shifts", perm: "shift:read" },
{ to: "/setup/logs", perm: "log:read" },
]; ];
// /setup is a LAYOUT route (tab bar + <Outlet>); the config screens are its // /setup is a LAYOUT route (tab bar + <Outlet>); the config screens are its
@@ -437,6 +440,14 @@ const shiftsHistoryRoute = createRoute({
}, },
}); });
// Diagnostic logs. Gated by log:read (an admin/diagnostic permission).
const logsRoute = createRoute({
getParentRoute: () => setupRoute,
path: "logs",
beforeLoad: ({ context }) => requirePerm("log:read")(context),
component: LogsViewer,
});
const routeTree = rootRoute.addChildren([ const routeTree = rootRoute.addChildren([
indexRoute, indexRoute,
boothRoute, boothRoute,
@@ -450,6 +461,7 @@ const routeTree = rootRoute.addChildren([
usersRoute, usersRoute,
rolesRoute, rolesRoute,
shiftsHistoryRoute, shiftsHistoryRoute,
logsRoute,
]), ]),
]); ]);
+20
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
CREATE TABLE `app_logs` (
`id` text PRIMARY KEY NOT NULL,
`level` text NOT NULL,
`source` text NOT NULL,
`message` text NOT NULL,
`context` text,
`http_status` integer,
`path` text,
`stack` text,
`user_id` text,
`user_agent` text,
`created_at` text DEFAULT (current_timestamp) NOT NULL
);
--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE INDEX `app_logs_created_at_idx` ON `app_logs` (`created_at`);--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE INDEX `app_logs_level_idx` ON `app_logs` (`level`);--> statement-breakpoint
-- Grant the new log:read permission to the built-in admin role (enforcement is
-- runtime-special-cased to ALL permissions, but the Roles UI lists the grid from these
-- rows — keep it in sync). INSERT OR IGNORE: harmless if the row already exists.
INSERT OR IGNORE INTO `role_permissions` (`role_id`, `permission`) VALUES ('admin','log:read');
+7
View File
@@ -64,6 +64,13 @@
"when": 1781885100000, "when": 1781885100000,
"tag": "0008_user_profile_theme", "tag": "0008_user_profile_theme",
"breakpoints": true "breakpoints": true
},
{
"idx": 9,
"version": "6",
"when": 1781885200000,
"tag": "0009_app_logs",
"breakpoints": true
} }
] ]
} }
+34
View File
@@ -356,6 +356,39 @@ export const sessions = sqliteTable("sessions", {
lastEventIndex: integer("last_event_index"), lastEventIndex: integer("last_event_index"),
}); });
// --- Application logs (diagnostics, UNSIGNED, prunable) ------------------
// A THIRD stream, distinct from the signed ledger_events (business facts) and
// device_events (hardware telemetry): operational/diagnostic logs for debugging the
// appliance. Backend warn/error/fatal (a Pino sink) AND frontend errors land here —
// failed requests, uncaught exceptions, rejected promises — so a booth problem is
// queryable from one place on an offline box. Never signed, never reconciled, pruned
// by age + row cap. See wiki/concepts/app-logs.md, event-streams-split.md.
export const appLogs = sqliteTable("app_logs", {
id: text("id").primaryKey(),
// pino levels: trace|debug|info|warn|error|fatal. We persist warn+ from the backend.
level: text("level", {
enum: ["trace", "debug", "info", "warn", "error", "fatal"],
}).notNull(),
// Which side produced it — the booth UI or the host.
source: text("source", { enum: ["frontend", "backend"] }).notNull(),
message: text("message").notNull(),
// Free-form structured detail: the failed request (path/method/status/body), the
// error name, component, anything the caller attaches. Kept in one JSON column.
context: text("context", { mode: "json" }).$type<Record<string, unknown>>(),
// Pulled out of context for cheap filtering of the common "failed request" case.
httpStatus: integer("http_status"),
path: text("path"),
// Captured stack trace, when there is one (uncaught errors / rejections).
stack: text("stack"),
// Who was logged in when it happened (frontend) / acted (backend), if known.
userId: text("user_id"),
// The browser/user-agent for a frontend log (triage which booth/device).
userAgent: text("user_agent"),
createdAt: text("created_at")
.notNull()
.default(sql`(current_timestamp)`),
});
export type UserRow = typeof users.$inferSelect; export type UserRow = typeof users.$inferSelect;
export type RoleRow = typeof roles.$inferSelect; export type RoleRow = typeof roles.$inferSelect;
export type RolePermissionRow = typeof rolePermissions.$inferSelect; export type RolePermissionRow = typeof rolePermissions.$inferSelect;
@@ -372,3 +405,4 @@ export type SubscriptionCredentialRow = typeof subscriptionCredentials.$inferSel
export type SubscriptionPlateRow = typeof subscriptionPlates.$inferSelect; export type SubscriptionPlateRow = typeof subscriptionPlates.$inferSelect;
export type BlocklistRow = typeof blocklist.$inferSelect; export type BlocklistRow = typeof blocklist.$inferSelect;
export type SessionRow = typeof sessions.$inferSelect; export type SessionRow = typeof sessions.$inferSelect;
export type AppLogRow = typeof appLogs.$inferSelect;
+48
View File
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ export const RESOURCES = [
"session", // active sessions, lookup "session", // active sessions, lookup
"event", // the signed ledger feed + void "event", // the signed ledger feed + void
"report", // events feed, occupancy, future reports "report", // events feed, occupancy, future reports
"log", // application/diagnostic logs (app_logs) — view + retention
] as const; ] as const;
export type Resource = (typeof RESOURCES)[number]; export type Resource = (typeof RESOURCES)[number];
@@ -51,6 +52,7 @@ export const PERMISSIONS: readonly Permission[] = [
"session:read", "session:read",
"event:read", "event:void", "event:read", "event:void",
"report:read", "report:read",
"log:read",
] as const; ] as const;
/** The protected built-in role: non-deletable, non-editable, always = ALL /** The protected built-in role: non-deletable, non-editable, always = ALL
@@ -260,6 +262,52 @@ export function reasonPayload(
/** Operational device telemetry — UNSIGNED, prunable. NOT the ledger. */ /** Operational device telemetry — UNSIGNED, prunable. NOT the ledger. */
export type DeviceEventKind = "input" | "relay" | "status" | "read" | "snapshot"; export type DeviceEventKind = "input" | "relay" | "status" | "read" | "snapshot";
/**
* Application/diagnostic logs — a THIRD unsigned, prunable stream (app_logs), distinct
* from the signed ledger and from device telemetry. Backend warn+ and frontend errors
* land here so a booth problem is queryable in one place. See
* wiki/concepts/app-logs.md, decisions/event-streams-split.md.
*/
export type LogLevel = "trace" | "debug" | "info" | "warn" | "error" | "fatal";
export type LogSource = "frontend" | "backend";
/** A persisted log record (the read shape returned by GET /api/logs). */
export interface AppLogRecord {
readonly id: string;
readonly level: LogLevel;
readonly source: LogSource;
readonly message: string;
readonly context: Record<string, unknown> | null;
readonly httpStatus: number | null;
readonly path: string | null;
readonly stack: string | null;
readonly userId: string | null;
readonly userAgent: string | null;
readonly createdAt: string;
}
/** One log entry POSTed by the frontend to /api/logs (server stamps id/userId/time). */
export interface ClientLogInput {
readonly level: LogLevel;
readonly message: string;
readonly context?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
readonly httpStatus?: number | null;
readonly path?: string | null;
readonly stack?: string | null;
/** Client-side capture time (ISO). The server records its own receive time too. */
readonly at?: string;
}
/** The numeric ordering of levels (pino-compatible), for threshold comparisons. */
export const LOG_LEVEL_ORDER: Record<LogLevel, number> = {
trace: 10,
debug: 20,
info: 30,
warn: 40,
error: 50,
fatal: 60,
};
/** /**
* The composable rate card stored in a tariff_version.structure. * The composable rate card stored in a tariff_version.structure.
* *
+101
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@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
---
type: concept
tags: [parking, observability, diagnostics, logging, frontend, backend]
sources: []
updated: 2026-06-19
status: open
---
# Application logs (diagnostics) — the third stream
A **third data stream**, deliberately distinct from the two in [[event-streams-split]]:
| Stream | Table | Signed? | Purpose |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Business ledger | `ledger_events` | ✅ ATECC608 | money/accountability ([[append-only-event-chain]]) |
| Device telemetry | `device_events` | ❌ | hardware chatter ([[device-events]]) |
| **App logs** | **`app_logs`** | ❌ | **operational/diagnostic logs** (this page) |
App logs answer *"why did the booth misbehave?"* — a question neither of the other streams should
absorb (logs are neither business facts nor hardware telemetry). On an **offline appliance** there's
no Sentry/Datadog to ship to, so the host **is** the log store: backend warnings/errors AND frontend
errors land in one queryable table, viewable at the booth. Built 2026-06-19.
## What's captured
- **Backend `warn` / `error` / `fatal`** — a pino stream tees these into `app_logs` (and still writes
them to stdout, unchanged). `info`/`debug`/`trace` stay **stdout-only** — they'd bloat the DB. So
every `app.log.warn/error(...)` already in the codebase is now persisted with **no call-site
change**.
- **Frontend errors** (always): every **failed API request** (`apiFetch`'s non-OK path → method,
path, status, server error body — except `401`, which is normal pre-login churn), every **uncaught
error** (`window.onerror`), every **unhandled promise rejection**, and a top-level **React
ErrorBoundary** (a render crash is reported as `fatal` instead of a white screen).
- **`console.warn` / `console.error`** — only forwarded when the **client log level is `debug`/`trace`**
(off by default; they're noisy with third-party chatter). The high-signal sources above are always
on. Toggle via `VITE_LOG_LEVEL` / `setClientLogLevel()`.
## Shape
`app_logs`: `level` (pino names), `source` (`frontend`|`backend`), `message`, `context` (one JSON
column — the failed request, error name, component stack, anything), plus pulled-out `httpStatus` /
`path` for cheap filtering, `stack`, `userId`, `userAgent`, `createdAt`. Indexed on `created_at` +
`level`. Shared types: `AppLogRecord` / `ClientLogInput` / `LogLevel` in `@parking/shared`.
## The API + the access split
- **`POST /api/logs`** — the frontend ships errors here. **Any signed-in user** may write (it's their
own browser's diagnostics) — `requireAuth`, not a permission. CSRF still applies (it's a mutation).
Accepts one entry or a `{ entries: [...] }` batch (capped at 50). **Deliberately never 4xx's on a
malformed entry** — a client erroring *while reporting an error* must not get a second error.
- **`GET /api/logs`** — read the store (level/source/since filters), gated by the **new `log:read`
permission** (a new `log` resource in the dynamic [[local-jwt-auth|RBAC]] grid). Admin holds it;
it's grantable to a diagnostic role. *Verified: a cashier without `log:read` gets 403 on GET but
204 on POST — the intended asymmetry.*
## Reliability invariants (a logger must never make things worse)
- **No infinite loop.** The frontend collector never logs the `/api/logs` request itself, and flushes
via **raw `fetch`/`sendBeacon`**, not `apiFetch` (so a flush failure can't recurse into a new log).
The backend `LogService` has a **reentrancy guard** — persisting a log can't emit a persisted log.
- **Best-effort, never fatal.** Every write is wrapped; a DB/logging failure is swallowed (it can't be
logged — that's the recursion we guard). Diagnostics must never break the path they observe.
- **Bounded.** Frontend queue capped (drops oldest); message/stack/context clamped per row;
ingest batch capped.
## Retention (offline appliance ⇒ must be bounded)
Pruned by **age AND a row cap** (a burst could blow past an age-only window): delete older than
`LOG_RETENTION_DAYS` (default 30) **and** keep only the newest `LOG_RETENTION_MAX_ROWS` (default
50 000). Runs **hourly** (unref'd timer) + once at startup. Both env-configurable. Same "prunable,
not precious" durability class as `device_events` — the opposite of the append-only ledger.
## The booth viewer
A **Logs screen** under Setup (`/setup/logs`, gated by `log:read`, sq+en) — filter by
level/source/since, newest first, each row expands to the structured `context` + stack. Read-only
(logs are evidence, never edited). Polls every 15 s (no WS — diagnostics aren't latency-critical).
Sits alongside the other admin tabs in [[booth-console]].
## As-built (2026-06-19)
- `packages/db`: `app_logs` table + migration `0009_app_logs.sql` (+ journal idx 9; seeds admin
`log:read`). Applied to the live `apps/server/parking.sqlite`.
- `@parking/shared`: `log` resource + `log:read` permission; `LogLevel`/`LogSource`/`AppLogRecord`/
`ClientLogInput`/`LOG_LEVEL_ORDER`.
- `apps/server`: `log-service.ts` (`LogService` + `pinoDbStream`), `routes/logs.ts`, wired in
`server.ts` (DB built before Fastify so the pino stream has the sink; prune timer).
- `apps/web`: `lib/logger.ts` (collector + global handlers), `lib/ErrorBoundary.tsx`, `apiFetch` hook,
`LogsViewer.tsx` + route/nav, i18n.
## Open
- **No automated test** (the standing harness gap) — though the ingest/read/gate path was verified by
in-process `app.inject` smoke (login → POST 204 → GET 200 with the record; non-admin 403/204 split).
- **Server API error strings stay English** — unchanged here; this is about *persisting* logs, not
localizing them. The localized-ledger-reason pattern ([[i18n]]) is the template if log *display*
ever needs translation (currently the message is whatever the thrower wrote).
- **Surfacing critical logs live** — a `fatal`/`error` count badge on the booth footer over the
existing `/api/ws` could flag problems without opening the viewer. Deferred.
- **Correlation id** — no request-id threads a frontend failed-request log to its backend log yet;
add a `x-request-id` echo if cross-stream correlation is wanted.
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@@ -31,6 +31,11 @@ diagnostics, and live booth status — **not** anti-fraud.
- **Device-keyed** — references the `devices` instance (raw device provenance). No `lane` - **Device-keyed** — references the `devices` instance (raw device provenance). No `lane`
(pool-of-spaces model — see [[entry-exit-points]]). (pool-of-spaces model — see [[entry-exit-points]]).
> **Not to be confused with [[app-logs]].** `device_events` is **hardware telemetry** (a relay fired,
> a camera failed). Diagnostic/application logs (a failed API request, an uncaught frontend error,
> a backend warning) are a **separate third stream** in `app_logs` — don't route app errors here, nor
> hardware telemetry there. Both are unsigned + prunable; the distinction is *what produced it*.
## The boundary that matters ## The boundary that matters
A device event is *evidence the host saw something happen*; it does **not** by itself authorize or A device event is *evidence the host saw something happen*; it does **not** by itself authorize or
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@@ -50,8 +50,16 @@ A raw button press is **telemetry** → `device_events`. The entry flow then min
input-push handler to emit `device_events` (+ the entry flow signs `vehicle_entry`). input-push handler to emit `device_events` (+ the entry flow signs `vehicle_entry`).
- `ParkingEventType` in `packages/shared` splits into ledger types vs. a device-event type set. - `ParkingEventType` in `packages/shared` splits into ledger types vs. a device-event type set.
## A third stream followed (2026-06-19)
The same separation logic produced a **third** stream: **`app_logs`** — operational/diagnostic logs
(backend warn+ via a pino sink, plus frontend errors). They're neither business facts (ledger) nor
hardware telemetry (device_events), so they get their own unsigned, prunable table. See
[[app-logs]]. The principle generalizes: *one stream per durability/meaning class*.
## Open ## Open
- `device_events` retention/rotation policy. - `device_events` retention/rotation policy. (Resolved for `app_logs`: age + row cap — see
[[app-logs]]; the same policy is a candidate for `device_events`.)
- Which device facts (if any) are witness-grade enough to *also* warrant a signed ledger entry - Which device facts (if any) are witness-grade enough to *also* warrant a signed ledger entry
(e.g. `barrier_open_observed` from a loop sensor) — see [[append-only-event-chain]] witness gap. (e.g. `barrier_open_observed` from a loop sensor) — see [[append-only-event-chain]] witness gap.
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@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ updated: 2026-06-19
# Index # Index
Content catalog for the wiki. Start at [[overview]]. Maintained on every ingest. Content catalog for the wiki. Start at [[overview]]. Maintained on every ingest.
Counts: 4 sources · 19 entities · 42 concepts · 5 decision records. Counts: 4 sources · 19 entities · 44 concepts · 5 decision records.
## Overview & navigation ## Overview & navigation
- [[overview]] — the top-level synthesis and entry point. - [[overview]] — the top-level synthesis and entry point.
@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ Counts: 4 sources · 19 entities · 42 concepts · 5 decision records.
- [[ticket-encoding]] — transient ticket id (11-digit numeric + Luhn) as Code128; printed at entry, scanned at pay station + exit; barcode geometry must fit paper width (KP-300H overflow); plate-as-ticket alt. - [[ticket-encoding]] — transient ticket id (11-digit numeric + Luhn) as Code128; printed at entry, scanned at pay station + exit; barcode geometry must fit paper width (KP-300H overflow); plate-as-ticket alt.
- [[anti-passback]] — block/flag one id entering twice without an exit; fold over open sessions. - [[anti-passback]] — block/flag one id entering twice without an exit; fold over open sessions.
- [[device-events]] — unsigned hardware telemetry (relay/printer/camera/reader/input); separate from the signed ledger. - [[device-events]] — unsigned hardware telemetry (relay/printer/camera/reader/input); separate from the signed ledger.
- [[app-logs]] — the third stream: diagnostic logs (backend warn+ pino sink + frontend errors) → app_logs; log:read viewer; pruned by age+row cap.
- [[subscription]] — recurring plan (e.g. 10,000 ALL/month); RF/QR or plate identity, car-count + max-concurrent, host-in-loop; short-circuits payment. (Renamed from "permit"; time-of-day windows noted, deferred.) - [[subscription]] — recurring plan (e.g. 10,000 ALL/month); RF/QR or plate identity, car-count + max-concurrent, host-in-loop; short-circuits payment. (Renamed from "permit"; time-of-day windows noted, deferred.)
- [[opencv-anpr-service]] — host-side vision microservice: ANPR (plate identity) + vehicle verification (anti-plate-spoofing witness). - [[opencv-anpr-service]] — host-side vision microservice: ANPR (plate identity) + vehicle verification (anti-plate-spoofing witness).
- [[blocklist]] — barred plates/cards refused at entry (never at exit); signed, attributed. - [[blocklist]] — barred plates/cards refused at entry (never at exit); signed, attributed.
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@@ -892,3 +892,15 @@ Dates were raw ISO on paper and time-only in the UI (a 2-day-old session showed
## [2026-06-19] fix | KP-300H barcode line-overflow — ticket id 13→11 digits ## [2026-06-19] fix | KP-300H barcode line-overflow — ticket id 13→11 digits
The Cashino KP-300H entry dispenser printed entry tickets as RASTER GARBAGE (solid black bars/banding) while the Rongta printed the IDENTICAL byte stream fine. Diagnosed on hardware: plain-text-only prints were clean → isolated to the `GS k` Code128 barcode. ROOT CAUSE = barcode line-overflow, not corruption: a Code128-B symbol is (11·chars+35)·moduleWidth dots; the old 13-digit id at module width 3 = ~534 dots OVERRAN the KP-300H's 72mm line (512 usable dots @ 203 dpi). The Rongta runs 80mm (576 dots) and had just enough room — why only the Cashino failed. FIX: shorten the ticket id 13→11 digits (10 random + Luhn) → ~468 dots, fits 72mm; scanned the full value at the exit reader (verified). Length is driven by GUESS-RESISTANCE not volume (10^10 space, ~1-in-10^7 to hit a live open ticket vs the booth-operator threat); chose 11 over the requested 9 (10^8 → ~1-in-10^5, too weak). validateTicketCode made length-agnostic (\d{10,14}+Luhn) so legacy 13-digit tickets still validate. NB: module width must stay 3 — a width-2 test scanned but returned TRUNCATED values (partial reads logged as exit.refused.noSession anomalies). Also fixed a separate latent transport bug in sendRaw: write-then-destroy could RST mid-stream (the write callback ≠ peer-flushed) and truncate a job; now end(payload)+FIN, resolve on socket `close`, timeout-after-write = success. NOT the cause of the garbage but a real risk. Committed bbf61c4. Updated [[ticket-encoding]], [[rongta-printer]]. The Cashino KP-300H entry dispenser printed entry tickets as RASTER GARBAGE (solid black bars/banding) while the Rongta printed the IDENTICAL byte stream fine. Diagnosed on hardware: plain-text-only prints were clean → isolated to the `GS k` Code128 barcode. ROOT CAUSE = barcode line-overflow, not corruption: a Code128-B symbol is (11·chars+35)·moduleWidth dots; the old 13-digit id at module width 3 = ~534 dots OVERRAN the KP-300H's 72mm line (512 usable dots @ 203 dpi). The Rongta runs 80mm (576 dots) and had just enough room — why only the Cashino failed. FIX: shorten the ticket id 13→11 digits (10 random + Luhn) → ~468 dots, fits 72mm; scanned the full value at the exit reader (verified). Length is driven by GUESS-RESISTANCE not volume (10^10 space, ~1-in-10^7 to hit a live open ticket vs the booth-operator threat); chose 11 over the requested 9 (10^8 → ~1-in-10^5, too weak). validateTicketCode made length-agnostic (\d{10,14}+Luhn) so legacy 13-digit tickets still validate. NB: module width must stay 3 — a width-2 test scanned but returned TRUNCATED values (partial reads logged as exit.refused.noSession anomalies). Also fixed a separate latent transport bug in sendRaw: write-then-destroy could RST mid-stream (the write callback ≠ peer-flushed) and truncate a job; now end(payload)+FIN, resolve on socket `close`, timeout-after-write = success. NOT the cause of the garbage but a real risk. Committed bbf61c4. Updated [[ticket-encoding]], [[rongta-printer]].
## [2026-06-19] feat | Snapshots on refused entry/exit + subscriber access medium in the activity log
Two booth-evidence gaps closed. (1) **Refused entry/exit now snapshot.** Originally only the OPEN paths fired the directional camera; refusal/hold anomalies didn't — yet a turned-away car is exactly the evidence an operator/auditor wants (fraud/dispute signal). Added `#fireSnapshot` to every refusal: entry refused-full + held-no-ticket (a refused entry has no ticket id, so mint a synthetic `REFUSED-…` ref to key the anomaly + photo together), exit refused closed/no-session/unpaid/grace-expired (BOTH booth `exitForBooth` and reader `#runExit` paths), and refused [[subscription]] (the lane the reader sits at — `resolved.direction`, "both"→entry — picks the camera). Same fire-and-forget contract: a refusal is never delayed/blocked by a camera; failed captures still surface as "⚠ camera unreachable" tiles. (2) **Subscriber access medium (`via`) surfaced.** The subscription flow already SIGNED `via` (`"qr"|"card"|"plate"`) into the entry/exit payload but the activity log never showed it. Added it as a typed `LedgerPayload.via` field, a cyan chip in the ticker, and an "Entry medium / Mënyra e hyrjes" row in the detail modal (QR code / RFID card·chip / plate, localized sq+en) — a lost-card investigation can now see which credential opened a barrier. Display-only, no re-signing. Refused-subscription anomalies also now carry `via`. Build+lint green. Updated [[entry-exit-points]], [[booth-console]].
## [2026-06-19] feat | One car = one ticket (entry anti-double-press) + refusal snapshots + subscriber via
FLAW found: the entry button could be pressed without limit — each press minted a fresh ticket + signed vehicle_entry, corrupting occupancy (one car counts as many) and letting a transient SHOP the cheapest ticket at exit. The old `#inFlight` guard only blocked OVERLAPPING presses (released in finally). FIX is per-relay config (`config.relays[]`), mode chosen by available barrier feedback: (1) PRESENCE (preferred) — `presenceInput` ties ticketing to a vehicle loop on a Dingtian input; a press prints only with a car present, and NO second ticket until the loop CLEARS (car drove in) and a new car re-occupies it → physical one-car-one-ticket; (2) COOLDOWN (fallback, no feedback) — `entryCooldownSec` suppresses repeat presses for N seconds (a timer, mitigation not guarantee). New `relayForPresence()` resolves a loop edge to its entry relay; `EntryFlow` keeps a per-relay `#guard` map (present/armed), disarms on PRINT success, re-arms on loop clear. A suppressed press = UNSIGNED device_events telemetry (entrySuppressed:true), NOT a signed anomaly (operator's call — it's a correct no-op, not fraud). SetupWizard relay editor exposes Presence-loop + Cooldown fields (sq+en). Fail-closed entry + barrier-is-not-a-door invariants untouched; guard state is in-memory/rebuildable, starts armed after restart (safe default). New page [[entry-double-press]]; updated [[entry-exit-points]], index. Build+lint green. (Bundled with this session's earlier refusal-snapshots + subscriber-`via` work.)
## [2026-06-19] feat | Application logs — backend pino DB sink + frontend error collection (app_logs)
Added a THIRD data stream (`app_logs`) alongside the signed ledger and device telemetry — operational/diagnostic logs, since an OFFLINE appliance has no Sentry to ship to. BACKEND: a pino stream tees warn/error/fatal into app_logs (info/debug stay stdout-only — no bloat) with NO call-site change; the DB is now built BEFORE Fastify so the logger stream has its sink. FRONTEND (lib/logger.ts): always ships failed API requests (apiFetch non-OK path, minus 401 pre-login churn), window.onerror, unhandledrejection, and a top-level React ErrorBoundary (render crash → fatal, not a white screen); console.warn/error forwarded ONLY at client debug/trace level (noisy otherwise). Batched/throttled POST, flush via raw fetch + sendBeacon on pagehide. Reliability invariants: never log the /api/logs call itself (loop guard), LogService reentrancy guard, all writes best-effort/swallowed, bounded queue + clamped rows. API: POST /api/logs (any signed-in user, CSRF, tolerant — never 4xx on a bad entry) + GET /api/logs gated by a NEW `log:read` permission (new `log` resource in the RBAC grid; admin holds it). Retention: pruned by age (LOG_RETENTION_DAYS=30) AND row cap (MAX_ROWS=50k), hourly + at startup. UI: a Logs screen under /setup (filter level/source/since, expand to context+stack, 15s poll), sq+en. DB migration 0009_app_logs (+journal idx 9, seeds admin log:read) applied to the live apps/server DB. Verified end-to-end via app.inject: login→POST 204→GET 200 with the record; backend warn/error persisted + info dropped; non-admin GET 403 / POST 204 (the intended split). Build+lint green. New page [[app-logs]]; updated [[event-streams-split]], [[device-events]], index.