feat(auth): dynamic RBAC — composable roles + resource×CRUD permissions

Replace the hardcoded role enum (admin/operator/cashier/readonly, checked
literally as requireRole("admin",...) across ~15 routes) with dynamic RBAC:
roles are DATA, route guards check a PERMISSION.

@parking/shared defines a code-defined grid: RESOURCES (user/role/tariff/
subscription/site/device/shift/payment/session/event/report) × Action
(create/read/update/delete + domain verbs void/cash) -> PERMISSIONS
(resource:action, e.g. tariff:update, payment:create, event:void).

DB: new roles + role_permissions tables; users.role enum -> role_id FK;
migration 0007_rbac (create tables, seed the builtin admin role + all 26
perms, seed operator/cashier/readonly composable roles matching old
behaviour, rebuild users to swap the column copying all rows).

auth.ts: JWT payload role -> roleId; permissionsFor(roleId) with an
in-memory cache + bumpPermsCache(); requirePermission(...perms) preHandler;
requireAuth for /me & /language; initAuth(db) wires the resolver once. Every
route guard mapped to a permission; device ingress (devices/qr-reader) stays
auth-free by design. New routes/users.ts (user:* CRUD, bcrypt 12, last-admin
guard) + routes/roles.ts (role:* CRUD, builtin-protected, perms validated
against the grid, cache bump on write). auth/me + /login return
{roleId, roleName, permissions, language}. seed-admin -> roleId:'admin'.

Frontend: SessionUser carries permissions + can() helper; router nav/route
guards gate by permission (requirePerm replaces adminOnly); SiteSettings
edit gated by site:update; new UsersManager + RolesManager (permission
checkbox grid; admin role locked); i18n nav.users/roles + blocks (sq+en).

Decisions: one role per user; protected built-in admin (no-lockout: the last
admin can't be deleted/downgraded); JWT carries roleId, perms resolved
per-request so role edits apply immediately (no re-login).

Verified: full build green; 20-assertion inject test passes (cashier 403s on
tariff publish + user list, admin passes, granting a perm applies on the next
request, last-admin + builtin-role protections return 409); migration 0007
applied to a copy of the live DB (incl WAL/shm) — existing admin maps to
role_id='admin', all rows preserved. Append-only event chain untouched
(event:void gates appending a void, not a delete).

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V

apps/server/src/routes/ws.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import type { FastifyInstance } from "fastify";
 import type { Db } from "@parking/db";
-import type { Role } from "@parking/shared";
+import { roleHasPermissions } from "../auth.js";
 import { deviceEvents } from "../device-events.js";
 import type { DeviceMonitor } from "../device-monitor.js";
 import { getOccupancy } from "../occupancy.js";
@@ -23,9 +23,9 @@ import { getOccupancy } from "../occupancy.js";
 // allowed booth UI origin). Non-browser clients (no Origin) are rejected too.
 // See auth.ts, event-log.ts (emitLedger), capacity-occupancy.md.
 
-/** Roles allowed to watch the live feed (everyone signed in; readonly included —
- *  it's a read-only stream). */
-const WATCH_ROLES: Role[] = ["admin", "operator", "cashier", "readonly"];
+/** Permission required to watch the live feed (a read-only stream of ledger +
+ *  device status). Any role granted `report:read` may watch. */
+const WATCH_PERMISSION = "report:read" as const;
 
 /**
  * Is the handshake's Origin trusted? Same-origin (Origin host === Host header) is
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ export async function wsRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, db: Db, deviceMonitor: Devi
           throw Object.assign(new Error("forbidden origin"), { statusCode: 403 });
         }
         await req.jwtVerify();
-        if (!req.user || !WATCH_ROLES.includes(req.user.role)) {
+        if (!req.user || !roleHasPermissions(req.user.roleId, [WATCH_PERMISSION])) {
           throw Object.assign(new Error("forbidden"), { statusCode: 403 });
         }
       },