Security review flagged a hardcoded JWT secret fallback. A booth machine
started without JWT_SECRET would have signed tokens with a publicly-known
default, letting anyone forge an admin token — defeating the local-auth
anti-fraud model.
- requireJwtSecret() refuses to start on a missing, <32-char, or placeholder
secret (no insecure default).
- Add sign.expiresIn: 8h so minted tokens expire (bound to a shift).
- Add apps/server/.env.example documenting JWT_SECRET + how to generate it.
Verified: refuses with no secret and with the old placeholder; boots and
serves /health with a valid `openssl rand -hex 32` secret.
Turborepo (pnpm workspaces) with all dependencies pinned to latest
mutually-compatible versions: turbo 2.9, TypeScript 6, Fastify 5,
React 19, Vite 8, better-sqlite3 12 + Drizzle ORM 0.45.
Layout:
- apps/server Fastify backend (local JWT auth + role guard, /health)
- apps/web React 19 + Vite 8 operator SPA
- packages/db Drizzle schema on SQLite/WAL; append-only events + users
- packages/devices reader/printer/relay adapter interfaces (intent-only relay)
- packages/shared shared domain types
Architecture constraints from the design wiki are encoded in the scaffold:
append-only hash-chained + signed event log, device-agnostic adapters,
"a barrier is not a door" (relay expresses intent only), fully-local
offline-first auth.
wiki/ is an LLM-maintained Obsidian knowledge base (28 pages) ingested
from the architecture & design notes, with its own maintenance schema.
Verified: pnpm install, full turbo build (5/5), server boots and serves
/health, drizzle-kit generates the initial migration.
julian