Brought up the real UHPPOTE controller (serial 225088491, fw 09120) end to end
and recorded a procurement-level blocker.
Verified on hardware:
- discovery (LAN scan), host-commanded openDoor on doors 1 & 2 (physically
actuated; reason="remote open door"), and live button capture
(reason="push button ok").
Driver/networking fixes (packages/devices/src/drivers/access-uhppote.ts):
- broadcast to subnet-directed address (lib doesn't enable SO_BROADCAST for the
global 255.255.255.255 -> EACCES);
- Config broadcast must match the target's subnet for unicast reply routing
(fixes the health-check timeout: 5s -> 24ms ready);
- discover across all local subnets, dedupe by serial;
- serialize all controller I/O (concurrent calls collided on UDP :60001).
Server/UX:
- load .env via node --env-file-if-exists (vars weren't being read before);
- SETUP_AUTH_BYPASS hardened: env-gated, dev + loopback only, fails closed
otherwise; surfaced as catalog.authBypass so the wizard drops the token field;
- .env.example documents all vars; inline favicon stops a 404.
- apps/server/scripts/: uhppote-listen (live events, restores prior listener)
and uhppote-relay (guarded door-open test).
BLOCKER (wiki/decisions/access-controller-button-flow.md): the controller's
push-button input auto-opens the relay in firmware with no report-without-open
mode, so ticket-first entry (button -> print -> open, fail-closed) is impossible
as wired. UHPPOTE can't do it on that input; ZKTeco *might* via a programmable
aux input + PULL SDK but that's unverified and needs a new driver. Entry-lane
hardware decision paused to focus on the business side.
wiki: access-controller-button-flow (blocker), zkteco-controller (stub +
assessment), uhppote-controller callout, index + log.
Security review flagged a hardcoded JWT secret fallback. A booth machine
started without JWT_SECRET would have signed tokens with a publicly-known
default, letting anyone forge an admin token — defeating the local-auth
anti-fraud model.
- requireJwtSecret() refuses to start on a missing, <32-char, or placeholder
secret (no insecure default).
- Add sign.expiresIn: 8h so minted tokens expire (bound to a shift).
- Add apps/server/.env.example documenting JWT_SECRET + how to generate it.
Verified: refuses with no secret and with the old placeholder; boots and
serves /health with a valid `openssl rand -hex 32` secret.
julian