Car Wash — the pilot venue module (wiki/decisions/venue-modules.md):
- Master data (categories × services price matrix) at /setup/carwash; the desk at /wash
(ticket lookup → order; open queue oldest-first: Done / Paid cash / Paid card / Void;
Finished list). Orders freeze names + price; their life is signed (carwash_order,
carwash_payment). Migration 0027.
- Where money is taken is a SITE setting (carwash_config.pay_at, migration 0028, signed
config_change on a flip) — no per-order radio; a stale client is refused (409).
- Core seams: PayStation charge providers (a booth-paid wash rides the parking payment as
chargeLines) + applyValidation() shared with the merchant route. A bay-paid, done wash
signs the $0 parking payment so the exit reader releases the car.
- "Parking discount" modes for the wash: free while the wash runs (+ tolerance) and wash
price off the fee (floored at 0), resolved at done and anchored at the order's intake
(the entry-anchored version comped a 74-day stay); typed-amount and percent hidden for
the wash. Long durations render y/d/h/m.
Tills — a shift belongs to a till, not the site (wiki/concepts/shift.md §Tills):
- TillId booth|carwash; every money event names its till (absent = booth, so the chain
re-folds identically). ShiftService is per till: single-open, folds, X/Z-reports,
vouchers, carry-forward. A bay payment needs the carwash shift.
- Working a till needs that till's module permission (manifest tillPermission; 403
till_forbidden); /api/shift/tills lists only the role's tills.
- Web: ShiftButton per till (header = booth, wash desk = carwash); shift hub lists every
open shift with till badges + filter; drawer hub switches tills.
Modules: landing per module (index route resolves booth → module landing → shifts →
profile); guards bounce to "/", /booth needs session:read.
Tests: carwash e2e suite (settings, intake, booth/bay paths, modes, void, gate, pay-at
policy, till permissions), 6 per-till shift tests; suite green (1 pre-existing flaky
backup test under the parallel run).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FWncR69HgGPuei1dLrW3cU
The v0.1.4 Origin fix cleared only the first of two gates in /api/ws's
preHandler. The second, req.jwtVerify(), reads the HttpOnly cookie — which
tauri-plugin-websocket (a bare tungstenite client, no cookie jar) can never
send. Every desktop handshake 401'd and use-live-feed reconnected every 10s
(confirmed in the park-2 server log).
- routes/ws.ts: POST /api/ws/ticket (cookie + CSRF auth) mints a 30s,
single-use, in-memory ticket; the WS preHandler accepts it via an
x-ws-ticket header after the Origin check, then the same report:read
role check. Browser cookie path unchanged; JWT stays out of JS.
- platform-ws.ts: fetch a ticket before connect, send it with the Origin
header; connect failures now go through logClient (rate-limited).
- logger.ts: flush read the CSRF token from document.cookie, null on
desktop, so every desktop POST /api/logs 403'd and was dropped silently —
no desktop client log had ever reached app_logs. Stash moved to a
dependency-free lib/desktop-csrf.ts shared by api.ts and logger.ts.
- backend-config.ts: ConnectScreen probe uses the unauthenticated /health
(now also returns app: "parking-system") instead of accepting any 401.
- README: local-AppImage release gate — tauri dev runs at
http://localhost:5173, not tauri://localhost, so none of these
origin-dependent bugs reproduce there.
- wiki: new section + log entry; four citation corrections.
Requires the server image with this commit deployed before the new desktop
build connects (the ticket endpoint must exist).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FWncR69HgGPuei1dLrW3cU
CI already computes <branch>-<short-sha> for image tags but never
surfaced it anywhere reachable from the app, so there was no way to
tell what's actually deployed on a booth without cross-referencing
komodo/resources.toml's TAG by hand.
Thread it through: CI passes BUILD_VERSION as a Docker build-arg,
the Dockerfile captures it as a runtime env var, GET /api/version
(gated by the existing site:read permission) exposes it, and the
Setup page's tab bar shows it right-aligned, muted, absent entirely
on a local/dev build with no CI-supplied value.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FWncR69HgGPuei1dLrW3cU
/drawer was record + review only: no current balance, no sight of the open
shift's incomings, no daily activity, no shift history. Rebuilt as a hub:
- Drawer now: the till's running balance (new GET /api/drawer/balance,
shift:read — exposes the service's existing drawerBalance(); the drawer
is one site-wide till, same exposure the X-report already had) with the
open shift's X-report breakdown alongside (float + takings + vouchers =
expected = balance) and a "This shift: ±X" figure (expected − opening
float — the shift's own contribution vs what it inherited).
- Today's cash activity: every cash payment + voucher since local
midnight from the signed chain, live, with day totals (card never
enters the till).
- Record + movements/review: the 2026-07-01 flow, unchanged.
- Closed shifts: drawer-focused history via the scope-aware /api/shifts
(float → takings ± vouchers → expected per shift).
Also: every shift open/close button (header, /shifts, pay modal, end-
shift confirm) now shows an animated spinner + dims while busy — the old
label-swap-only feedback read as a dead click when a shift open ran slow.
The slowness itself (drawer/shift reads fold the WHOLE chain, O(chain))
is recorded as an open item in wiki/concepts/shift.md with the fix
sketch: fold from the last z-report's signed expectedDrawerMinor forward.
No new ledger surface — one read-only endpoint; RBAC test added.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
Boots the REAL Fastify app over a fresh in-memory DB (buildServer({ db }), driven by
app.inject — no listen) to exercise the security seam end to end:
- routes.test.ts (7): /health open; login rejects bad creds and sets token+csrf
cookies on good ones; an unauthenticated GET /api/occupancy is 401; a site:read-only
role GETs occupancy but is 403 on PUT /api/site-config (the permission gate, with a
valid CSRF so the 403 is the perm check); an admin passes the same PUT; and a mutation
with the auth cookie but NO csrf header is 403 (double-submit enforced).
Adds seedUser()/login() helpers (real bcrypt + the real /api/auth/login route) and
LOG_LEVEL=silent in the vitest env so asserted 401/403 responses don't flood output.
server 75/75 green (8 suites).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
julian