a9f18be7003e0bad5b54339fce6a8d884c92f3e7
93 Commits
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c21babf293 |
feat(logging): ~2-month container rotation, ISO timestamps, level names
Operator asked for bounded container logs (~2 months of history), human- readable timestamps, and clarity on levels. Levels already existed (LOG_LEVEL env → pino, default info; warn+ teed into app_logs, queryable at /setup/logs) — the "level":30 / epoch-ms "time" in docker logs were pino defaults. - server.ts logger: stamp ISO-8601 UTC time (timestamp fn) and level NAMES (formatters.level) so `docker logs` reads human. - log-service.ts pinoDbStream: accept BOTH level encodings (name + numeric) — the label switch would otherwise have silently stopped warn+ persistence into app_logs. New log-service-stream.test.ts pins both encodings, the info-stays-stdout-only rule, and the never-throws fallback. - docker-compose.prod.yml: json-file caps resized from 10m×3 (≈30 MB — days, not months) to ≈2 months by volume: server 20m×30, vision 20m×10, proxy 10m×5. json-file rotates by SIZE; time-based isn't a driver feature — comment says to revisit if `docker logs` holds under ~60 days. - app_logs retention default aligned 30→60 days (LOG_RETENTION_DAYS still overrides). Wiki: app-logs.md gains the container-log store section (rotation, format, LOG_LEVEL knob) + retention update; log.md entry. Suite 282 green. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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35e593ab63 |
docs(wiki): DT-008 phantom-scan diagnosis + backfill bypass/relay-test concept pages
Two independent wiki updates bundled (all docs):
1. dingtian-dt008-reader.md: phantom optical decodes on the park-buzi EXIT
reader (empty pre-opening site, low-sun afternoons). Chain of evidence:
READ log lines carry the reader's own serial (H05MA5B0) → physical device,
not a network source; snapshot shows nobody present; code shapes are the
giveaway (6-digit numerics = checksum-less Interleaved 2-of-5, lone "C" =
Code39/Codabar artifact) → 1D engine decoding sun-made stripe patterns
(striped arm, fence shadows, glare). No fraud exposure (11-digit Luhn ids
can't match); noise only. Fix on the entity page: vendor-tool symbology cut
to QR+Code128 + min decode length, BOTH readers; config lives ON the device
→ re-apply after any factory reset/swap. Deliberately NOT filtering
impossible codes server-side — probe recording is the anomaly path's job.
2. Backfilled two shipped-but-undocumented features (six code files already
linked the first page as if it existed):
- concepts/entry-presence-bypass.md — admin drops a FAULTY presence signal
(granular radar/camera by decision, not a master switch); every flip is a
signed config_change; persists till off; tickets stamped presenceBypassed;
radar-bypass cooldown tradeoff; "the admin is not the adversary, but
trusted never means invisible".
- concepts/setup-relay-test.md — admin-only commissioning pulse, signed
barrier_open_command BEFORE the fire so a test open never reads as the
out-of-band-open fraud signal; saved controllers/declared relays only;
radarAlert lamps excluded; pulseOpen only.
Cross-linked from operator-issued-entry.md, cataloged in index.md, logged.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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b4f1418858 |
fix(entry): enforce the camera press-gate + duplicate-ticket defenses
Field report (park-buzi): a BLINKING entry button still printed — the lamp encoded blink-vs-solid (radar-only vs radar+camera) but #suppressReason only checked the radar, so a radar false-positive (rain, pedestrian) minted a real signed ticket. Three layered fixes: 1. CAMERA gate on the physical press: with an entry camera configured, a press is live only in the lamp's SOLID state (LaneStatus.entry busy, mirrored into EntryFlow via onLaneStatus). Suppress-only — the camera stays advisory (never opens, never traps). Camera-less sites keep the radar-only gate; a faulty camera is dropped via the existing bypassPresenceCamera admin toggle. 2. Cooldown as a REAL backstop behind presence: the presence branch returned early, so entryCooldownSec was dead wherever a loop was wired. Now it bounds the stationary-car double-ticket (a motion radar drops a motionless car → spurious loop-clear re-arms one-car-one-ticket → same car reprints). 3. Post-hoc duplicate-plate anomaly (entry-side twin of plateSwapSuspected): when entry ANPR recognizes a plate already OPEN under another session entered within ENTRY_DUP_PLATE_WINDOW_MIN (default 15 min), sign ONE entry.duplicatePlate anomaly naming both tickets for the operator to void. ANPR stays non-blocking (rides the post-open snapshot as before). REJECTED: camera-vetoed re-arm (defer re-arm until the lane flips free). The camera has no leave events — "free" is a ~30s silence timeout that never lapses inside a queue, so every queued car after the first would be suppressed until an operator intervened. Blocking legit entry at peak beats nothing; the proper preventive fix is a pass-through sensor (passedInput) — recorded as open in wiki/concepts/entry-double-press.md. Also: setup.relayTest reason was missing from both web catalogs (parity is only enforced sq<->en, so the build passed) — added. Tests: entry-press-gate.test.ts (blink suppresses / solid prints / camera-less unaffected / bypass honored / cooldown catches the dropout re-press / residual risk documented / still-present re-press stays suppressed) + entry-duplicate-plate.test.ts (flags open dup, ignores closed/stale/self/other plates). Suite 258 green. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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f486dcbbfc |
docs(wiki): vision-service hardening backlog + boot-migration data-seed note
Two unrelated leftover wiki edits from earlier sessions:
- NEW concepts/vision-service-hardening.md: the prioritised to-do list from the
2026-07-02 code + security reviews of apps/vision/ (DoS gaps, unauthenticated/
operator-writable model weights, 0.0.0.0 default bind). Cross-linked from
opencv-anpr-service.md ("consult before touching this service").
- container-deployment.md: note that a boot-time migration can be a DATA SEED
(e.g. an RBAC permission granted to the operator role via INSERT OR IGNORE),
and that a built-in-role grant does not auto-apply to a custom role.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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c142166972 |
docs(wiki): ATECC608 is upcoming — retag ledger signing to the on-host reality
No secure element is on-site: event signing runs on the software HMAC (EVENT_SIGNING_KEY, an env var on the host disk), so the ledger is tamper-EVIDENT but forgeable by anyone who owns the host. Several pages overstated it as present-tense "ATECC608-signed / unforgeable"; correct them. - NEW concepts/hardware-signer-options.md: four options for a non-extractable signing key (USB HSM / YubiKey / reuse the TPM / plain-dongle trap) + the recommendation (TPM interim → USB-HSM target; ATECC608 stays for the embedded ESP32, wrong part for a PC host). - entities/atecc608.md: UPCOMING-not-present status banner + PC-vs-embedded. - disk-os-hardening.md: fix the live-USB row (BIOS boot-order password is load-bearing, not Secure Boot — a signed live USB runs); add a physical-tamper chain (Dell 7070 CMOS-reset → live-USB → PCR-7 same-signer unseal) + accepted risks (that unseal, unsigned-initramfs evil-maid, operator-USB read TODO). - open-questions #6 reframed; standing-decisions / overview / threat-model / index de-overstated; log query entry. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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33c4ea1e91 |
feat(entry): operator-issued entry + exit plate-swap reconciliation
Two halves of one anti-fraud design.
(A) Operator-issued entry — when the physical entry button is broken, an
operator can issue an entry ticket so a real car isn't blocked out of the lot.
This hands the operator-adversary a mint, so it is:
- PRESENCE-GATED like the physical button: a real car must be present (radar/
loop AND camera busy). Enforced BOTH sides — the server re-checks current
presence so a direct POST can't bypass a disabled button; no presence loop
=> feature unavailable; a no-presence attempt signs an anomaly.
- FLAGGED: vehicle_entry source=manual + operatorInitiated + operator, PLUS a
companion entry.operatorIssued anomaly (the adversary path always leaves a
red-flag row).
- capacity-OVERRIDE allowed but stamped lotFull (a broken button mustn't trap
a legit car).
New session:create permission (migration 0019 -> operator role, admin-
revocable), POST /api/entry/issue (open-shift gated), EntryFlow.
issueForOperator; the fraud-critical print->sign->open->snapshot sequence is
factored into one shared #issueTicket (button + operator). UI: the entry
BarrierLight becomes a clickable issue-control when presence+permission+shift
meet (confirm -> issue).
(B) Exit plate-swap reconciliation — defends the ticket-swap fraud the mint
enables (paid car let out on a fresh $0 ticket, original ticket lingers
"inside", occupancy drifts up by phantom cars). The plate is the invariant:
ExitFlow.#reconcilePlateAtExit compares the exiting plate against all OPEN
sessions' entry plates, EXACT + HIGH-CONFIDENCE only (>=0.85; a fuzzy read never
gates — ANPR is advisory). On a match under a DIFFERENT ticket:
- BOOTH path: returns swap_suspected + signs exit.plateSwapSuspected; the
pay/exit modal shows a red warning + "Override & release" (override signs an
attributed exit.plateSwapOverride). Flag+override, never a silent hard block
(exit fails-open; a plate is never the sole gate).
- READER path (no operator): log-only anomaly + fail-open.
Extended BoothExitResult + /api/exit (override); boothExit client returns a
structured swap result.
Verified: full monorepo build/lint/test green (229 server tests incl. 4 new:
hold-on-swap, override-releases-with-attribution, low-confidence-no-warning,
own-plate-no-warning). New wiki: operator-issued-entry.md +
plate-reconciliation.md; cross-linked from entry-exit-points, capacity-
occupancy, index. Preserves "a plate never OPENS a barrier alone — and now never
TRAPS a car alone either."
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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114a32e6f2 |
feat(drawer): operator records cash movements, admin reviews after (own /drawer route)
Rework drawer cash movements from synchronous admin-authorization-at-creation
(operator typed an admin's password inline for every receipt/disbursement) to
operator-records-freely -> admin-reviews-after.
- New `drawer` resource: drawer:create (operator records; admin-revocable per
role) + drawer:review (admin authorizes/denies). Migration 0018 grants the
default operator role drawer:create; admin gets all in code.
- New signed `cash_review` ledger event { refId, decision, reviewedBy, note? }.
A DENIAL is a FLAG, not a reversal: it never appends reversing cash and never
touches the drawer balance (the correction is settled outside the app). This
is what keeps a late review from leaking into the next operator's inherited
drawer — a denial that lands after the reviewed shift closed moves no cash.
Regression test: op1 disburses -> closes -> op2 inherits -> admin denies ->
op2 drawer unchanged.
- Move the feature OFF the polluted /shifts route to a top-level /drawer
(operator: record + own; admin: review queue + all). routes/drawer.ts lifted
from routes/shift.ts (retired the authorizer-password gate; kept shift:cash
for its other job = admin-sees-all-shifts). New DrawerManager.tsx.
Display fixes bundled:
- Render cash_review in the event-detail modal (decision / reviewed-by / note /
movement ref) — previously showed nothing.
- Relabel the shift drawer figures for clarity: Daily takings / Receipts /
Disbursements (was Cash payments / Cash added / Cash removed).
- Hide the Card figure everywhere when CARD_PAYMENTS_ENABLED is false (no POS
on-site), matching the card-tender gate.
shared/db/server/web all typecheck; 225 server tests pass (incl. the drawer
review + cross-shift-leak regression); web build + i18n parity green. Verified
end-to-end via Playwright. Recorded in wiki/concepts/shift.md.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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018328a877 |
feat(booth): disable card tender until a P2PE POS is on-site (cash-only)
No card processor / POS terminal on any site yet. Offering "Card" would let an operator record a card payment that never cleared a terminal, corrupting the till reconciliation — a fraud/error surface on an operator-adversary system. Add apps/web/src/lib/features.ts → CARD_PAYMENTS_ENABLED=false, gating both tender pickers (BoothPayModal, SubscriptionManager). With card off there's nothing to choose, so the tender row is suppressed and payment defaults to cash. UI-only gate: the Tender type, payment events, shift accounting, and reports still understand `card`, so historical card events and a future re-enable stay coherent. Verified via Playwright: an unpaid-ticket modal shows Total + "Pay + open barrier" with no tender/cash/card row. Wiki: new concepts/card-payments.md records the current cash-only state, the PCI-scope-out-of-app constraint, the future-POS device requirements, and the re-enable path (flip the flag once a bank-certified P2PE terminal is provisioned). Linked from index, parking-session, open-questions #3. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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266e9b0027 |
docs(wiki): record session findings — snapshot fix, booth rework, db reset
- entry-exit-points.md: the snapshot content-type bug + serve-side cleanType fix (Hikvision image/jpeg; charset="UTF-8" broke every legacy render). - booth-exit-flow.md: the Active-Sessions/modal rework — inline barrier button removed -> modal; closed-within-grace view; live grace countdown; actual paid amount; read-only snapshot review in the closed-session view. - local-dev-workflow.md: the gated `pnpm db:reset` training tool + flag table + the booth (docker exec, no pnpm) note. - appliance-provisioning.md: new §7d — reset on the booth via docker exec into the server container (script ships in the deploy bundle; DATABASE_URL= /data/parking.sqlite), ledger-truncation warning + the two safety gates. - index.md catalog line; log.md entries. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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9c6741a485 |
docs(wiki): record backup deploy gotchas (compose allowlist + host mount)
CI / check (push) Successful in 40s
Two lessons from the first park-buzi staging deploy, both in backup-recovery.md: - A new server env var (BACKUP_KEY) must be added to docker-compose.yml's server.environment: allowlist, not just the Komodo secret/Stack env — otherwise the container never receives it (inspect shows it absent, not empty). - The backup target must be a host path bind-mounted into the container; a desktop- automounted USB (/run/media/...) is invisible inside the container, so Test target reports 'does not exist'. Destinations are admin-provisioned (fstab + compose bind- mount), not operator-pluggable — partly a threat-model feature. Acknowledged as a flexibility limitation; USB-automount-to-container flow deferred. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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84f00db48b |
feat(backup): admin-tunable retention + BACKUP_KEY as a Komodo secret
Retention (keep-last / keep-daily-days) is operational policy the on-site admin should tune, not a server env var requiring a redeploy -- same reasoning that moved the target directory to the UI. - Migration 0017: site_config.backup_keep_last + backup_keep_daily_days (nullable; null = code default 7 / 30 per field). - BackupService reads retention fresh each run; status() exposes keepLast + keepDailyDays. DEFAULT_BACKUP_RETENTION is now a pure code default (env reads gone). - PUT /api/backup/config accepts keepLast / keepDailyDays (non-negative int, or null to reset to default; 400 on negative). - UI: two retention fields on the Backup config card; one Save covers target + retention. i18n sq + en. BACKUP_KEY wired into Komodo: - komodo/resources.toml: BACKUP_KEY=[[park_buzi_backup_key]] (per-booth secret, alongside JWT / signing keys). - komodo/.env.komodo.example: documents it as the ONLY backup env var -- escrow it offsite alongside EVENT_SIGNING_KEY (recovery needs both); target + retention are admin-chosen in the UI / DB, not env. Server .env.example trimmed to just BACKUP_KEY. Also carries the small in-progress setup-intro i18n copy trim. Tests: 218 server tests green, incl. retention persist / reset-to-default / reject- negative and the updated status shape. Migration applies cleanly (needed a statement-breakpoint between the two ALTERs). Wiki backup-recovery updated. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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d5e41500a8 |
feat(backup): admin UI with admin-chosen target directory
The backup destination is now chosen by the on-site admin in the UI (Setup -> Backup), not a server env var. An env-pinned target defeats the purpose: the admin can't point backups at a freshly-plugged USB or a NAS mount without editing .env and restarting. The encryption key stays a server secret. Target storage: - New site_config.backup_target_dir (migration 0016, nullable; null = not configured). BackupService reads it fresh each run, so a UI change takes effect with no restart. Only BACKUP_KEY stays env -- a key must never live in the DB it backs up. Routes: - PUT /api/backup/config -- set/clear the target (backup:update; upserts id=1). - POST /api/backup/test -- probe a candidate path server-side (exists / is a directory / writable) so the admin gets feedback before relying on it. - status() now exposes targetDir + keyPresent, so the UI distinguishes 'no target set' from 'BACKUP_KEY missing'. UI (apps/web/src/BackupSettings.tsx): - A Setup -> Backup tab (gated backup:read): an editable target-path field with a Test-target probe (localized ok/missing/not-a-dir/not-writable), Save, the status panel (config state, last-run size/pruned/error, a distinct amber missing-key warning), a Back up now button, and the restore-is-out-of-band note. Full i18n (sq + en); nav.backup. - API client: fetchBackupStatus / setBackupTarget / testBackupTarget / runBackup. Also includes a small in-progress copy trim to the setup-intro i18n strings. Verified live with Playwright: typed a path -> Test reported writable -> Save persisted it -> status reflected it and showed the key-missing warning. Whole monorepo build/lint/test green. Wiki backup-recovery + open-question #5 updated. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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0c218179c4 |
feat(backup): encrypted on-site DB backup engine + local target
The SQLite DB is the signed append-only ledger, so a disk failure / stolen or destroyed PC means total revenue-history loss (open-question #5). This is the first slice of the backup-recovery design: the engine + a local/mounted target + a daily timer + a manual route. Engine (apps/server/src/backup.ts): - Consistent online copy of the live WAL DB via better-sqlite3's native .backup() (not a raw file copy, which can capture a torn WAL) — the restored copy is a byte-identical, queryable DB. - AES-256-GCM with a scrypt-derived key from BACKUP_KEY; self-describing header (magic|version|salt|iv|...|authTag) so a restore tool needs only the key + file. Zero new dependencies (Node crypto). - The plaintext intermediate is kept in scratch (not the removable/network target) and wiped in a finally, success or fail. - Retention: keep-last-N + one-per-day within N days. Wiring: - BackupService (env config, single in-flight guard, last-success/last-error). - routes/backup.ts: GET /api/backup/status (backup:read), POST /api/backup/run (backup:create), 409 when unconfigured. No restore route — restore is an out-of-band runbook action on a fresh appliance, not a console call. - New permission resource in @parking/shared. - server.ts: an unref'd daily timer, a no-op until BACKUP_TARGET_DIR + BACKUP_KEY are set, deliberately not run at startup (a just-power-cut booth shouldn't write to a possibly-unmounted disk). - openRawDb() added to @parking/db/testing (open a file without migrating, for restore-verification tests). BACKUP_KEY is deliberately SEPARATE from EVENT_SIGNING_KEY (independent rotation; backups travel, the signing key shouldn't). SMB/NFS work as mount paths; SFTP + admin UI + restore runbook are deferred slices. Tests: round-trip byte-identical, GCM tamper/wrong-key fail, short-key rejected, scratch cleaned, route auth/RBAC + 409. build/lint/test green (212 server tests). Wiki + open-question #5 updated. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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9e442586af |
docs(wiki): settle on-site encrypted backup + disaster-recovery design
New concept page backup-recovery.md resolving the design half of open-question #5. Driving scenario: a stolen/destroyed PC whose LUKS+TPM disk is unrecoverable by design — recovery stands up a NEW PC, restores a backup, and keeps signing the SAME chain. Settled: admin-driven encrypted full-DB backup (SQLite online-backup/VACUUM INTO, snapshots included) to local/USB, SMB/NFS, or SFTP targets; manual button + an in-process daily timer; keep-last-N + dailies retention; restore is admin-only / out-of-band (operator-adversary surface). A restored copy must still verifyChain. Key custody (the load-bearing decision, bears on #6): three independent keys — EVENT_SIGNING_KEY kept an extractable, escrowed software key DECOUPLED from the TPM so the ledger survives total hardware loss (the conscious trade: a TPM-sealed signing key would be unforgeable but permanently unverifiable after the machine dies); a NEW dedicated park_buzi_backup_key in Komodo for backup encryption, separate from the signing key; the LUKS/TPM disk key, appliance-only and deliberately non-recoverable. Keys are never inside the backup they unlock. Updated open-questions #5 (design SETTLED) + #10 note; disk-os-hardening deploy runbook (why the signing key is not sealed + park_buzi_backup_key); index catalog + concept count. Design only — not yet built. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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11567a417f |
docs(wiki): catch concept pages up to the booth-UX/shift/font-scale work
Bring three queryable pages current with the booth-UX commit (
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f6e35bbebf |
fix(reader): correct the QR reader's identity — Dingtian DT-008, not "GEE"
An early wrong assumption named the QR/RFID access reader "GEE" / "GEE/Fondvision" / "GEE-QR-ER80" (and summarized a raw GEE PDF as its datasheet). There is no GEE device — it's the Dingtian DT-008 (dingtian-tech.com/en_us/qr_code_reader.html), the same vendor as the relay board, which is why it integrates the identical HTTP-GET-push way. Code: - Driver symbol geeQrReaderDriver → dingtianQrReaderDriver; label → "Dingtian DT-008 QR/RFID reader (HTTP push)"; comments/description rewritten to the real DT-008 facts (Wiegand 26/34, TCP/IP, USB, RS485 — not RS-232; QR/barcode + ID/IC/NFC — not DataMatrix/1D). - Persisted driverId "gee-qr-reader" → "dingtian-qr-reader" (the registry lookup key + the row created on assign in qr-reader.ts). - Migration 0015 rewrites existing devices.driver_id rows so configured readers keep resolving (applied to the dev DB — 2 rows; the booth applies it on boot). Behaviour is unchanged: naming + the persisted id only. Wiki + memory: - Renamed entities/gee-qr-er80.md → dingtian-dt008-reader.md and sources/gee-qr-er80.md → dingtian-dt008.md; rewrote both to the real DT-008 product-page specs while KEEPING all the verified-on-hardware protocol facts (cjihao serial, .jsp path, Connection: close). Fixed every cross-reference + "GEE" mention in 6 other pages. Memory gee-reader-serial-binding → dingtian-reader-serial-binding. The only surviving "GEE" mentions are deliberate naming-correction notes, the raw PDF filename, and the append-only log history. Full workspace build/lint/test green; dev DB readers verified resolving to the registered dingtian-qr-reader driver. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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96acd6b662 |
feat(snapshot): re-encode captures + disk-pressure retention
Camera snapshots were stored RAW — the camera's full-res JPEG straight into the BLOB, no resize/recompress. Measured on the dev DB: 300 snapshots = 81.7 MB = ~72% of the 114 MB SQLite file (the big ones 2688×1520 / ~600 KB, Hikvision main stream). They dominated the appliance's single backed-up DB file. Re-encode on capture (snapshot.ts): - Downscale each frame to SNAPSHOT_MAX_EDGE (1280px long edge) + recompress at SNAPSHOT_JPEG_QUALITY (80) via sharp (libvips, Apache-2.0) before storage — ~6-10× smaller (verified 2688×1520 → 1280×724, ~8×), plate still readable, clean image/jpeg (drops the camera's charset cruft). STORAGE-ONLY: recognition keeps the ORIGINAL full-res bytes (downscaling hurts OCR). Fail-soft — a re-encode error stores the original, never drops the snapshot or blocks the (already-open) path. sharp lives in apps/server (owns the capture path), where bcrypt already establishes the native-dep pattern. Disk-pressure retention (snapshot-retention.ts) — a SAFETY VALVE, not the daily mechanism (the re-encode does that). Daily check reads the DB filesystem used% (statfs on db.$client.name); no-op unless ≥ SNAPSHOT_DISK_HIGH_PCT (70). Over the mark: delete the OLDEST until an estimated SNAPSHOT_DISK_FREE_TARGET_PCT (10%) of disk is freed — never below SNAPSHOT_MIN_KEEP (500) — then VACUUM once to return space to the OS. A DELETE only frees SQLite pages (disk doesn't drop until VACUUM), so the loop is driven by estimated freed bytes (SUM(length(bytes))), not a live disk re-read; the prune owns the DB-locking VACUUM, run daily off-peak. diskUsage is injectable for tests. None of this touches the signed ledger — snapshots are unsigned/advisory, referenced only by id. Tests: encodeForStorage (downscale / clean-type / no-enlarge / fail-soft) + pruneSnapshots (no-op below mark / delete-oldest-to-target + VACUUM / MIN_KEEP floor / skip-VACUUM-when-empty). All four snapshot env knobs documented in the komodo env reference. Full workspace build/lint/test green; the prune smoke-verified on a scratch DB copy (file shrank after VACUUM). Existing ~81.7 MB of raw snapshots are unchanged (a one-off re-encode backfill is a separate optional follow-up). Updated entry-exit-points + technology-stack wiki. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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38481f105f |
feat(booth): blink the Entry/Exit lights on radar presence (mirror relay 3)
The on-screen Hyrje/Dalje barrier lights were 2-state (green=free / red=busy)
off the camera lane-status only — they couldn't show the radar-only "detected,
not yet confirmed" state that makes the physical button lamp (relay 3) blink.
Now they mirror the lamp's 3-state rule per lane:
radar present + camera not busy → BLINK green↔red (~1 Hz)
camera busy → SOLID red
otherwise → SOLID green
End-to-end:
- LanePresence (lane-presence.ts): subscribes to deviceEvents.onInput, resolves
each presence edge to its lane via the new direction-agnostic presenceLaneOf()
(device-resolve.ts) — entry AND exit, unlike the entry-gated relayForPresence
the one-car-one-ticket gate uses — and emits a lane-presence {entry,exit} bus
event on change. Wired in server.ts (start + onClose).
- WS forwards it (hello snapshot + push) into live-store.radar.
- BarrierLight (BoothScreen.tsx) is now 3-state; blinks via the .lane-blink
keyframe (index.css), which holds solid-red under prefers-reduced-motion.
Same input + same rule as the lamp, so the screen and the post never disagree.
A new test (lane-presence.test.ts) caught a real bug: the first cut reused
relayForPresence, so the EXIT lane never resolved (it's entry-gated) and never
blinked — presenceLaneOf fixes it. Covers entry/exit independence, de-dupe
across several radars on one lane, and ignoring non-presence inputs.
Full workspace build/lint/test green (185 server tests). Updated the
button-light-indicator wiki page ("On-screen twin").
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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4418594af0 |
refactor(setup): unify controller I/O — event-driven relays[] + generic inputs[]
The controller new/edit modal hardcoded both its outputs and its inputs, so an
operator could neither add a generic event-driven relay nor a free-standing input
(e.g. a second radar at the exit). This unifies both into symmetric, first-class
lists. Behaviour for existing booths is unchanged (back-compat, no DB migration).
Outputs — one event→action relays[] list:
- A relay is "when EVENT X happens, do its action": entry/exit/both pulse a
barrier; a new `radarAlert` event drives a non-barrier alert lamp (blink while
its trigger input is active, SOLID once the camera confirms a car).
- Dropped the separate config.buttonLight block — the lamp is just a relays[] row
with direction:"radarAlert" (triggerInput + blink cadence). `alertRelaysOf()`
replaces `buttonLightOf()`; ButtonLightController keeps its proven 3-state
machine (serialized UDP, fail-OFF, hot-reload), now keyed per controllerId:relay
so several alert lamps on one controller run independently. Every barrier
resolver skips radarAlert rows (no auto-open; barrier-not-a-door intact).
Inputs — one first-class config.inputs[] list (the twin of relays[]):
- Each row is { input, role, relay?, kind?, activeLow?, cooldownSec? } with a
"+ Add input" button. role ∈ button | presence | alertTrigger; button/presence
name the relay they serve. An exit radar is just another presence row.
- Keystone `inputsOf(row)`: returns config.inputs[] or SYNTHESIZES it from the
legacy relays[].button/presenceInput/... fields, so relayForButton /
relayForPresence resolve identically from either shape — zero-downtime, no
migration. entry-flow.ts is unchanged (resolves through the same functions).
- Fixed a latent bug this exposed: the alert lamp's camera lock was hardcoded to
the ENTRY camera. Added relays[].lockLane ("entry"|"exit", default entry); the
lamp now locks on its own lane's camera, so an exit radar's lamp tracks the exit
camera. button-light tracks both #entryBusy/#exitBusy.
- Driver: extracted activeLowFrom(config) — merges inputs[] activeLow, legacy
relays[].presenceActiveLow, and the inputActiveLow escape hatch.
UI: the relay dropdown gained a "Radar alert" option (reveals trigger/lock/blink
inputs); InputEditor is rewritten to a generic list (role select folds loop/radar);
i18n sq+en kept at type-parity.
Tests: new device-resolve.test.ts (inputs[] resolution + legacy fallback identical
+ exit-radar resolves to the exit relay); button-light gains a two-independent-
alert-relays case and an exit-lamp lockLane case; access-dingtian gains
activeLowFrom cases. Full workspace build/lint/test green (i18n parity included).
Wiki + memory updated (button-light-indicator, entry-double-press, dingtian-relay).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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25a72ff20a |
feat(anpr): per-camera auto-open toggle (anprAutoTrigger) for shared lanes
A shared entry/exit lane has both an entry and an exit camera on ONE lane: a subscriber driving IN is admitted by the entry cam, but the exit cam sees the same car leaving its frame and phantom-EXITs the occurrence just opened (its back plate). Separate RECOGNITION from AUTO-OPEN per camera: - config.anpr (unchanged) = run snapshots through the recognizer, record the plate (evidence), BOTH directions — stays on. - config.anprAutoTrigger (new, absent ⇒ on when anpr is on) = may THIS camera auto-open the barrier. Set false on the shared-lane exit cam: it still recognises plates but never auto-triggers. The bridge gates on it (anpr-entry.ts), before the poll loop. UI: a "Auto open/close on subscriber plate" checkbox under ANPR in the camera setup (shown when anpr is on); persisted true/false so a park can explicitly disable it. i18n sq+en (also corrected the now-stale anprHint "never opens a barrier" wording — it does, via the bridge). +1 server test (anprAutoTrigger=false → no snapshot, no read); 172 green. Documented the two toggle levels (site-wide + per-camera) in lane-presence-and-anpr-entry. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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c2a861208f |
fix(anpr): sliding poll window so a car arriving mid-loop isn't lost
A loop started by a far/early car would (a) give up before the REAL car settled at the barrier, and (b) swallow the real car's pushes (the #polling guard dropped them). So a confident-but-wrong far-car plate could win, or the intended car get debounced out after the loop ended — wrong car acted on, right car blocked. Fix: a push that JOINS a running loop now EXTENDS the deadline (lastPush + ANPR_POLL_WINDOW_MS) instead of being dropped, capped at start + ANPR_POLL_MAX_MS (30s) so a continuously-busy lane can't slide forever. Each tick still pulls a FRESH frame, so the loop tracks whoever is at the barrier NOW, not the car that started it. Per-camera sliding deadline in #pollDeadline (cleared with #polling in finally). +1 test (push mid-poll keeps the loop alive past the initial deadline); 171 server tests green. New knob ANPR_POLL_MAX_MS documented in the komodo env reference + the two concurrency guards written up in lane-presence-and-anpr-entry. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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f77ed11782 |
feat(anpr): poll snapshots until a confident plate, so auto-exit works
The ANPR bridge took ONE snapshot at the camera's vehicle-alarm instant — but the
alarm fires as the car APPROACHES, so that frame's plate is small/blurry/half-in-
frame and ANPR returns a low-confidence misread ('111'@0.20). The manual test reads
the SAME car at ~100% because by then it's STOPPED at the barrier, well-framed. So
subscriber auto-exit silently never fired (read below the 0.85 floor → ignored).
Fix (the car-stops-at-the-barrier insight): the bridge now PULLS A FRESH FRAME every
ANPR_POLL_MS (1000) and re-runs ANPR until one clears VISION_ENTRY_MIN_CONFIDENCE, or
ANPR_POLL_WINDOW_MS (8000) elapses (drove off / non-subscriber → give up cleanly).
- One loop per camera (#polling set) — the camera's ~1Hz alarm re-fires JOIN the
running loop instead of spawning N concurrent loops.
- Fresh camera.captureSnapshot each tick, NOT captureSnapshotShared (its 1.5s TTL
would re-serve the same bad approach frame).
- Camera-level debounce stamp moved to AFTER a successful emit (suppresses re-fires
for ANPR_DEBOUNCE_MS once we've acted), not before the loop.
VERIFIED on hardware (DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU exit lane): 7 garbage approach frames →
AA890XX@0.999 at the barrier → signed vehicle_exit. Still advisory + fail-soft; a
barrier never opens on a low-confidence read. anpr-entry.test.ts +1 (poll
escalation low→low→high); 169 server tests green. Documented in
lane-presence-and-anpr-entry + the lpr-camera camera-fault writeup.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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898cf1953a |
docs(wiki): camera 503/stream, alarm URL helper, reader ICMP liveness
- lpr-camera.md: "503 Device Busy" can be PERSISTENT (main-stream saturation on the G3H) — the real fix is sub-stream selection, not just retry. - device-status-monitoring.md: QR reader health was false-healthy (hardcoded "ready") until the ICMP-ping fix; document the push-device monitoring model. - log entries for both 2026-06-26 sessions. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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6d7682ab4a |
docs(wiki): printer USB transport + open-question for the provisioning
New concepts/printer-usb-transport.md (the seam, usblp char device, reachability-only status, threat model). open-questions #14: confirm the on-site printer is USB and bake the usblp + udev write-access rule into the appliance image (provisioning, not app code; unverified on hardware). Updated rongta-printer.md (USB transport note), index.md, log.md. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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5a5fedf4f4 |
docs(wiki): booth bring-up fixes — relay password, secret re-merge, lamp concurrency
- dingtian-relay: the "offline despite ping" gotcha (relay_pw in every binary frame, missing form field → Test connection sent 0 → timeout) + the identity-gated secret re-merge that stops a redirected probe exfiltrating the password. - button-light-indicator: serialized desired-state worker (UDP is unordered → the lamp stuck on/off) and hot-reload of the lamp config (no restart). - log entry for the three fixes (commits |
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2915d141aa |
feat(devices): radar presence input + button-light output on the controller
Model the entry button (I1) and a Hikvision radar (I2) as named children of the access controller, and drive the button's 12V lamp on a spare relay. - Radar = the existing relays[].presenceInput one-car-one-ticket gate, now labelled presenceKind: loop|radar. A radar may idle opposite the button, so add a per-input active-level override: relays[].presenceActiveLow -> driver inputActiveLow set, inverting just that terminal (pure helper inputActive()). The Dingtian has one board-wide resting level otherwise. - AuxOutputDevice.setAux(channel,on) capability on the device interface (Dingtian latch) so business logic drives a NON-barrier lamp through the interface. Barriers still only pulseOpen — barrier-not-a-door preserved. - ButtonLightController: subscribes to the radar input edge + the camera lane status and drives a 3-state lamp — radar+car=solid, radar-only=blink (~1Hz), else off. Fails OFF on host loss/error; de-duped. A radar detection never opens a barrier on its own (advisory; threat model). - SetupWizard: presence kind + active-low + a button-light relay picker; sq+en i18n. Tests: button-light.test.ts (truth table + blink + fail-OFF + de-dupe), access-dingtian.test.ts (active-level inversion). Workspace build+lint+test green (158 server tests). Wiki: hikvision-radar, button-light-indicator + updates. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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9d65099d9b |
docs(wiki): appliance provisioning runbook — booth unit 1 hardened (LUKS+TPM+SecureBoot+GRUB)
CI / check (push) Successful in 45s
New wiki/decisions/appliance-provisioning.md: the hardware-verified step-by-step for provisioning a booth PC (Dell OptiPlex 7070, i5-8500, discrete Nuvoton TPM 2.0) from factory Windows to a hardened Ubuntu 26.04 LTS appliance. Every command was run on the first real unit (2026-06-23). Captures the firmware-specific gotchas: Ventoy → 0x1A under Secure Boot (flash ISO directly); the 7070 BIOS can't view db (verify via live USB); the installer's hardware-backed encryption fails with PCR_UNUSABLE/dbt (use passphrase LUKS + manual systemd-cryptenroll PCR-7 seal); GRUB password must be edit-only (--unrestricted) to keep unattended boot. OS hardening on unit 1 is COMPLETE + verified: LUKS FDE + TPM auto-unlock (PCR 7, unattended) + Secure Boot (Deployed) + GRUB edit-lock (closes the init=/bin/bash root-shell hole that PCR-7 sealing does not cover). Resolves the implementation half of open-questions #12 for unit 1. Cross-linked from disk-os-hardening; index + log updated. Still TODO on the box: Docker + run the stack. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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8a437d0c4b |
feat(booth): cancel wrongly-printed ticket (signed void) + refused-vs-anomaly display; fix CI uv
CI / check (push) Failing after 56s
Cancel a misprinted/test/wrong-vehicle ticket via a SIGNED `void` event — the
vehicle_entry is never edited/deleted (append-only). VoidFlow appends void{
voidedEntryRef, voidReason, operator, reasonCode:"void.ticketCancelled" }; route
POST /api/tickets/void gated event:void + open shift; reason REQUIRED. Refuses a
subscription / already-exited / already-voided / paid ticket (refund out of scope).
The void folds the session CLOSED everywhere it's counted — occupancy (count +
reserved spots), pay-station (lookup/activeSessions), exit-flow (#sessionFor), and
reports (excluded from entries) — so a voided car stops occupying a spot, can't be
paid/exited, and doesn't inflate "cars entered". No barrier action. Booth UI: a
"Cancel ticket" action in the pay/exit lookup modal (transient + unpaid + open;
gated on event:void) with a preset-or-free reason prompt.
Reclassify the Live feed: refused-action events (exitRefused/entryRefused/
permitRefused — e.g. a double card-scan, at-capacity subscriber, exit on a closed
session) are benign warnings, not red anomalies. event-detail.tsx now shows them as
amber REFUZUAR/REFUSED, reserving red ANOMALI for genuine red-flags. Display-only —
no ledger change, so historical events reclassify too.
CI: install uv + sync vision deps before the Turbo run. @parking/vision's lint/
typecheck/test shell to `uv run …`, but CI set up only Node+pnpm, so `uv run ruff`
failed ("uv not found") and broke the whole Turbo run. The Python checks pass once
uv provisions the toolchain.
- new: void-flow.ts (+ tests, 8) ; occupancy void-fold test
- shared: reason code void.ticketCancelled ; both web catalogs (sq/en parity)
- wiki: parking-session (ticket-void folds + guards, refused/anomaly split), log
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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65328b8c11 |
feat(anpr): subscriber-entry bridge + admin disable toggle
CI / check (push) Failing after 15s
Wire the lane camera's vehicle event into the gated subscription flow: on a vehicle/active push from an opt-in (config.anpr) camera, AnprBridge pulls a fresh snapshot, runs ANPR, applies a stricter entry confidence floor, debounces, and — matching the plate to a subscription BEFORE emitting — emits a kind:"plate" read. The existing ReadDispatcher -> SubscriptionFlow then signs the entry/exit and opens the barrier. A plate is never the sole authority: it routes through the same gate (active/window/blocklist/car-count) as any credential. Fail-soft, fire-and-forget, subscriber-only by construction. Field-verified end to end (plate AA504LX opened the entry barrier and appended a signed vehicle_entry). Add an admin master switch (site_config.anpr_entry_enabled, default ON) in Site Settings that disables ONLY the barrier-driving bridge; advisory snapshot-ANPR and lane busy/free are unaffected. Read live per event, so toggling takes effect with no restart. Migration 0013 (additive ALTER ADD COLUMN, default 1). - New: apps/server/src/anpr-entry.ts (AnprBridge) + tests (9) - hikvision-alarm.ts hands vehicle detections to the bridge (fire-and-forget) + wiring tests (3) - server.ts reorders the read flows above the hik-alarm registration - snapshot.ts exports buildCamera for reuse - env: VISION_ENTRY_MIN_CONFIDENCE (0.85), ANPR_DEBOUNCE_MS (12000) - site route + SiteSettings checkbox + i18n (sq/en parity) - wiki: lane-presence-and-anpr-entry / lpr-camera / index / log -> BUILT Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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411572511d |
docs(camera): lane presence + ANPR subscriber-entry bridge design
Captures this session's back-and-forth as a new concept page
[[lane-presence-and-anpr-entry]] and cross-links it:
- BUILT: advisory lane busy/free booth lights (LaneStatus + WS), with the
measured camera limits behind the 30s timeout (no leave signal; movement-
driven re-fire; notificationRecurrence locked to "beginning" — ISAPI flip
silently reverts).
- PLANNED: the ANPR "bridge" — explicitly a small apps/server HANDLER (~40
lines), NOT a new service/container. On a camera vehicle event: snapshot ->
ANPR -> high-confidence match -> debounce -> emitRead{kind:"plate"}, then
the existing subscription match/dispatch/gate admits the subscriber. Both
directions, opt-in (config.anpr), plate never the sole authority.
- Records the decisions (high confidence floor, debounce-for-correctness)
and the REJECTED ideas (continuous livestream / per-car queue tracking /
make-model) with why, plus the open hardware question (booth-PC test).
Updates subscription.md (plate matching is built; the live source is this
bridge) and lpr-camera.md (the two consumers of the vehicle event).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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7680d9a0ed |
feat(recycle-bin): soft delete + restore for master data
Accidental admin deletes of users/roles/subscriptions/plans/tariffs were hard and unrecoverable. Now they soft-delete into a recycle bin. Schema (migration 0012): nullable deleted_at + deleted_by on users, roles, subscriptions, subscription_plans, tariffs. Additive ADD COLUMN; verified against a copy of the live DB. Backend: each resource's DELETE route STAMPS instead of removing; every catalog list filters deleted_at IS NULL. New recycle-bin module + routes (GET /api/recycle-bin, POST .../restore, DELETE .../:id purge) gated on a new recyclebin:read/update/delete permission. A 6-hourly + startup sweep auto-purges items older than RECYCLE_BIN_RETENTION_DAYS (default 30; 0 = forever). Invariants: soft-deleted users can't log in (login rejects deleted_at; no-lockout counts live admins only); a soft-deleted subscription doesn't open the barrier; plans are versioned so a delete stamps all versions of the plan_id (bin shows one item); username/role-name UNIQUE spans deleted rows so reuse returns a clear 409 pointing at the bin; restore doesn't auto-cascade a dangling role (guard resolves missing role to empty perms). The signed append-only ledger is OUT of scope (no delete path). Web: a Recycle bin tab under Setup (RecycleBin.tsx) with Restore/Purge + purge confirm; api client + i18n (sq + en parity). Tests: recycle-bin.test.ts (9 unit) + recycle-bin-routes.test.ts (4 integration: delete -> can't-login -> restore -> login, purge, gating, 409 reuse). server 103/103; build+lint+test 19/19. Wiki: new concepts/soft-delete.md; local-jwt-auth + index + log updated. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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3527f48d76 |
refactor(reports): top-level /reports section in the header, not a Setup tab
CI / check (push) Failing after 30s
Moves Reports out of the Setup tab bar into a standalone top-level route (/reports) with its own header nav link, alongside Booth/Shifts/ Subscriptions. Adds a /setup/reports → /reports legacy redirect. Same report:read gate. Wiki note updated. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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5a5f5c554b |
feat(reports): admin Reports dashboard — ledger-first charts
Adds an admin Reports screen (/setup/reports, gated report:read) — an on-demand dashboard over the signed event log. Server (ledger-first): GET /api/reports/summary?from&to&bucket aggregates in one call — entry/exit counts + all money summed straight from ledger_events (same source the shift Z-report reconciles, so totals tie out to the drawer); revenue split into ticket / subscription-sale / out-of-window mirrors the Z-report. Duration stats come from the sessions cache (flagged). All bucketing is in the SITE timezone (siteTz). A .csv export of the per-bucket series. reports.ts + routes/reports.ts. Web: Reports.tsx — date-range presets (today/7d/30d/90d), hour/day/month grain, KPI cards, entry/exit line, revenue bar + cash/card split, revenue-mix pie, peak-hours histogram, numeric breakdown, subscription stats. Charts via Recharts (MIT), lazy-loaded into its own chunk (~111KB gz) so the booth bundle is untouched. New Setup tab + nav + i18n (sq + en parity). asc() exported from @parking/db; formatMinutes helper. Tests: reports.test.ts (10) pin the sums, tz bucketing, money split, duration stats, subscription counts. server 90/90; build+lint 14/14. Wiki: reporting-analytics.md "Built v1" section + log entry. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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66c1291578 |
docs(deploy): COOKIE_SECURE=0 runbook for the plain-HTTP appliance
Documents the deploy-time requirement that the cookie fail-safe fix (
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2fb947e908 |
test(vision): fix stub-mode tests; close the testing-gap wiki note
The two failing apps/vision smoke tests assumed stub mode but the local .env sets VISION_RECOGNIZER=fast_alpr (real-model work, 2026-06-19), so the app built the real recognizer: /health reported "fast_alpr" not "stub", and /analyze on garbage bytes 422'd (real decode reject) instead of returning the empty stub contract. Fix is test isolation: a conftest autouse fixture pins VISION_RECOGNIZER=stub for the session (an OS env var overrides the .env in pydantic-settings), restoring it after. vision 7/7. Updates wiki/concepts/booth-console.md (the "no automated tests" Open note now reflects the coverage that landed) and appends wiki/log.md. Full workspace: shared 87, server 75, devices 18, web 17, vision 7 = 204 tests across 8 turbo test tasks, 0 failures; build/lint 14/14. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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3ed785c33e |
feat(booth): open the pay/exit modal on a hardware scan regardless of focus
A barcode/QR scanner is an HID "keyboard wedge" — it types the id + Enter into whatever holds focus. Previously that only worked while the ticket <input> was focused; a scan with focus elsewhere (or nowhere) went nowhere. New useScanner hook (apps/web/src/lib/use-scanner.ts): a document-level keydown listener that detects the scanner's FAST keystroke burst ended by Enter and opens the pay/exit modal via setActiveTicket — regardless of focus. A gap > 50ms resets the buffer, so human-paced typing with nothing focused never registers as a scan (min length 3 guards stray Enters). Keystrokes into an input/textarea/select/ contenteditable are ignored, so the manual ticket field still works by hand. The hook is paused while a modal is already open — a scan must not abandon an in-progress payment; the operator finishes/closes, then scans the next car. Verified at runtime (Playwright): a fast burst with focus on BODY opens the modal; a second scan while the modal is open is ignored; slow (120ms) human typing does NOT open it; the manual input submit still opens it. build+lint 14/14. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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eb47016ae3 |
feat(shift): confirm-before-close with X-report + split tickets vs subscriptions; fix dark <select>
CI / check (push) Failing after 31s
Three changes: 1. Confirm-before-close. The header shift button closed the shift directly — a stray click would sign the irreversible Z-report. It now opens a confirm modal showing the live X-report (takings split by source + expected drawer) with Cancel / End-shift. Opening a shift stays immediate (no such risk). 2. Split takings by SOURCE. The report separates Tickets (transient) from Subscriptions (monthly sales + a subscriber's out-of-window charge), so the operator sees subscriber money apart from ticket money. Buckets are derived from the signed payment payload flags (subscriptionSale / subscriptionWindowCharge) and always reconcile to cash + card (a payment with neither flag is a ticket). Computed in #summariseWindow, carried on the signed shift_z_report payload, and shown in the X-report, the close modal, the shift history detail, and the printed Z-report. Reports predating the fields default subscription to 0 (ticket absorbs the whole take), so old shifts still reconcile. 3. Fix dark-theme native <select> popups rendering WHITE on WebKitGTK (the Tauri Linux WebView): set color-scheme dark/light on <html> per theme + explicit <option> colours, so the OS-drawn dropdown list follows the theme. Verified the split on a read-only DB copy: tickets 0, subscriptions 10,200 (10,000 sale + 200 out-of-window), reconciles to cash+card. build+lint 14/14, i18n parity (sq+en). Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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d0536da3d7 |
feat(desktop): Tauri v2 kiosk shell — maximized window, prod right-click block, auto-update + code-signing
Add apps/desktop, a thin Tauri v2 shell wrapping the SAME @parking/web SPA so the desktop and browser UIs never drift: dev loads the Vite dev server (HMR), prod bundles the web app's dist/. No business logic in the shell (device/auth/ ledger stay in @parking/server); deny-by-default capabilities. apps/web (single UI source of truth): - lib/origin.ts: centralize the backend origin (API_BASE/apiUrl/wsUrl from VITE_API_BASE); no-op in the browser, lets the desktop build target Fastify. - lib/kiosk.ts: block the right-click context menu in PROD only (dev keeps it + devtools). - lib/desktop-updater.ts: prompt-on-update auto-update (no-op in browser/offline) → downloadAndInstall + relaunch; i18n update.* keys (sq+en). - .env.production: VITE_API_BASE wired to the Fastify origin for the bundle. Desktop: - window starts maximized (not fullscreen — operator keeps OS access). - auto-update via tauri-plugin-updater + -process; self-hosted endpoint is a PLACEHOLDER to fill in. Updater keypair: pubkey embedded in tauri.conf.json; private key + password kept OUTSIDE the repo (~/.parking-updater-keys) and as TAURI_SIGNING_* build secrets. - Turbo build is a no-op; the real signed bundle is `pnpm --filter @parking/desktop bundle` (verified → .deb/.rpm/.AppImage + .sig signatures). Verified: cargo check clean; turbo run build lint 14/14 green; i18n parity holds; no key/sig/bundle artifacts in the repo. Wiki (security + desktop analysis recorded alongside): - new concepts/tpm.md (TPM 2.0: how it works, sealed-LUKS auto-unlock + non- extractable signing key, limits — live-root, bus-sniff — TPM-vs-ATECC608 by platform). - new decisions/desktop-shell-tauri.md (Tauri v2 over Electron; best-case Ubuntu 26.04 LTS, worst-case Windows+WSL → kiosk browser; full as-built). - pull-the-disk attack trace on append-only-event-chain; ATECC608 not-in-a-PC caveat; cross-links from disk-os-hardening / threat-model. - open-questions #11 (appliance WebKitGTK), #12 (TPM hardening impl), #13 (startup verifyChain self-check); index/overview/log/standing-decisions. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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53e1e7b25c |
feat: subscription v2 — quantity pricing, plan timeframes (tariff bridge), reserved spots
Three subscriber enhancements driven by real scenarios (migration 0011, all
additive columns — backward-compatible).
1. QUANTITY. One subscription covers N cars (a family pays once for two). Sale
amount = span price × quantity; maxConcurrent defaults to the quantity so all
N cars can be inside. Quantity rides in the payment payload.
2. PLAN TIMEFRAMES → TARIFF BRIDGE. A plan may restrict WHEN a subscriber may
park (e.g. weekday 20:00→08:00, weekend all-day). A scan outside the window is
NOT refused — the out-of-window minutes are charged at the normal TRANSIENT
tariff (the subscriber is a transient for that time):
- early entry: arrival → window-open, DEFERRED (signed as windowOwedMinor on
the vehicle_entry payload), collected at exit;
- late exit: window-close → departure, and exit is GATED
(sub.refused.unpaidWindow) until paid at the booth.
Pure, tz-aware outOfWindowGap in @parking/shared (12 unit tests); pricing
reuses computeFee + the active tariff version
(apps/server/src/subscription-window.ts). The exit refusal is a host-ONLINE
business gate — the fail-open rule still governs the offline path.
3. RESERVED SPOTS. Site toggle reserve_subscriber_spots: occupancy holds
max(0, quantity − itsCarsInside) per active subscription, so transients see
"full" sooner; effectiveFree = capacity − count − reserved. Subscribers are
never gated by full.
UI: quantity field + ×N quote (SubscriptionManager); timeframes editor
(SubscriptionPlansManager); reserve checkbox (SiteSettings); booth pay modal
shows an "OUT-OF-WINDOW" charge and takes payment to clear the exit gate.
Verified on a copy of the live DB: qty 2 = 2× price; a night-plan 19:30 entry →
30min/15,000 ALL owed, stamped + paid → gate clears, chain verifies; the reserve
toggle holds a qty-2 sub's 2 spots. Build+lint 12/12; 80 shared tests pass.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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fd4608a8f1 |
feat: subscription plan catalog — config-defined pricing, dated spans, no typed amounts
Re-model subscription pricing from per-row, operator-typed prices into an admin-composed, versioned PLAN CATALOG (the tariff pattern). The operator now SELLS by picking a plan over a date span; the price is LOOKED UP, never typed — removing the fat-finger risk on a money field — and day/week/month periods make the hotel "guest stays 1–N days" case a daily plan over a check-in→check-out span. - Schema/migration 0010: new `subscription_plans` (immutable, effective-dated, keyed by a stable planId; period day/week/month + per-period price + active flag). `subscriptions` gains planId/planVersionId; period enum widened. Seeds a "Monthly" plan from the existing site default price (no data loss). - Pricing (pure, unit-tested in @parking/shared): periods = ceil(span / period), amount = periods × per-period price. Ceil = any started period is full (hotel practice). `resolvePlanVersion` picks the latest active version ≤ sale instant. - Backend: new admin-only plan CRUD (`subscription:plan` permission); reworked sell path derives the amount from the plan; `POST /api/subscriptions/quote` returns a server-computed quote so the operator can't override it. The signed-payment sale fix is unchanged — only the amount SOURCE moved; payload now carries planId/planVersionId/periods. Updates never re-sell (price frozen). - Frontend: SubscriptionManager sell form swaps the price field for a plan picker + start/end dates + a live quote line. New SubscriptionPlansManager (Setup tab) for the admin catalog. i18n (sq+en) for both. Verified on a copy of the live DB: 0010 applies (existing subs intact), a 3-night hotel sale prices to 2,400 ALL, appends one signed payment with planVersionId, chain verifies. Build+lint 12/12; 68 shared tests pass. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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cb68cbafdb |
feat: mid-shift X-report (read-only takings-so-far)
Let the operator see, on demand during an open shift, the opening float inherited, cash/card collected so far, pay-ins/pay-outs, and the current expected drawer balance — without closing. GET /api/shift/report (shift:read; 204 when no shift is open) returns the same drawer projection the Z-report computes. Factored that math into a shared ShiftService.#summariseWindow(open, asOf) used by BOTH the X-report (asOf=now, read-only) and close()'s Z-report (asOf=endedAt, signed), so the two can't drift. The X-report appends NOTHING — it's a snapshot, not an accountability mark; the Z-report at close remains the signed record. UI: a "Takings so far" button on the shift control reveals a cyan X-report panel; the header still shows the live drawer total for the at-a-glance figure. Verified against a copy of the live DB: X figures match drawerBalance(), the drawer identity holds, zero events appended, chain still verifies. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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2835f78635 |
feat: re-model drawer cash as directional vouchers (Mandat Arkëtimi / Pagese)
Replace the single signed-± cash_movement with two distinct financial documents — the direction is the event TYPE, not the sign of an amount: cash_in = Mandat Arkëtimi (receipt / pay-IN, +) voucher AR-NNNN cash_out = Mandat Pagese (disbursement / pay-OUT, −) voucher PA-NNNN Each carries a positive magnitude, voucher number, reason, the operator who raised it and the admin who authorized it, and prints an Albanian slip. Authorization changes from admin-only to operator-RAISED / admin-AUTHORIZED: any shift:create holder raises the voucher, but POST /api/cash-voucher only commits when authorizedBy is a real admin (shift:cash) re-entering their password (verified server-side). Keeps the float control while letting the operator do the booth paperwork. Legacy cash_movement events are kept — they still verify and still fold into the drawer (signed-±); the append-only chain is never rewritten. The drawer fold and the Z-report window now sum all three types. Verified against a copy of the live DB with the real signing modules: cash_in 3000 + cash_out 5000 → drawer −2000, hash-chain verifies OK. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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a20400c2c5 |
fix: record subscription sale as a signed payment (close off-book hole)
Creating a priced subscription wrote only the mutable `subscriptions`
master row and appended NOTHING to the signed ledger — so the cash an
operator collected showed in the live feed, drawer, and shift Z-report
nowhere, leaving no signed trace. A booth operator could sell
subscriptions and pocket the money untraceably — the exact
operator-as-adversary path the append-only signed ledger exists to close.
Found live: 3 priced subscriptions (27,000 ALL) had zero payment events.
Selling a priced subscription now appends a signed `payment` event at
create time: amount = priceMinor x months (full multi-month prepay),
operator-chosen tender (cash->drawer / card->bank), payload
{ subscriptionSale: true, permitId, operator, months }. Folds into the
shift Z-report/drawer with no new summing logic; the feed badges it
"subscription sale" and resolves the holder name. The create response
returns the recorded { sale }; subscriptionRoutes now takes the EventLog
and ShiftService.
Not hard-gated on an open shift (a sale can happen outside the booth money
path) — it warns instead. The 3 historical off-book sales are not
back-fillable (append-only forbids forging dated events) — reconcile via
cash_movement or a Z-report note.
Verified against a copy of the live DB with the real signing modules:
signed payment appended, hash-chain still verifies, lands in shift cash
totals. Build + lint 12/12.
Wiki: subscription "Collecting the fee" deferred -> BUILT (+ the off-book
hole and why); shift sale-folds-in; threat-model worked example
("store the price != account for the sale").
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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b0c9ba0f8c |
docs(wiki): per-increment vs per-hour tariff gotcha + composer UX idea
priceMinorPerIncrement is per BILLING INCREMENT, not per hour. Documented the effective-hourly formula (price x 60/incrementMin) as a callout after recurring "Lab is wrong" confusion (weekend 3h=600 not 300 was correct), and filed a per-hour-preview composer UX candidate under Open. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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9a1feeeb20 |
fix(tariff): reject stepped base combined with time/seasonal tiers
A stepped ("up-to") default card prices the whole stay as one total, so the V2
engine short-circuits to steppedFee and NEVER consults windowed cards — any
time/seasonal tiers would silently never fire. Found live: an active tariff had a
stepped base plus weekday-night + weekend tiers, and every 3h stay priced 600 ALL
regardless of hour/day because the tiers were dead.
- validateTariffV2 now rejects a stepped defaultCard combined with windowedCards,
with an actionable message (switch the base to ladder/flat, or remove the tiers).
- Composer shows an inline red warning the moment base mode is stepped and tiers
exist; publishing is blocked server-side regardless.
- ApiError now carries the server's problems[], so the publish error surfaces the
SPECIFIC reason instead of a generic "invalid tariff structure".
- 2 new validation tests (55 pass).
Wiki: tariff, log.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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cc507f490f |
feat(tariff): stepped ("up-to") pricing mode — total-by-duration
Owners often state rates as a total-by-duration matrix (0-1h=200, 0-3h=500,
0-6h=800, 0-9h=900, 0-12h=1000) that the marginal hourly ladder can't express
(the ladder sums per-increment rates; this is cumulative totals at thresholds).
Add STEPPED as a third pricing mode alongside the ladder and flat.
- @parking/shared: TariffStep {uptoMin, totalMinor} + a `steps[]` field on V1
structures and V2 cards (mutually exclusive with blocks/flatMinor). steppedFee():
smallest tier with uptoMin >= duration wins (INCLUSIVE boundary), the top tier
repeats as a per-day cap; wired into computeFeeV1 + computeFeeV2 (V2 default card
only — a whole-stay total can't be sliced per-increment by a windowed card).
Validation: ascending uptoMin, non-negative totals, no daily-cap-with-steps,
steps-only-on-default. priceSession/quote/booth/Lab price it via the shared core.
- Composer UI: a "By duration (up-to)" mode with an up-to/total table (base card
only). i18n modeStepped/steppedHint/stepUpTo/stepTotal/addStep (sq+en).
- 8 new unit tests incl. the exact owner matrix, multi-day repeat, overstay, and
validation (53 pass). Verified end-to-end via the UI: authored + published the
matrix, Tariff Lab prices it exactly (3h->500, 6h->800, 12h->1000, 2d->2000).
Wiki: tariff (three pricing modes + stepped semantics), log.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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3d02134711 |
feat(tariff): Tariff Lab — pure session-pricing simulator
Test rates "in time" (overnight windows, daily caps, overstay) in seconds against any tariff version, instead of waiting hours/days. No real ledger writes. - Extract priceSession() into @parking/shared: the grace/overstay wrapper over computeFee (unpaid -> entry..now; within-grace -> settled 0; grace-expired -> overstay, a fresh period from grace-expiry). PayStation.quote() now calls it so the booth and the lab can never diverge. - API (tariffs.ts, tariff:read, read-only): POST /api/tariff/simulate prices a hypothetical session (active/any version/inline structure) and returns the priceSession outcome + a 30m..3d duration curve (see where the daily cap flattens); GET /api/tariff/simulate/session/:identity prefills from a real ledger session. - UI TariffLab.tsx at Setup -> "Tariff Lab": version picker, entry/asOf times, optional payment+grace, category, and load-a-real-ticket. Admin-gated, available on-site (useful to quote a dispute). - 4 new priceSession unit tests incl. the ticket-1245791632490 overstay-not-zero regression (40 pass). i18n lab.* + nav.tariffLab (sq+en). Verified live via the UI. Wiki: tariff (priceSession + Tariff Lab as-built), log. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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a4712774ab |
feat(booth): overstay sessions, top-up pricing, and session/feed filters
Rework paid-but-grace-expired sessions and add booth filters. Overstay (was "stuck"): - Stop silently aging out a paid transient whose walk-back grace lapsed with no signed exit. Keep it listed with an OVERSTAY badge — a new parking period began (re-parked) or the car is faulty/abandoned; it is not a system fault. - No free exit: reopenBarrier refuses server-side once a transient's payment grace has expired (allow only subscription OR paid-and-within-grace); the UI hides the Open-barrier button on overstay rows and routes to the pay/exit modal. Closes a hole where a stale payment authorized a free multi-day exit (operator-as-adversary). - Price the overstay as a NEW period from grace-expiry -> now with its own daily-cap ladder, NOT "full stay minus paid" (which a daily cap collapsed to 0 — ticket 1245791632490 owed ALL 0; now owes its real overstay). quote() gains periodStart + overstay; SessionLookup/ActiveSession gain `overstay`. handlePayAndExit charges whenever the session is payable (was: only if !alreadyPaid, skipping the overstay). Filters (new ui/FilterBar): Active Sessions — search + status (unpaid/paid/exiting/overstay) + transient-vs-subscriber. Live feed — search + event (entry/exit/pay/void/anomaly) + direction + source (booth=manual vs reader). All client-side over already-fetched data; matched/total count shown. i18n parity (sq+en). Wiki: booth-exit-flow updated (overstay model, naming history, no-free-exit security fix, new-period pricing; open question on grace-renewal noted). Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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c0a775818b |
docs(wiki): note log:read perm + entry presence/cooldown guard in reference pages
Sync the two canonical reference pages with this session's features: local-jwt-auth gains the new log resource / log:read permission in the RBAC grid (links app-logs); first-run-setup notes the one-car-one-ticket presence-loop/cooldown guard the admin configures on a relay (links entry-double-press). Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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30e7fe85de |
feat(booth): refusal snapshots, subscriber access medium, one-car-one-ticket entry
Three booth-integrity improvements that share the entry/exit flows and activity log. Refusal snapshots: previously only an accepted open captured a camera image; now every refusal/hold anomaly fires the directional camera too (a turned-away car is exactly the evidence wanted) — entry refused-full/held, exit refused closed/no-session/unpaid/grace-expired (booth + reader paths), refused subscription. A refused entry has no ticket id, so a synthetic REFUSED- ref keys the anomaly + photo together. Same fire-and-forget contract; failed captures still show as tiles. Subscriber access medium: the subscription flow already signed `via` (qr|card|plate) into entry/exit payloads; surface it as a typed LedgerPayload.via, a cyan chip in the ticker, and an "Entry medium" modal row (sq+en). Display-only. One car = one ticket: the entry button could be mashed to mint many tickets per car (corrupting occupancy + enabling ticket-shopping at exit) — the old #inFlight guard only blocked overlapping presses. Add a per-relay guard configured on the relay spec: PRESENCE mode (presenceInput ties ticketing to a vehicle loop on a Dingtian input — one ticket per car, re-armed when the loop clears) or COOLDOWN fallback (entryCooldownSec) when there's no barrier feedback. A suppressed press is unsigned device_events telemetry, not a signed anomaly. SetupWizard exposes both fields. Fail-closed entry and barrier-is-not-a-door invariants untouched; guard state is in-memory/rebuildable, starts armed after restart. Wiki: new entry-double-press; updated entry-exit-points, booth-console, index. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |