- site_config gains optional park identity (park_name, operator_name, nius,
address, phone, email); additive Drizzle migration 0001. GET/PUT
/api/site-config read/write the full config (PUT partial patch, admin only);
SiteSettings + SetupWizard expose the fields.
- renderTicket() prints an Albanian header sourced from site_config, the
all-numeric 13-digit ticket id (12 random + Luhn) as Code128, large digits,
and a lost-ticket footer. CP852 codepage so ë/ç render.
- Widen the Code128 module width 2->3 and height 80->100 dots so the
short-range "Simple" QR/barcode reader decodes reliably (was barely reading
at module width 2 on the 80mm head).
See wiki/concepts/site-metadata.md and ticket-encoding.md.
A parking lot is one pool of spaces with a flexible set of entry/exit
points — no "lane". Direction is a property of each RELAY inside an access
controller; readers/cameras bind to a controller relay and inherit it.
Schema:
- drop `lane` from ledger_events, device_events, sessions
- rename lane_devices -> devices (no lane/direction columns)
- access config.relays=[{relay,direction,button?}]; reader/camera
config.controllerId+relay binding
- fresh 0000_baseline migration (history reset; dev data was throwaway)
Signed ledger:
- remove `lane` from canonicalize(); bump signer keyId sw-hmac-v1 -> v2
(v1 events won't verify under v2 — intentional, gated per-event by keyId)
Server:
- new device-resolve.ts (replaces lane-map.ts): relayForButton,
relayForDevice, firstRelayByDirection, devicesByDirection
- entry-flow: button terminal -> its relay; exit/permit: reader's bound
relay; dispatcher resolves the bound relay + inherited direction
- camera snapshots fire by direction site-wide, async, never block open
- DeviceConfig widened to nested JSON for relays[]
Web:
- wizard: no lane selector; add controllers (relay map + entry-button
terminal) first, then bind readers/cameras/printers to a controller relay
Wiki: new entry-exit-points.md (replaces lane-direction); reworked
entry-exit-readers, parking-session, first-run-setup, device-registry,
append-only-event-chain, device-events; removed stale lane/LaneMap mentions.
Implement the core anti-fraud primitive: an append-only, hash-chained,
signed event log (the schema + types predated this; the writer/signer are new).
- EventLog (apps/server): serialized append, monotonic index, prevHash chain,
signature; verifyChain() detects tamper/reorder/delete. No update/delete paths.
- Signer abstraction (packages/shared) over the ATECC608 secure element, with a
SoftwareSigner (HMAC, EVENT_SIGNING_KEY) shipped now since the chip is still
open-question #6. Documented: software signer is tamper-evident but NOT
unforgeable-by-owner.
- Add ParkingEventType "input_received" for raw device inputs (not yet a
vehicle_entry, which the entry flow will append later).
- Read API: GET /api/events; integrity self-check: GET /api/events/verify (admin).
Verified on hardware: shorting the Dingtian inputs produced signed, chained
input_received events; verifyChain ok; direct DB tamper/delete detected.
NOTE: the log captures host-originated actions only. Out-of-band relay
actuation (sniffed relay_pw, string protocol, ip_watchdog) produces no event
by design -- the control is reconciliation vs. an independent witness, which is
not yet built. See wiki/concepts/append-only-event-chain.md.
julian