The desktop shell is one generic .deb/.AppImage distributed via
mca/public_releases, not built per-booth, but the backend origin was baked
in at build time (VITE_API_BASE, hardcoded to http://127.0.0.1:3000) — the
same installer could never point at a different appliance without a
rebuild.
Adds ConnectScreen (shown before Login in Tauri when no backend is saved),
backed by tauri-plugin-store persisting the operator-entered URL across
restarts. CSP's connect-src tightens to 'self' only — all backend traffic
already routes through tauri-plugin-http/websocket, which run Rust-side
and are outside connect-src's reach anyway — and the real access boundary
moves to capabilities/default.json's http:default scope, wildcarded so an
operator-chosen host is actually reachable. Adds a "Change server" control
in Setup (desktop-only) to repoint an already-configured install.
While tracing the desktop auth path for this: tauri-plugin-http's fetch()
runs through Rust's reqwest, which keeps its own cookie jar separate from
the webview, so document.cookie on tauri://localhost never sees the
parking_csrf cookie the server sets (open upstream bug,
tauri-apps/tauri#13045/#11518). This means the desktop app has likely been
silently sending no CSRF header on every mutation since the shell was
first built — pre-existing, independent of this change. Fixed by having
sessionView() (routes/auth.ts) also echo the CSRF value in the login/me
JSON body; the desktop client stashes it in memory and echoes that instead
of reading document.cookie. assertCsrf() itself is untouched.
Verified end-to-end against a real LAN-bound dev server: login returns a
csrfToken matching the cookie, a mutation using the body-sourced token in
X-CSRF-Token succeeds (200), and the same mutation without it still
correctly 403s.
console.error/console.warn only forward to the server when the client log
level is debug/trace (default: info) — the earlier error-logging fix never
actually surfaced anything, and a real update failure produced zero logs
anywhere. desktop-updater.ts now calls logClient() directly, unconditionally,
plus download-progress events. Also documents the resource-sync-park-systems
branch misconfig (pointed at dev, Stacks are stage-tier) found while chasing
this — full writeup on fleet-deployment-komodo.md.
v0.1.1 was tagged but tauri.conf.json's own "version" field (what Tauri
bakes into the bundle filename/internal version) stayed at 0.1.0 — the
signed binary didn't match what latest.json claimed to describe, so every
update download failed signature verification. desktop-updater.ts's single
catch{} swallowed that identically to "offline", so it looked like nothing
happened at all. release.yml now syncs tauri.conf.json's version from the
git tag before building; the updater now logs a real post-accept failure
instead of silently reverting.
Add apps/desktop, a thin Tauri v2 shell wrapping the SAME @parking/web SPA so
the desktop and browser UIs never drift: dev loads the Vite dev server (HMR),
prod bundles the web app's dist/. No business logic in the shell (device/auth/
ledger stay in @parking/server); deny-by-default capabilities.
apps/web (single UI source of truth):
- lib/origin.ts: centralize the backend origin (API_BASE/apiUrl/wsUrl from
VITE_API_BASE); no-op in the browser, lets the desktop build target Fastify.
- lib/kiosk.ts: block the right-click context menu in PROD only (dev keeps it +
devtools).
- lib/desktop-updater.ts: prompt-on-update auto-update (no-op in browser/offline)
→ downloadAndInstall + relaunch; i18n update.* keys (sq+en).
- .env.production: VITE_API_BASE wired to the Fastify origin for the bundle.
Desktop:
- window starts maximized (not fullscreen — operator keeps OS access).
- auto-update via tauri-plugin-updater + -process; self-hosted endpoint is a
PLACEHOLDER to fill in. Updater keypair: pubkey embedded in tauri.conf.json;
private key + password kept OUTSIDE the repo (~/.parking-updater-keys) and as
TAURI_SIGNING_* build secrets.
- Turbo build is a no-op; the real signed bundle is `pnpm --filter
@parking/desktop bundle` (verified → .deb/.rpm/.AppImage + .sig signatures).
Verified: cargo check clean; turbo run build lint 14/14 green; i18n parity holds;
no key/sig/bundle artifacts in the repo.
Wiki (security + desktop analysis recorded alongside):
- new concepts/tpm.md (TPM 2.0: how it works, sealed-LUKS auto-unlock + non-
extractable signing key, limits — live-root, bus-sniff — TPM-vs-ATECC608 by
platform).
- new decisions/desktop-shell-tauri.md (Tauri v2 over Electron; best-case Ubuntu
26.04 LTS, worst-case Windows+WSL → kiosk browser; full as-built).
- pull-the-disk attack trace on append-only-event-chain; ATECC608 not-in-a-PC
caveat; cross-links from disk-os-hardening / threat-model.
- open-questions #11 (appliance WebKitGTK), #12 (TPM hardening impl), #13
(startup verifyChain self-check); index/overview/log/standing-decisions.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
julian