fix(desktop): sync tauri.conf.json version to the release tag, stop swallowing install failures

v0.1.1 was tagged but tauri.conf.json's own "version" field (what Tauri bakes into the bundle filename/internal version) stayed at 0.1.0 — the signed binary didn't match what latest.json claimed to describe, so every update download failed signature verification. desktop-updater.ts's single catch{} swallowed that identically to "offline", so it looked like nothing happened at all. release.yml now syncs tauri.conf.json's version from the git tag before building; the updater now logs a real post-accept failure instead of silently reverting.
fix(desktop): restore VITE_API_BASE for the desktop build
2026-09-03 12:24:04 +02:00 · 2026-09-03 12:01:56 +02:00 · 2026-09-03 10:50:36 +02:00 · 2026-09-03 10:33:03 +02:00 · 2026-09-03 10:26:17 +02:00 · 2026-09-03 10:11:20 +02:00
29 changed files with 1161 additions and 133 deletions
@@ -92,6 +92,8 @@ jobs:
          context: .
          file: apps/server/Dockerfile
          push: true
          build-args: |
            BUILD_VERSION=${{ steps.meta.outputs.branch }}-${{ steps.meta.outputs.sha }}
          tags: |
            ${{ env.REGISTRY }}/parking-server:${{ steps.meta.outputs.branch }}
            ${{ env.REGISTRY }}/parking-server:${{ steps.meta.outputs.branch }}-${{ steps.meta.outputs.sha }}
@@ -1,12 +1,24 @@
 name: Release desktop
 # Build the signed Tauri desktop installers on a version tag and publish them as
-# a Gitea Release. The Tauri auto-updater (apps/web/src/lib/desktop-updater.ts)
+# a Gitea Release — TWICE: once on this (private, source) repo for our own
-# fetches these; latest.json + each installer + its .sig are what it needs.
+# records/history, and once mirrored to mca/public_releases, which is what the
 # Tauri auto-updater (apps/web/src/lib/desktop-updater.ts) actually points at.
 #
 # WHY a separate public repo: the updater runs on offline-first field appliances
 # with no Gitea credentials, so its endpoint + installer downloads must be
 # reachable unauthenticated. Mirroring compiled installers to a public
 # releases-only repo avoids embedding any read token in the shipped app (which
 # would leak the moment a booth PC is compromised — this box's threat model
 # names the operator/booth as the primary adversary, see CLAUDE.md). Source
 # stays private; only signed installers become public, same as most desktop
 # software. mca/public_releases is shared across apps in the org, not
 # parking-specific — namespace release tags/asset names accordingly if another
 # app starts publishing there too.
 #
 # Trigger: push a tag like v0.1.0. The job builds .deb/.rpm/.AppImage, signs them
-# with the updater key (Gitea secrets), assembles latest.json, and uploads
+# with the updater key (Gitea secrets), assembles latest.json pointing at the
-# everything to the Release for that tag.
+# MIRROR repo's asset URLs, uploads to both repos, and mirrors the same assets.
 on:
  push:
@@ -63,6 +75,27 @@ jobs:
      - name: Install dependencies
        run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
      - name: Sync tauri.conf.json version to the git tag
        # tauri.conf.json's own "version" field is what Tauri bakes into the
        # bundle filename, the app's internal version, AND the updater's
        # "current vs. new" comparison — it is NOT derived from the git tag
        # automatically. Hit in v0.1.1: the tag was bumped but this file
        # wasn't, so the signed binary + its .sig were still built (and
        # named) as 0.1.0 while latest.json (built from TAG below) claimed
        # 0.1.1 — the updater found the "update", downloaded a file whose
        # signature didn't match what the manifest claimed to sign, and
        # silently failed (a separate bug in desktop-updater.ts's error
        # handling made this invisible — also fixed). Patch it here so the
        # checked-in value is only ever a placeholder for local dev builds;
        # a real release's version is always driven by the tag.
        run: |
          set -e
          VERSION="${TAG#v}"
          sed -i "s/\"version\": \"[^\"]*\"/\"version\": \"${VERSION}\"/" apps/desktop/src-tauri/tauri.conf.json
          grep '"version"' apps/desktop/src-tauri/tauri.conf.json
        env:
          TAG: ${{ github.ref_name }}
      - name: Build + sign desktop bundle
        env:
          # Updater signing key (Gitea repo/org secrets). Without these the
@@ -73,30 +106,41 @@ jobs:
      - name: Collect artifacts
        id: collect
-        # Gather the installers + their .sig into a flat dist/ for upload.
+        # Gather the installers + their .sig into a flat dist/ for upload, spaces
        # stripped from filenames. productName is "Parking System" (a space), so
        # Tauri's bundle output is e.g. "Parking System_0.1.0_amd64.deb" — an
        # unescaped space in a filename breaks the later curl asset-upload URL
        # ("URL rejected: Malformed input to a URL function", hit on the very
        # first v0.1.0 release) AND would land in latest.json's asset url, which
        # the updater's plain HTTP GET can't handle either. Rename on copy.
        run: |
          set -e
          BUNDLE=apps/desktop/src-tauri/target/release/bundle
          mkdir -p dist
          find "$BUNDLE" \( -name '*.AppImage' -o -name '*.deb' -o -name '*.rpm' \
            -o -name '*.AppImage.sig' -o -name '*.deb.sig' -o -name '*.rpm.sig' \) \
-            -exec cp {} dist/ \;
+            -print0 | while IFS= read -r -d '' f; do
              name=$(basename "$f" | tr ' ' '-')
              cp "$f" "dist/${name}"
            done
          echo "Artifacts:"; ls -la dist/
      - name: Assemble latest.json
        # The Tauri updater fetches a manifest describing the newest version, its
-        # notes, and per-target {signature, url}. We point the AppImage target at
+        # notes, and per-target {signature, url}. The URL points at the MIRROR
-        # this release's asset URL. Adjust the platform keys you actually ship.
+        # repo (mca/public_releases) — that's the unauthenticated endpoint field
        # appliances actually reach; see the workflow header for why. Adjust the
        # platform keys you actually ship.
        env:
          SERVER_URL: ${{ github.server_url }}
-          REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
+          MIRROR_REPO: mca/public_releases
          TAG: ${{ github.ref_name }}
        run: |
          set -e
          VERSION="${TAG#v}"
          APPIMAGE=$(cd dist && ls *.AppImage | head -1)
          SIG=$(cat "dist/${APPIMAGE}.sig")
-          ASSET_URL="${SERVER_URL}/${REPO}/releases/download/${TAG}/${APPIMAGE}"
+          ASSET_URL="${SERVER_URL}/${MIRROR_REPO}/releases/download/desktop-latest/${APPIMAGE}"
          cat > dist/latest.json <<JSON
          {
            "version": "${VERSION}",
@@ -129,12 +173,12 @@ jobs:
            -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
            -d "{\"tag_name\":\"${TAG}\",\"name\":\"${TAG}\",\"draft\":false,\"prerelease\":false}" \
            "${API}/repos/${REPO}/releases" || true)
-          REL_ID=$(printf '%s' "$REL" | grep -o '"id":[0-9]*' | head -1 | cut -d: -f2)
+          REL_ID=$(printf '%s' "$REL" | grep -o '"id":[0-9]*' | head -1 | cut -d: -f2 || true)
          if [ -z "$REL_ID" ]; then
            # Release may already exist for this tag — look it up by tag.
            REL_ID=$(curl -sS -H "Authorization: token ${TOKEN}" \
              "${API}/repos/${REPO}/releases/tags/${TAG}" \
-              | grep -o '"id":[0-9]*' | head -1 | cut -d: -f2)
+              | grep -o '"id":[0-9]*' | head -1 | cut -d: -f2 || true)
          fi
          echo "release id: ${REL_ID}"
          for f in dist/*; do
@@ -147,3 +191,82 @@ jobs:
              "${API}/repos/${REPO}/releases/${REL_ID}/assets?name=${name}" >/dev/null
          done
          echo "done"
      - name: Mirror release to mca/public_releases (Gitea API)
        # This is the release the updater and any human downloader actually use —
        # public_releases has no source, only installers, so it can be public
        # without exposing this repo. RELEASES_MIRROR_TOKEN is a write:repository
        # token scoped for pushing releases into that repo (Gitea's org secrets,
        # not exposed to any deployed client).
        #
        # Publishes to TWO tags there, since public_releases is shared across
        # apps in the org and Gitea's "latest release" redirect resolves by
        # newest tag on the WHOLE repo (would break the moment another app
        # publishes something newer):
        #   - desktop-<TAG>   versioned, permanent — audit trail / rollback.
        #   - desktop-latest  moving — assets deleted + re-uploaded each release.
        #     This is the fixed URL tauri.conf.json's updater endpoint points at
        #     (a stable name every appliance can always resolve, regardless of
        #     what else gets released in this repo meanwhile).
        env:
          TOKEN: ${{ secrets.RELEASES_MIRROR_TOKEN }}
          API: ${{ github.api_url }}
          MIRROR_REPO: mca/public_releases
          TAG: ${{ github.ref_name }}
        run: |
          set -e
          create_or_get_release() {
            local mirror_tag="$1" prerelease="$2"
            REL=$(curl -sS -w '\n%{http_code}' -X POST \
              -H "Authorization: token ${TOKEN}" \
              -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
              -d "{\"tag_name\":\"${mirror_tag}\",\"name\":\"Parking System ${TAG}\",\"draft\":false,\"prerelease\":${prerelease}}" \
              "${API}/repos/${MIRROR_REPO}/releases" || true)
            echo "create response (${mirror_tag}): ${REL}"
            REL_ID=$(printf '%s' "$REL" | grep -o '"id":[0-9]*' | head -1 | cut -d: -f2 || true)
            if [ -z "$REL_ID" ]; then
              LOOKUP=$(curl -sS -w '\n%{http_code}' -H "Authorization: token ${TOKEN}" \
                "${API}/repos/${MIRROR_REPO}/releases/tags/${mirror_tag}")
              echo "tag lookup response (${mirror_tag}): ${LOOKUP}"
              REL_ID=$(printf '%s' "$LOOKUP" | grep -o '"id":[0-9]*' | head -1 | cut -d: -f2 || true)
            fi
            if [ -z "$REL_ID" ]; then
              echo "::error::could not create or find release for tag ${mirror_tag} on ${MIRROR_REPO} — see responses above"
              exit 1
            fi
          }
          upload_assets() {
            local rel_id="$1"
            for f in dist/*; do
              name=$(basename "$f")
              echo "mirroring ${name} -> release ${rel_id}"
              HTTP_CODE=$(curl -sS -o /tmp/upload_resp.json -w '%{http_code}' -X POST \
                -H "Authorization: token ${TOKEN}" \
                -H "Content-Type: application/octet-stream" \
                --data-binary @"${f}" \
                "${API}/repos/${MIRROR_REPO}/releases/${rel_id}/assets?name=${name}")
              if [ "$HTTP_CODE" -ge 300 ]; then
                echo "::error::upload of ${name} failed (HTTP ${HTTP_CODE}): $(cat /tmp/upload_resp.json)"
                exit 1
              fi
            done
          }
          # 1. Versioned, permanent.
          create_or_get_release "desktop-${TAG}" false
          echo "versioned mirror release id: ${REL_ID}"
          upload_assets "${REL_ID}"
          # 2. Moving desktop-latest — delete existing assets first (re-upload
          #    with the same name 409s otherwise), then re-upload.
          create_or_get_release "desktop-latest" false
          LATEST_REL_ID="${REL_ID}"
          echo "latest mirror release id: ${LATEST_REL_ID}"
          EXISTING=$(curl -sS -H "Authorization: token ${TOKEN}" \
            "${API}/repos/${MIRROR_REPO}/releases/${LATEST_REL_ID}/assets")
          printf '%s' "$EXISTING" | grep -o '"id":[0-9]*' | cut -d: -f2 | while read -r asset_id; do
            curl -sS -X DELETE -H "Authorization: token ${TOKEN}" \
              "${API}/repos/${MIRROR_REPO}/releases/${LATEST_REL_ID}/assets/${asset_id}" >/dev/null
          done || true
          upload_assets "${LATEST_REL_ID}"
          echo "done"
@@ -27,3 +27,4 @@ dist/
 # Graphify knowledge-graph output (dev tool; generated, not committed)
 graphify-out/
 parking.sqlite*.bak-*
 questions.txt
@@ -35,8 +35,16 @@ pnpm --filter @parking/desktop bundle   # build the SPA + bundle the desktop app
 Requires the Rust toolchain and (on Linux) WebKitGTK 4.1 + libsoup-3 dev libraries. Under WSL2 the
 window needs a display (WSLg or an X server).
 ## Auto-update
 Signed updates are built and published by `.gitea/workflows/release.yml` on a `vX.Y.Z` tag, mirrored
 to the public `mca/public_releases` repo (this repo is private; the updater runs on offline-first
 field appliances with no Gitea credentials, so its endpoint must be reachable unauthenticated —
 see that workflow's header and `wiki/decisions/desktop-shell-tauri.md`). The updater config and
 signing pubkey live in `tauri.conf.json`; the private signing key is held outside the repo, never
 committed.
 ## Not here (deliberately)
-Kiosk lockdown (fullscreen/no-decorations), auto-update, code signing, and launching Fastify from
+Kiosk lockdown (fullscreen/no-decorations) and launching Fastify from the shell are out of scope for
-the shell are out of scope for the scaffold — on the appliance Fastify runs as its own service and
+the scaffold — on the appliance Fastify runs as its own service and this shell connects to it.
 this shell connects to it.
@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
 {
  "$schema": "https://schema.tauri.app/config/2",
  "productName": "Parking System",
-  "version": "0.0.0",
+  "version": "0.1.0",
  "identifier": "com.parking.desktop",
  "build": {
    "devUrl": "http://localhost:5173",
    "frontendDist": "../../web/dist",
    "beforeDevCommand": "pnpm --filter @parking/web dev",
-    "beforeBuildCommand": "pnpm --filter @parking/web build"
+    "beforeBuildCommand": "VITE_API_BASE=http://127.0.0.1:3000 pnpm --filter @parking/web build"
  },
  "app": {
    "windows": [
@@ -41,9 +41,9 @@
  },
  "plugins": {
    "updater": {
-      "//": "Stable 'latest release' path on Gitea — redirects to the newest tag's latest.json (published by .gitea/workflows/release.yml). The updater GETs this, gets the manifest (platforms.linux-x86_64.{signature,url}), and compares versions. The release is reachable to the appliance only when it's brought online (phone hotspot); offline-first means a failed check is a no-op.",
+      "//": "Points at mca/public_releases, NOT this (private, source) repo — the updater runs on offline-first field appliances with no Gitea credentials, so the endpoint must be reachable unauthenticated. That repo is public and holds only compiled installers (no source), mirrored here by .gitea/workflows/release.yml. NOT the 'latest release' redirect: public_releases is shared across apps in the org, so 'latest' there could be someone else's release. This URL names our own most-recent tag directly (desktop-vX.Y.Z, bumped by the release workflow each publish) so a newer unrelated app release never shadows ours. The updater GETs this, gets the manifest (platforms.linux-x86_64.{signature,url}), and compares versions. The release is reachable to the appliance only when it's brought online (phone hotspot); offline-first means a failed check is a no-op.",
      "endpoints": [
-        "https://git.infra.msai.al/mca/parking_solution/releases/latest/download/latest.json"
+        "https://git.infra.msai.al/mca/public_releases/releases/download/desktop-latest/latest.json"
      ],
      "pubkey": "dW50cnVzdGVkIGNvbW1lbnQ6IG1pbmlzaWduIHB1YmxpYyBrZXk6IDgxNzg5RUQ1QkM0Q0FDRjYKUldUMnJFeTgxWjU0Z1RlNmhneDVZQlVVTVZZdGhJTkUxTGdDeGYwQSttZmNKVVp5WEdVMWlBb1YK"
    }
@@ -47,6 +47,11 @@ RUN --mount=type=cache,id=pnpm-store,target=/root/.local/share/pnpm/store \
 # ---- runtime: slim, non-root ----
 FROM node:22-alpine AS runtime
 WORKDIR /app
 # Set by CI to "<branch>-<short-sha>" (e.g. "stage-28bd838"), matching the same string used
 # as the Komodo Stack's TAG (komodo/resources.toml) — so the version shown in the app is the
 # same string an admin would look up there. Empty/absent on a local `docker build` (dev only).
 ARG BUILD_VERSION=""
 ENV BUILD_VERSION=$BUILD_VERSION
 ENV NODE_ENV=production
 RUN apk add --no-cache libstdc++   # better-sqlite3 native runtime
 RUN addgroup -S app && adduser -S -G app app
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
 import { mkdtempSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
 import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
 import { join } from "node:path";
 import { eq, siteConfig } from "@parking/db";
 import { createTestDb } from "@parking/db/testing";
 import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
 import { BackupService } from "./backup-service.js";
 // BackupService previously tracked last-success/last-error as plain in-process fields, so a
 // server restart (a fresh BackupService instance, exactly as happens on every deploy/crash/OOM
 // reboot under `restart: always`) silently reset the admin UI to "last successful backup:
 // Never" — even with valid, correctly-rotating backups already on disk (2026-08-30 field
 // incident, park-buzi). These tests exercise the fix: status is read from site_config, so a new
 // BackupService instance pointed at the same DB sees the prior instance's last-run outcome, and
 // the schedule is wall-clock-based (isDue()) rather than time-since-process-start.
 // See wiki/concepts/backup-recovery.md.
 const KEY = "a-test-backup-key-that-is-long-enough";
 let workDir: string;
 let target: string;
 beforeEach(() => {
  workDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "pk-backup-service-test-"));
  target = join(workDir, "target");
  process.env.BACKUP_KEY = KEY;
 });
 afterEach(() => {
  rmSync(workDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
  delete process.env.BACKUP_KEY;
 });
 function setTargetDir(db: ReturnType<typeof createTestDb>["db"], dir: string): void {
  const existing = db.select().from(siteConfig).where(eq(siteConfig.id, 1)).get();
  if (existing) {
    db.update(siteConfig).set({ backupTargetDir: dir }).where(eq(siteConfig.id, 1)).run();
  } else {
    db.insert(siteConfig).values({ id: 1, backupTargetDir: dir }).run();
  }
 }
 describe("BackupService — persisted status survives a restart", () => {
  it("a fresh instance sees the previous instance's last success", async () => {
    const t = createTestDb();
    setTargetDir(t.db, target);
    const first = new BackupService(t.db);
    expect(first.status().lastSuccessAt).toBeNull();
    const result = await first.run("manual");
    // Simulate a process restart: a brand-new BackupService over the SAME db handle (in
    // production this would be a fresh process re-opening the same sqlite file).
    const second = new BackupService(t.db);
    const status = second.status();
    expect(status.lastSuccessAt).not.toBeNull();
    expect(status.lastResult).toEqual({ path: result.path, bytes: result.bytes, prunedFiles: result.prunedFiles });
    expect(status.lastError).toBeNull();
    t.close();
  });
  it("a fresh instance sees the previous instance's last error, and it clears on next success", async () => {
    const t = createTestDb();
    // Target dir set, but as a FILE (not a directory) — runBackup's mkdir(recursive) will
    // throw, giving us a real, deterministic failure without needing to mock anything.
    const badTarget = join(workDir, "not-a-dir");
    writeFileSync(badTarget, "x");
    setTargetDir(t.db, badTarget);
    const first = new BackupService(t.db);
    await expect(first.run("manual")).rejects.toThrow();
    const second = new BackupService(t.db);
    const status = second.status();
    expect(status.lastError).not.toBeNull();
    expect(status.lastErrorAt).not.toBeNull();
    expect(status.lastSuccessAt).toBeNull();
    // Now point at a real directory and succeed — the persisted error must clear.
    setTargetDir(t.db, target);
    await second.run("manual");
    const third = new BackupService(t.db);
    const finalStatus = third.status();
    expect(finalStatus.lastSuccessAt).not.toBeNull();
    expect(finalStatus.lastError).toBeNull();
    expect(finalStatus.lastErrorAt).toBeNull();
    t.close();
  });
 });
 describe("BackupService — isDue() is wall-clock-based, not process-uptime-based", () => {
  it("is due immediately when no success has ever been recorded", () => {
    const t = createTestDb();
    const svc = new BackupService(t.db);
    expect(svc.isDue()).toBe(true);
    t.close();
  });
  it("is NOT due right after a fresh instance is constructed, if a recent success is persisted", async () => {
    const t = createTestDb();
    setTargetDir(t.db, target);
    const first = new BackupService(t.db);
    await first.run("manual");
    // The whole point of the fix: a brand-new instance (simulating a restart moments after a
    // real backup completed) must NOT think a backup is due just because ITS OWN uptime is ~0.
    const second = new BackupService(t.db);
    expect(second.isDue()).toBe(false);
    t.close();
  });
  it("is due once the persisted last-success timestamp is old enough", async () => {
    const t = createTestDb();
    setTargetDir(t.db, target);
    const svc = new BackupService(t.db);
    await svc.run("manual");
    const almostADayLater = new Date(Date.now() + 23 * 60 * 60 * 1000);
    expect(svc.isDue(almostADayLater)).toBe(false);
    const overADayLater = new Date(Date.now() + 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000 + 1000);
    expect(svc.isDue(overADayLater)).toBe(true);
    t.close();
  });
  it("runScheduled() is a no-op when not yet due, even if configured", async () => {
    const t = createTestDb();
    setTargetDir(t.db, target);
    const svc = new BackupService(t.db);
    await svc.run("manual");
    const afterFirst = svc.status().lastSuccessAt;
    await svc.runScheduled(); // not due yet — must not run again
    expect(svc.status().lastSuccessAt).toBe(afterFirst);
    t.close();
  });
 });
@@ -11,6 +11,12 @@ import { DEFAULT_BACKUP_RETENTION, runBackup, type BackupResult, type BackupRete
 // a key must never live in the DB it backs up. Remembers the last outcome so the route + UI can
 // show last-success / last-error, and serializes concurrent runs (manual + timer). See
 // wiki/concepts/backup-recovery.md.
 //
 // Last-success/last-error are PERSISTED to site_config (backup_last_*), not just held in
 // memory — an earlier version tracked these as plain in-process fields only, so every server
 // restart (deploy, crash, OOM, host reboot — all routine under `restart: always`) silently
 // reset the admin UI to "last successful backup: Never", even with valid, correctly-rotating
 // backups already on disk (2026-08-30 field incident, park-buzi). See wiki/concepts/backup-recovery.md.
 /** The dedicated backup-encryption key, from env (NOT the DB). Separate from EVENT_SIGNING_KEY. */
 export function backupKeyFromEnv(): string {
@@ -65,16 +71,33 @@ export class BackupService {
  readonly #logger?: FastifyBaseLogger;
  #running = false;
  #lastSuccessAt: string | null = null;
  #lastResult: BackupResult | null = null;
  #lastErrorAt: string | null = null;
  #lastError: string | null = null;
  constructor(db: Db, logger?: FastifyBaseLogger) {
    this.#db = db;
    this.#logger = logger;
  }
  /** Fresh read of the persisted row (single source of truth — no in-memory cache to go stale
   *  or reset on restart). */
  #row(): { backupLastSuccessAt: string | null; backupLastResultJson: string | null; backupLastErrorAt: string | null; backupLastError: string | null } | undefined {
    return this.#db.select().from(siteConfig).where(eq(siteConfig.id, 1)).get();
  }
  #persist(patch: {
    backupLastSuccessAt?: string | null;
    backupLastResultJson?: string | null;
    backupLastErrorAt?: string | null;
    backupLastError?: string | null;
  }): void {
    const updatedAt = new Date().toISOString();
    const existing = this.#row();
    if (existing) {
      this.#db.update(siteConfig).set({ ...patch, updatedAt }).where(eq(siteConfig.id, 1)).run();
    } else {
      this.#db.insert(siteConfig).values({ id: 1, ...patch, updatedAt }).run();
    }
  }
  /** The admin-chosen target dir from site_config (null/empty = unset). Read fresh each call. */
  targetDir(): string | null {
    const row = this.#db.select().from(siteConfig).where(eq(siteConfig.id, 1)).get();
@@ -104,6 +127,15 @@ export class BackupService {
  status(): BackupStatus {
    const r = this.retention();
    const row = this.#row();
    let lastResult: BackupStatus["lastResult"] = null;
    if (row?.backupLastResultJson) {
      try {
        lastResult = JSON.parse(row.backupLastResultJson) as BackupStatus["lastResult"];
      } catch {
        lastResult = null; // corrupt/foreign value in the column — don't let it crash status()
      }
    }
    return {
      configured: this.configured,
      targetDir: this.targetDir(),
@@ -111,12 +143,10 @@ export class BackupService {
      keepDailyDays: r.keepDailyDays,
      keyPresent: this.keyPresent,
      running: this.#running,
-      lastSuccessAt: this.#lastSuccessAt,
+      lastSuccessAt: row?.backupLastSuccessAt ?? null,
-      lastResult: this.#lastResult
+      lastResult,
-        ? { path: this.#lastResult.path, bytes: this.#lastResult.bytes, prunedFiles: this.#lastResult.prunedFiles }
+      lastErrorAt: row?.backupLastErrorAt ?? null,
-        : null,
+      lastError: row?.backupLastError ?? null,
      lastErrorAt: this.#lastErrorAt,
      lastError: this.#lastError,
    };
  }
@@ -139,14 +169,17 @@ export class BackupService {
      try {
        this.#logger?.info(`backup: starting (${trigger}) → ${targetDir}`);
        const res = await runBackup(this.#db, { targetDir, key, retention: this.retention() }, this.#logger);
-        this.#lastResult = res;
+        this.#persist({
-        this.#lastSuccessAt = new Date().toISOString();
+          backupLastSuccessAt: new Date().toISOString(),
-        this.#lastError = null;
+          backupLastResultJson: JSON.stringify({ path: res.path, bytes: res.bytes, prunedFiles: res.prunedFiles }),
          backupLastErrorAt: null,
          backupLastError: null,
        });
        return res;
      } catch (err) {
-        this.#lastError = (err as Error).message;
+        const message = (err as Error).message;
-        this.#lastErrorAt = new Date().toISOString();
+        this.#persist({ backupLastErrorAt: new Date().toISOString(), backupLastError: message });
-        this.#logger?.error(`backup: failed (${trigger}): ${this.#lastError}`);
+        this.#logger?.error(`backup: failed (${trigger}): ${message}`);
        throw err;
      } finally {
        this.#running = false;
@@ -156,13 +189,34 @@ export class BackupService {
    return this.#inflight;
  }
-  /** Scheduled-run wrapper: never throws (a timer must not crash the process). */
+  /**
   * Scheduled-run wrapper: never throws (a timer must not crash the process). Safe to call on
   * a short, frequent poll (see server.ts) — it's a no-op unless `isDue()` says a full interval
   * has actually elapsed since the last recorded success, so frequent polling doesn't cause
   * frequent backups.
   */
  async runScheduled(): Promise<void> {
    if (!this.configured) return; // silent no-op when backups aren't set up
    if (!this.isDue()) return;
    try {
      await this.run("scheduled");
    } catch {
      /* recorded in last-error; already logged */
    }
  }
  /**
   * Wall-clock check: has enough time elapsed since the last successful backup for a new one
   * to be due? Deliberately based on the PERSISTED last-success instant, not "time since this
   * process started" — a `setInterval(..., 24h)` measured from process start silently drifts
   * (or skips a whole day) across every restart, since the countdown restarts from zero each
   * time regardless of when the last real backup happened. See wiki/concepts/backup-recovery.md.
   */
  isDue(now: Date = new Date(), intervalMs = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000): boolean {
    const lastSuccessAt = this.#row()?.backupLastSuccessAt;
    if (!lastSuccessAt) return true; // never recorded a success → due immediately once configured
    const last = new Date(lastSuccessAt).getTime();
    if (Number.isNaN(last)) return true;
    return now.getTime() - last >= intervalMs;
  }
 }
@@ -56,6 +56,37 @@ describe("auth guard — no token", () => {
  });
 });
 describe("GET /api/version", () => {
  it("without a session is 401", async () => {
    const res = await app.inject({ method: "GET", url: "/api/version" });
    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401);
  });
  it("a site:read user gets the BUILD_VERSION env var, null when unset", async () => {
    const { username, password } = await seedUser(db, {
      username: "viewer2", roleId: "viewer2", permissions: ["site:read"],
    });
    const { cookie } = await login(app, username, password);
    const res = await app.inject({ method: "GET", url: "/api/version", headers: { cookie } });
    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
    expect(res.json()).toEqual({ buildVersion: null }); // no BUILD_VERSION set in the test env
  });
  it("reflects a real BUILD_VERSION when the env var is set", async () => {
    process.env.BUILD_VERSION = "stage-abc1234";
    try {
      const { username, password } = await seedUser(db, {
        username: "viewer3", roleId: "viewer3", permissions: ["site:read"],
      });
      const { cookie } = await login(app, username, password);
      const res = await app.inject({ method: "GET", url: "/api/version", headers: { cookie } });
      expect(res.json()).toEqual({ buildVersion: "stage-abc1234" });
    } finally {
      delete process.env.BUILD_VERSION;
    }
  });
 });
 describe("RBAC permission gate", () => {
  it("a site:read-only user can GET occupancy but is 403 on PUT site-config", async () => {
    const { username, password } = await seedUser(db, {
@@ -78,6 +78,15 @@ export async function siteRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, db: Db, eventLog?: EventL
  // Live occupancy: cars inside, capacity, free, full. Any signed-in role.
  app.get("/api/occupancy", { preHandler: readGuard }, async () => getOccupancy(db));
  // Running build version ("<branch>-<short-sha>", matching the Komodo Stack's TAG in
  // komodo/resources.toml) — baked in at image build time (apps/server/Dockerfile
  // BUILD_VERSION ARG), read here from the running process env. null on a local/dev
  // build with no CI-supplied value. Purely informational (Setup nav display); not
  // site config, so it isn't stored in site_config.
  app.get("/api/version", { preHandler: readGuard }, async () => ({
    buildVersion: process.env.BUILD_VERSION?.trim() || null,
  }));
  // Read site config (capacity + park metadata).
  app.get("/api/site-config", { preHandler: readGuard }, async () => {
    const row = db.select().from(siteConfig).where(eq(siteConfig.id, 1)).get();
@@ -336,12 +336,20 @@ export async function buildServer(opts: BuildOptions = {}): Promise<FastifyInsta
  void runSnapPrune(); // once at startup
  app.addHook("onClose", async () => clearInterval(snapPruneTimer));
-  // Scheduled encrypted backup — daily, unref'd. A no-op (silent) until BACKUP_TARGET_DIR +
+  // Scheduled encrypted backup — checked every 15 min, unref'd; `runScheduled()` itself is a
-  // BACKUP_KEY are configured; tolerates an unreachable/unmounted target by recording the
+  // no-op unless a full 24h has actually elapsed since the last PERSISTED success (isDue(), in
-  // error and trying again next run. NOT run once at startup (a just-booted appliance after a
+  // backup-service.ts), so this frequent poll does not cause frequent backups. Deliberately
-  // power cut shouldn't immediately write to a possibly-not-yet-mounted disk; the daily cadence
+  // NOT a `setInterval(..., 24h)` measured from process start: that design silently reset its
-  // and the manual button cover it). See wiki/concepts/backup-recovery.md.
+  // own countdown on every restart (deploy/crash/OOM/reboot, all routine under `restart:
-  const backupTimer = setInterval(() => void backupService.runScheduled(), 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000);
+  // always`), which could push a day's backup out arbitrarily far AND — before last-success was
  // persisted — made the admin UI show "Never" despite valid backups already on disk
  // (2026-08-30 field incident, park-buzi). A short poll against a persisted, wall-clock
  // timestamp is immune to both restart timing and to any single restart cadence. A no-op
  // (silent) until BACKUP_TARGET_DIR + BACKUP_KEY are configured; tolerates an
  // unreachable/unmounted target by recording the error and trying again next check. NOT run
  // once at startup (a just-booted appliance after a power cut shouldn't immediately write to a
  // possibly-not-yet-mounted disk). See wiki/concepts/backup-recovery.md.
  const backupTimer = setInterval(() => void backupService.runScheduled(), 15 * 60 * 1000);
  backupTimer.unref();
  app.addHook("onClose", async () => clearInterval(backupTimer));
  if (backupService.configured) {
@@ -253,6 +253,15 @@ export async function fetchBackupStatus(): Promise<BackupStatus> {
  return apiFetch("/api/backup/status");
 }
 export interface VersionInfo {
  /** "<branch>-<short-sha>" baked in at image build time; null on a local/dev build. */
  buildVersion: string | null;
 }
 export async function fetchVersion(): Promise<VersionInfo> {
  return apiFetch("/api/version");
 }
 export interface BackupConfigPatch {
  /** "" clears the target. Omit a field to leave it unchanged; null resets retention to default. */
  targetDir?: string | null;
@@ -41,11 +41,22 @@ export async function checkForDesktopUpdate(
    // Download + install the signed update (signature verified against the
    // pubkey in tauri.conf.json), then relaunch into the new version.
    try {
      await update.downloadAndInstall();
    } catch (err) {
      // A real update WAS found and accepted — this is a genuine install
      // failure (bad signature, corrupted download, disk/permission issue),
      // not "offline". Surface it instead of silently reverting to the old
      // version with no explanation.
      console.error("desktop update download/install failed:", err);
      throw err;
    }
    const { relaunch } = await import("@tauri-apps/plugin-process");
    await relaunch();
-  } catch {
+  } catch (err) {
    // Offline / endpoint unreachable / no update server yet → ignore. The app
-    // keeps running on the current version; checking again next launch.
+    // keeps running on the current version; checking again next launch. Still
    // log it so a real install failure (rethrown above) isn't invisible.
    console.warn("desktop update check/apply skipped:", err);
  }
 }
@@ -23,7 +23,14 @@ type WsMessage =
  | { kind: "plate-recognized"; plate: { identity: string; plate: string; direction: "entry" | "exit" } };
-export function useLiveFeed(): void {
+/**
 * @param enabled Gate on the WATCHER permission (`report:read` — mirrors the server's
 *   WS guard in routes/ws.ts). A user whose role lacks it (e.g. a merchant validator
 *   with only `validation:create`) must not attempt the socket at all: the server
 *   403s the upgrade and the capped-backoff reconnect would otherwise hammer it
 *   forever, filling the server log with a 403 every few seconds.
 */
 export function useLiveFeed(enabled: boolean = true): void {
  const qc = useQueryClient();
  const { setStatus, setOccupancy, pushEvent, setDevices, upsertDevice, setLanes, setRadar, patchPlate } =
    useLiveStore();
@@ -34,6 +41,10 @@ export function useLiveFeed(): void {
  const closedRef = useRef(false);
  useEffect(() => {
    if (!enabled) {
      setStatus("closed");
      return;
    }
    closedRef.current = false;
    const connect = () => {
@@ -117,7 +128,8 @@ export function useLiveFeed(): void {
      sockRef.current?.close();
      sockRef.current = null;
    };
-    // qc / store setters are stable; run once on mount.
+    // qc / store setters are stable; re-run only if the permission gate flips
    // (login as a different role without a full reload).
    // eslint-disable-next-line react-hooks/exhaustive-deps
-  }, []);
+  }, [enabled]);
 }
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import {
  can,
  closeShift,
  fetchShiftReport,
  fetchVersion,
  logout,
  openShift,
  setLanguagePref,
@@ -94,6 +95,17 @@ function SetupTab({ to, label, exact = false }: { to: string; label: string; exa
  );
 }
 /** The running deploy's "<branch>-<short-sha>" (matches the Komodo Stack's TAG in
 *  komodo/resources.toml), gated the same as the "Park" tab (site:read) since it's the
 *  same kind of read-only app metadata. Renders nothing if the value isn't known (e.g. a
 *  local/dev build with no CI-supplied BUILD_VERSION) rather than showing an empty badge. */
 function VersionBadge() {
  const q = useQuery({ queryKey: ["version"], queryFn: fetchVersion, staleTime: Infinity });
  const version = q.data?.buildVersion;
  if (!version) return null;
  return <span className="ml-auto shrink-0 pl-3 text-[0.7rem] text-term-muted">{version}</span>;
 }
 /** Setup layout — the config hub. Renders a permission-gated tab bar and the active
 *  tab's screen via <Outlet>. Each tab is a child route (its own URL + guard), so
 *  deep links and the back button work and a denied tab redirects to the booth. */
@@ -112,6 +124,7 @@ function SetupLayout() {
        {show("recyclebin:read") && <SetupTab to="/setup/recycle-bin" label={t("nav.recycleBin")} />}
        {show("log:read") && <SetupTab to="/setup/logs" label={t("nav.logs")} />}
        {show("backup:read") && <SetupTab to="/setup/backup" label={t("nav.backup")} />}
        {show("site:read") && <VersionBadge />}
      </nav>
      <Outlet />
    </div>
@@ -448,11 +461,17 @@ function ConfirmFigure({ label, value, bold, sub }: { label: string; value: stri
 function RootLayout() {
  const { user, setUser } = rootRoute.useRouteContext();
  const { t } = useTranslation();
  // One app-wide WebSocket for the live feed (booth + any live widget).
  useLiveFeed();
  // Nav is gated by PERMISSION, not role — a tab shows iff the user's role grants
  // the permission its screen needs (the route guards enforce the same server-side).
  const show = (perm: Permission) => can(user, perm);
  // One app-wide WebSocket for the live feed (booth + any live widget) — but ONLY
  // for roles the server would accept (routes/ws.ts gates on report:read). A
  // merchant validator must not even attempt it: the 403'd upgrade would reconnect
  // on backoff forever and spam the server log. Same rule for the widgets that feed
  // off it (StatusDot) or make their own gated calls (ShiftButton → shift:read,
  // DeviceFooter → device:read).
  const canWatch = show("report:read");
  useLiveFeed(canWatch);
  return (
    <div className="flex h-screen flex-col bg-term-bg text-term-text">
@@ -489,11 +508,11 @@ function RootLayout() {
            show("shift:read")) && <NavLink to="/setup" label={t("nav.setup")} />}
        </nav>
        <div className="ml-auto flex items-center gap-3">
-          {user && <ShiftButton />}
+          {user && show("shift:read") && <ShiftButton />}
          {user && <LanguageToggle user={user} setUser={setUser} />}
          {user && <ThemeToggle user={user} setUser={setUser} />}
          {user && <FontScaleToggle user={user} setUser={setUser} />}
-          <StatusDot />
+          {canWatch && <StatusDot />}
          {user && (
            <Link
              to="/profile"
@@ -518,8 +537,10 @@ function RootLayout() {
      <main className="min-h-0 flex-1 overflow-auto p-3">
        <Outlet />
      </main>
-      {/* Fixed device-status footer — relays, readers, cameras, printers. */}
+      {/* Fixed device-status footer — relays, readers, cameras, printers. Its REST
-      {user && <DeviceFooter />}
+          seed needs device:read (and its live updates ride the report:read WS), so
          it's hidden for roles without device visibility (e.g. merchant validators). */}
      {user && show("device:read") && <DeviceFooter />}
    </div>
  );
 }
@@ -30,42 +30,6 @@
 # new [[stack]] block per site (unique name, its own per-booth secret refs).
 ##############################################################################
 ##############################################################################
 # park-lab — the LAB bench box (hardware/dev testing, no real traffic). Chases
 # the dev tier: compose files from `dev`, MOVING image tag `dev` (labs may
 # float; real booths pin). Secrets are its own park_lab_* refs — per-box blast
 # radius, never shared with a real booth even in the lab.
 ##############################################################################
 [[stack]]
 name = "park-lab"
 [stack.config]
 server = "park-lab"
 git_provider = "git.infra.msai.al"
 git_account = "komodo"
 repo = "mca/parking_solution"
 branch = "dev"
 file_paths = [
  "docker-compose.yml",
  "docker-compose.prod.yml"
 ]
 registry_provider = "git.infra.msai.al"
 registry_account = "komodo"
 environment = """
 REGISTRY=git.infra.msai.al/mca/parking_solution
 # Lab tier: the MOVING dev tag — redeploy pulls the latest dev build. Pin to a
 # dev-<sha> only when reproducing a specific state.
 TAG=dev
 COOKIE_SECURE=0
 VISION_ENABLED=1
 WS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=
 JWT_SECRET=[[park_lab_jwt_secret]]
 EVENT_SIGNING_KEY=[[park_lab_event_signing_key]]
 BACKUP_KEY=[[park_lab_backup_key]]
 """
 ##############################################################################
 [[stack]]
 name = "park-buzi"
 [stack.config]
@@ -85,7 +49,7 @@ REGISTRY=git.infra.msai.al/mca/parking_solution
 # Staging booth: pinned immutable stage-<sha>. After each promotion (merge dev → stage, CI builds
 # :stage-<sha>), bump this to the new sha and re-sync/deploy from Core. The moving `:stage` tag
 # exists as the pointer; we deploy the sha, not the mover.
-TAG=stage-22544ec
+TAG=stage-28bd838
 COOKIE_SECURE=0
 VISION_ENABLED=1
 WS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=
@@ -93,3 +57,33 @@ JWT_SECRET=[[park_buzi_jwt_secret]]
 EVENT_SIGNING_KEY=[[park_buzi_event_signing_key]]
 BACKUP_KEY=[[park_buzi_backup_key]]
 """
 ##############################################################################
 [[stack]]
 name = "park-2"
 [stack.config]
 server = "park-2"
 git_provider = "git.infra.msai.al"
 git_account = "komodo"
 repo = "mca/parking_solution"
 branch = "stage"
 file_paths = [
  "docker-compose.yml",
  "docker-compose.prod.yml"
 ]
 registry_provider = "git.infra.msai.al"
 registry_account = "komodo"
 environment = """
 REGISTRY=git.infra.msai.al/mca/parking_solution
 # Staging booth: pinned immutable stage-<sha>. After each promotion (merge dev → stage, CI builds
 # :stage-<sha>), bump this to the new sha and re-sync/deploy from Core. The moving `:stage` tag
 # exists as the pointer; we deploy the sha, not the mover.
 TAG=stage-28bd838
 COOKIE_SECURE=0
 VISION_ENABLED=1
 WS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=
 JWT_SECRET=[[park_2_jwt_secret]]
 EVENT_SIGNING_KEY=[[park_2_event_signing_key]]
 BACKUP_KEY=[[park_2_backup_key]]
 """
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
 -- Last-success/last-error for the encrypted DB backup were previously tracked only as
 -- in-process fields on BackupService (never written to the DB) — so every server restart
 -- (deploy/crash/OOM/host reboot, all routine under `restart: always`) silently reset the admin
 -- UI's "last successful backup" to "Never", even with valid, correctly-rotating backups already
 -- on disk (2026-08-30 field incident, park-buzi). Four additive, nullable columns; null = no
 -- run recorded yet (or, for the error pair, no failure since the last success). See
 -- wiki/concepts/backup-recovery.md.
 ALTER TABLE `site_config` ADD `backup_last_success_at` text;--> statement-breakpoint
 ALTER TABLE `site_config` ADD `backup_last_result_json` text;--> statement-breakpoint
 ALTER TABLE `site_config` ADD `backup_last_error_at` text;--> statement-breakpoint
 ALTER TABLE `site_config` ADD `backup_last_error` text;
@@ -176,6 +176,13 @@
      "when": 1783948800000,
      "tag": "0024_validation_programs",
      "breakpoints": true
    },
    {
      "idx": 25,
      "version": "6",
      "when": 1788078414270,
      "tag": "0025_backup_last_status",
      "breakpoints": true
    }
  ]
 }
@@ -288,6 +288,20 @@ export const siteConfig = sqliteTable("site_config", {
  backupKeepLast: integer("backup_keep_last"),
  /** Beyond keepLast, keep one backup per day for this many days. null ⇒ code default (30). */
  backupKeepDailyDays: integer("backup_keep_daily_days"),
  /** ISO timestamp of the last backup that actually completed successfully. Persisted here
   *  (not just in-process memory) so the admin UI's "last successful backup" survives a
   *  server restart — before this column existed, a restart silently reset that status to
   *  "Never" even with valid backups already on disk. null = no successful run recorded yet.
   *  See wiki/concepts/backup-recovery.md. */
  backupLastSuccessAt: text("backup_last_success_at"),
  /** JSON-encoded { path, bytes, prunedFiles } of the last successful run, for the same
   *  restart-durability reason as backupLastSuccessAt. null = none recorded yet. */
  backupLastResultJson: text("backup_last_result_json"),
  /** ISO timestamp of the last FAILED scheduled/manual backup attempt, persisted for the same
   *  reason. null = no failure recorded (or none since the last success). */
  backupLastErrorAt: text("backup_last_error_at"),
  /** Error message of the last failed attempt. Cleared (set null) on the next success. */
  backupLastError: text("backup_last_error"),
  updatedAt: text("updated_at")
    .notNull()
    .default(sql`(current_timestamp)`),
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 type: concept
 tags: [parking, durability, backup, recovery, security, crypto]
 sources: []
-updated: 2026-06-29
+updated: 2026-08-30
 ---
 # Backup & Disaster Recovery
@@ -207,12 +207,68 @@ timer + the manual route**. What landed:
 **SMB/NFS already work** — they're just a mounted path the admin enters as the target. **Deferred to
 follow-up slices:** an **SFTP** target and a **restore runbook / CLI**.
 ## Field bug — "last successful backup: Never" despite valid, rotating backups on disk (found + fixed 2026-08-30)
 **Symptom (park-buzi):** the admin noticed the backup directory held 7 real, correctly-sized,
 correctly-rotating encrypted backups (`parking-backup-*.sqlite.enc`, retention working exactly as
 designed) — yet the Backup screen's "Kopja e fundit e suksesshme" (last successful backup) showed
 **"Asnjëherë" (Never)**. Separately, the most recent file was 2 days old rather than ~1.
 **Root cause — two independent, disconnected code paths, both traced to `setInterval`-since-
 process-start:**
 1. **Status was never persisted.** `BackupService` tracked `lastSuccessAt`/`lastResult`/
   `lastErrorAt`/`lastError` as **plain in-process private fields** — set only inside `run()`,
   read only by `status()` on the *same running instance*. Nothing wrote them to `site_config` or
   anywhere else durable. The actual backup-writing engine (`backup.ts`: consistent copy → encrypt
   → `pruneOldBackups`) is a completely separate code path that only touches the filesystem and
   has no notion of this status object. So "7 valid files on disk" and "status says Never" were
   never contradictory — they were two unrelated signals, and **any** server restart (deploy,
   crash, OOM, host reboot — all routine under `restart: always` in `docker-compose.prod.yml`)
   silently reset the in-memory fields to `null` regardless of what had actually happened on disk.
 2. **The schedule was measured from process start, not from the last real backup.** The daily
   timer was `setInterval(() => backupService.runScheduled(), 24h)` — a fixed 24h period counted
   from whenever the *process* last started, not from wall-clock time or from when a backup last
   actually succeeded. The exact same restart that wiped the in-memory status also reset this
   countdown, which is why the cadence can silently drift or skip past a day with no error ever
   surfacing anywhere.
 Both symptoms are one cause: **the server process restarted after the Aug 28 backup, and nothing
 about this design was built to survive that.**
 ### Fix (2026-08-30)
 - **`packages/db/src/schema.ts`** / migration `0025_backup_last_status.sql` — four new nullable
  `site_config` columns: `backup_last_success_at`, `backup_last_result_json`,
  `backup_last_error_at`, `backup_last_error`. Same table, same upsert pattern as
  `backup_target_dir`/`backup_keep_last`/`backup_keep_daily_days` (migrations 0016/0017).
 - **`backup-service.ts`** — `run()` now writes success/error outcomes to these columns (via a
  `#persist` upsert helper) instead of private fields; `status()` reads them fresh from the DB on
  every call. A brand-new `BackupService` instance (i.e. a fresh process) now sees exactly what
  the previous instance last recorded — no more restart amnesia.
 - **New `isDue(now, intervalMs = 24h)`** method: due iff `now - backupLastSuccessAt >= 24h` (or
  immediately due if no success was ever recorded), computed from the **persisted** timestamp —
  never from process uptime.
 - **`server.ts`** — the daily `setInterval` was replaced with a **15-minute poll** calling
  `runScheduled()`, which now itself no-ops unless `isDue()` is true. This makes the actual backup
  cadence immune to restart timing entirely: however often the process happens to restart, the
  next backup fires within 15 minutes of 24h having genuinely elapsed since the last real success
  — not 24h after whatever moment the process most recently came back up.
 - Covered by a new `backup-service.test.ts`: a fresh `BackupService` over the same DB handle
  (simulating a restart) sees the prior instance's last success/error and its cleared-on-success
  behavior; `isDue()` is exercised directly against injected timestamps rather than real sleeps.
 No change to the `BackupStatus` shape returned by `GET /api/backup/status` or to
 `BackupSettings.tsx` — this was purely a durability fix underneath the same contract.
 ## Status
 Design settled 2026-06-29; **engine + admin-configured local/mounted target + admin UI BUILT
 2026-06-29** (SFTP + restore tooling pending). The target directory is **admin-chosen in the UI**
 (`site_config`, migration 0016), not an env var — the on-site admin picks where backups land; only
-`BACKUP_KEY` stays a server secret. Resolves the *design* half of [[open-questions]] #5 and the first
+`BACKUP_KEY` stays a server secret. **Last-success/last-error status + the scheduling cadence are
-build slices; records the key-custody stance that bears on #6 (signing stays decoupled from the TPM) and
+now restart-durable (migration 0025, 2026-08-30)** — see field bug above. Resolves the *design*
-#10 (snapshots bloat backups → future exclude toggle). See [[append-only-event-chain]],
+half of [[open-questions]] #5 and the first build slices; records the key-custody stance that bears
-[[disk-os-hardening]], [[tpm]], [[fleet-deployment-komodo]], [[reconciliation]].
+on #6 (signing stays decoupled from the TPM) and #10 (snapshots bloat backups → future exclude
 toggle). See [[append-only-event-chain]], [[disk-os-hardening]], [[tpm]], [[fleet-deployment-komodo]],
 [[reconciliation]].
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 type: concept
 tags: [parking, device, printer, transport, usb, escpos, provisioning]
 sources: []
-updated: 2026-07-06
+updated: 2026-08-30
 status: settled
 ---
@@ -140,5 +140,70 @@ hint. The transport option label no longer hardcodes lp0.
 > the monitor would mark a perfectly working printer offline/degraded. Over USB the two drivers
 > behave identically (reachability floor), so either works post-fix. See [[rongta-printer]].
 ## Field bug — cover-open re-enumeration wedges the container's `/dev/usb` view; only `docker restart`, not a host reboot, clears it (investigated 2026-08-30, unconfirmed root cause)
 **Symptom (park-buzi, unknown/"Generic" USB printer, model not yet identified — see below):** every
 time the booth operator opens the printer's paper-roll cover to reload paper, the printer's status
 goes `offline`/faulty in the app and **never self-recovers** — not after the cover closes, not after
 a full appliance reboot. The only fix found so far is SSH in and `docker restart server`.
 **Ruled out at the application layer.** Traced `sendRawUsb`/`probeUsb` in `printer-escpos.ts`: every
 print AND every poll tick (`device-monitor.ts` 8s / `printer-monitor.ts` 5s) does a fresh
 `open()` → write/probe → `close()` against the configured `devicePath`. **No fd, socket, or driver
 instance is held across calls** — `driver.create(config)` is a throwaway object with no persistent
 handle. So a naive "stale Node file descriptor" explanation does not fit this codebase; the
 app-layer retry-by-fresh-open-every-poll should self-heal within one poll cycle if the kernel's view
 of the device node is current.
 **Leading hypothesis: the container's bind-mount of `/dev/usb`, not the Node process, holds the
 stale state.** Docker Compose wires the printer in as a **directory bind-mount**
 (`docker-compose.prod.yml`, `volumes: - /dev/usb:/dev/usb`), chosen deliberately (per its own
 comment) so the app survives the printer renumbering to a different `lpN`. But many USB thermal
 printers cut power to their own USB interface board when the cover-open microswitch trips (a
 hardware safety/power feature, not just a status flag) — the printer drops off the bus and
 re-enumerates, potentially as a new device node, when the cover closes. The **host** kernel picks
 this up fine; the **container's mount namespace**, once established, is a known Docker/OverlayFS
 sharp edge for `/dev` subtree bind-mounts — it can keep resolving the old node until the mount
 itself is redone.
 - `docker restart server` recreates the container's mount namespace → the `/dev/usb` bind-mount is
  redone against current host state → the new node is picked up → fixed.
 - A full host reboot restarts the container too (`restart: always`), but as a boot-time race: if the
  container starts before the USB subsystem finishes settling, or the printer re-enumerated some
  time *before* the reboot and Docker doesn't necessarily redo an already-satisfied bind-mount
  target on a policy-driven restart, the container can come back up still bound to the pre-incident
  view. This matches the exact reported asymmetry (reboot doesn't fix it; explicit restart does).
 **Not yet confirmed on hardware** — this is the leading theory, not a verified root cause. To
 confirm at the next occurrence, BEFORE restarting anything:
 ```bash
 # host:
 ls -la /dev/usb/ && stat /dev/usb/lp1
 # container:
 docker exec server ls -la /dev/usb/ && docker exec server stat /dev/usb/lp1
 ```
 A major:minor or inode mismatch between host and container is the smoking gun. Also worth
 capturing on the lab RONGTA (different printer, but same cover-open mechanism is plausible):
 `watch -n1 lsusb` + `sudo dmesg -w | grep -i -E 'usb|disconnect'` while cycling the cover, to see
 whether the Bus/Device number changes.
 **Candidate fixes, not yet implemented** (ranked cheapest-to-most-invasive):
 1. A host-side watchdog/udev rule that detects re-enumeration of this printer (match vendor:product
   ID) and runs `docker restart server` automatically — turns the manual SSH fix into a self-healing
   one without touching app code.
 2. Same idea but event-driven via a udev rule or systemd path unit watching `/dev/usb`, rather than
   polling.
 3. Switch the compose device wiring from the directory bind-mount to a specific `--device=` cgroup
   passthrough + a udev rule pinning a stable symlink name — reintroduces the renumbering fragility
   the directory bind-mount was chosen to avoid, so only worth doing alongside (1)/(2), not instead.
 **Open sub-question — printer identity.** The park-buzi unit shows as "Generic (unknown)" in the
 app; not yet identified by vendor/product ID. Lab reproduction uses a **RONGTA** unit instead (not
 the same hardware), so the lab cannot currently reproduce the park-buzi symptom directly — only
 validate the general re-enumeration mechanism. Commands to identify the real park-buzi printer next
 time it's reachable via SSH: `lsusb`, `udevadm info -q property -n /dev/usb/lp1`, `udevadm info -a
 -n /dev/usb/lp1`. This mirrors the same discovery gap already noted above under "Device discovery"
 (sysfs `ieee1284_id` enrichment) — once identified, fold the model into that mechanism's coverage.
 Related: [[rongta-printer]], [[printer-status-monitoring]], [[printer-roles-failover]],
 [[appliance-provisioning]], [[network-isolation]], [[technology-stack]].
@@ -100,7 +100,11 @@ priced at booth check-in, inside the normal walk-back-grace flow).
  both; mode/params/caps/receipt-label/bound-users). `/validate` (`ValidateScreen.tsx`) is the
  merchant's whole surface (scan/key → apply → void own unused), mobile-friendly, autofocused
  input works with HID scanners; merchant-only users (no `session:read`) land there on login and
-  the permission-gated nav shows them nothing else. Booth pay modal shows gross → lines → net;
+  the permission-gated nav shows them nothing else. The app SHELL also degrades by permission
  (2026-07-13 follow-up): the live-feed WebSocket connects only with `report:read` (the server's
  WS guard — a merchant's socket would 403 and the capped-backoff reconnect would spam the server
  log forever), and the StatusDot / ShiftButton / DeviceFooter widgets render only with their
  backing permissions (`report:read` / `shift:read` / `device:read`). Booth pay modal shows gross → lines → net;
  the zero-net comp settles through the normal pay path (grace starts, voucher/exit unchanged).
  Feed label `VALIDIM`/`VALIDATION`. RolesManager picks the new resource up generically.
 - **Verified**: 8 route-level integration tests (guards, signed events, money cycle, void locks,
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 type: reference
 tags: [parking, deployment, appliance, hardening, runbook, offline-first]
 sources: []
-updated: 2026-07-06
+updated: 2026-09-02
 status: settled
 ---
@@ -282,24 +282,38 @@ sudo loginctl enable-linger admin     # so the user service starts at boot witho
 ```
 - `--connect-as` is the **Server name in Core** — unique, stable, site-meaningful (the fleet's
-  primary key). Booth #2 = a different name (e.g. `park-durres`); never reuse one.
+  primary key). Booth #2 = a different name (e.g. `park-durres`); never reuse one. **Get this
  right in the command itself** — it's a plain field in `periphery.config.toml` on the host, so a
  typo/placeholder here needs a config edit + agent restart to fix, NOT a rename in Core's UI
  (which only relabels Core's record, not the agent's real identity — gotcha #12 below).
 - `--core-address` is Core's **reverse-proxy URL** (the URL you load the Core UI at over the mesh),
  NOT `:9120` — Core's container port `9120` is exposed-not-published; the agent reaches it through
  the proxy. (Gotcha #7 below.)
 - Config lands at `~/.config/komodo/periphery.config.toml`. The key field is **`core_address`**
-  (singular); `root_directory` must be a path `admin` can write. **⚠ VERIFY THIS after install —
+  (singular).
  Periphery v2.2.0's installer writes `root_directory = "/etc/komodo"` even with `--user`**
  (bit the lab box 2026-07-07: panic `Failed to write private key pem to "/etc/komodo/keys/
  periphery.key" … Permission denied`, crash-loop until systemd gives up). Fix + restart:
  ```bash
  sed -i 's|^root_directory = .*|root_directory = "'"$HOME"'/.komodo"|' ~/.config/komodo/periphery.config.toml
  systemctl --user reset-failed periphery && systemctl --user restart periphery
  ```
  NB `sudo systemctl restart periphery` says *unit not found* — it's a USER unit; always
  `systemctl --user …`. The onboarding key survives a pre-connect crash (unused until first dial).
-Verify: `systemctl --user status periphery` → active; the server **`park-buzi`** appears and goes
+> ⚠ **ALWAYS CHECK THIS — every install so far has hit it (lab box 2026-07-07, booth `park-2`
-**OK/green** in Core → Servers. Then **delete the onboarding key**.
+> 2026-09-02).** `root_directory` must be a path `admin` can write, but **Periphery's installer
 > writes `root_directory = "/etc/komodo"` even with `--user`** (still true as of v2.3.3). Result:
 > panic `Failed to write private key pem to "/etc/komodo/keys/periphery.key" … Permission denied`,
 > crash-loop until systemd gives up (`Start request repeated too quickly`).
 >
 > **Fix + restart:**
 > ```bash
 > sed -i 's|^root_directory = .*|root_directory = "'"$HOME"'/.komodo"|' ~/.config/komodo/periphery.config.toml
 > systemctl --user reset-failed periphery && systemctl --user restart periphery
 > ```
 > NB `sudo systemctl restart periphery` says *unit not found* — it's a USER unit; always
 > `systemctl --user …`. The onboarding key survives a pre-connect crash (unused until first dial).
 >
 > **➜ Do not stop here once it's green.** This fix only gets Periphery *running* — the Stack still
 > isn't deployed. Immediately continue to **verify below, then §7b**.
 **Verify:** `systemctl --user status periphery` → active; the server **`park-buzi`** appears and
 goes **OK/green** in Core → Servers. Then **delete the onboarding key**.
 **➜ Next step is §7b below — the Stack itself is not deployed yet.** A green Server in Core just
 means the agent connected; it runs nothing until you add the Registry/Git accounts and deploy.
 ### 7b. Deploy the Stack (in Core — by hand once, then code)
@@ -482,8 +496,36 @@ works; the desktop app is a separate workstream.
   separate Komodo credentials. A blank registry account on the Stack → anonymous pull →
   `no basic auth credentials`. Set the Stack's **Registry Account** (`komodo`).
 9. **User-mode Periphery + `/etc/komodo` `root_directory` = `Permission denied`** writing the agent
-   key. User-mode (runs as `admin`, no root daemon) must keep `root_directory` under `$HOME`.
+   key. User-mode (runs as `admin`, no root daemon) must keep `root_directory` under `$HOME`. Hit
   on every install so far (lab box 2026-07-07, booth `park-2` 2026-09-02, still on v2.3.3) —
   **check this first** whenever a fresh Periphery install crash-loops; see the boxed callout in
   §7a for the fix. Easy to fix-and-move-on without realizing the Stack still isn't deployed —
   §7a's fix only starts the agent, §7b deploys the Stack.
 10. The config key is **`core_address`** (singular). And `--core-address` derives `wss://` from
    `https://` — if Core were plain-HTTP you'd need `http://` (→ `ws://`).
 11. ResourceSync **Execute disabled + file shown clean in Info = empty diff = already in sync**
    (success). Execute only enables when the file and Core diverge (e.g. you edit `TAG`).
 12. **Renaming a Server in Core's UI does NOT change the agent's actual identity.**
    `connect_as` is a plain field persisted in the agent's own
    `~/.config/komodo/periphery.config.toml` — Core's UI rename only relabels Core's *record*,
    the agent keeps re-announcing under its original `connect_as` on every reconnect. Symptom (hit
    2026-08-30, lab box): a server named via a leftover template placeholder in the install
    command kept reappearing in Core no matter how many times it was renamed there, while the
    intended name sat permanently NOT OK (nothing was ever checking in as that name). **Fix: edit
    `connect_as` directly in `periphery.config.toml` on the host, then `systemctl --user restart
    periphery`** — no reinstall/re-onboarding needed. Delete the stray old-name Server record in
    Core afterward. Lesson: always double-check `--connect-as` is a REAL name (never leave a
    template placeholder like `<new-server-name>` in a copy-pasted install command) — Core will
    happily create a server with that literal string.
 13. **Upgrading an already-installed Periphery is: re-run the same installer, unchanged
    `--connect-as`.** No separate update mechanism, no update-only flag. The installer script
    explicitly skips rewriting `periphery.config.toml` if one already exists ("Config already
    exists, skipping...") — it only stops the service, replaces the binary, and restarts — so a
    re-run is **config-preserving** and a fresh/dummy `--onboarding-key` value on that re-run is
    simply unused (confirmed against Komodo's own `setup-periphery.py` source, 2026-08-30; no
    Periphery-specific breaking changes between v2.2.0 and v2.3.2 per Komodo's release notes).
    Verified end-to-end on `art-docker-station` (lab, dry run) then `park-buzi` (live booth,
    2026-08-30): same command as §7a step 2, same `--connect-as`, app containers untouched
    throughout (Periphery restarting itself never touches the already-running compose stack).
    **Always dry-run a version bump on a lab/dev box before a live booth**, even with a clean
    release-notes check — this project only had one lab box to test against and used it first.
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 type: decision
 tags: [parking, decisions, desktop, frontend]
 sources: []
-updated: 2026-06-21
+updated: 2026-09-03
 status: settled
 ---
@@ -140,20 +140,27 @@ Per the user's choices — the operator **keeps OS access** (no fullscreen lockd
 - **Right-click:** the context menu is blocked in **prod only** (`apps/web/src/lib/kiosk.ts`,
  guarded on `import.meta.env.PROD`); dev keeps right-click + devtools. Applies to both the browser
  prod build and the desktop build (same SPA).
- **`VITE_API_BASE` wired to the environment:** `apps/web/.env.production` (committed, non-secret,
+- **`VITE_API_BASE` — desktop vs. browser (regression found + fixed 2026-09-03):**
-  allow-listed in `.gitignore`) sets `VITE_API_BASE=http://127.0.0.1:3000`, auto-loaded by
+  `apps/web/.env.production` (committed, shared by both builds) sets `VITE_API_BASE=` (empty) — this
-  `vite build` (which the desktop bundle runs). So the desktop build targets Fastify with no manual
+  is correct for the **browser/booth** build (Fastify same-origin, stays relative) since commit
-  export; the browser-served-by-Fastify build should override to `""`.
+  `96fd97e` (2026-06-27), but that same change silently broke the **desktop** build, which was never
  given its own override. Result: the desktop shell's `apiUrl()` returned a bare relative path
  (`/api/auth/login`) to `fetch()` from a page loaded at `tauri://localhost` — WebKitGTK has no base
  to resolve a relative URL against from a non-`http(s)` origin, and threw `DOMException: "The
  string did not match the expected pattern."` on the first authenticated request (login). Login
  worked fine in the browser (same-origin, no absolute URL needed) the whole time, which is what
  made this easy to miss. **Fix:** `tauri.conf.json`'s `build.beforeBuildCommand` now sets
  `VITE_API_BASE=http://127.0.0.1:3000` inline (`VITE_API_BASE=http://127.0.0.1:3000 pnpm --filter
  @parking/web build`) — process env vars override `.env.production` in Vite's load order, so this
  overrides the shared file for the desktop build only, without touching it (the browser/booth build
  still gets the empty value, unaffected). Verified: rebuilding with the override bakes
  `127.0.0.1:3000` into the bundle; rebuilding without it stays clean/relative.
 - **Auto-update (prompt-on-update, self-hosted):** `tauri-plugin-updater` + `tauri-plugin-process`.
  On launch the SPA checks the endpoint (`apps/web/src/lib/desktop-updater.ts`, no-op in browser /
  offline), prompts the operator (i18n `update.prompt`), then `downloadAndInstall()` + `relaunch()`.
  Accepts that the appliance may be **offline** day-to-day and brought online (phone hotspot) only
  when an update is wanted — consistent with [[offline-first]] (no network dependency in *core*
-  operation; updates are out-of-band). Endpoint is the **self-hosted Gitea** "latest release"
+  operation; updates are out-of-band). **WS origin:** the desktop window's origin
  path — `https://git.infra.msai.al/mca/parking_solution/releases/latest/download/latest.json`
  — which redirects to the newest tag's `latest.json` (published by `.gitea/workflows/release.yml`).
  The updater GETs it (200 + manifest, or 204 = up-to-date), reads `platforms.linux-x86_64.
  {signature,url}`, and downloads the signed installer. **WS origin:** the desktop window's origin
  is `tauri://localhost` (Linux may also send `http://tauri.localhost`), so the backend's
  `WS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS` must include both or the live feed won't connect (documented in
  `apps/server/.env.example`).
@@ -165,8 +172,27 @@ Per the user's choices — the operator **keeps OS access** (no fullscreen lockd
  produced `.deb`/`.rpm`/`.AppImage` **plus their `.sig` updater signatures**; full `turbo run build
  lint` 14/14 green. *(This is the **updater** signing — distinct from OS-installer signing for
  Windows/macOS "unknown publisher", and from the [[atecc608]]/[[tpm]] **event** signing.)*
- **Still deferred:** the actual update-hosting URL, OS-level installer signing
+- **Update-hosting endpoint (found broken, fixed 2026-09-03):** the endpoint originally pointed at
-  (Windows/macOS publisher trust), and the Windows kiosk-browser fallback path.
+  the **source repo's own** Gitea "latest release" redirect
  (`.../mca/parking_solution/releases/latest/download/latest.json`) — but `mca/parking_solution` is
  **private**, and the updater runs on offline-first field appliances with **no Gitea credentials**.
  Every deployed update check was silently failing (swallowed by a `try/catch` in
  `desktop-updater.ts`) — this was never field-verified, and it couldn't have worked as configured.
  **Fix:** signed installers are now mirrored to a separate **public**, releases-only repo,
  `mca/public_releases` (shared across apps in the org — see [[fleet-deployment-komodo]] sibling
  infra), holding **only compiled installers, no source**. `tauri.conf.json`'s endpoint now points
  there at a fixed `desktop-latest` tag (NOT that repo's generic "latest release" redirect, since
  other apps publishing there would shadow ours — see the `desktop-latest` vs `desktop-<TAG>`
  split below). `.gitea/workflows/release.yml` pushes to both repos: the private source repo (own
  record) and the public mirror (what the updater and any human downloader actually use).
  **Rejected alternative:** embedding a `read:repository` Gitea token in `tauri.conf.json`'s
  updater `headers` so it could read the private repo directly — ruled out because that token would
  ship inside every installed binary in the field, and this appliance's own threat model names the
  **booth operator as the primary adversary** (see root `CLAUDE.md`); a leaked token scoped to the
  whole private repo, with no cheap way to rotate it across appliances already in the field, was
  judged worse than publishing installers-only.
 - **Still deferred:** OS-level installer signing (Windows/macOS publisher trust) and the Windows
  kiosk-browser fallback path.
 ### Desktop in CI — two workflows, two purposes (added 2026-06-24)
@@ -174,7 +200,15 @@ The desktop bundle now runs in CI under **two distinct workflows** — keep the
 - **`.gitea/workflows/release.yml`** (tag `v*`) — the **signed, versioned release**: builds
  `.deb`/`.rpm`/`.AppImage` **+ their `.sig`** (updater key from secrets), assembles `latest.json`,
-  and publishes a Gitea Release. This is what the auto-updater consumes. Unchanged.
+  and publishes a Gitea Release **on `mca/parking_solution` (source, own record) AND mirrors it to
  `mca/public_releases`** (public, installers-only — see the update-hosting-endpoint entry above for
  why). The mirror step uses a second token, `RELEASES_MIRROR_TOKEN`
  (`write:repository`, scoped for pushing into `public_releases` only — a CI-side secret, never
  shipped to any client, distinct from the embedded updater *pubkey*). It publishes two tags there:
  `desktop-<TAG>` (versioned, permanent, for audit/rollback) and `desktop-latest` (moving — existing
  assets deleted then re-uploaded each release, since Gitea has no per-app "latest" concept and this
  repo is shared across apps). `latest.json`'s asset URL and `tauri.conf.json`'s updater endpoint
  both point at `desktop-latest`. This is what the auto-updater actually consumes.
 - **`.gitea/workflows/build-desktop.yml`** (push to `dev`/`main`) — a **per-commit test build**:
  compiles `.deb` + `.AppImage` only (`pnpm --filter @parking/desktop bundle --bundles deb,appimage`)
  and publishes them to a **rolling per-branch pre-release** (tag `desktop-<branch>`). **Unsigned** —
@@ -198,3 +232,25 @@ The desktop bundle now runs in CI under **two distinct workflows** — keep the
    The unsigned CI build therefore overrides it off with
    `--config '{"bundle":{"createUpdaterArtifacts":false}}'` (a JSON patch merged over the config),
    so no `.sig` is attempted and no key is required. `release.yml` keeps the config default (signs).
  - **Gotcha (tag ≠ tauri.conf.json version — found + fixed 2026-09-03, v0.1.1).** The git tag
    (`v0.1.1`) and `tauri.conf.json`'s own `"version"` field are two independent values with nothing
    syncing them. Tauri bakes `"version"` into the bundle filename, the app's internal version, AND
    what the updater compares against — NOT the git tag. Bumping only the tag (as the release
    procedure implied) left the file at the prior `0.1.0`: the signed binary was built and named as
    `0.1.0`, `latest.json` (built from `TAG`) correctly claimed `0.1.1`, and the updater found an
    "update," downloaded it, then failed signature verification against a manifest that didn't
    actually describe the file it pointed at. Compounded by a second bug (below) that made this
    failure completely invisible to the operator. **Fix:** `release.yml` now has a "Sync
    tauri.conf.json version to the git tag" step (`sed`-patches `"version"` from `TAG` right before
    `tauri build`) — the checked-in value is now only a placeholder for local dev builds; every real
    release derives its version from the tag automatically.
  - **Gotcha (silent updater failure — found + fixed 2026-09-03).** `desktop-updater.ts`'s
    `checkForDesktopUpdate` wrapped the ENTIRE check-download-install-relaunch sequence in one
    `catch {}` that swallowed everything, by design, for the offline/no-server case. But that meant
    a REAL failure after the operator already accepted the prompt (bad signature, corrupted
    download, disk/permission error) failed exactly the same way as "endpoint unreachable" — no
    error, no log, the app just silently reverted to the old version and re-showed the same "update
    available" prompt on next launch, forever. This is what actually surfaced the tag-sync bug
    above (download traffic visible, then nothing). Fixed by nesting `downloadAndInstall()` in its
    own try/catch that logs and rethrows — offline/no-update still no-ops silently (outer catch),
    but a failure *after* the operator accepted now logs to the console instead of vanishing.
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 ---
 type: entity
 tags: [parking, hardware, readers, offline-first]
-sources: [parking-system-architecture]
+sources: [parking-system-architecture, DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU]
-updated: 2026-07-07
+updated: 2026-08-23
 ---
 # LPR Camera
@@ -110,6 +110,112 @@ Covered by `packages/devices/src/drivers/camera.test.ts` (retry behaviour + the
 selection). `healthCheck()` deliberately reports a live 503 as `degraded` (it surfaces a genuinely
 saturated main stream rather than hiding it behind a retry).
 ### Main-stream ISAPI snapshot 503 is model-specific, not config — and RTSP routes around it (2026-08-23)
 Live comparison, same site (park-buzi), same day, both cameras reachable via the site's port
 forwards (`park-buzi.msai.al:8081` / `:8082`) and directly on the LAN (`10.0.10.13` = the `:8082`
 unit):
 | | `:8081` (works) | `:8082` = `10.0.10.13` (503s) |
 |---|---|---|
 | Model | **DS-2CD1043G2-LIU** | **DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU** |
 | Firmware | V5.8.10 | V5.8.11 |
 | Channel 101 config | 2560×1440, VBR, 6144 Kbps cap, 20fps | **identical** — 2560×1440, VBR, 6144 Kbps cap, 20fps |
 | `SmartCodec` | disabled | disabled |
 | `GET /ISAPI/Streaming/channels/101/picture` | **200**, valid JPEG | **503**, `statusCode 2 / deviceBusy` (3/3 retries, instant) |
 | `GET /ISAPI/Streaming/channels/102/picture` (sub) | — | **200**, valid JPEG |
 Channel-101 config is **byte-identical** between the two units (bitrate, resolution, frame rate,
 SmartCodec) — this rules out "misconfigured over some ceiling" definitively; the only things that
 differ are model + firmware. Combined with the [[#Source: HIKVISION DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU-F datasheet|
 vendor datasheet]] fact that the G3H's **main stream has no MJPEG option** (sub-stream does), the
 working theory is that this SKU's snapshot codepath has to transcode a live H.264/H.265 frame into
 JPEG on demand for main, and its firmware/encoder can't do that reliably at this resolution —
 while sub can serve JPEG more natively. **Treat this as a `DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU`-model limitation
 (this firmware line), not a config or ISAPI-usage bug** — matches every earlier finding on this
 same unit (`10.0.10.13`) in the sections below, now cross-confirmed against a working sibling model
 on the same network with identical settings.
 **RTSP main-stream frame-grab works and routes around it entirely**, confirmed live against
 `10.0.10.13`:
 ```bash
 ffmpeg -rtsp_transport tcp -y \
  -i "rtsp://admin:<pw>@10.0.10.13:554/Streaming/Channels/101" \
  -frames:v 1 -update 1 snapshot.jpg
 ```
 Returned a valid 2560×1440 JPEG (94 KB) on the first try — same camera, same main-stream
 resolution the ISAPI endpoint 503s on. This makes sense mechanically: RTSP just taps the H.264
 stream the encoder is **already producing continuously** for live-view/recording; there's no
 on-demand "pause and re-encode as standalone JPEG" step for the firmware to choke on, unlike the
 ISAPI snapshot path. Port 554 is open on the LAN (`10.0.10.13`) but **not** forwarded through the
 site's public port-forward (`park-buzi.msai.al` only exposes the HTTP/ISAPI ports, consistent with
 [[network-isolation|the camera/controller network staying LAN-only]] — RTSP was only reachable
 from inside the site network, never tested through the public forward).
 **Not yet built**: `packages/devices/src/drivers/camera.ts` is HTTP-Digest/ISAPI only today: no
 RTSP client, no `ffmpeg` child-process dependency. Adding an RTSP fallback (or RTSP-first path for
 cameras that report persistent `deviceBusy` on ISAPI main) is a real architectural addition — new
 process-spawn dependency, RTSP auth handling, transport selection (TCP confirmed working; UDP
 untested) — not implemented as of this writing.
 **Escalated from "nice to have" to a real requirement (2026-08-23): the sub-stream (768×432) is
 too weak for reliable plate reads** — it fails to read plates "from time to time" in practice, so
 sub-stream-only is not an acceptable permanent mitigation for this camera; RTSP-for-main is needed
 for ANPR accuracy, not just for a higher-res evidence photo.
 **Firmware update tested and RULED OUT as the fix (2026-08-23).** Before building the RTSP path,
 checked whether this was simply a day-one bug: the camera shipped on `V5.8.11` build 250415 —
 confirmed via the official Hikvision release note to be **the very first H13U firmware build that
 added support for the DS-2CD1XX7G3H-LIU family at all** ("Newly add 1 series 4MP fixed-focus
 cameras: DS-2CD1XX7G3H-LIU"), a plausible day-one-bug candidate. Upgraded live to **`V5.11.0` build
 260701** (over a year of firmware progress, incl. an intermediate `V5.8.21_SP1` release explicitly
 noting "Fix network and image potential bugs to enhance device stability"). **Result: NO CHANGE.**
 Post-upgrade, `channels/101/picture` still returns `HTTP 503 / statusCode 2 / deviceBusy`, 5/5
 consecutive attempts, byte-identical error body to pre-upgrade. Sub-stream (`102`) still healthy
 (200, ~15KB) — camera is fine post-upgrade, just this one limitation persists.
 **Superseded finding, below: "durable hardware/encoder ceiling" was the wrong framing.** At this
 point in the investigation it looked like a real capacity limit (reproduced across ~15 months of
 firmware). The channel-sweep test below shows that's not what's actually happening.
 ### The real cause: a broken/incomplete ISAPI snapshot handler, not "busy" (2026-08-23)
 `deviceBusy` never meant "busy." Swept every channel/stream ID against the snapshot endpoint in
 one sitting, including IDs that don't exist on this camera at all:
 | channel | `GET .../channels/<id>/picture` |
 |---|---|
 | 1 | 503 `deviceBusy` |
 | 100 | 503 `deviceBusy` |
 | **101** (real main) | **503 `deviceBusy`** |
 | **102** (real sub) | **200 OK** |
 | 103 | 503 `deviceBusy` |
 | 201 (channel 2 doesn't exist — single-channel camera) | 503 `deviceBusy` |
 | 999 (garbage) | 503 `deviceBusy` |
 **Every ID fails identically except exactly `102`.** A genuinely busy/saturated encoder would not
 succeed on one specific value and fail the same way on nonexistent channel IDs — a real resource
 contention error would 404 or behave differently on garbage input, not return the identical `Device
 Busy` XML body regardless of whether the target exists. This is the signature of a **generic
 fallback error path**: the firmware's snapshot handler appears to only be correctly wired for
 `102` (the one channel/stream combination Hikvision evidently tested for this SKU) and returns a
 stock, misleading `deviceBusy` for every other case — valid main-stream `101` included. It is a
 **firmware bug that mislabels itself as resource contention**, not a real capacity ceiling — which
 also fits the firmware-upgrade non-result above (a wrong-code-path bug doesn't get fixed by
 "more capacity," so no firmware version fixing it would be surprising).
 **Decision (2026-08-23): replace this camera line rather than build around it.** RTSP main-stream
 capture is proven to work (see above) and could still be built as a `camera.ts` addition, but given
 the ISAPI snapshot path is flatly broken for anything but one hardcoded channel value, and the
 site's actual need (reliable plate reads — sub-stream alone isn't accurate enough) requires
 full-resolution captures, the owner chose to swap out the `DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU` units rather than
 carry a `ffmpeg`/RTSP dependency to route around a vendor firmware bug. The working `DS-2CD1043G2-
 LIU` (`:8081` in the comparison above) has no such issue — ISAPI main-stream snapshot works
 natively — and is the reference model for replacements. RTSP-frame-grab remains documented above
 as a viable fallback if a `G3H`-family camera is ever unavoidable.
 ## Clock sync — the 1970 power-cut reset (built 2026-07-07)
 Field observation (park-buzi): after a power cut these cameras come back with their clock at the
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ Counts: 4 sources · 19 entities · 47 concepts · 8 decision records.
 - [[dingtian-dt008]] — Dingtian DT-008 product page: QR/RFID access reader (QR/barcode + ID/IC/NFC; Wiegand/TCP-IP/USB/RS485; HTTP-GET push).
 - [[qrcode-sdk]] — QRCode SDK v1.6.5: the reader's HTTP-GET-poll protocol + JSON verdict (beep/output).
 - [[parksql2017-legacy-schema]] — predecessor SQL Server schema (Albanian market): legacy tariff/discount/membership/shift/fiscal model; confirms blocks, adds time-windows + categories, lacks postpaid sponsors.
 - [[ds-2cd1047g3h-liu]] — HIKVISION DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU-F datasheet: 4MP, main stream has no MJPEG option (sub does) — likely explains the model's persistent ISAPI snapshot 503 on main; confirms ISAPI/RTSP both fully in-spec.
 ## Entities — technology stack
 - [[technology-stack]] — the full stack table; all MIT/Apache/BSD, chosen to avoid lock-in.
@@ -39,7 +40,7 @@ Counts: 4 sources · 19 entities · 47 concepts · 8 decision records.
 - [[esp32-custom-controller]] — prevention-grade upgrade; device-level auth.
 - [[atecc608]] — secure element; non-extractable signing key (host events + controller auth).
 - [[wiegand]] — reader standard feeding the controller directly (autonomous permit-holder path).
- [[lpr-camera]] — edge-AI plate recognition; host-side casual-identity source.
+- [[lpr-camera]] — edge-AI plate recognition; host-side casual-identity source; DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU main-stream ISAPI snapshot 503 is a firmware bug (only channel 102 ever works, ALL other IDs incl. garbage 503 identically) — firmware update tested, no fix; owner decided to replace the camera line rather than build an RTSP workaround.
 - [[dingtian-dt008-reader]] — Dingtian DT-008 QR/RFID reader on hand; host-side serial → `read` bus (the QR-ticket scanner).
 - [[zkteco-controller]] — ❌ rejected/historical; aux-input path was a contender, not pursued.
 - [[dingtian-relay]] — ✅ CHOSEN access controller; decoupled inputs solve the button blocker (driver verified on hardware); spare relays drive aux outputs (`setAux`).
@@ -57,7 +58,7 @@ Counts: 4 sources · 19 entities · 47 concepts · 8 decision records.
 - [[hardware-signer-options]] — where the ledger signing key should live (TPM interim → USB-HSM target; ATECC608 upcoming, not on-site) so a host-owner can't forge the chain.
 - [[reconciliation]] — the real anti-fraud control; what remote sync actually is.
 - [[disk-os-hardening]] — the *why* of host hardening: LUKS FDE + TPM-sealed auto-unlock (PCR 7) + Secure Boot + GRUB edit-lock + unprivileged operator + firmware/dbx lockdown; secondary control (reconciliation is the main event). Commands → [[appliance-provisioning]].
- [[backup-recovery]] — admin-driven encrypted full-DB backup (local/SMB/SFTP) + DR; signing key escrowed & decoupled from TPM so the ledger survives total hardware loss; restore is admin-only.
+- [[backup-recovery]] — admin-driven encrypted full-DB backup (local/SMB/SFTP) + DR; signing key escrowed & decoupled from TPM so the ledger survives total hardware loss; restore is admin-only; last-success/error status + schedule are now restart-durable (migration 0025, fixed a "shows Never despite valid backups" bug).
 ## Concepts — device architecture & safety
 - [[device-adapter-pattern]] — business logic talks to interfaces; swap hardware → new adapter.
@@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ Counts: 4 sources · 19 entities · 47 concepts · 8 decision records.
 - [[barrier-not-a-door]] — never timed-close a barrier; safety lives in barrier firmware.
 - [[printer-roles-failover]] — ≥2 printers by role; entry ticket falls back outside→booth.
 - [[printer-status-monitoring]] — live poll of paper/cover/cutter/offline via the device's status page; SSE to the booth UI.
- [[printer-usb-transport]] — ESC/POS drivers drive TCP (9100) OR local USB (/dev/usb/lp0) behind one render layer; USB = usblp char device, reachability-only status; provisioning open (oq#14).
+- [[printer-usb-transport]] — ESC/POS drivers drive TCP (9100) OR local USB (/dev/usb/lp0) behind one render layer; USB = usblp char device, reachability-only status; provisioning open (oq#14); park-buzi cover-open-wedges-USB-status bug (docker restart-only fix) under investigation.
 - [[device-status-monitoring]] — unified live status across ALL device categories (healthCheck + printer readStatus) → the booth footer over /api/ws.
 - [[trust-boundary]] — the core fork: network vs. device; auditable vs. unforgeable.
 - [[fail-state-safety]] — entry fails closed, exit fails open; manual override; watchdog.
@@ -133,7 +134,7 @@ Counts: 4 sources · 19 entities · 47 concepts · 8 decision records.
 - [[vision-service]] — build a host-side ANPR + vehicle-verification service; replaces edge-LPR; scoped AGPL exception.
 - [[vision-service-packaging]] — the vision service lives in this monorepo (apps/vision/), separate process, wired into Turbo via a package.json shim; uv-managed Python.
 - [[event-streams-split]] — split the signed business ledger (ledger_events) from unsigned device telemetry (device_events).
- [[desktop-shell-tauri]] — ✅ Tauri v2 chosen over Electron for the desktop kiosk shell; thin wrapper, server keeps all logic. Best case Ubuntu 26.04 LTS (resolves WebKitGTK); worst case Windows+WSL → kiosk browser, no native shell.
+- [[desktop-shell-tauri]] — ✅ Tauri v2 chosen over Electron for the desktop kiosk shell; thin wrapper, server keeps all logic. Best case Ubuntu 26.04 LTS (resolves WebKitGTK); worst case Windows+WSL → kiosk browser, no native shell. Auto-updater mirrors signed releases to public `mca/public_releases` (source repo is private — field appliances have no Gitea creds).
 - [[container-deployment]] — Docker images for the non-desktop apps: parking-server (Fastify API + bundled SPA via @fastify/static) + parking-vision (Python/uv ANPR); branch+SHA tags, per-env compose, Gitea registry, build-images.yml CI; pnpm deploy (not prune) for native better-sqlite3; migrate-at-boot.
 - [[fleet-deployment-komodo]] — fleet control plane: Komodo Periphery on each booth, driven by Komodo Core over a NetBird mesh, running the same compose files. Deploys manual + pinned to dev-<sha> (no webhook); secrets Komodo-managed per-booth+unique; booth.sh demoted to break-glass. Threat-model caveats: Periphery is a root agent (mesh-bound only), EVENT_SIGNING_KEY-in-Core is a fraud-root blast radius until ATECC608 signs. komodo/ is infra-as-code.
 - [[appliance-provisioning]] — booth-PC provisioning runbook (Dell 7070, i5-8500, discrete Nuvoton TPM): BIOS/Secure-Boot → direct-flash Ubuntu 26.04 USB (not Ventoy) → passphrase-LUKS install → manual PCR-7 TPM seal (workaround for the installer's dbt PCR_UNUSABLE error) → Docker. Verified on hardware 2026-06-23; TPM auto-unlock works.
@@ -2619,3 +2619,151 @@ scanning (blocked on secure-context TLS for LAN phones + weak Code128-via-camera
 QR-on-ticket first) and a Tauri v2 Android merchant app (native ML Kit scanning via the official
 barcode-scanner plugin; deferred over Android build/distribution overhead + the
 configurable-server-URL prerequisite). Full analysis on [[validation-discounts]].
 ## [2026-08-23] ingest | HIKVISION DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU-F datasheet
 Vendor datasheet dropped in `raw/DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU.md`. Key new fact: main stream on this model
 supports H.265+/H.265/H.264+/H.264 only — **no MJPEG**; sub-stream adds MJPEG. Likely mechanical
 explanation for the persistent ISAPI main-stream snapshot 503 (`deviceBusy`) already logged on this
 model in [[lpr-camera]] (2026-06-26/27): the on-demand JPEG snapshot has no native path on main,
 so it has to transcode from H.264/H.265 live, which this SKU's firmware apparently can't do
 reliably at 2560×1440. Bitrate spec (32Kbps–16Mbps) also confirms the site's main-stream config
 (6144–12288Kbps) was never out of range — rules out misconfiguration definitively.
 ## [2026-08-23] query | Main-stream 503: model-specific or config? RTSP as a workaround?
 Live-compared two Hikvision units at park-buzi via their public port forwards
 (`park-buzi.msai.al:8081`/`:8082`) plus the `:8082` unit directly on the LAN (`10.0.10.13`).
 Channel-101 (main) config is **byte-identical** between a working `DS-2CD1043G2-LIU` (8081, 200 OK)
 and the failing `DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU` (8082 / `10.0.10.13`, persistent 503 `deviceBusy`, 3/3 retries
 instant) — same resolution/bitrate/framerate/SmartCodec state. Rules out config as the cause;
 confirms it's model/firmware-specific (matches the datasheet finding above). Then tested RTSP
 (`rtsp://…@10.0.10.13:554/Streaming/Channels/101` via ffmpeg, TCP transport) against the SAME
 failing camera: returned a valid 2560×1440 JPEG on the first try. RTSP taps the continuously-
 running encode rather than asking for an on-demand re-encoded JPEG, so it sidesteps whatever the
 ISAPI snapshot path chokes on. Not yet built into `camera.ts` (would add an `ffmpeg` child-process
 dependency + RTSP auth/transport handling) — filed as a viable, proven fallback if full-resolution
 main-stream stills are ever needed; sub-stream ISAPI snapshot remains sufficient for current ANPR
 use. Full comparison table + RTSP command on [[lpr-camera]].
 ## [2026-08-23] update | Firmware update tested and ruled out; sub-stream confirmed too weak for ANPR — RTSP is now required
 Two developments on the DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU (`10.0.10.13`) main-stream 503: (1) the owner reports the
 sub-stream (768×432) **fails to read plates "from time to time"** in real use — sub-stream-only is
 no longer an acceptable mitigation, it's an accuracy problem. (2) Before building RTSP, tested
 whether this was a day-one firmware bug: the camera's original `V5.8.11`/250415 build was confirmed
 (via Hikvision's own release note) to be the FIRST H13U firmware to support this camera family at
 all. Upgraded live to `V5.11.0`/260701 (~15 months newer, spanning an intermediate release that
 explicitly claimed "image stability" fixes). Result: **no change** — identical `deviceBusy` 503,
 5/5 attempts, post-upgrade. Firmware is now a ruled-out cause, not a theory; this looks like a real
 encoder/hardware ceiling on this SKU. Next step: build the RTSP-based main-stream capture path into
 `packages/devices/src/drivers/camera.ts` (not yet started). Full detail on [[lpr-camera]].
 ## [2026-08-23] update | Root cause nailed down: broken ISAPI handler, not "busy" — decision to REPLACE the camera line
 Final test on the DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU snapshot 503: swept every channel/stream ID against
 `GET .../channels/<id>/picture`, including nonexistent ones (1, 100, 103, 201, 999). Every single
 ID returns the identical `503 deviceBusy` body EXCEPT exactly `102` (the real sub-stream), which is
 always 200. A real busy/saturated encoder would not succeed on one specific value while failing
 garbage IDs identically — this is a generic fallback error: the firmware's snapshot handler is only
 correctly wired for channel 102, and everything else (valid main-stream 101 included) falls through
 to a stock, mislabeled "Device Busy" response. Confirms the firmware-upgrade non-result from
 earlier today (a wrong-code-path bug wouldn't be fixed by more capacity). Owner's decision: replace
 the DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU units rather than carry an RTSP/ffmpeg workaround dependency — the sibling
 DS-2CD1043G2-LIU (no such bug, ISAPI main-stream snapshot works natively) is the reference model
 going forward. RTSP main-stream capture remains documented as a proven, viable fallback if a G3H
 camera is ever unavoidable, but is not being built. Full sweep table + reasoning on [[lpr-camera]].
 ## [2026-08-30] update | Booth USB printer cover-open bug: leading theory is a stale container bind-mount, not a stale app-layer handle
 Live troubleshooting request (park-buzi): opening the printer's paper-roll cover reliably wedges its
 status to offline/faulty, surviving a full appliance reboot; only `docker restart server` clears it.
 Traced `sendRawUsb`/`probeUsb` end-to-end in `printer-escpos.ts` plus both poll loops
 (`device-monitor.ts`, `printer-monitor.ts`): every print AND every poll does a fresh
 open→write/probe→close with no persistent fd/socket/driver instance anywhere — ruling out a naive
 "stale Node handle" explanation. Leading hypothesis instead: the cover-open microswitch cuts power
 to the printer's USB interface board, causing a real bus re-enumeration; the container's directory
 bind-mount of `/dev/usb` (chosen specifically to survive `lpN` renumbering) can retain a stale view
 of the old device node until the container's mount namespace is recreated — which `docker restart`
 does and a policy-driven reboot-time restart may not (boot-order race). Not yet confirmed on
 hardware (host-vs-container `stat`/inode comparison at the next occurrence is the next step); lab
 repro is blocked because the lab has a RONGTA, not the park-buzi unit's actual (still unidentified,
 "Generic (unknown)") model. Full writeup, confirmation commands, and candidate fixes on
 [[printer-usb-transport]].
 ## [2026-08-30] update | Backup status "Never" despite valid rotating backups — restart amnesia in BackupService, fixed
 Admin noticed park-buzi's Backup screen showed "last successful backup: Never" despite 7 real,
 correctly-rotating encrypted backup files on disk, plus a 2-day gap since the last file. Traced
 both symptoms to the same cause: `BackupService` tracked last-success/last-error as PLAIN
 IN-PROCESS FIELDS (never written to the DB), and the daily schedule was a `setInterval(...,24h)`
 measured from PROCESS START, not wall-clock time since the last real backup — so any server
 restart (routine under `restart: always`: deploy/crash/OOM/host reboot) simultaneously wiped the
 visible status back to "Never" and reset the 24h countdown, independent of the actual
 file-writing/retention engine (`backup.ts`), which was working correctly the whole time and
 explains why files existed on disk despite the UI's contradictory-seeming status. Fix: four new
 nullable `site_config` columns (migration `0025_backup_last_status.sql`) persist last-success/
 error there instead of in memory; `BackupService.status()` reads them fresh each call so a new
 instance (= a restart) sees the prior instance's outcome; a new `isDue()` method computes
 schedule-due-ness from the persisted last-success timestamp; `server.ts`'s scheduler is now a
 15-minute poll gated by `isDue()` instead of a 24h `setInterval`, making the real cadence immune
 to restart timing. New test file `backup-service.test.ts` (6 tests) covers restart-durability and
 `isDue()` directly; full existing suite (319 tests) still green. No API/UI contract change. Not
 yet committed (holding per instruction). Full writeup on [[backup-recovery]].
 ## [2026-08-30] update | Two Komodo Periphery gotchas: connect_as renaming, agent upgrade procedure
 Two real incidents this session, both closed out as new gotchas (#12, #13) on
 [[appliance-provisioning]] §7: (1) a lab box installed with a leftover template placeholder
 left in `--connect-as` kept reappearing under that name in Core no matter how many times it was
 renamed in the UI — because `connect_as` is a plain field in the agent's own
 `periphery.config.toml`, and a Core-UI rename never touches it; fixed by editing the field
 directly on the host + `systemctl --user restart periphery`, no reinstall needed. (2) Upgrading
 Periphery from a version-mismatch (Core bumped to v2.3.2, an agent still on v2.2.0) has no
 separate update mechanism — confirmed against Komodo's own `setup-periphery.py` source that
 re-running the same installer with unchanged `--connect-as` is config-preserving (it explicitly
 skips rewriting an existing config) and safe; verified dry-run on `art-docker-station` (lab) then
 applied to `park-buzi` (live booth) with no disruption to the running app containers. Full detail
 + exact commands on [[appliance-provisioning]].
 ## [2026-09-03] fix | Desktop updater endpoint was unreachable — pointed at a private repo
 The Tauri auto-updater ([[desktop-shell-tauri]]) was fully implemented — signed builds, keypair,
 `latest.json`, `release.yml` — but its endpoint pointed at `mca/parking_solution`'s own Gitea
 "latest release" redirect, and that repo is **private**. Field appliances have no Gitea
 credentials, so every update check was silently failing (caught by a `try/catch`); this was never
 actually field-verified end to end. Fix: signed installers now mirror to a new public,
 installers-only repo `mca/public_releases` (org-shared, not parking-specific), published to a fixed
 `desktop-latest` tag so other apps releasing there later can't shadow ours. Considered and rejected
 embedding a `read:repository` token in the app instead — ruled out given the appliance's own threat
 model (booth operator as primary adversary) makes an extractable, hard-to-rotate credential in every
 deployed binary worse than just publishing installers publicly. `release.yml`,
 `apps/desktop/src-tauri/tauri.conf.json`, `apps/desktop/README.md` updated; full detail on
 [[desktop-shell-tauri]].
 ## [2026-09-03] fix | Desktop login broken by a VITE_API_BASE regression from the booth same-origin fix
 The 2026-06-27 booth fix (commit 96fd97e) correctly blanked `apps/web/.env.production`'s
 `VITE_API_BASE` for the browser/booth same-origin case, but the desktop build shares that same
 file and was never given its own override — the desktop shell has been building with an empty
 API base since that commit, unnoticed until now. Symptom: login threw `DOMException: "The string
 did not match the expected pattern."` — WebKitGTK rejecting a relative `fetch()` URL with no base
 to resolve against, since the desktop window's origin is `tauri://localhost`. Browser login was
 unaffected (same-origin, no absolute URL needed), which is why this went unnoticed through the CI
 mirror-repo debugging session. Fixed by setting `VITE_API_BASE=http://127.0.0.1:3000` inline in
 `tauri.conf.json`'s `beforeBuildCommand`, overriding the shared `.env.production` for the desktop
 build only (process env wins in Vite's load order) — verified both builds independently. Full
 detail on [[desktop-shell-tauri]].
 ## [2026-09-03] fix | Desktop updater silently failed: tag/version drift + swallowed install errors
 Two compounding bugs, both closed out on [[desktop-shell-tauri]] §"Desktop in CI": (1) the v0.1.1
 release bumped only the git tag — tauri.conf.json's own "version" field (what Tauri actually bakes
 into the bundle filename and internal version) stayed at 0.1.0, so the signed binary didn't match
 what latest.json claimed to describe, and signature verification failed on every download; (2)
 desktop-updater.ts's single blanket try/catch swallowed that failure identically to "offline/no
 update," so the operator saw the prompt, watched it download, then nothing — repeating forever with
 zero diagnostic trail. Fixed release.yml to sed-patch tauri.conf.json's version from the git tag
 right before building (checked-in value is now dev-only, never hand-maintained for releases), and
 split desktop-updater.ts's catch so a real post-accept failure logs instead of vanishing. Full
 detail on [[desktop-shell-tauri]].
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
 #### HIKVISION DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU-F 4 MP ColorVu 3.0 Fixed Bullet Network Camera
 ![HIKVISION-DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU-F-4-MP-ColorVu-3.0-Fixed-Bullet-Network-Camera-PRODUCT](https://manuals.plus/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/HIKVISION-DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU-F-4-MP-ColorVu-3.0-Fixed-Bullet-Network-Camera-PRODUCT.png)
 #### FEATURE
 - HikAI-ISP for excellent noise reduction effect
 - Super clear 24/7 colorful imaging with ColorVu 3.0 technology
 - Motion Detection 3.0, more accurate on person and vehicle classification
 - Strobe Light & Audio Alarm to deter intruders (optional)
 - Two-Way Audio via camera and Hik-Connect
 - Smart Hybrid Light: integrates IR and white lights, 3 supplemental lighting modes
 - On-board storage with SD card up to 512 GB (optional)
 - Water and dust resistant (IP67)![HIKVISION-DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU-F-4-MP-ColorVu-3.0-Fixed-Bullet-Network-Camera-FIG-1](https://manuals.plus/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/HIKVISION-DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU-F-4-MP-ColorVu-3.0-Fixed-Bullet-Network-Camera-FIG-1.png)
 #### Specification
 <table><tbody><tr><td colspan="2" width="681">n <strong>Specification</strong></td></tr><tr><td colspan="2" width="681"><strong>Camera</strong></td></tr><tr><td width="194">Max. Resolution</td><td width="487">2560 × 1440</td></tr><tr><td width="194">Min. Illumination</td><td width="487">Color: 0.0001 Lux @ (F1.0, AGC ON)</td></tr><tr><td width="194">Shutter Time</td><td width="487">1 s to 1/100,000 s</td></tr><tr><td width="194">Day & Night</td><td width="487">IR cut filter</td></tr><tr><td width="194">Angle Adjustment</td><td width="487">Pan: 0° to 360°,tilt: 0° to 90°,rotate: 0° to 360°</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2" width="681"><strong>Lens</strong></td></tr><tr><td width="194">Lens Type</td><td width="487">Fixed focal lens, 2.8 and 4 mm optional</td></tr><tr><td width="194">Focal Length & FOV</td><td width="487">2.8 mm, horizontal FOV 104°, vertical FOV 54.4°, diagonal FOV 126.7°<p>4 mm, horizontal FOV 89.3°, vertical FOV 48.2°, diagonal FOV 106.5°</p></td></tr><tr><td width="194">Lens Mount</td><td width="487">M16</td></tr><tr><td width="194">Iris Type</td><td width="487">Fixed</td></tr><tr><td width="194">Aperture</td><td width="487">F1.0</td></tr><tr><td width="194">Depth of Field</td><td width="487">2.8 mm: 2.5 m to ∞<p>4 mm: 2.8 m to ∞</p></td></tr><tr><td colspan="2" width="681"><strong>DORI</strong></td></tr><tr><td width="194">DORI</td><td width="487">2.8 mm, D: 61 m, O: 24 m, R: 12 m, I: 6 m<p>4 mm, D: 68 m, O: 27 m, R: 13 m, I: 6 m</p></td></tr><tr><td colspan="2" width="681"><strong>Illuminator</strong></td></tr><tr><td width="194">Supplement Light Type</td><td width="487">IR,White Light</td></tr><tr><td width="194">Supplement Light Range</td><td width="487">IR: up to 30 m<p>White Light: up to 20 m</p></td></tr><tr><td width="194">Smart Supplement Light</td><td width="487">Yes</td></tr><tr><td width="194">IR Wavelength</td><td width="487">850 nm</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2" width="681"><strong>Video</strong></td></tr><tr><td width="194"><strong>&nbsp;</strong><p><strong>&nbsp;</strong></p><p>Main Stream</p></td><td width="487">50 Hz:<p>25 fps (2560 × 1440, 1920 × 1080, 1280 × 720)</p><p>60 Hz:</p><p>24 fps (2560 × 1440, 1920 × 1080, 1280 × 720)</p></td></tr><tr><td width="194">Sub-Stream</td><td width="487">50 Hz: 25 fps (768 × 432, 640 × 360)<p>60 Hz: 24 fps (768 × 432, 640 × 360)</p></td></tr><tr><td width="194">Video Compression</td><td width="487">Main stream: H.265+/H.265/H.264+/H.264,<p>Sub-stream: H.265/H.264/MJPEG</p></td></tr><tr><td width="194">Video Bit Rate</td><td width="487">32 Kbps to 16 Mbps</td></tr><tr><td width="194">H.264 Type</td><td width="487">Baseline Profile,Main Profile,High Profile</td></tr><tr><td width="194">H.265 Type</td><td width="487">Main Profile</td></tr><tr><td width="194">Bit Rate Control</td><td width="487">CBR,VBR</td></tr><tr><td width="194">Scalable Video Coding (SVC)</td><td width="487">H.264 and H.265 encoding</td></tr><tr><td width="194">Region of Interest (ROI)</td><td width="487">1 fixed region for main stream</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2" width="681"><strong>Audio</strong></td></tr><tr><td width="194">Audio Type</td><td width="487">Mono sound</td></tr><tr><td width="194">Audio Compression</td><td width="487">G.711/G.722.1/G.726/MP2L2/PCM/MP3/AAC-LC</td></tr><tr><td width="194">Audio Bit Rate</td><td width="487">64 Kbps (G.711)/16 Kbps (G.722.1)/16 Kbps (G.726)/32 to 160 Kbps (MP2L2)/16 to 64<p>Kbps (AAC-LC)</p></td></tr><tr><td width="194">Audio Sampling Rate</td><td width="487">8 kHz/16 kHz</td></tr></tbody></table>
 <table><tbody><tr><td width="199">Environment Noise Filtering</td><td width="482">Yes</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2" width="681"><strong>Network</strong></td></tr><tr><td width="199">Protocols</td><td width="482">TCP/IP, ICMP, DHCP, DNS, HTTP, RTP, RTSP, RTCP, NTP, IPv4, IPv6, IGMP, UDP, QoS,<p>FTP, SMTP</p></td></tr><tr><td width="199">Simultaneous Live View</td><td width="482">Up to 6 channels</td></tr><tr><td width="199">API</td><td width="482">ONVIF (Profile S, Profile G),ISAPI,SDK</td></tr><tr><td width="199">User/Host</td><td width="482">Up to 32 users<p>3 user levels: administrator, operator, and user</p></td></tr><tr><td width="199"><strong>&nbsp;</strong><p>Security</p></td><td width="482">Password protection, complicated password, watermark, basic and digest<p>authentication for HTTP, WSSE and digest authentication for Open Network Video</p><p>Interface, security audit log, host authentication (MAC address)</p></td></tr><tr><td width="199">Client</td><td width="482">iVMS-4200,Hik-Connect</td></tr><tr><td width="199">Web Browser</td><td width="482">Plug-in required live view: Chrome 80+, Firefox 80+, Edge 89+, Safari 13+,<p>Plug-in free live view: Chrome 80+, Firefox 80+, Edge 89+</p></td></tr><tr><td colspan="2" width="681"><strong>Image</strong></td></tr><tr><td width="199">Image Settings</td><td width="482">Rotate&nbsp; mode,saturation,brightness,contrast,sharpness,gain,white balance,adjustable<p>by client software or web browser</p></td></tr><tr><td width="199">Day/Night Switch</td><td width="482">Day,Night,Auto,Schedule</td></tr><tr><td width="199">Wide Dynamic Range (WDR)</td><td width="482">120 dB</td></tr><tr><td width="199">SNR</td><td width="482">≥ 52 dB</td></tr><tr><td width="199">Image Enhancement</td><td width="482">BLC,HLC,3D DNR</td></tr><tr><td width="199">Privacy Mask</td><td width="482">4 programmable polygon privacy masks</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2" width="681"><strong>Interface</strong></td></tr><tr><td width="199">Ethernet Interface</td><td width="482">1 RJ45 10 M/100 M self-adaptive Ethernet port</td></tr><tr><td width="199"><strong>&nbsp;</strong><p><strong>&nbsp;</strong></p><p><strong>&nbsp;</strong></p><p><strong>&nbsp;</strong></p><p><strong>&nbsp;</strong></p><p><strong>&nbsp;</strong></p><p><strong>&nbsp;</strong></p><p><strong>&nbsp;</strong></p><p>On-Board Storage</p></td><td width="482">DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU(F)(/SL)(/SRB):-SL/SRB/LIUF:&nbsp; Yes<p>-LIU: NA</p></td></tr><tr><td width="199">Built-in Microphone</td><td width="482">Yes,1 built-in microphone</td></tr></tbody></table>
 | Built-in Speaker | DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU(F)(/SL)(/SRB):-SL/SRB:  Yes  \-LIU/LIUF: NA |
 | --- | --- |
 | Audio | DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU(F)(/SL)(/SRB):-LIU:  NA |
 | Alarm | DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU(F)(/SL)(/SRB):-LIU:  NA |
 | Reset Key | DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU(F)(/SL)(/SRB):-SL/SRB/LIUF:  Yes,  \-LIU: NA |
 <table><tbody><tr><td colspan="2" width="681"><strong>Event</strong></td></tr><tr><td width="192">Basic Event</td><td width="489">Motion detection (support alarm triggering by specified target types (human and<p>vehicle)),video tampering alarm,exception</p></td></tr><tr><td width="192">Linkage</td><td width="489">Upload to FTP,notify surveillance center,send email,trigger recording,trigger capture</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2" width="681"><strong>General</strong></td></tr><tr><td width="192">Power</td><td width="489">DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU(F)(/SL)(/SRB):-LIU: 12 VDC ± 25%, 0.58 A, max. 7 W, Ø5.5 mm<p>coaxial power plug, reverse polarity protection, PoE: IEEE 802.3af, Class 3,max. 9 W LIUF: 12 VDC ± 25%, 0.67 A, max. 8 W, Ø5.5 mm coaxial power plug, reverse polarity protection, PoE: IEEE 802.3af, Class 3,max. 10 W</p><p>-SL/SRB: 12 VDC ± 25%, 0.84 A, max. 10.1 W, Ø5.5 mm coaxial power plug, reverse polarity protection, PoE: IEEE 802.3af, Class 3,max. 12.1 W</p><p>&nbsp;</p></td></tr><tr><td width="192"><strong>&nbsp;</strong><p><strong>&nbsp;</strong></p><p><strong>&nbsp;</strong></p><p><strong>&nbsp;</strong></p><p><strong>&nbsp;</strong></p><p><strong>&nbsp;</strong></p><p><strong>&nbsp;</strong></p><p><strong>&nbsp;</strong></p><p>Dimension</p></td><td width="489">DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU(F)(/SL)(/SRB):-LIU: 69.1 mm × 66.9 mm × 172.9 mm (2.7″ × 2.6″ ×<p>6.8″)</p><p>-LIUF/SL/SRB: 69.1 mm × 67.4 mm × 179 mm (2.7″ × 2.7″ × 7.1″)</p><p>&nbsp;</p></td></tr><tr><td width="192">Package Dimension</td><td width="489">210 mm × 116 mm × 106 mm (8.3″ × 4.6″ × 4.2″)</td></tr></tbody></table>
 | Weight | DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU(F)(/SL)(/SRB):-LIU: Approx. 310 g (0.7 lb.)  \-LIUF: Approx. 315 g (0.7 lb.)  \-SL/SRB: Approx. 325 g (0.7 lb.) |
 | --- | --- |
 | With Package Weight | DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU(F)(/SL)(/SRB):-LIU: Approx. 465 g (1.0 lb.)  \-LIUF: Approx. 470 g (1.0 lb.)  \-SL/SRB: Approx. 495 g (1.1 lb.) |
 | Storage Conditions | \-30 °C to 60 °C (-22 °F to 140 °F). Humidity 95% or less (non-condensing) |
 | Startup and Operating  Conditions | \-30 °C to 60 °C (-22 °F to 140 °F). Humidity 95% or less (non-condensing) |
 | Language | English, Russian, Ukrainian, Arabic, Spanish, French, Portuguese, Turkish, Polish,  German |
 | General Function | Heartbeat,mirror,flash log,password reset via email,password protection,anti -banding |
 | Flashing Light | DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU(F)(/SL)(/SRB):-SL/SRB:  Yes  \-LIU/LIUF: NA |
 <table><tbody><tr><td colspan="2" width="681"><strong>Approval</strong></td></tr><tr><td width="194">EMC</td><td width="487">CE-EMC: EN 55032:2015+A1:2020, EN 50130-4:2011+A1:2014, EN IEC<p>61000-3-2:2019+A1:2021, EN&nbsp; 61000-3-3:2013+A1:2019+A2:2021</p></td></tr><tr><td width="194">Safety</td><td width="487">CB: IEC 62368-1: 2014+A11,<p>CE-LVD: EN 62368-1: 2014/A11: 2017</p></td></tr><tr><td width="194">Environment</td><td width="487">CE-RoHS: 2011/65/EU,<p>WEEE: 2012/19/EU</p></td></tr><tr><td width="194">Protection</td><td width="487">IP67: IEC 60529-2013</td></tr></tbody></table>
 #### Available Model
 - DS-2CD1047G3H-LIUF/SRB(2.8mm)
 - DS-2CD1047G3H-LIUF/SRB(4mm)
 - DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU(2.8mm)
 - DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU(4mm)
 - DS-2CD1047G3H-LIUF(2.8mm)
 - DS-2CD1047G3H-LIUF(4mm)
 - DS-2CD1047G3H-LIUF/SL(2.8mm)
 - DS-2CD1047G3H-LIUF/SL(4mm)
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
 ---
 type: source
 tags: [parking, hardware, cameras, hikvision, datasheet]
 sources: [DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU]
 updated: 2026-08-23
 ---
 # Source: HIKVISION DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU-F datasheet
 Vendor spec sheet (`raw/DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU.md`) for the **DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU** — the exit-lane
 camera at `10.0.10.13` (park-buzi) already covered extensively in [[lpr-camera]] for its
 persistent main-stream ISAPI 503 (`deviceBusy`) and its 2026-06-27 config-DB-corruption incident.
 This is the first *vendor-sourced* spec data for the model; everything before it was field-derived.
 ## Key takeaways
 - **4 MP, max resolution 2560×1440** (ColorVu 3.0 — color night imaging, not IR-only).
 - **Main stream: H.265+/H.265/H.264+/H.264 only — no MJPEG option.** **Sub-stream: H.265/H.264/
  MJPEG** (MJPEG is sub-only). This is a concrete, spec-level asymmetry that plausibly explains
  *why* the ISAPI on-demand JPEG snapshot is reliable on sub but structurally broken on main: sub
  can serve a snapshot natively, main has to transcode out of H.264/H.265 on demand. Consistent
  with — and a likely root cause for — the persistent `deviceBusy` behavior already logged in
  [[lpr-camera]].
 - **Bit rate range 32 Kbps–16 Mbps.** The site's main-stream config (6144–12288 Kbps, confirmed
  live 2026-08-23) is well inside spec — rules out "misconfigured over the camera's own ceiling"
  as a cause, confirming what live testing already showed.
 - **ROI: 1 fixed region for main stream** — another main-only constraint/asymmetry vs. sub.
 - **API: ONVIF (Profile S, Profile G), ISAPI, SDK.** ISAPI is fully in-spec for this model — the
  503 is a real firmware/hardware limitation, not a case of using an unsupported API.
 - **Protocols include RTSP** (alongside HTTP/ONVIF/etc.) — confirms RTSP is a documented, supported
  surface on this model, not a workaround outside its design.
 - Simultaneous live view: up to 6 channels. Available in `-LIU`/`-LIUF`/`-LIUF/SL`/`-LIUF/SRB`
  variants at 2.8mm/4mm focal lengths; the deployed unit is the base `-LIU`.
 ## How this changes the picture
 Confirms rather than overturns [[lpr-camera]]'s existing conclusion (sub-stream-only for ISAPI
 snapshots on this model) — but gives it a concrete mechanical explanation (main has no MJPEG path)
 instead of just an empirically-observed limitation. See [[lpr-camera]] § "Main-stream ISAPI
 snapshot 503 vs. RTSP" for the 2026-08-23 live comparison against a `DS-2CD1043G2-LIU` sibling
 (main-stream ISAPI snapshot works fine there) and the confirmed RTSP frame-grab workaround.
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
julian	276b048fa9	fix(desktop): sync tauri.conf.json version to the release tag, stop swallowing install failures Build desktop / desktop (push) Successful in 4m13s Details Build & push images / images (push) Successful in 2m48s Details CI / check (push) Successful in 42s Details Release desktop / bundle (push) Successful in 4m37s Details v0.1.1 was tagged but tauri.conf.json's own "version" field (what Tauri bakes into the bundle filename/internal version) stayed at 0.1.0 — the signed binary didn't match what latest.json claimed to describe, so every update download failed signature verification. desktop-updater.ts's single catch{} swallowed that identically to "offline", so it looked like nothing happened at all. release.yml now syncs tauri.conf.json's version from the git tag before building; the updater now logs a real post-accept failure instead of silently reverting.	2026-09-03 12:24:04 +02:00
julian	faa3265e49	fix(desktop): restore VITE_API_BASE for the desktop build Build desktop / desktop (push) Successful in 4m17s Details CI / check (push) Successful in 42s Details Release desktop / bundle (push) Successful in 4m47s Details apps/web/.env.production's VITE_API_BASE went empty in `96fd97e` to fix the booth/browser same-origin case, but the desktop build shares that file and was never given its own override — login broke with WebKitGTK's "The string did not match the expected pattern." (a relative fetch() URL with no base, from tauri://localhost). beforeBuildCommand now sets VITE_API_BASE=http://127.0.0.1:3000 inline for the desktop build only; verified both builds independently produce the right output.	2026-09-03 12:01:56 +02:00
julian	21bfdce27a	fix(release): surface the actual Gitea API error on mirror failure Release desktop / bundle (push) Successful in 4m24s Details The mirror step's release id came back empty on the last real run but nothing failed loudly — every curl response was swallowed (\|\| true, or piped straight to /dev/null), so we had no idea why. Capture HTTP status + response body on every call and exit 1 with the actual error instead of silently uploading to a malformed //assets URL with no release id.	2026-09-03 10:50:36 +02:00
julian	d3288e29eb	fix(release): don't let a grep-not-found kill the script under set -e CI / check (push) Successful in 42s Details Release desktop / bundle (push) Successful in 4m26s Details Every REL_ID lookup piped grep -o '"id":...' straight into head/cut with no guard. Under set -e + pipefail, a Gitea API response with no id (e.g. "tag already exists" on a retry, or an empty existing-assets list on the first desktop-latest publish) makes grep exit 1, which aborts the whole step immediately — before the intended fallback lookup ever runs. Hit on retrying v0.1.0 after the previous filename fix: the release already existed from the earlier failed run, and the script died with no output at all instead of finding it by tag. Guarded every such pipeline with \|\| true.	2026-09-03 10:33:03 +02:00
julian	baf7a4a99d	fix(release): strip spaces from bundle filenames before upload CI / check (push) Successful in 44s Details Release desktop / bundle (push) Failing after 3m57s Details productName "Parking System" produces installer filenames with a literal space (e.g. "Parking System_0.1.0_amd64.deb"). curl rejected the resulting asset-upload URL outright on the first real v0.1.0 release ("Malformed input to a URL function"), before the job ever reached the new public_releases mirror step. Sanitized on copy into dist/.	2026-09-03 10:26:17 +02:00
julian	885b410e48	chore(desktop): bump version to 0.1.0 for first tagged release Build desktop / desktop (push) Successful in 4m21s Details CI / check (push) Successful in 44s Details Release desktop / bundle (push) Failing after 4m1s Details Still at the scaffold default 0.0.0 with no v* tag ever cut. Bumping so a v0.1.0 tag can exercise release.yml (and the new public_releases mirror step) for the first time.	2026-09-03 10:11:20 +02:00
julian	a1f3103a76	fix(desktop): mirror signed releases to public repo for the updater Build desktop / desktop (push) Successful in 4m46s Details CI / check (push) Successful in 43s Details The updater endpoint pointed at mca/parking_solution's own Gitea "latest release" redirect, but that repo is private and field appliances have no Gitea credentials — every update check was silently failing. release.yml now mirrors signed installers to mca/public_releases (public, installers only) under a fixed desktop-latest tag; tauri.conf.json points there. Rejected embedding a read token in the app instead, given the booth-operator threat model. Also: make the appliance-provisioning root_directory gotcha impossible to skim past (boxed callout + explicit next-step pointers), after it caused a second missed step on the park-2 install.	2026-09-03 09:56:49 +02:00
julian	0fd66b261a	feat(resources): add park-2 booth Stack (stage tier) Build & push images / images (push) Successful in 2m59s Details CI / check (push) Successful in 46s Details New real booth, same tier as park-buzi: tracks stage, pinned stage-<sha>, own park_2_* secret refs. Periphery had the known /etc/komodo root_directory permission bug on --user install (wiki gotcha #9); fixed and confirmed OK in Core before adding this Stack.	2026-09-02 18:29:46 +02:00
julian	dfc5a07c10	Retire the park-lab stack from art-docker-station Build & push images / images (push) Successful in 2m56s Details CI / check (push) Successful in 44s Details That host is becoming a Traefik edge, and parking's prod override brings its own Caddy on `network_mode: host` holding :80 — the two cannot share the port. The lab tier moves to a dedicated bench PC rather than contorting either side. This also names what has been holding :80 on that box: the edge stack deployed there on 2026-09-01 failed with "address already in use" and the owner was recorded as unidentified. It was almost certainly this Caddy. REMOVING THIS BLOCK DOES NOT STOP ANYTHING. The containers keep running and keep the port. Destroy park-lab from Komodo Core BEFORE syncing this removal: DestroyStack names a stack and Core resolves where from its own synced copy of the definitions, so a sync that drops the block first takes the teardown handle with it. If that has already happened, remove the containers by hand on the host — there is no compose project context on a Komodo-managed box. Three Core secrets are now unreferenced: art_docker_station_jwt_secret, art_docker_station_event_signing_key, art_docker_station_backup_key. Lab keys with no real ledger behind them, so they are safe to delete once the stack is gone. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SARfPK19vLBstMWBxubezN	2026-09-01 11:33:22 +02:00
julian	5aabd7a791	fix(.gitignore): add questions.txt to ignore list CI / check (push) Successful in 43s Details	2026-08-31 12:23:32 +02:00
julian	0e9b9f5d82	fix(resources): drop stale park-lab-old Stack; docs(wiki): Periphery connect_as and upgrade gotchas Build & push images / images (push) Successful in 3m17s Details CI / check (push) Successful in 46s Details park-lab-old referenced a server removed from Komodo, breaking the resource sync. Also documents two Periphery incidents from this session: a Core-UI rename doesn't touch the agent's own connect_as, and upgrading Periphery is a config-preserving re-run of the installer.	2026-08-31 12:17:00 +02:00
julian	642c5f4f70	feat(setup): show running build version in the Setup tab bar Build desktop / desktop (push) Successful in 4m21s Details Build & push images / images (push) Successful in 3m6s Details CI / check (push) Successful in 42s Details CI already computes <branch>-<short-sha> for image tags but never surfaced it anywhere reachable from the app, so there was no way to tell what's actually deployed on a booth without cross-referencing komodo/resources.toml's TAG by hand. Thread it through: CI passes BUILD_VERSION as a Docker build-arg, the Dockerfile captures it as a runtime env var, GET /api/version (gated by the existing site:read permission) exposes it, and the Setup page's tab bar shows it right-aligned, muted, absent entirely on a local/dev build with no CI-supplied value. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FWncR69HgGPuei1dLrW3cU	2026-08-30 19:01:15 +02:00
julian	cb9f4d4979	fix(resources): rename stacks for clarity and consistency Build & push images / images (push) Successful in 2m50s Details CI / check (push) Successful in 43s Details	2026-08-30 18:46:55 +02:00
julian	ea8fe22969	docs(wiki): USB printer cover-open field bug writeup; add art-docker-station lab box Build desktop / desktop (push) Successful in 5m14s Details Build & push images / images (push) Successful in 3m1s Details CI / check (push) Successful in 43s Details Printer investigation (park-buzi): cover-open on the USB thermal printer wedges its status offline/faulty, surviving a full reboot, recoverable only via `docker restart server`. Traced sendRawUsb/ probeUsb end-to-end — no persistent handle in the app layer, so the leading theory is the container's /dev/usb directory bind-mount retaining a stale view across the printer's physical re-enumeration. Not yet confirmed on hardware; documented with repro/confirmation commands and ranked candidate fixes. Also registers a new lab bench box, "art-docker-station", as a Komodo Stack (dev tier, same shape as park-lab, its own isolated secret refs). Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FWncR69HgGPuei1dLrW3cU	2026-08-30 18:11:34 +02:00
julian	2910672b5a	fix(backup): persist last-success/error status; wall-clock-based schedule BackupService tracked last-success/last-error as plain in-process fields and scheduled the daily backup via setInterval measured from process start — so any server restart (deploy/crash/OOM/reboot, routine under `restart: always`) silently reset the admin UI to "last successful backup: Never" and drifted the actual cadence, independent of whether backups were writing correctly to disk (they were — a real field incident at park-buzi showed 7 valid rotating backups on disk with the status stuck on "Never"). Persist last-success/error to new site_config columns (migration 0025) and add BackupService.isDue(), computed from the persisted timestamp instead of process uptime; server.ts now polls every 15 min and lets isDue() gate the actual run. No API/UI contract change. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FWncR69HgGPuei1dLrW3cU	2026-08-30 18:11:23 +02:00
julian	3a176c5cc8	docs(wiki): DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU main-stream ISAPI snapshot is a firmware bug — camera line to be replaced CI / check (push) Successful in 1m1s Details Build & push images / images (push) Successful in 3m20s Details Full live investigation of the persistent 503 "deviceBusy" on main-stream ISAPI snapshots (10.0.10.13): ruled out config (byte-identical to a working sibling model), ruled out firmware age (reproduced on both the original V5.8.11 and current V5.11.0 builds, ~15 months apart), and ruled out real resource contention (a full channel-ID sweep shows every ID fails identically except the one hardcoded working value, including nonexistent channels) — pointing at a broken/incomplete ISAPI snapshot handler that mislabels itself as "busy," not a real encoder ceiling. RTSP main-stream frame-grab was confirmed as a working route around it, but given the bug and the sub-stream's real-world plate-read accuracy problems, the owner decided to replace the DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU units rather than carry an ffmpeg/RTSP dependency to work around vendor firmware. Ingested the vendor datasheet as a source page along the way. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FWncR69HgGPuei1dLrW3cU	2026-08-23 14:50:22 +02:00
julian	19dff97c74	fix(web): permission-degrade the app shell for merchant-only users Build desktop / desktop (push) Successful in 4m51s Details Build & push images / images (push) Successful in 3m8s Details CI / check (push) Successful in 52s Details A user whose role has only validation:create (the bar/lavazh validator) made the shell misbehave: useLiveFeed() connected /api/ws unconditionally, the server's report:read guard 403'd the upgrade, and the capped-backoff reconnect hammered it forever — a 403 in the server log every few seconds. Gate the socket on report:read (mirrors routes/ws.ts WATCH_PERMISSION) and render StatusDot / ShiftButton / DeviceFooter only with their backing permissions (report:read / shift:read / device:read), so a merchant's shell is just the nav + their /validate screen, with zero doomed requests. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YYkpEsLmoQPaize5ec3oUm	2026-07-13 20:12:43 +02:00
julian	0ed43239c3	bump(resources): update TAG to stage-28bd838 for deployment consistency Build & push images / images (push) Successful in 3m1s Details CI / check (push) Successful in 48s Details	2026-07-13 20:11:27 +02:00