Dingtian harden(): rotate the admin/admin web login (cosmetic)

harden() now rotates the device's default admin/admin web-UI login via GET /userset.cgi?<old>&<old>&<new>&<new>& (best-effort: a failure logs and doesn't fail the assign). The new password is stored back in config (webUser/webPassword) so a re-run can rotate again, and is stripped from the assign response like the push secret. Documented the load-bearing caveat: this device's CGI API is fully UNAUTHENTICATED — config read/write, relay fire, and userset.cgi itself all return 200 with no credentials (verified on hardware). admin/admin gates only the browser UI, and there's no inbound-auth setting (only session_en, which bricks the read API). So the rotation is defence-in- depth for the UI, NOT a boundary; the signed event log remains the real anti-fraud guarantee. Verified rotation end-to-end on 10.0.10.5 (success &0&, wrong-old-pw &2&); device left at admin/admin.
Setup wizard: show + override the backend push IP (multi-NIC hosts)
2026-06-14 19:00:42 +02:00 · 2026-06-14 18:47:23 +02:00 · 2026-06-14 18:34:35 +02:00 · 2026-06-14 16:59:36 +02:00 · 2026-06-14 16:39:08 +02:00 · 2026-06-14 15:10:50 +02:00
45 changed files with 2203 additions and 740 deletions
@@ -17,4 +17,6 @@ dist/
 *:Zone.Identifier
 .playwright-mcp/
 # stray hardware/UI test screenshots
-/*.png
+/*.png
 # Vendor device SDKs (reference only — protocol captured in wiki, not committed)
 /dingtian/
@@ -21,8 +21,7 @@
    "@parking/shared": "workspace:*",
    "bcrypt": "6.0.0",
    "fastify": "5.8.5",
-    "fastify-plugin": "6.0.0",
+    "fastify-plugin": "6.0.0"
    "uhppoted": "0.9.0"
  },
  "devDependencies": {
    "@types/bcrypt": "6.0.0",
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
 // Dingtian relay+input hardware test.
 //
 //   node apps/server/scripts/dingtian-test.mjs                 # status only (safe)
 //   node apps/server/scripts/dingtian-test.mjs watch           # live input/button monitor
 //   node apps/server/scripts/dingtian-test.mjs pulse 1         # pulse relay 1 (prompts)
 //
 // Env: DINGTIAN_HOST (default 10.0.10.172), DINGTIAN_PORT (60001).
 //
 // SAFETY: `pulse` fires a relay → the barrier may move. It prompts first unless
 // YES=1. pulseOpen is momentary (the device self-releases).
 import { createInterface } from "node:readline/promises";
 import { stdin, stdout } from "node:process";
 import { createRequire } from "node:module";
 const require = createRequire(import.meta.url);
 const { dingtianDriver } = require("@parking/devices");
 const host = process.env.DINGTIAN_HOST ?? "10.0.10.172";
 const port = process.env.DINGTIAN_PORT ? Number(process.env.DINGTIAN_PORT) : 60001;
 const dev = dingtianDriver.create({ host, port, channels: 4 });
 const mode = process.argv[2] ?? "status";
 console.log(`dingtian @ ${host}:${port}\n`);
 async function showStatus() {
  const health = await dev.healthCheck();
  console.log("health:", JSON.stringify(health));
  const inputs = await dev.readInputs();
  console.log("inputs (active=pressed):", inputs.map((v, i) => `in${i + 1}=${v ? "ON" : "off"}`).join("  "));
  for (let ch = 1; ch <= 4; ch++) {
    console.log(`relay ${ch}:`, await dev.getDoorStatus(ch));
  }
 }
 if (mode === "status") {
  await showStatus();
  process.exit(0);
 }
 if (mode === "watch") {
  console.log("── press the buttons on the inputs — Ctrl-C to stop ──\n");
  const unsub = dev.onInput((e) => {
    console.log(`[${e.at}] input ${e.input} ${e.edge.toUpperCase()}`);
  });
  process.on("SIGINT", () => {
    unsub();
    console.log("\nstopped.");
    process.exit(0);
  });
  // keep alive
  await new Promise(() => {});
 }
 if (mode === "pulse") {
  const ch = Number(process.argv[3] ?? 1);
  if (process.env.YES !== "1") {
    const rl = createInterface({ input: stdin, output: stdout });
    const ans = (await rl.question(`Pulse relay ${ch}? (barrier may move) [y/N] `)).trim();
    rl.close();
    if (ans.toLowerCase() !== "y") {
      console.log("aborted.");
      process.exit(0);
    }
  }
  await dev.pulseOpen(ch);
  console.log(`pulsed relay ${ch}.`);
  // show the relay state right after (likely back off — pulse is momentary)
  setTimeout(async () => {
    console.log(`relay ${ch} now:`, await dev.getDoorStatus(ch));
    process.exit(0);
  }, 300);
 }
@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
 // Shared helpers for the UHPPOTE hardware test scripts.
 // Run directly against the device (independent of the HTTP server).
 //
 //   node apps/server/scripts/uhppote-listen.mjs
 //   node apps/server/scripts/uhppote-relay.mjs
 //
 // Env overrides:
 //   UHPPOTE_SERIAL   controller serial   (default 225088491)
 //   UHPPOTE_HOST     controller IP       (default 10.0.10.3)
 //   UHPPOTE_BCAST    Config broadcast    (default derived from HOST subnet)
 //   HOST_IP          this host's IP the controller pushes events to
 //                    (default: auto-detected interface on the controller's subnet)
 import { networkInterfaces } from "node:os";
 import { createRequire } from "node:module";
 const require = createRequire(import.meta.url);
 const uhppoted = require("uhppoted");
 export const SERIAL = Number(process.env.UHPPOTE_SERIAL ?? 225088491);
 export const HOST = process.env.UHPPOTE_HOST ?? "10.0.10.3";
 /** Subnet-directed broadcast for the interface that owns `ip`. */
 function broadcastForHost(ip) {
  const o = ip.split(".").map(Number);
  for (const ifaces of Object.values(networkInterfaces())) {
    for (const i of ifaces ?? []) {
      if (i.family !== "IPv4" || i.internal) continue;
      const a = i.address.split(".").map(Number);
      const m = i.netmask.split(".").map(Number);
      if (o.every((x, k) => (x & m[k]) === (a[k] & m[k]))) {
        return a.map((x, k) => (x & m[k]) | (~m[k] & 0xff)).join(".");
      }
    }
  }
  return "255.255.255.255";
 }
 /** This host's own IP on the controller's subnet (where it should push events). */
 export function hostIpOnControllerSubnet(ip = HOST) {
  if (process.env.HOST_IP) return process.env.HOST_IP;
  const o = ip.split(".").map(Number);
  for (const ifaces of Object.values(networkInterfaces())) {
    for (const i of ifaces ?? []) {
      if (i.family !== "IPv4" || i.internal) continue;
      const a = i.address.split(".").map(Number);
      const m = i.netmask.split(".").map(Number);
      if (o.every((x, k) => (x & m[k]) === (a[k] & m[k]))) return i.address;
    }
  }
  return null;
 }
 export const BCAST = process.env.UHPPOTE_BCAST ?? broadcastForHost(HOST);
 export function makeCtx(timeoutMs = 5000) {
  return {
    config: new uhppoted.Config(
      "parking",
      "0.0.0.0",
      `${BCAST}:60000`,
      "0.0.0.0:60001",
      timeoutMs,
      [],
      false,
    ),
    locale: "en-US",
  };
 }
 export const controller = { id: SERIAL, address: HOST, protocol: "udp" };
 export { uhppoted };
@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
 // Live button/event listener for the UHPPOTE controller.
 //
 // Points the controller's event listener at THIS host, then prints each pushed
 // event in real time. Press the door buttons on the controller and watch them
 // appear. Ctrl-C to stop.
 //
 //   node apps/server/scripts/uhppote-listen.mjs
 import {
  controller,
  hostIpOnControllerSubnet,
  makeCtx,
  uhppoted,
 } from "./uhppote-common.mjs";
 const ctx = makeCtx();
 const hostIp = hostIpOnControllerSubnet();
 if (!hostIp) {
  console.error("Could not determine this host's IP on the controller's subnet.");
  console.error("Set HOST_IP=<your-ip-on-the-controller-LAN> and retry.");
  process.exit(1);
 }
 console.log(`controller : ${controller.id} @ ${controller.address}`);
 console.log(`this host   : ${hostIp} (events will be pushed here on :60001)`);
 // 0) Remember the controller's current listener so we can restore it on exit
 //    (it was pointing somewhere else, e.g. 10.0.10.241).
 let prevListener = null;
 try {
  prevListener = await uhppoted.getListener(ctx, controller);
  console.log(`prior listener: ${prevListener.address}:${prevListener.port} (will restore on exit)`);
 } catch (e) {
  console.warn("getListener (non-fatal):", e.code ?? e.message);
 }
 // 1) Tell the controller to push events to us.
 try {
  const r = await uhppoted.setListener(ctx, controller, hostIp, 60001);
  console.log("setListener:", JSON.stringify(r));
 } catch (e) {
  console.error("setListener failed:", e.code ?? e.message);
  process.exit(1);
 }
 // 2) (Best-effort) ensure door open/close + button events are recorded.
 try {
  await uhppoted.recordSpecialEvents(ctx, controller, true);
  console.log("recordSpecialEvents: enabled");
 } catch (e) {
  console.warn("recordSpecialEvents (non-fatal):", e.code ?? e.message);
 }
 console.log("\n── listening — press the door buttons on the controller ──\n");
 function describe(ev) {
  const e = ev?.state?.event ?? ev?.event;
  const buttons = ev?.state?.buttons;
  const doors = ev?.state?.doors;
  const parts = [];
  if (e) {
    parts.push(
      `event#${e.index} type=${e.type?.event ?? e.type?.code} door=${e.door} granted=${e.granted} reason="${e.reason?.reason ?? e.reason?.code}" @${e.timestamp}`,
    );
  }
  if (buttons) {
    const pressed = Object.entries(buttons).filter(([, v]) => v).map(([k]) => k);
    parts.push(`buttons=[${pressed.join(",") || "none"}]`);
  }
  if (doors) {
    const open = Object.entries(doors).filter(([, v]) => v).map(([k]) => k);
    parts.push(`doorsOpen=[${open.join(",") || "none"}]`);
  }
  return parts.join("  ");
 }
 uhppoted.listen(
  ctx,
  (event) => {
    console.log(`[${new Date().toISOString()}] ${describe(event)}`);
  },
  (err) => {
    console.error("listen error:", err?.message ?? err);
  },
 );
 process.on("SIGINT", async () => {
  // Restore the controller's previous listener so we don't hijack it.
  if (prevListener && prevListener.address && prevListener.address !== "0.0.0.0") {
    try {
      await uhppoted.setListener(ctx, controller, prevListener.address, prevListener.port);
      console.log(`\nrestored listener -> ${prevListener.address}:${prevListener.port}`);
    } catch (e) {
      console.warn("\ncould not restore listener:", e.code ?? e.message);
    }
  }
  console.log("stopped.");
  process.exit(0);
 });
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
 // Guarded relay (door-open) test for the UHPPOTE controller.
 //
 // Prompts before firing each relay so a door only opens when you're ready and
 // watching. This is a 2-door controller, so it tests doors 1 and 2 by default.
 //
 //   node apps/server/scripts/uhppote-relay.mjs           # doors 1,2 (prompted)
 //   node apps/server/scripts/uhppote-relay.mjs 1          # only door 1
 //   YES=1 node apps/server/scripts/uhppote-relay.mjs      # no prompts (fires!)
 //
 // SAFETY: openDoor only expresses INTENT to open. The controller / barrier
 // operator owns the close timing and anti-crush — we never time a close.
 import { createInterface } from "node:readline/promises";
 import { stdin, stdout } from "node:process";
 import { controller, makeCtx, uhppoted } from "./uhppote-common.mjs";
 const ctx = makeCtx();
 const doors = process.argv.slice(2).map(Number).filter((n) => n >= 1 && n <= 4);
 const targets = doors.length ? doors : [1, 2];
 const autoYes = process.env.YES === "1";
 console.log(`controller : ${controller.id} @ ${controller.address}`);
 console.log(`testing doors: ${targets.join(", ")}${autoYes ? " (auto, no prompts)" : ""}\n`);
 const rl = autoYes ? null : createInterface({ input: stdin, output: stdout });
 for (const door of targets) {
  if (rl) {
    const ans = await rl.question(`Open door ${door}? [y/N] `);
    if (ans.trim().toLowerCase() !== "y") {
      console.log(`  skipped door ${door}`);
      continue;
    }
  }
  try {
    const res = await uhppoted.openDoor(ctx, controller, door);
    console.log(`  door ${door}: openDoor -> ${JSON.stringify(res)}`);
  } catch (e) {
    console.log(`  door ${door}: ERROR ${e.code ?? e.message}`);
  }
 }
 rl?.close();
 console.log("\ndone.");
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
 import { EventEmitter } from "node:events";
 // Internal event bus for device-originated events (button presses, etc.).
 // Hardware drivers / inbound device pushes emit here; business logic (entry
 // flow, event-log) subscribes — keeping the HTTP/transport layer thin and the
 // app device-agnostic. See wiki/entities/fastify.md.
 export interface DeviceInputEvent {
  readonly driverId: string; // e.g. "dingtian"
  readonly deviceId: string; // which configured device (lane_devices id)
  readonly input: number; // 1-based input/channel
  readonly edge: "on" | "off"; // active / inactive
  readonly at: string; // ISO-8601 (server receive time)
  readonly source: "push" | "poll";
 }
 class DeviceEventBus extends EventEmitter {
  emitInput(event: DeviceInputEvent): void {
    this.emit("input", event);
  }
  onInput(cb: (event: DeviceInputEvent) => void): () => void {
    this.on("input", cb);
    return () => this.off("input", cb);
  }
 }
 /** Process-wide device event bus. */
 export const deviceEvents = new DeviceEventBus();
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
 import { createHash, randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
 import type { FastifyReply, FastifyRequest } from "fastify";
 // HTTP Digest auth (RFC 2617, MD5, qop=auth) — verified against the Dingtian
 // device, which CAN do Digest but CANNOT do HTTPS to a self-signed cert. On
 // this flat network Digest is the strongest available push auth: the password
 // is never sent (only a nonce-keyed hash). It is defence-in-depth; the signed
 // event log is the real anti-fraud guarantee. See wiki/concepts/device-input-flow.md.
 export const DIGEST_REALM = "parking";
 const md5 = (s: string) => createHash("md5").update(s).digest("hex");
 /** Nonces we've issued and not yet consumed (single-use → replay resistance). */
 const issuedNonces = new Map<string, number>(); // nonce → issuedAt (ms epoch is unavailable in scripts but fine at runtime)
 const NONCE_TTL_MS = 5 * 60_000;
 function issueNonce(): string {
  const nonce = randomBytes(16).toString("hex");
  issuedNonces.set(nonce, Date.now());
  // opportunistic cleanup
  if (issuedNonces.size > 1000) {
    const cutoff = Date.now() - NONCE_TTL_MS;
    for (const [n, t] of issuedNonces) if (t < cutoff) issuedNonces.delete(n);
  }
  return nonce;
 }
 function parseDigest(header: string): Record<string, string> {
  const out: Record<string, string> = {};
  const re = /(\w+)=(?:"([^"]*)"|([^,]*))/g;
  let m: RegExpExecArray | null;
  while ((m = re.exec(header))) out[m[1]!] = (m[2] ?? m[3] ?? "").trim();
  return out;
 }
 function eq(a: string, b: string): boolean {
  const ab = Buffer.from(a);
  const bb = Buffer.from(b);
  return ab.length === bb.length && timingSafeEqual(ab, bb);
 }
 export interface DigestCreds {
  readonly user: string;
  readonly password: string;
 }
 /**
 * Verify a Digest Authorization header. Returns true on success. On failure (or
 * a missing/expired header) sets a 401 challenge on `reply` and returns false —
 * the caller should stop. `creds` is the device's stored push credentials.
 */
 export function verifyDigest(
  req: FastifyRequest,
  reply: FastifyReply,
  creds: DigestCreds,
 ): boolean {
  const header = req.headers["authorization"];
  if (!header || !/^Digest /i.test(header)) {
    challenge(reply);
    return false;
  }
  const p = parseDigest(header.replace(/^Digest /i, ""));
  // Nonce must be one we issued and not yet consumed (single-use).
  const issuedAt = p.nonce ? issuedNonces.get(p.nonce) : undefined;
  if (!p.nonce || issuedAt === undefined || Date.now() - issuedAt > NONCE_TTL_MS) {
    challenge(reply, true);
    return false;
  }
  const ha1 = md5(`${creds.user}:${DIGEST_REALM}:${creds.password}`);
  const ha2 = md5(`${req.method}:${p.uri ?? req.url}`);
  const expected =
    p.qop === "auth"
      ? md5(`${ha1}:${p.nonce}:${p.nc}:${p.cnonce}:${p.qop}:${ha2}`)
      : md5(`${ha1}:${p.nonce}:${ha2}`);
  if (!p.response || !eq(expected, p.response) || !eq(p.username ?? "", creds.user)) {
    challenge(reply);
    return false;
  }
  // Consume the nonce so it can't be replayed.
  issuedNonces.delete(p.nonce);
  return true;
 }
 function challenge(reply: FastifyReply, stale = false): void {
  const nonce = issueNonce();
  reply.header(
    "www-authenticate",
    `Digest realm="${DIGEST_REALM}", qop="auth", nonce="${nonce}", algorithm=MD5${stale ? ", stale=true" : ""}`,
  );
  reply.code(401).send("authentication required");
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
 import { networkInterfaces } from "node:os";
 // Figure out which local IP a device should call back on. For input-push, the
 // device needs OUR address on ITS subnet — pick the local IPv4 interface whose
 // network contains the device's IP. Override with BACKEND_HOST_IP if the
 // auto-pick is wrong (e.g. multi-homed host). See wiki/concepts/device-input-flow.md.
 export function backendIpForDevice(deviceHost: string): string | null {
  if (process.env.BACKEND_HOST_IP) return process.env.BACKEND_HOST_IP;
  const ip = deviceHost.split(".").map(Number);
  if (ip.length !== 4 || ip.some((o) => Number.isNaN(o))) return null;
  for (const ifaces of Object.values(networkInterfaces())) {
    for (const i of ifaces ?? []) {
      if (i.family !== "IPv4" || i.internal) continue;
      const addr = i.address.split(".").map(Number);
      const mask = i.netmask.split(".").map(Number);
      if (addr.length !== 4 || mask.length !== 4) continue;
      const sameNet = ip.every((o, k) => (o & mask[k]!) === (addr[k]! & mask[k]!));
      if (sameNet) return i.address;
    }
  }
  return null;
 }
 /** Backend port the device should call (the server's listen port). */
 export function backendPort(): number {
  return Number(process.env.PORT ?? 3000);
 }
 export interface BackendIpCandidate {
  ip: string;
  iface: string;
  /** True if this interface's subnet contains the device IP (the likely one). */
  onDeviceSubnet: boolean;
 }
 /**
 * List local IPv4 addresses the device could call back on, with the ones on the
 * device's own subnet flagged + sorted first. Lets the admin see/override the
 * auto-pick (important on multi-NIC hosts). BACKEND_HOST_IP, if set, is the only
 * candidate (the deterministic override).
 */
 export function backendIpCandidates(deviceHost: string): BackendIpCandidate[] {
  if (process.env.BACKEND_HOST_IP) {
    return [{ ip: process.env.BACKEND_HOST_IP, iface: "BACKEND_HOST_IP", onDeviceSubnet: true }];
  }
  const dev = deviceHost.split(".").map(Number);
  const validDev = dev.length === 4 && !dev.some((o) => Number.isNaN(o));
  const out: BackendIpCandidate[] = [];
  for (const [iface, ifaces] of Object.entries(networkInterfaces())) {
    for (const i of ifaces ?? []) {
      if (i.family !== "IPv4" || i.internal) continue;
      const addr = i.address.split(".").map(Number);
      const mask = i.netmask.split(".").map(Number);
      const onDeviceSubnet =
        validDev &&
        addr.length === 4 &&
        mask.length === 4 &&
        dev.every((o, k) => (o & mask[k]!) === (addr[k]! & mask[k]!));
      out.push({ ip: i.address, iface, onDeviceSubnet });
    }
  }
  // On-subnet candidates first.
  return out.sort((a, b) => Number(b.onDeviceSubnet) - Number(a.onDeviceSubnet));
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
 import type { FastifyInstance, FastifyReply, FastifyRequest } from "fastify";
 import { eq, laneDevices, type Db } from "@parking/db";
 import { deviceEvents } from "../device-events.js";
 import { verifyDigest } from "../digest-auth.js";
 // Inbound device push endpoints. The Dingtian board's "Input Link URL" feature
 // HTTP-calls us when an input (button) fires — no polling. We translate the
 // push into an internal device event; the entry flow decides what to do
 // (print a ticket, then command the relay). See wiki/concepts/device-input-flow.md.
 //
 // AUTH: HTTP Digest (the device can do Digest but not HTTPS-to-self-signed —
 // both tested on hardware). The password is never sent on the wire; the secret
 // is NOT in the URL. Per-device credentials live in lane_devices (written on
 // assign). This is defence-in-depth on a flat network; the signed event log is
 // the real anti-fraud guarantee (an open with no matching signed event is an
 // anomaly). Source-IP is also checked. NOT behind the SPA cookie/CSRF auth
 // (machine call from the device).
 interface InputParams {
  deviceId: string;
  n: string;
  edge: string;
 }
 interface DingtianDeviceConfig {
  host?: string;
  pushUser?: string;
  pushPassword?: string;
 }
 function clientIp(req: FastifyRequest): string {
  return req.ip.replace(/^::ffff:/, "");
 }
 export async function deviceRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, db: Db): Promise<void> {
  const handle = async (req: FastifyRequest<{ Params: InputParams }>, reply: FastifyReply) => {
    const { deviceId, n, edge } = req.params;
    const row = await db.select().from(laneDevices).where(eq(laneDevices.id, deviceId)).get();
    const cfg = row?.config as DingtianDeviceConfig | undefined;
    // Unknown device / not a dingtian / no push creds / wrong source IP → 404.
    if (
      !row ||
      row.driverId !== "dingtian" ||
      !cfg?.pushUser ||
      !cfg.pushPassword ||
      !cfg.host ||
      clientIp(req) !== cfg.host
    ) {
      app.log.warn(`rejected device push: device=${deviceId} ip=${clientIp(req)}`);
      return reply.code(404).send({ error: "not found" });
    }
    // Digest auth — issues a 401 challenge on first hit; the device retries with
    // the hashed response (verifyDigest sends the challenge + returns false).
    if (!verifyDigest(req, reply, { user: cfg.pushUser, password: cfg.pushPassword })) {
      return; // 401 already sent
    }
    const input = Number(n);
    const ed = edge === "off" ? "off" : "on";
    app.log.info(`[dingtian:${deviceId}] input ${input} ${ed} (push)`);
    deviceEvents.emitInput({
      driverId: "dingtian",
      deviceId,
      input,
      edge: ed,
      at: new Date().toISOString(),
      source: "push",
    });
    return { ok: true };
  };
  for (const method of ["GET", "POST"] as const) {
    app.route({
      method,
      url: "/api/devices/dingtian/:deviceId/input/:n/:edge",
      handler: handle,
    });
  }
 }
@@ -1,14 +1,18 @@
-import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
+import { randomBytes, randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
 import type { FastifyInstance } from "fastify";
 import { eq, laneDevices, setupState, type Db } from "@parking/db";
 import {
  hasPreconditions,
  hasPushConfig,
  isDiscoverable,
  isHardenable,
  registerBuiltinDrivers,
  registry,
  setDeviceLogSink,
  type DeviceCategory,
 } from "@parking/devices";
 import { requireRole } from "../auth.js";
 import { backendIpCandidates, backendIpForDevice, backendPort } from "../net.js";
 // First-run setup API. The admin reads the driver catalog and assigns devices
 // per lane. See wiki/concepts/first-run-setup.md.
@@ -18,6 +22,14 @@ interface AssignBody {
  category: DeviceCategory;
  driverId: string;
  config: Record<string, string | number | boolean>;
  /** Optional: the backend IP the device should push to (overrides auto-pick;
   *  matters on multi-NIC hosts). */
  backendIp?: string;
 }
 interface TestBody {
  driverId: string;
  config: Record<string, string | number | boolean>;
 }
 export async function setupRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, db: Db): Promise<void> {
@@ -28,14 +40,14 @@ export async function setupRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, db: Db): Promise<void> {
  const adminGuard = requireRole("admin");
  // Catalog of selectable drivers per category (no secrets — schema only).
-  // `discoverable` flags drivers that can scan the LAN (e.g. UHPPOTE).
+  // `discoverable` flags drivers that can scan the LAN.
  app.get("/api/setup/catalog", async () => {
    const catalog = registry.catalog();
    const discoverable = registry.list().filter(isDiscoverable).map((d) => d.id);
    return { ...catalog, discoverable };
  });
-  // Scan the LAN for devices a driver can discover (UHPPOTE UDP broadcast, etc).
+  // Scan the LAN for devices a driver can discover (UDP broadcast, etc).
  // Each found device is health-checked so the admin sees reachability before
  // assigning. Admin-only. See wiki/concepts/device-discovery.md.
  app.get<{ Params: { driverId: string } }>(
@@ -78,32 +90,134 @@ export async function setupRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, db: Db): Promise<void> {
    },
  );
-  // Assign a device to a lane. Validates the chosen driver + config against the
+  // Test a device config WITHOUT saving or changing the device: validate the
-  // registry before persisting; rejects unknown drivers / missing config.
+  // config, probe reachability (healthCheck), and report preconditions
  // (e.g. input_link_relay state). Lets the admin verify before committing.
  app.post<{ Body: TestBody }>(
    "/api/setup/test",
    { preHandler: adminGuard },
    async (req, reply) => {
      const { driverId, config } = req.body;
      const driver = registry.get(driverId);
      if (!driver) return reply.code(400).send({ error: `unknown driver: ${driverId}` });
      let device;
      try {
        device = registry.create(driverId, config);
      } catch (err) {
        return reply.code(400).send({ error: (err as Error).message });
      }
      const health = await device.healthCheck();
      const preconditions = hasPreconditions(device)
        ? await device.checkPreconditions()
        : { ok: true, issues: [] };
      return { health, preconditions };
    },
  );
  // Candidate backend IPs the device can push to, for a given device host. The
  // wizard pre-fills with the on-subnet one and lets the admin override (matters
  // on multi-NIC hosts). See net.ts / wiki/concepts/device-input-flow.md.
  app.get<{ Querystring: { host?: string } }>(
    "/api/setup/backend-ips",
    { preHandler: adminGuard },
    async (req) => {
      const candidates = backendIpCandidates(req.query.host ?? "");
      return { candidates, port: backendPort() };
    },
  );
  // Assign a device to a lane. Validates the chosen driver + config, configures
  // the device (fix preconditions + set up Digest-authenticated input push — no
  // manual device-web-UI step by the admin), then persists. Fails the save if
  // the device can't be configured. See wiki/concepts/device-input-flow.md.
  app.post<{ Body: AssignBody }>(
    "/api/setup/assign",
    { preHandler: adminGuard },
    async (req, reply) => {
-      const { lane, category, driverId, config } = req.body;
+      const { lane, category, driverId, config, backendIp } = req.body;
      const driver = registry.get(driverId);
      if (!driver || driver.category !== category) {
        return reply.code(400).send({ error: `invalid driver for ${category}: ${driverId}` });
      }
      const id = randomUUID();
      const fullConfig: Record<string, unknown> = { ...config };
      let device;
      try {
-        registry.create(driverId, config); // validates required fields
+        device = registry.create(driverId, config); // validates required fields
      } catch (err) {
        return reply.code(400).send({ error: (err as Error).message });
      }
      // Configure the device on save (before persisting, so we don't store a row
      // for a device we couldn't configure):
      //   1. fix preconditions (e.g. disable input_link_relay so a button press
      //      doesn't auto-fire its relay — host must decide first),
      //   2. harden (relay password + disable unused protocol channels), and
      //   3. set up input push (Digest creds + push URLs).
      // Each step is a device config write (the device reboots on apply).
      try {
        if (hasPreconditions(device)) {
          const fixed = await device.fixPreconditions();
          if (!fixed.ok) {
            const unfixable = fixed.issues.find((i) => !i.fixable);
            return reply.code(502).send({
              error: `device precondition not satisfied: ${unfixable?.message ?? fixed.issues[0]?.message}`,
            });
          }
        }
        if (isHardenable(device)) {
          const { secrets } = await device.harden();
          Object.assign(fullConfig, secrets); // e.g. relayPassword
        }
        if (hasPushConfig(device)) {
          const host = String(config.host ?? "");
          // Admin-provided backend IP wins; else auto-derive (on-subnet NIC).
          const pushHost = backendIp ?? backendIpForDevice(host);
          if (!pushHost) {
            return reply.code(400).send({
              error: `cannot determine the backend IP on the device's subnet (${host}). Pick one in setup or set BACKEND_HOST_IP.`,
            });
          }
          const pushUser = "dingtian";
          // 24 hex chars = 96 bits. The Dingtian `pass` field caps at 31 chars
          // (longer is silently truncated → auth mismatch), so keep it short.
          const pushPassword = randomBytes(12).toString("hex");
          await device.configureInputPush({
            host: pushHost,
            port: backendPort(),
            pathBase: `/api/devices/${driverId}/${id}/input`,
            auth: { user: pushUser, password: pushPassword },
          });
          fullConfig.pushUser = pushUser;
          fullConfig.pushPassword = pushPassword;
          // Record the backend IP the device was told to push to — lets us detect
          // a later mismatch if the host's IP changes.
          fullConfig.backendIp = pushHost;
        }
      } catch (err) {
        return reply
          .code(502)
          .send({ error: `device configuration failed: ${(err as Error).message}` });
      }
      const row = {
-        id: randomUUID(),
+        id,
        lane,
        category,
        driverId,
-        config,
+        config: fullConfig,
        enabled: true,
      };
      await db.insert(laneDevices).values(row);
-      return reply.code(201).send(row);
+      // Don't echo device secrets back (push Digest password, web-UI login).
      const { pushPassword: _pw, webPassword: _wp, ...safeConfig } = fullConfig;
      return reply.code(201).send({ ...row, config: safeConfig });
    },
  );
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import Fastify, { type FastifyInstance } from "fastify";
 import { createDb, type Db } from "@parking/db";
 import { TOKEN_COOKIE, requireJwtSecret } from "./auth.js";
 import { authRoutes } from "./routes/auth.js";
 import { deviceRoutes } from "./routes/devices.js";
 import { setupRoutes } from "./routes/setup.js";
 // The backend is Fastify (Node). Hardware drivers live as isolated Fastify
@@ -43,7 +44,12 @@ export async function buildServer(opts: BuildOptions = {}): Promise<FastifyInsta
  // catalog at first-run. See wiki/concepts/first-run-setup.md.
  await setupRoutes(app, db);
-  // TODO: device-driver runtime plugins, append-only event-log routes.
+  // Inbound device pushes (e.g. Dingtian Input Link URL → button events),
  // guarded by source-IP allowlist + a shared-secret path token, both read from
  // the device's lane_devices config (written on assign).
  await deviceRoutes(app, db);
  // TODO: entry flow (input event → signed event → print → relay), event-log routes.
  return app;
 }
@@ -1,11 +1,16 @@
-import { useEffect, useState } from "react";
+import { useState, useEffect } from "react";
 import {
  assignDevice,
  discoverDevices,
  fetchBackendIps,
  fetchCatalog,
  testDevice,
  type BackendIpCandidate,
  type Catalog,
  type CatalogEntry,
  type DeviceCategory,
  type DiscoveredDevice,
  type TestResult,
 } from "./api.js";
 // First-run setup wizard (scaffold). The admin picks a device per category for a
@@ -54,6 +59,8 @@ export function SetupWizard() {
      {CATEGORIES.map(({ key, title }) => (
        <CategoryPicker
          key={key}
          lane={lane}
          category={key}
          title={title}
          entries={catalog[key]}
          discoverableIds={catalog.discoverable}
@@ -66,12 +73,16 @@ export function SetupWizard() {
 }
 function CategoryPicker({
  lane,
  category,
  title,
  entries,
  discoverableIds,
  selectedId,
  onSelect,
 }: {
  lane: number;
  category: DeviceCategory;
  title: string;
  entries: CatalogEntry[];
  discoverableIds: string[];
@@ -83,10 +94,49 @@ function CategoryPicker({
  // Config values (auto-filled by discovery, editable by hand).
  const [config, setConfig] = useState<Record<string, string | number>>({});
  const [tested, setTested] = useState<TestResult | null>(null);
  const [testing, setTesting] = useState(false);
  const [testError, setTestError] = useState<string | null>(null);
  const [saving, setSaving] = useState(false);
  const [saved, setSaved] = useState(false);
  const [saveError, setSaveError] = useState<string | null>(null);
  const [found, setFound] = useState<DiscoveredDevice[] | null>(null);
  const [scanning, setScanning] = useState(false);
  const [scanError, setScanError] = useState<string | null>(null);
  // Backend push IP: which of OUR addresses the device should call back on. We
  // auto-pick the NIC on the device's subnet, but surface it editable here so a
  // multi-NIC host can be corrected (the chosen IP is baked into the device on
  // save). Only relevant for drivers that push (the field hides if no candidates).
  const [backendIps, setBackendIps] = useState<BackendIpCandidate[] | null>(null);
  const [backendIp, setBackendIp] = useState<string>("");
  // (Re)load backend-IP candidates whenever the device host changes after a
  // successful test (the test confirms the host is real + reachable).
  const testedHost = tested ? String(mergedConfig().host ?? "") : "";
  useEffect(() => {
    if (!testedHost) {
      setBackendIps(null);
      return;
    }
    let live = true;
    fetchBackendIps(testedHost)
      .then(({ candidates }) => {
        if (!live) return;
        setBackendIps(candidates);
        // Pre-fill with the on-subnet auto-pick (the first candidate, since the
        // server sorts on-subnet first), unless the admin already chose one.
        setBackendIp((cur) => cur || candidates.find((c) => c.onDeviceSubnet)?.ip || "");
      })
      .catch(() => {
        if (live) setBackendIps(null);
      });
    return () => {
      live = false;
    };
    // eslint-disable-next-line react-hooks/exhaustive-deps
  }, [testedHost]);
  async function scan() {
    if (!selected) return;
    setScanning(true);
@@ -102,6 +152,59 @@ function CategoryPicker({
  function applyDiscovered(d: DiscoveredDevice) {
    setConfig((c) => ({ ...c, ...(d.config as Record<string, string | number>) }));
    resetStatus();
  }
  // Config the user actually entered, merged over driver defaults.
  function mergedConfig(): Record<string, string | number> {
    const out: Record<string, string | number> = {};
    for (const f of selected?.configFields ?? []) {
      const v = config[f.key] ?? (f.default as string | number | undefined);
      if (v !== undefined && v !== "") out[f.key] = v;
    }
    return out;
  }
  // Editing config invalidates a prior test/save.
  function resetStatus() {
    setTested(null);
    setTestError(null);
    setSaved(false);
    setSaveError(null);
  }
  async function test() {
    if (!selected) return;
    setTesting(true);
    setTestError(null);
    setTested(null);
    try {
      setTested(await testDevice(selected.id, mergedConfig()));
    } catch (e) {
      setTestError((e as Error).message);
    } finally {
      setTesting(false);
    }
  }
  async function save() {
    if (!selected) return;
    setSaving(true);
    setSaveError(null);
    try {
      await assignDevice({
        lane,
        category,
        driverId: selected.id,
        config: mergedConfig(),
        ...(backendIp ? { backendIp } : {}),
      });
      setSaved(true);
    } catch (e) {
      setSaveError((e as Error).message);
    } finally {
      setSaving(false);
    }
  }
  return (
@@ -159,11 +262,77 @@ function CategoryPicker({
                  type={f.type === "secret" ? "password" : f.type === "number" || f.type === "port" ? "number" : "text"}
                  value={config[f.key] ?? (f.default as string | number | undefined) ?? ""}
                  placeholder={f.help}
-                  onChange={(e) => setConfig((c) => ({ ...c, [f.key]: e.target.value }))}
+                  onChange={(e) => {
                    const v = e.target.value;
                    setConfig((c) => ({ ...c, [f.key]: v }));
                    resetStatus();
                  }}
                />
              </label>
            </div>
          ))}
          {/* Test (no save/no device change) then Save (configures + persists). */}
          <div style={{ marginTop: "0.75rem", display: "flex", gap: "0.5rem", alignItems: "center" }}>
            <button type="button" onClick={test} disabled={testing}>
              {testing ? "Testing…" : "Test connection"}
            </button>
            <button type="button" onClick={save} disabled={saving || saved}>
              {saving ? "Saving…" : saved ? "Saved ✓" : "Save & configure"}
            </button>
          </div>
          {testError && <p style={{ color: "crimson", margin: "0.5rem 0 0" }}>Test failed: {testError}</p>}
          {tested && (
            <div style={{ margin: "0.5rem 0 0" }}>
              <div>
                Device: <HealthBadge status={tested.health.status} />
                {tested.health.detail && <span style={{ color: "#666" }}> — {tested.health.detail}</span>}
              </div>
              {tested.preconditions.ok ? (
                <div style={{ color: "#16a34a" }}>● preconditions OK</div>
              ) : (
                tested.preconditions.issues.map((i) => (
                  <div key={i.key} style={{ color: "#d97706" }}>
                    ⚠ {i.message}
                    {i.fixable && <span style={{ color: "#666" }}> (auto-fixed on save)</span>}
                  </div>
                ))
              )}
            </div>
          )}
          {/* Backend push IP — only for push-capable devices (candidates present).
              Pre-filled with the auto-pick; editable for multi-NIC hosts. */}
          {backendIps && backendIps.length > 0 && (
            <div style={{ margin: "0.5rem 0 0" }}>
              <label>
                Backend push IP{" "}
                <select value={backendIp} onChange={(e) => setBackendIp(e.target.value)}>
                  {!backendIps.some((c) => c.onDeviceSubnet) && (
                    <option value="" disabled>
                      Choose an address…
                    </option>
                  )}
                  {backendIps.map((c) => (
                    <option key={c.ip} value={c.ip}>
                      {c.ip} ({c.iface}){c.onDeviceSubnet ? " — on device subnet" : ""}
                    </option>
                  ))}
                </select>
              </label>
              {!backendIps.some((c) => c.onDeviceSubnet) && (
                <span style={{ marginLeft: 8, color: "#d97706" }}>
                  ⚠ no NIC on the device's subnet — the device may not reach the backend
                </span>
              )}
              <p style={{ margin: "0.25rem 0 0", color: "#666", fontSize: "0.85em" }}>
                The address this device will POST input events to.
              </p>
            </div>
          )}
          {saveError && <p style={{ color: "crimson", margin: "0.5rem 0 0" }}>Save failed: {saveError}</p>}
          {saved && <p style={{ color: "#16a34a", margin: "0.5rem 0 0" }}>Saved and configured ✓</p>}
        </div>
      )}
    </fieldset>
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ export interface DiscoveredDevice {
  health: { status: string; detail?: string };
 }
-/** Scan the LAN for devices a driver can discover (e.g. UHPPOTE). Admin-only. */
+/** Scan the LAN for devices a driver can discover. Admin-only. */
 export async function discoverDevices(driverId: string): Promise<DiscoveredDevice[]> {
  const body = await apiFetch<{ devices: DiscoveredDevice[] }>(
    `/api/setup/discover/${driverId}`,
@@ -118,13 +118,48 @@ export async function discoverDevices(driverId: string): Promise<DiscoveredDevic
  return body.devices;
 }
 export type DeviceConfig = Record<string, string | number | boolean>;
 export interface TestResult {
  health: { status: string; detail?: string };
  preconditions: {
    ok: boolean;
    issues: { key: string; message: string; fixable: boolean }[];
  };
 }
 /** Test a device config (reachability + preconditions) without saving. */
 export function testDevice(driverId: string, config: DeviceConfig): Promise<TestResult> {
  return apiFetch<TestResult>("/api/setup/test", {
    method: "POST",
    body: JSON.stringify({ driverId, config }),
  });
 }
 export interface BackendIpCandidate {
  ip: string;
  iface: string;
  onDeviceSubnet: boolean;
 }
 /** Local IPs the device could push to (on-subnet first), for the wizard to
 *  pre-fill/override. Matters on multi-NIC hosts. */
 export function fetchBackendIps(
  host: string,
 ): Promise<{ candidates: BackendIpCandidate[]; port: number }> {
  return apiFetch(`/api/setup/backend-ips?host=${encodeURIComponent(host)}`);
 }
 export interface AssignBody {
  lane: number;
  category: DeviceCategory;
  driverId: string;
-  config: Record<string, string | number | boolean>;
+  config: DeviceConfig;
  /** Backend IP the device should push to (overrides auto-pick). */
  backendIp?: string;
 }
-export function assignDevice(body: AssignBody): Promise<unknown> {
+/** Save + configure the device (preconditions, push setup), then persist. */
 export function assignDevice(body: AssignBody): Promise<{ id: string }> {
  return apiFetch("/api/setup/assign", { method: "POST", body: JSON.stringify(body) });
 }
@@ -18,8 +18,7 @@
    "lint": "tsc --noEmit"
  },
  "dependencies": {
-    "@parking/shared": "workspace:*",
+    "@parking/shared": "workspace:*"
    "uhppoted": "0.9.0"
  },
  "devDependencies": {
    "@types/node": "25.9.3",
@@ -0,0 +1,674 @@
 import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
 import { createSocket } from "node:dgram";
 import { request as httpRequest } from "node:http";
 import type {
  AccessControlDevice,
  DeviceHealth,
  HardenableDevice,
  HardenResult,
  InputDevice,
  InputEvent,
  PreconditionDevice,
  PreconditionResult,
  PushConfig,
  PushConfigurableDevice,
 } from "../interfaces.js";
 import type { AccessDriver, DeviceConfig } from "../registry.js";
 import { hostField, portField, stubLog } from "./common.js";
 // Dingtian relay+input controller driver. Backed by the "Dingtian string"
 // protocol over UDP. Implements AccessControlDevice (relay/barrier) AND the
 // optional InputDevice capability (host-readable buttons, decoupled from relays)
 // — which is what makes host-in-the-loop entry possible. See
 // wiki/entities/dingtian-relay.md and access-controller-button-flow.md.
 //
 // SAFETY: pulseOpen expresses INTENT only. It uses the device's jog/pulse
 // (momentary) so the relay self-releases; we never time a close against a
 // vehicle — anti-crush/auto-reverse is the barrier operator's firmware.
 // See wiki/concepts/barrier-not-a-door.md.
 //
 // SECURITY: unauthenticated UDP — the board must sit on an isolated VLAN
 // reachable only by the host. See wiki/concepts/network-isolation.md.
 //
 // NOTE: by default Dingtian links each input to auto-fire its relay
 // (input_link_relay). That must be DISABLED on the device for ticket-first
 // entry, else the button opens the barrier before the host can act.
 /** Send one UDP datagram and (optionally) await a single reply. */
 function udpRequest(
  host: string,
  port: number,
  payload: string,
  timeoutMs: number,
  expectReply: boolean,
 ): Promise<string | null> {
  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
    const sock = createSocket("udp4");
    let settled = false;
    const done = (err: Error | null, val: string | null) => {
      if (settled) return;
      settled = true;
      clearTimeout(timer);
      sock.close();
      err ? reject(err) : resolve(val);
    };
    const timer = setTimeout(
      () => done(expectReply ? new Error("timeout") : null, null),
      timeoutMs,
    );
    sock.on("error", (e) => done(e, null));
    sock.on("message", (m) => done(null, m.toString()));
    sock.bind(() => {
      sock.send(Buffer.from(payload), port, host, (e) => {
        if (e) done(e, null);
        else if (!expectReply) done(null, null);
      });
    });
  });
 }
 /**
 * Send a Dingtian *binary* protocol frame (UDP, default port 60000) and await
 * the reply. Used for relay control because — unlike the string protocol — the
 * binary protocol supports a password (`relay_pw`), so an attacker on a flat
 * network can't fire a relay without it. Frame verified on hardware:
 *
 *   FF AA <session> <relayCmd> <pwLo> <pwHi> <data...>
 *
 *   FF        = command "set relay"
 *   AA        = result xor (0x00 ^ 0xAA, pc→device)
 *   session   = echoed back
 *   relayCmd  = 1 write, 3 jogging, …
 *   pwLo,pwHi = relay password, 16-bit LSB-first (0 = none)
 *   data      = command-specific
 */
 function binaryUdp(
  host: string,
  port: number,
  frame: Buffer,
  timeoutMs: number,
 ): Promise<Buffer> {
  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
    const sock = createSocket("udp4");
    let settled = false;
    const done = (err: Error | null, val: Buffer | null) => {
      if (settled) return;
      settled = true;
      clearTimeout(timer);
      sock.close();
      err ? reject(err) : resolve(val!);
    };
    const timer = setTimeout(() => done(new Error("timeout"), null), timeoutMs);
    sock.on("error", (e) => done(e, null));
    sock.on("message", (m) => done(null, m));
    sock.bind(() => {
      sock.send(frame, port, host, (e) => {
        if (e) done(e, null);
      });
    });
  });
 }
 let binarySession = 0;
 /** Build a binary "write relay with jogging" frame (relay on, auto-off). */
 function jogFrame(channel: number, password: number, jogMs: number): Buffer {
  const session = binarySession++ & 0xff;
  // relay index + on/off: bit0 = on, bits1..7 = (channel-1)
  const relayByte = (((channel - 1) & 0x7f) << 1) | 0x01;
  const units = Math.max(1, Math.round(jogMs / 100)); // 100ms units
  return Buffer.from([
    0xff,
    0xaa,
    session,
    0x03, // jogging
    password & 0xff,
    (password >> 8) & 0xff,
    relayByte,
    units & 0xff,
    (units >> 8) & 0xff,
  ]);
 }
 /** Build a binary "write relay" frame (latch on/off via mask+set). */
 function writeRelayFrame(channel: number, on: boolean, password: number, channels: number): Buffer {
  const session = binarySession++ & 0xff;
  const bit = 1 << (channel - 1);
  const mask = bit; // only this channel updates
  const set = on ? bit : 0;
  // 4ch: mask + set are 1 byte each (bit0→relay1).
  const widthBytes = channels <= 8 ? 1 : channels <= 16 ? 2 : channels <= 24 ? 3 : 4;
  const maskBuf = Buffer.alloc(widthBytes);
  const setBuf = Buffer.alloc(widthBytes);
  maskBuf.writeUIntLE(mask, 0, widthBytes);
  setBuf.writeUIntLE(set, 0, widthBytes);
  return Buffer.concat([
    Buffer.from([0xff, 0xaa, session, 0x01, password & 0xff, (password >> 8) & 0xff]),
    maskBuf,
    setBuf,
  ]);
 }
 const rand16 = () => randomBytes(2).readUInt16BE(0);
 /** GET a CGI path on the device's HTTP server and return the raw response text. */
 function cgiGet(host: string, httpPort: number, path: string, timeoutMs: number): Promise<string> {
  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
    const req = httpRequest({ host, port: httpPort, path, method: "GET", timeout: timeoutMs }, (res) => {
      let data = "";
      res.on("data", (c) => (data += c));
      res.on("end", () => resolve(data));
    });
    req.on("error", reject);
    req.on("timeout", () => req.destroy(new Error("cgi timeout")));
    req.end();
  });
 }
 interface DingtianStatus {
  relays: boolean[]; // true = on
  inputs: boolean[]; // true = active (after resting-level normalisation)
  channels: number;
 }
 const INPUT_LINK_ISSUE = {
  key: "input_link_relay",
  message:
    "input_link_relay is ENABLED — a button press will auto-fire its relay (opening the barrier before the host can act). Disable it for ticket-first entry.",
  fixable: true,
 } as const;
 /** GET/POST the device's JSON config API (HTTP; port is configurable). */
 function configApi(
  host: string,
  httpPort: number,
  path: string,
  method: "GET" | "POST",
  body: string | null,
  timeoutMs: number,
  sessionId?: number, // device session check: sent as Cookie: session=<id>
 ): Promise<string> {
  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
    // The device's embedded HTTP server does NOT support chunked request bodies.
    // Node uses chunked encoding when Content-Length is absent, so the device
    // silently ignores the body (POST returns {"status":0} but nothing changes).
    // Always set Content-Length explicitly.
    const headers: Record<string, string | number> = {};
    if (body) {
      headers["content-type"] = "application/json";
      headers["content-length"] = Buffer.byteLength(body);
    }
    // When the device's HTTP session check is enabled, the CGI API requires a
    // matching session cookie (a numeric magic id). See programming manual §3.8.
    if (sessionId) headers["cookie"] = `session=${sessionId}`;
    const req = httpRequest(
      {
        host,
        port: httpPort,
        path,
        method,
        timeout: timeoutMs,
        headers: Object.keys(headers).length ? headers : undefined,
      },
      (res) => {
        let data = "";
        res.on("data", (c) => (data += c));
        res.on("end", () => resolve(data));
      },
    );
    req.on("error", reject);
    req.on("timeout", () => req.destroy(new Error("config api timeout")));
    if (body) req.write(body);
    req.end();
  });
 }
 class DingtianController
  implements
    AccessControlDevice,
    InputDevice,
    PreconditionDevice,
    PushConfigurableDevice,
    HardenableDevice
 {
  readonly driverId = "dingtian";
  readonly #host: string;
  readonly #port: number; // string protocol (status read) — UDP 60001
  readonly #binaryPort: number; // binary protocol (relay control) — UDP 60000
  readonly #relayPassword: number; // relay_pw (0 = none)
  readonly #sessionId: number; // device CGI session id (0 = session check off)
  readonly #httpPort: number;
  readonly #timeout: number;
  readonly #channels: number;
  /** Input level at rest; an input is "active" when it differs from this. */
  readonly #restingHigh: boolean;
  readonly #pulseMs: number;
  /** Current device web-UI login (gates the browser UI only, not the CGI API). */
  readonly #webUser: string;
  readonly #webPassword: string;
  #poll: ReturnType<typeof setInterval> | null = null;
  #last: boolean[] | null = null;
  #subs = new Set<(e: InputEvent) => void>();
  constructor(config: DeviceConfig) {
    this.#host = String(config.host);
    this.#port = config.port ? Number(config.port) : 60001;
    this.#binaryPort = config.binaryPort ? Number(config.binaryPort) : 60000;
    this.#relayPassword = config.relayPassword ? Number(config.relayPassword) : 0;
    this.#sessionId = config.sessionId ? Number(config.sessionId) : 0;
    this.#httpPort = config.httpPort ? Number(config.httpPort) : 80;
    this.#timeout = config.timeoutMs ? Number(config.timeoutMs) : 2000;
    this.#channels = config.channels ? Number(config.channels) : 4;
    // This unit idles with inputs HIGH (status "1111"); a press pulls LOW.
    this.#restingHigh = config.inputRestingHigh !== false;
    this.#pulseMs = config.pulseMs ? Number(config.pulseMs) : 500;
    // The device ships with admin/admin. After harden() rotates it, the new
    // creds are stored back in config so a re-created driver knows the current
    // login (needed to rotate again — userset.cgi checks the old credentials).
    this.#webUser = config.webUser ? String(config.webUser) : "admin";
    this.#webPassword = config.webPassword ? String(config.webPassword) : "admin";
  }
  async connect(): Promise<void> {
    await this.healthCheck();
  }
  async disconnect(): Promise<void> {
    this.#stopPolling();
    stubLog(this.driverId, "disconnect");
  }
  async healthCheck(): Promise<DeviceHealth> {
    try {
      await this.#status();
      return { status: "ready" };
    } catch (err) {
      return { status: "offline", detail: (err as Error).message };
    }
  }
  // --- relay / barrier ----------------------------------------------------
  /**
   * Pulse a relay open (momentary). Channel is 1-based. Intent only — the device
   * jogs the relay ON then auto-releases after pulseMs, so we never time a close
   * against a vehicle. Uses the binary protocol + relay password (authenticated).
   */
  async pulseOpen(doorId: number): Promise<void> {
    this.#assertChannel(doorId);
    const frame = jogFrame(doorId, this.#relayPassword, this.#pulseMs);
    await binaryUdp(this.#host, this.#binaryPort, frame, this.#timeout);
  }
  /** Latch a relay on/off (e.g. for a held-open mode). Channel is 1-based. */
  async setRelay(doorId: number, on: boolean): Promise<void> {
    this.#assertChannel(doorId);
    const frame = writeRelayFrame(doorId, on, this.#relayPassword, this.#channels);
    await binaryUdp(this.#host, this.#binaryPort, frame, this.#timeout);
  }
  async getDoorStatus(doorId: number): Promise<"open" | "closed"> {
    this.#assertChannel(doorId);
    const { relays } = await this.#status();
    // "open" here = relay energised. Physical door state needs a sensor input.
    return relays[doorId - 1] ? "open" : "closed";
  }
  // --- inputs (buttons) ---------------------------------------------------
  async readInputs(): Promise<boolean[]> {
    return (await this.#status()).inputs;
  }
  onInput(cb: (event: InputEvent) => void): () => void {
    this.#subs.add(cb);
    this.#startPolling();
    return () => {
      this.#subs.delete(cb);
      if (this.#subs.size === 0) this.#stopPolling();
    };
  }
  // --- preconditions ------------------------------------------------------
  /**
   * Parking requires `input_link_relay` DISABLED: otherwise a button press
   * auto-fires its relay, opening the barrier before the host can act (print a
   * ticket / decide). This is the configurable version of the UHPPOTE blocker.
   */
  async checkPreconditions(): Promise<PreconditionResult> {
    let cfg: Record<string, unknown>;
    try {
      cfg = await this.#readConfig();
    } catch (err) {
      return {
        ok: false,
        issues: [
          {
            key: "config_unreachable",
            message: `could not read device config: ${(err as Error).message}`,
            fixable: false,
          },
        ],
      };
    }
    return { ok: this.#linkDisabled(cfg), issues: this.#linkDisabled(cfg) ? [] : [INPUT_LINK_ISSUE] };
  }
  async fixPreconditions(): Promise<PreconditionResult> {
    const cfg = await this.#readConfig();
    if (this.#linkDisabled(cfg)) return { ok: true, issues: [] };
    // Disable the master flag AND clear the per-input action maps.
    const ilr = cfg.input_link_relay as Record<string, unknown>;
    ilr.input_link_relay = 0;
    if (Array.isArray(ilr.on_action_on)) {
      ilr.on_action_on = (ilr.on_action_on as unknown[]).map(() => []);
    }
    await this.#writeConfig(cfg, (after) => this.#linkDisabled(after));
    return this.checkPreconditions();
  }
  /**
   * Configure the device to HTTP-push input (button) events to our backend —
   * the "Input Link URL" feature. Each input N calls `${pathBase}/<N>/on` (and
   * `/off`) on host:port via GET, authenticated with **HTTP Digest** (the device
   * does Digest but not HTTPS-to-self-signed; both verified on hardware). The
   * password is never sent on the wire and the secret is not in the URL.
   * Enables the feature, plain HTTP, active-LOW. Replaces polling.
   */
  async configureInputPush(opts: PushConfig): Promise<void> {
    const cfg = await this.#readConfig();
    const ilu = cfg.input_link_url as Record<string, unknown>;
    const n = Number((ilu.cnt as number) ?? this.#channels);
    const fill = (v: unknown) => Array.from({ length: n }, () => v);
    ilu.en = 1;
    ilu.active_level = fill(0); // active-LOW (matches this board's wiring)
    ilu.tls = fill(0); // plain HTTP (device can't do HTTPS to self-signed)
    ilu.auth = fill(2); // 2 = Digest
    ilu.server = fill(opts.host);
    ilu.port = fill(opts.port);
    ilu.user = fill(opts.auth.user);
    ilu.pass = fill(opts.auth.password);
    ilu.on_method = fill(0); // GET
    ilu.off_method = fill(0);
    ilu.on_path = Array.from({ length: n }, (_, i) => `${opts.pathBase}/${i + 1}/on`);
    ilu.off_path = Array.from({ length: n }, (_, i) => `${opts.pathBase}/${i + 1}/off`);
    ilu.on_body = fill("");
    ilu.off_body = fill("");
    const wantPath = `${opts.pathBase}/1/on`;
    await this.#writeConfig(cfg, (after) => {
      const a = after.input_link_url as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
      const paths = a?.on_path as string[] | undefined;
      const pass = a?.pass as string[] | undefined;
      // Verify both the path and the (secret) password landed — the password is
      // what the backend's Digest check depends on.
      return (
        a?.en === 1 &&
        Array.isArray(paths) &&
        paths[0] === wantPath &&
        Array.isArray(pass) &&
        pass[0] === opts.auth.password
      );
    });
  }
  // --- hardening ----------------------------------------------------------
  /**
   * Lock the device down for a flat (no-VLAN) network:
   *  - set a random relay password (`relay_pw`) so binary relay commands need it,
   *  - disable unused protocol channels (rs485/can/tcp×2/mqtt) — keep only UDP1
   *    binary (relay control) and UDP2 string (status read).
   * Returns the relay password for the backend to persist (required to keep
   * commanding the device afterwards).
   *
   * NOTE: deliberately does NOT touch the device's HTTP CGI session check
   * (`session_en`). On this firmware enabling it makes the config-read API drop
   * connections, locking us out of the very API we depend on (verified the hard
   * way — required a factory reset). So we leave the config API as-is and rely on
   * relay_pw + fewer open channels + the signed event log.
   *
   * All are plaintext over HTTP/UDP on a flat network → defence-in-depth, not a
   * boundary; the signed event log is the real guarantee. See device-input-flow.
   */
  async harden(): Promise<HardenResult> {
    const cfg = await this.#readConfig();
    const rc = cfg.relay_connect as Record<string, unknown>;
    const relayPassword = 1 + (rand16() % 9999); // 1..9999 (0 = none)
    rc.relay_pw = relayPassword;
    // Keep UDP1=Binary (p:1) for relay control, UDP2=String (p:0) for status.
    // Disable everything else (p:255 = None).
    (rc.udp1 as Record<string, unknown>).p = 1;
    (rc.udp2 as Record<string, unknown>).p = 0;
    (rc.rs485 as Record<string, unknown>).p = 255;
    (rc.can as Record<string, unknown>).p = 255;
    (rc.tcpc as Record<string, unknown>).p = 255;
    (rc.tcps as Record<string, unknown>).p = 255;
    (rc.mqtt as Record<string, unknown>).p = 255;
    await this.#writeConfig(cfg, (after) => {
      const a = after.relay_connect as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
      return (
        a?.relay_pw === relayPassword &&
        (a?.rs485 as Record<string, unknown> | undefined)?.p === 255 &&
        (a?.mqtt as Record<string, unknown> | undefined)?.p === 255
      );
    });
    const applied = [
      "set relay password",
      "disabled rs485/can/tcp/mqtt channels (kept UDP binary + string)",
    ];
    const secrets: Record<string, string | number> = { relayPassword };
    // Rotate the default admin/admin web login. NOTE: cosmetic — this device's
    // CGI API needs NO auth (config read/write + relay fire + this very call all
    // work unauthenticated), so the login only gates the interactive browser UI,
    // not the control plane. We rotate it anyway (defence-in-depth: stops a
    // casual browser reaching the settings page), but it is NOT a boundary; the
    // signed event log is. See dingtian-relay.md.
    try {
      const newPassword = await this.#rotateWebLogin();
      secrets.webUser = this.#webUser;
      secrets.webPassword = newPassword;
      applied.push("rotated the admin/admin web-UI login (cosmetic — CGI API is unauthenticated)");
    } catch (err) {
      // Don't fail the whole harden over a cosmetic step — log and continue.
      stubLog(this.driverId, `web-login rotate skipped: ${(err as Error).message}`);
    }
    return { secrets, applied };
  }
  /**
   * Rotate the device web-UI login password (keeps the username) via
   * `userset.cgi?<old_user>&<old_pass>&<new_user>&<new_pass>&`. Returns the new
   * password. The device validates the OLD credentials in the query, so we send
   * the current ones (admin/admin on first run, the stored pair afterwards).
   * Response is `&<code>&<redirect>&` with code 0 = success. Password is hex
   * (URL-safe, no escaping) and ≤31 chars (the device truncates longer).
   */
  async #rotateWebLogin(): Promise<string> {
    const newPassword = randomBytes(12).toString("hex"); // 24 hex chars
    const u = encodeURIComponent(this.#webUser);
    const oldP = encodeURIComponent(this.#webPassword);
    const path = `/userset.cgi?${u}&${oldP}&${u}&${newPassword}&`;
    const res = await cgiGet(this.#host, this.#httpPort, path, this.#timeout);
    // "&0&/&" = success; anything else (e.g. "&-5&/&" bad params / wrong old pw).
    const code = res.split("&")[1];
    if (code !== "0") {
      throw new Error(`userset.cgi rejected (response "${res.trim()}")`);
    }
    return newPassword;
  }
  // --- config api internals ----------------------------------------------
  async #readConfig(): Promise<Record<string, unknown>> {
    const raw = await configApi(this.#host, this.#httpPort, "/api/v2/config.cgi", "GET", null, this.#timeout, this.#sessionId);
    return JSON.parse(raw) as Record<string, unknown>;
  }
  /**
   * Write full config back, then WAIT for the device to apply it. The device
   * reboots on apply (~10s) and back-to-back writes onto a rebooting device are
   * silently lost — so we poll until the device is reachable again AND `verify`
   * confirms the change landed, retrying the write if needed.
   *
   * @param verify predicate over the re-read config; should return true once the
   *        intended change is present.
   */
  async #writeConfig(
    cfg: Record<string, unknown>,
    verify: (after: Record<string, unknown>) => boolean,
  ): Promise<void> {
    // The set endpoint requires `"command":"setconfig"` injected after `status`
    // (the GET payload omits it). Rebuild preserving node order, command second.
    const out: Record<string, unknown> = {};
    for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(cfg)) {
      out[k] = v;
      if (k === "status") out.command = "setconfig";
    }
    if (!("command" in out)) out.command = "setconfig";
    const payload = JSON.stringify(out);
    const sleep = (ms: number) => new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, ms));
    for (let attempt = 1; attempt <= 3; attempt++) {
      // POST. The device resets on apply, so the connection may drop — that's
      // expected, not failure.
      try {
        await configApi(this.#host, this.#httpPort, "/api/v2/config_set.cgi", "POST", payload, this.#timeout, this.#sessionId);
      } catch {
        // device likely reset on apply
      }
      // Poll for the device to come back and the change to be present.
      for (let i = 0; i < 12; i++) {
        await sleep(2000);
        try {
          if (verify(await this.#readConfig())) return; // applied
        } catch {
          // still rebooting / unreachable — keep polling
        }
      }
      // Not applied within the window — likely the POST hit a rebooting device.
      // Loop and re-POST (now that it's reachable again).
    }
    throw new Error("dingtian: config write did not apply after retries");
  }
  #linkDisabled(cfg: Record<string, unknown>): boolean {
    const ilr = cfg.input_link_relay as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
    if (!ilr) return true; // no such block → nothing to link
    const flagOff = ilr.input_link_relay === 0;
    const mapsEmpty =
      !Array.isArray(ilr.on_action_on) ||
      (ilr.on_action_on as unknown[]).every((a) => Array.isArray(a) && a.length === 0);
    return flagOff || mapsEmpty;
  }
  // --- internals ----------------------------------------------------------
  #assertChannel(ch: number): void {
    if (!Number.isInteger(ch) || ch < 1 || ch > this.#channels) {
      throw new Error(`dingtian: channel ${ch} out of range (1..${this.#channels})`);
    }
  }
  /** Query "00" → parse "0000:1111:4" into relays/inputs/channels. */
  async #status(): Promise<DingtianStatus> {
    const reply = await udpRequest(this.#host, this.#port, "00", this.#timeout, true);
    if (!reply) throw new Error("dingtian: empty status reply");
    const [relayStr, inputStr, countStr] = reply.trim().split(":");
    if (relayStr === undefined || inputStr === undefined) {
      throw new Error(`dingtian: bad status reply "${reply}"`);
    }
    const bit = (c: string) => c === "1";
    return {
      relays: [...relayStr].map(bit),
      // active = differs from the resting level (press pulls the line).
      inputs: [...inputStr].map((c) => bit(c) !== this.#restingHigh),
      channels: countStr ? Number(countStr) : this.#channels,
    };
  }
  #startPolling(): void {
    if (this.#poll) return;
    const tick = async () => {
      let inputs: boolean[];
      try {
        inputs = await this.readInputs();
      } catch {
        return; // transient; try again next tick
      }
      const prev = this.#last;
      this.#last = inputs;
      if (!prev) return; // first sample establishes a baseline, no events
      const at = new Date().toISOString();
      for (let i = 0; i < inputs.length; i++) {
        if (inputs[i] === prev[i]) continue;
        const event: InputEvent = {
          input: i + 1,
          edge: inputs[i] ? "pressed" : "released",
          at,
        };
        for (const cb of this.#subs) cb(event);
      }
    };
    // ~50ms poll: a button press is held well longer than this.
    this.#poll = setInterval(() => void tick(), 50);
  }
  #stopPolling(): void {
    if (this.#poll) {
      clearInterval(this.#poll);
      this.#poll = null;
      this.#last = null;
    }
  }
 }
 export const dingtianDriver: AccessDriver = {
  id: "dingtian",
  category: "access",
  label: "Dingtian relay controller",
  description:
    "Dingtian network relay+input board (UDP). Inputs are decoupled from relays — enables host-in-the-loop entry. Unauthenticated UDP: isolate the VLAN.",
  transports: ["udp"],
  configFields: [
    hostField,
    { ...portField(60001), required: false, help: "Dingtian string protocol UDP port — status read (default 60001)." },
    { key: "binaryPort", label: "Binary protocol port", type: "port", required: false, default: 60000, help: "Dingtian binary protocol UDP port — authenticated relay control (default 60000)." },
    { key: "httpPort", label: "HTTP config port", type: "port", required: false, default: 80, help: "Device web/config-API port (default 80)." },
    { key: "channels", label: "Channels (relays/inputs)", type: "number", required: true, default: 4 },
    {
      key: "pulseMs",
      label: "Pulse open (ms)",
      type: "number",
      required: false,
      default: 500,
      help: "Momentary relay pulse; the barrier operator owns the close.",
    },
    {
      key: "inputRestingHigh",
      label: "Inputs idle HIGH",
      type: "boolean",
      required: false,
      default: true,
      help: "This board idles inputs HIGH (status 1111); a press pulls LOW.",
    },
    { key: "timeoutMs", label: "Timeout (ms)", type: "number", required: false, default: 2000 },
    // Current device web-UI login. Defaults to admin/admin; harden() rotates the
    // password and stores the new pair back here so a re-run can rotate again.
    // (Gates only the browser UI — the CGI control plane is unauthenticated.)
    { key: "webUser", label: "Device web username", type: "string", required: false, default: "admin", help: "Device web-UI login user (default admin)." },
    { key: "webPassword", label: "Device web password", type: "secret", required: false, help: "Device web-UI login password (default admin; rotated on save)." },
  ],
  create: (c) => new DingtianController(c),
 };
@@ -1,263 +0,0 @@
 import { networkInterfaces } from "node:os";
 import uhppoted, { type Controller, type Ctx } from "uhppoted";
 import type { AccessControlDevice, DeviceHealth } from "../interfaces.js";
 import type {
  AccessDriver,
  DeviceConfig,
  DiscoveredDevice,
 } from "../registry.js";
 import { hostField, stubLog } from "./common.js";
 // `uhppoted` is CommonJS — import the default and destructure (named ESM imports
 // don't resolve off a CJS module under NodeNext).
 const { Config, getDevices, getStatus, openDoor } = uhppoted;
 // Every uhppoted call binds a UDP listener on :60001 for replies. Concurrent
 // calls collide on that port (EACCES / dropped replies → spurious timeouts), so
 // we serialize ALL controller I/O through one queue. UDP request/response is
 // fast, so serial throughput is fine for a parking host. This is why parallel
 // discovery + health checks were timing out.
 let chain: Promise<unknown> = Promise.resolve();
 function serialize<T>(fn: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {
  const run = chain.then(fn, fn);
  // keep the chain alive regardless of this call's outcome
  chain = run.then(
    () => undefined,
    () => undefined,
  );
  return run;
 }
 /**
 * Compute subnet-directed broadcast addresses (e.g. 10.0.10.255) for every
 * non-internal IPv4 interface.
 *
 * Why this matters: the uhppoted lib only enables SO_BROADCAST when the target
 * matches a *subnet-directed* broadcast of a local interface — it does NOT
 * recognise the global 255.255.255.255, so broadcasting there fails with EACCES.
 * We must broadcast to the per-interface address (e.g. 10.0.10.255) instead.
 */
 interface Iface {
  network: number[]; // ip & mask, per octet
  mask: number[];
  broadcast: string;
 }
 function localIfaces(): Iface[] {
  const out: Iface[] = [];
  for (const ifaces of Object.values(networkInterfaces())) {
    for (const i of ifaces ?? []) {
      if (i.family !== "IPv4" || i.internal) continue;
      const ip = i.address.split(".").map(Number);
      const mask = i.netmask.split(".").map(Number);
      if (ip.length !== 4 || mask.length !== 4) continue;
      out.push({
        network: ip.map((o, k) => o & mask[k]!),
        mask,
        broadcast: ip.map((o, k) => (o & mask[k]!) | (~mask[k]! & 0xff)).join("."),
      });
    }
  }
  return out;
 }
 function subnetBroadcastAddrs(): string[] {
  return localIfaces().map((i) => i.broadcast);
 }
 /** Broadcast target for discovery: explicit override, else first subnet bcast. */
 function discoveryBroadcast(): string {
  return (
    process.env.UHPPOTE_BROADCAST ?? subnetBroadcastAddrs()[0] ?? "255.255.255.255"
  );
 }
 /**
 * The subnet-directed broadcast for the interface that `host` belongs to. The
 * uhppoted Config's broadcast address governs reply routing even for unicast
 * ops, so it must match the TARGET's subnet (not just the first interface) or
 * the reply is missed → timeout.
 */
 function broadcastForHost(host: string): string {
  const ip = host.split(".").map(Number);
  if (ip.length === 4) {
    for (const i of localIfaces()) {
      if (ip.every((o, k) => (o & i.mask[k]!) === i.network[k])) return i.broadcast;
    }
  }
  return discoveryBroadcast();
 }
 // Real UHPPOTE access-control driver, backed by the official `uhppoted` lib.
 // Implements AccessControlDevice (intent-only relay — "a barrier is not a door";
 // the controller/barrier operator owns physical safety). See
 // wiki/entities/uhppote-controller.md and wiki/concepts/barrier-not-a-door.md.
 //
 // SECURITY: the UHPPOTE protocol is unauthenticated UDP (port 60000). This driver
 // assumes the controller sits on an isolated VLAN reachable only by the host.
 // See wiki/concepts/uhppote-udp-protocol.md and network-isolation.md.
 /**
 * uhppoted context broadcasting to a specific address on :60000, listening for
 * replies on :60001.
 */
 function buildCtxFor(broadcast: string, timeoutMs = 5000): Ctx {
  return {
    config: new Config(
      "parking",
      "0.0.0.0",
      `${broadcast}:60000`,
      "0.0.0.0:60001",
      timeoutMs,
      [],
      false,
    ),
    locale: "en-US",
  };
 }
 /** Default context for non-discovery ops (status/open use a unicast host). */
 function buildCtx(timeoutMs = 5000): Ctx {
  return buildCtxFor(discoveryBroadcast(), timeoutMs);
 }
 /**
 * Broadcast targets to try for discovery. An explicit UHPPOTE_BROADCAST wins;
 * otherwise every local subnet-directed broadcast (a host may have several
 * interfaces — LAN, VPN, docker — and the controller is on only one).
 */
 function discoveryBroadcasts(): string[] {
  const override = process.env.UHPPOTE_BROADCAST;
  if (override) return [override];
  const addrs = subnetBroadcastAddrs();
  return addrs.length > 0 ? addrs : ["255.255.255.255"];
 }
 class UhppoteAccessControl implements AccessControlDevice {
  readonly driverId = "uhppote";
  readonly #controller: Controller;
  readonly #ctx: Ctx;
  constructor(config: DeviceConfig) {
    const serial = Number(config.serial);
    const address = config.host ? String(config.host) : undefined;
    const protocol = config.protocol === "tcp" ? "tcp" : "udp";
    // Addressable descriptor when a host is given; otherwise rely on UDP
    // broadcast discovery by serial.
    this.#controller = address ? { id: serial, address, protocol } : serial;
    // The Config broadcast must match the target host's subnet (it governs
    // reply routing even for unicast), else replies are missed → timeout.
    const timeoutMs = config.timeoutMs ? Number(config.timeoutMs) : 5000;
    this.#ctx = address
      ? buildCtxFor(broadcastForHost(address), timeoutMs)
      : buildCtx(timeoutMs);
  }
  async connect(): Promise<void> {
    // No persistent socket to open (request/response over UDP); verify reachability.
    await this.healthCheck();
  }
  async disconnect(): Promise<void> {
    stubLog(this.driverId, "disconnect (stateless udp — nothing to close)");
  }
  async healthCheck(): Promise<DeviceHealth> {
    try {
      await serialize(() => getStatus(this.#ctx, this.#controller));
      return { status: "ready" };
    } catch (err) {
      return { status: "offline", detail: (err as Error).message };
    }
  }
  /**
   * Express intent to open a door (1–4). NEVER timed/forced closed against a
   * vehicle — auto-close/anti-crush is the barrier operator's firmware.
   */
  async pulseOpen(doorId: number): Promise<void> {
    const res = await serialize(() =>
      openDoor(this.#ctx, this.#controller, doorId),
    );
    if (!res.opened) {
      throw new Error(`uhppote: door ${doorId} not opened (deviceId ${res.deviceId})`);
    }
  }
  async getDoorStatus(): Promise<"open" | "closed"> {
    // The UHPPOTE status payload carries per-door state; without a confirmed
    // wiring of door sensors we report the safe default until the real status
    // mapping is added. (Status is fetched to prove reachability.)
    await serialize(() => getStatus(this.#ctx, this.#controller));
    return "closed";
  }
 }
 export const uhppoteDriver: AccessDriver & {
  discover(): Promise<DiscoveredDevice[]>;
 } = {
  id: "uhppote",
  category: "access",
  label: "UHPPOTE controller",
  description:
    "UHPPOTE Wiegand 26/34 network controller via the official uhppoted lib. Unauthenticated UDP — isolate the VLAN.",
  transports: ["udp", "tcp"],
  // UDP broadcast discovery (get-devices): every controller on the LAN answers
  // with its serial, IP, and firmware. Broadcasts on every local subnet (the
  // controller is on only one interface) and dedupes by serial.
  // See wiki/concepts/device-discovery.md.
  async discover(): Promise<DiscoveredDevice[]> {
    const bySerial = new Map<number, DiscoveredDevice>();
    // Serial, not parallel: each getDevices binds :60001, so concurrent scans
    // across interfaces collide (EACCES / dropped replies).
    for (const bcast of discoveryBroadcasts()) {
      let found;
      try {
        found = await serialize(() => getDevices(buildCtxFor(bcast, 3000)));
      } catch {
        continue; // a dead interface shouldn't fail the whole scan
      }
      for (const d of found) {
        bySerial.set(d.device.serialNumber, {
          id: String(d.device.serialNumber),
          label: `UHPPOTE ${d.device.serialNumber} @ ${d.device.address}`,
          config: { serial: d.device.serialNumber, host: d.device.address, protocol: "udp" },
          info: {
            address: d.device.address,
            netmask: d.device.netmask,
            gateway: d.device.gateway,
            MAC: d.device.MAC,
            firmware: d.device.version,
          },
        });
      }
    }
    return [...bySerial.values()];
  },
  configFields: [
    {
      key: "serial",
      label: "Controller serial number",
      type: "number",
      required: true,
      help: "Printed on the controller (e.g. 405419896).",
    },
    { ...hostField, required: false, help: "Optional: target a specific IP instead of UDP broadcast. Isolated VLAN only." },
    {
      key: "protocol",
      label: "Protocol",
      type: "select",
      required: false,
      default: "udp",
      options: [
        { value: "udp", label: "UDP (default)" },
        { value: "tcp", label: "TCP (newer firmware)" },
      ],
    },
    { key: "doors", label: "Door count", type: "number", required: true, default: 4 },
    { key: "timeoutMs", label: "Timeout (ms)", type: "number", required: false, default: 5000 },
  ],
  create: (c) => new UhppoteAccessControl(c),
 };
@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
 import type { AccessControlDevice, DeviceHealth } from "../interfaces.js";
 import type { AccessDriver, DeviceConfig } from "../registry.js";
 import { hostField, portField, stubLog } from "./common.js";
 // Access-control drivers. Each implements AccessControlDevice (intent-only relay
 // — "a barrier is not a door"). STUBS: connect/log only, no real protocol yet.
 class StubAccessControl implements AccessControlDevice {
  constructor(
    readonly driverId: string,
    protected readonly config: DeviceConfig,
  ) {}
  async connect(): Promise<void> {
    stubLog(this.driverId, `connect ${this.config.host}:${this.config.port}`);
  }
  async disconnect(): Promise<void> {
    stubLog(this.driverId, "disconnect");
  }
  async healthCheck(): Promise<DeviceHealth> {
    return { status: "ready", detail: "stub" };
  }
  async pulseOpen(doorId: number): Promise<void> {
    // Intent only — never times/forces a close against a vehicle.
    stubLog(this.driverId, `pulseOpen door=${doorId}`);
  }
  async getDoorStatus(): Promise<"open" | "closed"> {
    return "closed";
  }
 }
 export const zktecoDriver: AccessDriver = {
  id: "zkteco",
  category: "access",
  label: "ZKTeco controller",
  description: "ZKTeco network access controller (TCP/IP). Reader + relay.",
  transports: ["tcp-ip"],
  configFields: [hostField, portField(4370), { key: "doors", label: "Door count", type: "number", required: true, default: 4 }],
  create: (c) => new StubAccessControl("zkteco", c),
 };
 export const esp32RelayDriver: AccessDriver = {
  id: "esp32-relay",
  category: "access",
  label: "ESP32 relay controller",
  description: "Simple ESP32-based relay controller over the network.",
  transports: ["tcp-ip"],
  configFields: [hostField, portField(80), { key: "doors", label: "Relay channels", type: "number", required: true, default: 1 }],
  create: (c) => new StubAccessControl("esp32-relay", c),
 };
@@ -2,8 +2,7 @@
 // module wires the catalog. Add a new device by registering it here.
 import { registry } from "../registry.js";
-import { esp32RelayDriver, zktecoDriver } from "./access.js";
+import { dingtianDriver } from "./access-dingtian.js";
 import { uhppoteDriver } from "./access-uhppote.js";
 import { dahuaDriver, hikvisionDriver } from "./camera.js";
 import { tcpipReaderDriver, wiegandReaderDriver } from "./reader.js";
@@ -13,9 +12,7 @@ let registered = false;
 export function registerBuiltinDrivers(): void {
  if (registered) return;
  registered = true;
-  registry.register(uhppoteDriver);
+  registry.register(dingtianDriver);
  registry.register(zktecoDriver);
  registry.register(esp32RelayDriver);
  registry.register(wiegandReaderDriver);
  registry.register(tcpipReaderDriver);
  registry.register(hikvisionDriver);
@@ -23,9 +20,7 @@ export function registerBuiltinDrivers(): void {
 }
 export {
-  uhppoteDriver,
+  dingtianDriver,
  zktecoDriver,
  esp32RelayDriver,
  wiegandReaderDriver,
  tcpipReaderDriver,
  hikvisionDriver,
@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
 // Minimal ambient types for the `uhppoted` CommonJS module (no bundled types).
 // Only the surface we use; extend as we adopt more of the API.
 // Upstream: https://github.com/uhppoted/uhppoted-lib-nodejs
 declare module "uhppoted" {
  export class Config {
    constructor(
      name?: string,
      bindAddr?: string,
      broadcastAddr?: string,
      listenAddr?: string,
      timeout?: number,
      controllers?: unknown[],
      debug?: boolean,
    );
  }
  /** Either a bare controller serial, or an addressable descriptor. */
  export type Controller =
    | number
    | { id: number; address?: string; protocol?: "udp" | "tcp" };
  export interface Ctx {
    config: Config;
    locale?: string;
  }
  export interface DiscoveredController {
    deviceId: number;
    device: {
      serialNumber: number;
      address: string;
      netmask: string;
      gateway: string;
      MAC: string;
      version: string;
      date: string;
    };
  }
  /** UDP broadcast discovery — returns every controller answering on the LAN. */
  export function getDevices(ctx: Ctx): Promise<DiscoveredController[]>;
  export function openDoor(
    ctx: Ctx,
    controller: Controller,
    door: number,
  ): Promise<{ deviceId: number; opened: boolean }>;
  export function getStatus(
    ctx: Ctx,
    controller: Controller,
  ): Promise<Record<string, unknown>>;
  export function getEvent(
    ctx: Ctx,
    controller: Controller,
    index: number,
  ): Promise<Record<string, unknown>>;
  export function getEventIndex(
    ctx: Ctx,
    controller: Controller,
  ): Promise<{ deviceId: number; index: number }>;
  export function setListener(
    ctx: Ctx,
    controller: Controller,
    address: string,
    port: number,
  ): Promise<unknown>;
  // CommonJS default export (module.exports = { ... }). Destructure from this.
  const uhppoted: {
    Config: typeof Config;
    getDevices: typeof getDevices;
    openDoor: typeof openDoor;
    getStatus: typeof getStatus;
    getEvent: typeof getEvent;
    getEventIndex: typeof getEventIndex;
    setListener: typeof setListener;
  };
  export default uhppoted;
 }
@@ -5,5 +5,14 @@
 export * from "./interfaces.js";
 export * from "./registry.js";
 export { registerBuiltinDrivers } from "./drivers/index.js";
 export { setDeviceLogSink, type DeviceLogSink } from "./drivers/common.js";
 // Built-in drivers: the registrar plus the individual driver objects (used by
 // hardware test scripts and any direct/programmatic device access).
 export {
  registerBuiltinDrivers,
  dingtianDriver,
  wiegandReaderDriver,
  tcpipReaderDriver,
  hikvisionDriver,
  dahuaDriver,
 } from "./drivers/index.js";
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ export type DeviceCategory = "access" | "reader" | "camera" | "printer";
 /** Lifecycle shared by every device adapter. */
 export interface Device {
-  /** Stable id of the driver that produced this instance (e.g. "zkteco"). */
+  /** Stable id of the driver that produced this instance (e.g. "dingtian"). */
  readonly driverId: string;
  connect(): Promise<void>;
  disconnect(): Promise<void>;
@@ -28,13 +28,126 @@ export interface DeviceHealth {
 }
 // --- Access control (barrier relay) --------------------------------------
-// ZKTeco, an ESP32 relay controller, UHPPOTE, etc. all implement this.
+// The Dingtian relay board (and any future relay controller) implements this.
 export interface AccessControlDevice extends Device {
  /** Express intent to open. NEVER timed/forced closed against a vehicle. */
  pulseOpen(doorId: number): Promise<void>;
  getDoorStatus(doorId: number): Promise<"open" | "closed">;
 }
 // --- Inputs (buttons / dry contacts) -------------------------------------
 // Optional capability for controllers that expose host-readable inputs SEPARATE
 // from their relays — e.g. the Dingtian board. This is what enables host-in-the-
 // loop entry: a button press is reported to the host, which decides (print a
 // ticket) before commanding the relay — instead of the input auto-firing the
 // relay. See wiki/decisions/access-controller-button-flow.md.
 export interface InputDevice {
  /** Read the current state of all inputs (true = active/pressed). */
  readInputs(): Promise<boolean[]>;
  /**
   * Subscribe to input edges. Returns an unsubscribe fn. Implementations may
   * back this with hardware push or polling — the consumer doesn't care.
   */
  onInput(cb: (event: InputEvent) => void): () => void;
 }
 export interface InputEvent {
  /** 1-based input/channel index. */
  readonly input: number;
  /** Edge: pressed = went active, released = went inactive. */
  readonly edge: "pressed" | "released";
  readonly at: string; // ISO-8601
 }
 /** Type guard: does this device expose host-readable inputs? */
 export function hasInputs(device: Device): device is Device & InputDevice {
  return (
    typeof (device as Partial<InputDevice>).readInputs === "function" &&
    typeof (device as Partial<InputDevice>).onInput === "function"
  );
 }
 // --- Preconditions (device must be configured a certain way) -------------
 // Optional capability: a device that depends on specific on-device configuration
 // to work correctly for parking can report it. Example: the Dingtian board must
 // have `input_link_relay` DISABLED, else a button press auto-fires the relay and
 // defeats host-in-the-loop entry (the same trap as the UHPPOTE, but fixable here).
 // The app does not own full device config (that's the vendor's web UI) — it only
 // checks the few preconditions our flow depends on, and optionally fixes them.
 // See wiki/decisions/access-controller-button-flow.md.
 export interface PreconditionDevice {
  checkPreconditions(): Promise<PreconditionResult>;
  /** Apply automatic fixes for fixable issues; returns the re-checked result. */
  fixPreconditions(): Promise<PreconditionResult>;
 }
 export interface PreconditionResult {
  readonly ok: boolean;
  readonly issues: PreconditionIssue[];
 }
 export interface PreconditionIssue {
  readonly key: string;
  readonly message: string;
  /** True if fixPreconditions() can correct this automatically. */
  readonly fixable: boolean;
 }
 export function hasPreconditions(
  device: Device,
 ): device is Device & PreconditionDevice {
  return typeof (device as Partial<PreconditionDevice>).checkPreconditions === "function";
 }
 // --- Push configuration (device → backend) -------------------------------
 // Optional capability: a device that can be told to HTTP-push its input/button
 // events to our backend (vs. the host polling it). The backend configures the
 // device with where to call and a shared-secret token embedded in the path.
 // The Dingtian board implements this via its "Input Link URL" feature.
 // See wiki/concepts/device-input-flow.md.
 export interface PushConfigurableDevice {
  configureInputPush(opts: PushConfig): Promise<void>;
 }
 export interface PushConfig {
  /** Backend host the device should call (our IP on the device's subnet). */
  readonly host: string;
  readonly port: number;
  /** Path prefix the device appends `/<input>/<on|off>` to,
   *  e.g. `/api/devices/dingtian/<deviceId>/input`. */
  readonly pathBase: string;
  /** HTTP Digest credentials the device authenticates the push with. */
  readonly auth: { user: string; password: string };
 }
 export function hasPushConfig(
  device: Device,
 ): device is Device & PushConfigurableDevice {
  return typeof (device as Partial<PushConfigurableDevice>).configureInputPush === "function";
 }
 // --- Hardening (lock the device down) ------------------------------------
 // Optional capability: a device that can be hardened against a flat (no-VLAN)
 // network — disable unused protocols/channels, set a relay password, and change
 // the default web/config login. Returns any secrets the backend must persist to
 // keep talking to the device. See wiki/concepts/device-input-flow.md.
 export interface HardenableDevice {
  harden(): Promise<HardenResult>;
 }
 export interface HardenResult {
  /** Secrets to persist in lane_devices so the backend can keep operating the
   *  device (relay password, new web login). The backend merges these into the
   *  stored config. */
  readonly secrets: Record<string, string | number>;
  /** Human-readable summary of what was changed (for logging/UI). */
  readonly applied: string[];
 }
 export function isHardenable(device: Device): device is Device & HardenableDevice {
  return typeof (device as Partial<HardenableDevice>).harden === "function";
 }
 // --- Readers (RF / optical; TCP-IP or Wiegand) ---------------------------
 export interface ReaderDevice extends Device {
  /** Emits when a credential is read (card number, plate, QR payload, …). */
@@ -35,9 +35,9 @@ export type DeviceConfig = Record<string, string | number | boolean>;
 * fields the admin must supply, and a factory that builds a live adapter.
 */
 export interface DeviceDriver<T extends Device = Device> {
-  readonly id: string; // stable, e.g. "zkteco", "esp32-relay", "hikvision"
+  readonly id: string; // stable, e.g. "dingtian", "hikvision"
  readonly category: DeviceCategory;
-  readonly label: string; // human name for the picker, e.g. "ZKTeco controller"
+  readonly label: string; // human name for the picker, e.g. "Dingtian relay controller"
  readonly description: string;
  /** Transports/notes surfaced in the UI, e.g. ["tcp-ip"], ["wiegand"]. */
  readonly transports: readonly string[];
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ export type PrinterDriver = DeviceDriver<PrinterDevice>;
 /** A device found on the LAN by a driver's discovery scan. */
 export interface DiscoveredDevice {
-  /** Identifier to pre-fill (e.g. UHPPOTE serial number). */
+  /** Identifier to pre-fill (e.g. a serial number). */
  readonly id: string;
  readonly label: string;
  /** Config values to auto-fill into the setup form (host, serial, …). */
@@ -63,9 +63,10 @@ export interface DiscoveredDevice {
 }
 /**
- * Optional capability: a driver that can find devices on the LAN. UHPPOTE
+ * Optional capability: a driver that can find devices on the LAN (e.g. UDP
- * implements this via the protocol's UDP broadcast discovery (get-devices);
+ * broadcast discovery). No bundled driver implements this yet — the Dingtian
- * cameras (ONVIF) and others may add it later. See wiki/concepts/device-discovery.md.
+ * board uses a fixed IP; cameras (ONVIF) or other UDP-discoverable devices may
 * add it later. See wiki/concepts/device-discovery.md.
 */
 export interface DiscoverableDriver {
  discover(): Promise<DiscoveredDevice[]>;
@@ -50,9 +50,6 @@ importers:
      fastify-plugin:
        specifier: 6.0.0
        version: 6.0.0
      uhppoted:
        specifier: 0.9.0
        version: 0.9.0
    devDependencies:
      '@types/bcrypt':
        specifier: 6.0.0
@@ -122,9 +119,6 @@ importers:
      '@parking/shared':
        specifier: workspace:*
        version: link:../shared
      uhppoted:
        specifier: 0.9.0
        version: 0.9.0
    devDependencies:
      '@types/node':
        specifier: 25.9.3
@@ -1262,9 +1256,6 @@ packages:
  once@1.4.0:
    resolution: {integrity: sha512-lNaJgI+2Q5URQBkccEKHTQOPaXdUxnZZElQTZY0MFUAuaEqe1E+Nyvgdz/aIyNi6Z9MzO5dv1H8n58/GELp3+w==}
  os@0.1.2:
    resolution: {integrity: sha512-ZoXJkvAnljwvc56MbvhtKVWmSkzV712k42Is2mA0+0KTSRakq5XXuXpjZjgAt9ctzl51ojhQWakQQpmOvXWfjQ==}
  path-scurry@2.0.2:
    resolution: {integrity: sha512-3O/iVVsJAPsOnpwWIeD+d6z/7PmqApyQePUtCndjatj/9I5LylHvt5qluFaBT3I5h3r1ejfR056c+FCv+NnNXg==}
    engines: {node: 18 || 20 || >=22}
@@ -1467,10 +1458,6 @@ packages:
    engines: {node: '>=14.17'}
    hasBin: true
  uhppoted@0.9.0:
    resolution: {integrity: sha512-7VDPNg4x31TETgMD3xp9NwVr+NvmZJ6CO8gTpyuRrdHu/UBGXw9/9kq8yiB0vR4opaUQPdvR8Gj373Ac/QWPwQ==}
    engines: {node: '>=14.18.3'}
  undici-types@7.24.6:
    resolution: {integrity: sha512-WRNW+sJgj5OBN4/0JpHFqtqzhpbnV0GuB+OozA9gCL7a993SmU+1JBZCzLNxYsbMfIeDL+lTsphD5jN5N+n0zg==}
@@ -2357,8 +2344,6 @@ snapshots:
    dependencies:
      wrappy: 1.0.2
  os@0.1.2: {}
  path-scurry@2.0.2:
    dependencies:
      lru-cache: 11.5.1
@@ -2586,10 +2571,6 @@ snapshots:
  typescript@6.0.3: {}
  uhppoted@0.9.0:
    dependencies:
      os: 0.1.2
  undici-types@7.24.6: {}
  util-deprecate@1.0.2: {}
@@ -35,9 +35,9 @@ wiki/
 - **Frontmatter** (YAML) on every wiki page:
  ```yaml
  ---
-  type: source | entity | concept | decision | overview
+  type: source | entity | concept | decision | overview | reference
  tags: [parking, ...]
-  sources: [parking-system-architecture]   # raw source slugs this draws from
+  sources: [parking-system-architecture]   # raw source slugs (omit/[] if not source-derived)
  updated: 2026-06-14
  status: settled | open      # decisions only
  ---
@@ -20,13 +20,39 @@ device carries an `id`, a `label`, a `config` blob to **auto-fill** the setup fo
 (firmware, MAC, …). The [[device-registry]]'s `isDiscoverable()` guard lets the system treat it
 as optional; the setup catalog returns a `discoverable` list of driver ids.
-## UHPPOTE discovery
+> **No current driver implements discovery.** The [[dingtian-relay]] board uses a fixed IP
 > (entered/known at setup). The capability remains for future UDP-discoverable devices (cameras
 > via ONVIF, etc.). The worked example below is the (removed) UHPPOTE driver — kept because the
 > **broadcast gotchas are transferable** to any UDP discovery we add later.
-The [[uhppote-controller]] supports discovery natively: a **UDP broadcast** (`get-devices` on
+## UHPPOTE discovery (historical example)
-`255.255.255.255:60000`) that **every controller on the LAN answers** with its serial, IP,
+
-netmask, gateway, MAC, firmware version, and date. The official `uhppoted` lib exposes this as
+The [[uhppote-controller]] supported discovery natively: a **UDP broadcast** (`get-devices` on
-`getDevices(ctx)`; the `uhppote` driver maps each result into a `DiscoveredDevice` (serial → id,
+port `60000`) that **every controller on the LAN answers** with its serial, IP, netmask, gateway,
-IP → host).
+MAC, firmware version, and date. The `uhppoted` lib exposed this as `getDevices(ctx)`; the
 (now-removed) `uhppote` driver mapped each result into a `DiscoveredDevice` (serial → id, IP →
 host). **Was verified on real hardware** (serial 225088491).
 ### Broadcast gotchas (learned the hard way — see [[wsl-dev-networking]])
 These cost real debugging time; the (removed) `uhppote` driver handled all three, and any future
 UDP-discovery driver will need to as well:
 1. **Broadcast to the *subnet-directed* address, not the global `255.255.255.255`.** The
   `uhppoted` lib only calls `setBroadcast(true)` when the target matches a **local interface's
   subnet broadcast** (e.g. `10.0.10.255`). For the global address it skips it, so the `send`
   fails with **`EACCES`**. The driver computes the subnet broadcast from `os.networkInterfaces()`.
 2. **A host with multiple interfaces must broadcast on *all* subnets.** With several NICs (LAN,
   VPN/Tailscale, docker bridges) the controller is on only one. Picking the first interface
   misses it; the driver broadcasts on every subnet and dedupes by serial.
 3. **For *unicast* ops (status / open), the lib's `Config` broadcast must match the target's
   subnet** — it governs reply routing, so a mismatched broadcast makes `getStatus` time out even
   though `openDoor` "succeeds". The driver sets the broadcast per the target host's subnet. (This
   was the health-check "offline/timeout" bug: a 5 s timeout dropped to 24 ms once fixed.)
 Also: concurrent `uhppoted` calls collide on the `:60001` reply-listener port (EACCES / dropped
 replies), so the driver **serializes** all controller I/O. Override the broadcast with
 `UHPPOTE_BROADCAST` for unusual setups.
 ## Flow
@@ -38,9 +64,9 @@ IP → host).
 ## Deployment notes
- UHPPOTE discovery is a **broadcast** — the host socket needs broadcast permission (a raw
+- Discovery is an **L2 broadcast**: the host and controller must share a layer-2 segment. Works
-  `send EACCES …:60000` means the OS blocked it). Works on the isolated device VLAN
+  on the isolated device VLAN ([[network-isolation]]). A routed/NAT'd network (e.g. WSL2 NAT mode
-  ([[network-isolation]]) where the controller and host share an L2 segment.
+  — see [[wsl-dev-networking]]) blocks it entirely.
 - Discovery shares the same unauthenticated UDP exposure as everything else UHPPOTE — another
  reason the controllers live on an isolated VLAN ([[uhppote-udp-protocol]]).
 - Cameras (Hikvision/Dahua via ONVIF/WS-Discovery) could implement the same interface later.
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
 ---
 type: concept
 tags: [parking, architecture, devices, entry-flow]
 sources: []
 updated: 2026-06-15
 ---
 # Device Input Flow (button → backend → relay)
 How a physical button press drives the entry lane. The **backend is the source of truth**: the
 device only *reports* the press; the host decides and commands the relay. This is the host-in-the-
 loop flow the [[dingtian-relay]] makes possible (and the [[uhppote-controller]] could not).
 ## The path (no polling)
 ```
 car arrives → driver presses button (input I_N, dry contact to GND)
  → device HTTP-pushes  GET …/api/devices/dingtian/<deviceId>/input/<N>/on
  → backend: emit internal device event (device-events bus)
  → backend entry flow: create + sign an entry event, print the ticket
  → backend: pulseOpen(N) over UDP  → barrier opens
  → (on release) device pushes …/input/<N>/off
 ```
 - **Push, not poll.** The device's `input_link_url` feature is configured (by the driver's
  `configureInputPush()`) to call the backend on each input edge — see [[dingtian-relay]]. The
  driver's poll path remains only as a dev/fallback aid.
 - **Per-input path** carries the input number in the URL (`…/input/3/on`), so routing needs no
  body parsing. Both edges (`on`/`off`) are sent.
 - **Internal event bus** (`device-events.ts`, a Node `EventEmitter`) decouples the HTTP/transport
  layer from business logic — drivers/pushes emit; the entry flow subscribes. Keeps the app
  [[device-adapter-pattern|device-agnostic]].
 ## Trust model (important — flat network, no VLAN)
 The site is a **flat network with no VLAN** ([[network-isolation]] is not yet enforceable here),
 so we do **not** trust the device or the network. Both directions now have defence-in-depth, but
 neither is the real boundary:
 - **Relay control (host → device)** — UDP, now via the Dingtian **binary protocol on :60000 with a
  `relay_pw`** (the only authenticated relay option; the string protocol has none). Set on the
  device + stored in `lane_devices` by the harden step (below).
 - **Input push (device → host)** — guarded by **HTTP Digest auth** + a **source-IP allowlist**.
 - **The real guarantee is the signed log:** every barrier open is a host decision, recorded as a
  signed event BEFORE the relay fires ([[append-only-event-chain]]). An out-of-band open (which a
  flat network allows) has **no matching signed event → a detectable anomaly**. Device/network
  auth is just speed bumps; both are plaintext over a sniffable network.
 - This sharpens under the [[autonomous-direction|unmanned]] roadmap: with no operator, tamper
  detection via the signed log matters more than perimeter auth.
 ## Device hardening (on assign)
 The assign/Save step configures the device end-to-end (admin never touches the device web UI):
 fix preconditions (disable `input_link_relay`) → **harden** → set up input push. The `harden`
 capability ([[device-registry|HardenableDevice]]):
 - **Sets a random `relay_pw`** (1–9999) so binary relay commands need it; stores it in
  `lane_devices` so the backend can keep commanding the relay.
 - **Disables unused protocol channels** (rs485, can, tcp×2, mqtt → `p:255`), keeping only UDP1
  binary (relay control) + UDP2 string (status read) — fewer open doors.
 > **⚠️ Lesson (the hard way):** do **NOT** enable the device's HTTP CGI session check
 > (`session_en`). On this firmware (DT-R004) it makes the config-**read** API drop connections
 > (`ECONNRESET`), locking the backend out of the very API it depends on — it required a **factory
 > reset** to recover. The harden step deliberately leaves `session_en` off. The CGI config API
 > being open is accepted as part of the flat-network reality (the signed log is the guarantee);
 > the proper fix is network isolation, not this fragile device feature.
 ## Push authentication — Digest (decided by hardware testing)
 The secret must not be in the URL (sniffable, logged) and the password must not cross the wire in
 the clear. We **empirically tested the device** to pick the strongest achievable option:
 | Option | Device result |
 | --- | --- |
 | HTTPS (self-signed) | ❌ device won't push to a self-signed cert |
 | **Digest auth** (`auth=2`) | ✅ **works** — full 401-nonce challenge/response |
 | Basic auth | ✅ works (but password base64 on the wire) |
 | URL token | rejected by design (visible in URL/logs) |
 → **HTTP Digest** (MD5, qop=auth). The password is never sent (only a nonce-keyed hash); nonces
 are **single-use** (replay resistance). Per-device credentials (`pushUser`/`pushPassword`) are
 generated by the backend on **device assign**, written to the device's `input_link_url` config,
 and stored in `lane_devices` — the admin never types a URL or secret. HTTPS would be stronger but
 the device can't do it here; Digest + the signed log is the practical answer on a flat network.
 See `apps/server/src/digest-auth.ts`.
 ## Dingtian config-write gotchas (cost a lot of debugging)
 Writing the device's config API (`/api/v2/config_set.cgi`) has two non-obvious traps — both now
 handled in the driver:
 1. **Content-Length is mandatory.** The device's embedded HTTP server does **not** accept chunked
   request bodies. Node uses chunked encoding when `Content-Length` is absent, so the device
   silently ignores the body and returns `{"status":0}` anyway — the write looks successful but
   nothing changes. Always set `Content-Length`.
 2. **The `pass` field caps at 31 chars** (longer is silently truncated → Digest mismatch). The
   generated push password is 24 hex chars (96 bits).
 3. (Also: the device reboots on apply, so the driver writes then **polls until the change is
   verified**, retrying — back-to-back writes onto a rebooting device are lost.)
 ## Status
 Input push **verified on hardware** with Digest auth (all 4 inputs, real presses authenticated, no
 failures). The entry
 flow itself (signed event + ticket print + `pulseOpen`) is the next build — see [[dingtian-relay]].
@@ -38,7 +38,8 @@ driver; **no business-logic change** — this is the [[device-adapter-pattern]]
 - Config is **validated against the driver's declared fields** before persisting.
 - Selections persist in the `lane_devices` table and drive runtime adapter construction.
 - Drivers may optionally implement **[[device-discovery]]** (`discover()`), so the admin can scan
-  the LAN instead of typing connection details — UHPPOTE does this today.
+  the LAN instead of typing connection details — no current driver uses it (the UHPPOTE did,
  before removal; the [[dingtian-relay]] uses a fixed IP).
 Cameras are modelled as **snapshot-on-event**: the host requests an image at entry/exit; it's
 stored and referenced from the signed event as an **independent record** — a fraud-control input
@@ -18,11 +18,16 @@ each device's connection config.
 1. **Read the catalog** — `GET /api/setup/catalog` returns supported drivers per category (no
   secrets, just schema) plus a `discoverable` list. The web `SetupWizard` renders a picker + the
   driver's config fields, and a **Scan** button for discoverable drivers ([[device-discovery]]).
-2. **Assign per lane** — `POST /api/setup/assign` (admin-only, role-guarded; see
+2. **Test** (optional, no save) — `POST /api/setup/test` (admin-only). Validates the config,
-   [[local-jwt-auth]]). The server validates the chosen driver + config against the registry
+   probes reachability (`healthCheck`), and reports preconditions (e.g. `input_link_relay`) —
-   before persisting to the `lane_devices` table; unknown drivers / missing required fields are
+   **without** saving or changing the device. The wizard's **Test connection** button shows a
-   rejected.
+   health badge + any precondition warnings.
-3. **Complete** — `POST /api/setup/complete` marks the single-row `setup_state`.
+3. **Save & configure** — `POST /api/setup/assign` (admin-only). Validates, then **configures the
   device**: fixes preconditions (e.g. disables `input_link_relay`) and sets up the Digest-
   authenticated input push ([[device-input-flow]]) — the admin never touches the device's own web
   UI. **Fails the save** (no DB row) if the device can't be configured, so there are no
   orphan/half-configured rows. On success persists to `lane_devices`.
 4. **Complete** — `POST /api/setup/complete` marks the single-row `setup_state`.
 ## Config granularity
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
 ---
 type: reference
 tags: [parking, dev-environment, workflow]
 sources: []
 updated: 2026-06-15
 ---
 # Local Dev Workflow
 > Dev-environment reference, not product architecture. How to run the stack locally and the
 > gotchas that have bitten us. For device testing under WSL also read [[wsl-dev-networking]].
 ## First-time setup
 ```bash
 pnpm install
 cp apps/server/.env.example apps/server/.env     # then fill in JWT_SECRET
 #   JWT_SECRET=$(openssl rand -hex 32)            # server refuses to start without a strong one
 pnpm --filter @parking/db exec drizzle-kit migrate   # create the SQLite schema
 pnpm seed:admin                                   # create the first admin (see [[local-jwt-auth]])
 ```
 `apps/server/.env` and the `*.sqlite` files are **gitignored** (local-only). Leave `NODE_ENV`
 **unset** in dev so the auth cookies aren't `Secure`-only (Vite dev is plain http).
 ## Running
 ```bash
 pnpm dev      # turbo runs both: Vite (web, :5173) + Fastify (server, :3000)
 ```
 Open `http://localhost:5173`. The Vite dev proxy forwards `/api` + `/health` to the backend, so
 the SPA and API are **same-origin** and the [[local-jwt-auth|cookie auth]] works without CORS.
 Production uses an **nginx** reverse proxy (`deploy/nginx.conf`) for the same same-origin setup.
 ## Gotchas (all fixed, recorded so they don't recur)
 - **Server dev must not be `node --experimental-strip-types src/index.ts`.** Type-stripping does
  **not** rewrite `.js` import specifiers to `.ts`, so it crashed with `ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND` and
  silently never started — the symptom was the SPA hanging for *minutes* (the Vite proxy waiting
  on a dead backend), then finally erroring. The `dev` script uses **`tsx watch`** instead.
 - **Vite proxy → `127.0.0.1`, not `localhost`.** `localhost` resolves to IPv6 `::1` first while
  the backend binds IPv4; Node's proxy can stall on the v6 attempt. Same class of "slow then
  works" hang, worse under WSL2 mirrored mode ([[wsl-dev-networking]]).
 - **`.env` must actually be loaded.** The server reads `process.env` only; the dev/start scripts
  load the file via Node's `--env-file-if-exists=.env`. An empty `JWT_SECRET=` makes the server
  fail-fast at boot.
 - **Seed into the DB the server reads.** `seed:admin` and the server must use the same
  `DATABASE_URL`; running via `pnpm seed:admin` (which loads `apps/server/.env`) keeps them aligned.
 ## Useful one-offs
 - First admin: `pnpm seed:admin` (prompts; blank username → `admin`). Non-interactive:
  `ADMIN_USER=.. ADMIN_PASS=.. pnpm seed:admin`. Reset a password: add `FORCE=1`.
 - Hardware test scripts (UHPPOTE): `apps/server/scripts/uhppote-listen.mjs` (live events),
  `uhppote-relay.mjs` (guarded door-open). See [[uhppote-controller]].
@@ -35,3 +35,9 @@ The controls that actually address insider/operator fraud are different in kind:
 The same reframing recurs at the device layer: the [[uhppote-controller]]'s real problem is
 unauthenticated commands ([[uhppote-udp-protocol]]), addressed by detection
 ([[event-log-ingestion]]) or prevention ([[esp32-custom-controller]]).
 > **Direction shift:** the system is heading toward **fully unmanned operation** — no operator, no
 > booth ([[autonomous-direction]]). That removes the booth-operator as the *primary* adversary, but
 > swaps in **unattended-machine threats** (tailgating, plate spoofing, physical tampering, forced
 > entry). The append-only signed log + reconciliation controls carry over; the emphasis moves from
 > "catch the cashier" to "trust the automated record and detect tampering."
@@ -7,6 +7,11 @@ updated: 2026-06-14
 # UHPPOTE vs. Custom ESP32 — Detection vs. Prevention
 > **Historical comparison.** Neither is the current device — the [[uhppote-controller]] was
 > **rejected** (entry-flow blocker → [[dingtian-relay]] chosen) and the [[esp32-custom-controller]]
 > is **deferred**. Kept because the **detection-vs-prevention** framing on the [[trust-boundary]]
 > fork is a durable lens that applies to any access device.
 A head-to-head on the [[trust-boundary]] fork: the off-the-shelf [[uhppote-controller]] versus
 the [[esp32-custom-controller]]. (Synthesized from [[parking-system-architecture]] §6–7.)
@@ -23,9 +28,10 @@ the [[esp32-custom-controller]]. (Synthesized from [[parking-system-architecture
 ## Bottom line
- The UHPPOTE is the **current choice**: good enough as a detection/audit layer **when only the
+- The UHPPOTE was the **detection-grade** option: good enough as a detection/audit layer **when
-  host can reach it** (isolation) and every event lands in the [[append-only-event-chain]].
+  only the host can reach it** (isolation) and every event lands in the [[append-only-event-chain]]
- The ESP32 is the **documented upgrade** when you need a control path that holds even against an
+  — but it was rejected for the entry lane (the button blocker).
-  attacker on the wire. They're **mixable per lane**.
+- The ESP32 is the **prevention-grade** option when you need a control path that holds even against
  an attacker on the wire. Deferred.
 - Both still rely on host-side integrity ([[append-only-event-chain]]) and external
  [[reconciliation]] as the ultimate anti-fraud control.
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
 ---
 type: reference
 tags: [parking, dev-environment, networking, wsl, troubleshooting]
 sources: []
 updated: 2026-06-15
 ---
 # WSL2 Dev Networking (for device testing)
 > Dev-environment note, not product architecture. Recorded because reaching real
 > hardware (the [[uhppote-controller]]) from a dev box running under **WSL2** took
 > significant debugging. If you test devices from WSL, read this first.
 ## The problem
 By default WSL2 uses **NAT networking**: the Linux VM sits on its own virtual subnet
 (e.g. `172.x`), not the Windows host's LAN. Consequences for device work:
 - **UDP broadcast (UHPPOTE discovery) cannot leave the VM** — a `get-devices` broadcast gets
  `EACCES` / never reaches a controller on the physical LAN. The device is reachable from
  *Windows* but not from *inside WSL*.
 - Even unicast to a LAN device may not route, depending on setup.
 ## The fix: mirrored networking
 Switch WSL to **mirrored** mode so it shares the Windows host's interfaces (and thus the real
 LAN). Requires **Windows 11 22H2+** and **WSL ≥ 2.0**.
 `%UserProfile%\.wslconfig` (create it; it doesn't exist by default):
 ```ini
 [wsl2]
 networkingMode=mirrored
 firewall=false            # Windows Firewall otherwise filters WSL traffic (can drop UDP replies)
 [experimental]
 hostAddressLoopback=true  # host <-> WSL over the host's IP
 ```
 Apply: in **PowerShell** `wsl --shutdown`, wait ~10 s, reopen WSL. Verify with `ip -4 addr` —
 interfaces should now show the **real LAN subnet** (e.g. `10.0.10.x`) instead of `172.x`.
 (Microsoft recommends editing via the **WSL Settings** GUI rather than the file by hand.)
 > `wsl --shutdown` kills the dev servers — restart `pnpm dev` afterward.
 ## After mirrored mode: app-level gotchas that remained
 Mirrored networking is necessary but **not sufficient** — these still bit us:
 - **Multiple interfaces.** Mirrored WSL exposes *all* host NICs (LAN, Tailscale/CGNAT `100.x`,
  docker bridges). UHPPOTE discovery must broadcast on **every** subnet, not the first one — see
  [[device-discovery]].
 - **Subnet-directed broadcast** (`10.0.10.255`, not `255.255.255.255`) — the lib won't enable
  `SO_BROADCAST` otherwise. See [[device-discovery]].
 - **`localhost` → IPv6 first.** `localhost` resolves to `::1`, but the backend binds IPv4
  (`127.0.0.1`). Node's Vite proxy can stall on the v6 attempt before falling back — point the
  proxy at `127.0.0.1` explicitly. (See [[local-dev-workflow]].)
 ## Alternative if you can't use mirrored mode
 Windows 10 / old WSL can't do mirrored mode. Options: run the **backend natively on Windows**
 (shares the LAN), or use **unicast by IP** instead of broadcast discovery (target the controller's
 known IP — the driver supports an explicit host). On the real **appliance** (a dedicated hardened
 Linux box, [[disk-os-hardening]]) none of this applies — it's bare-metal on the device VLAN
 ([[network-isolation]]).
@@ -1,17 +1,22 @@
 ---
 type: decision
-tags: [parking, hardware, access-control, blocker, open]
+tags: [parking, hardware, access-control, resolved]
 sources: [parking-system-architecture]
 updated: 2026-06-15
-status: open
+status: settled
 ---
-# Blocker: Push-Button → Auto-Open Defeats the Ticket-First Entry Flow
+# Push-Button → Auto-Open: the Ticket-First Entry Blocker (RESOLVED)
-> **Procurement-blocking finding (2026-06-15), from on-hardware testing.** The UHPPOTE and
+> **✅ RESOLVED (2026-06-15) by the [[dingtian-relay]] controller.** Its inputs are decoupled from
-> ZKTeco access controllers **on hand** cannot, as wired/configured, deliver the required entry
+> its relays (`input_link_relay` configurable off — done & verified on hardware), so a button on an
-> flow. This blocks the entry lane and needs a hardware/wiring resolution before that lane ships.
+> input reports to the host **without** firing a relay. Host-in-the-loop entry
-> Work paused here to focus on the business side. See [[entry-exit-readers]], [[trust-boundary]].
+> (`button → host → ticket → host opens relay`) now works. The original blocker (below) stands as
 > the record of why the UHPPOTE/ZKTeco units couldn't do it.
 >
 > **Original procurement-blocking finding (2026-06-15), from on-hardware testing:** the UHPPOTE and
 > ZKTeco controllers on hand could not, as wired/configured, deliver the required entry flow.
 > See [[entry-exit-readers]], [[trust-boundary]].
 ## The required flow
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
 ---
 type: decision
 tags: [parking, direction, roadmap]
 sources: []
 updated: 2026-06-15
 status: open
 ---
 # Project Direction: Toward Fully Autonomous (Unmanned)
 > Stated goal (2026-06-15): the system will evolve to **fully automatic operation — no human
 > operator, no booth at all**. Recorded because "unmanned" is an architectural force that shapes
 > several existing decisions, not just a feature.
 ## What "unmanned" changes
 - **Threat model shift.** The original primary adversary was *"the legitimate operator at the
  booth"* ([[threat-model]]). Remove the operator and that specific fraud vector (take cash → void
  the record) largely disappears — but it's replaced by **unattended-machine threats**: tailgating,
  plate spoofing/obscuring, physical tampering with a box nobody is watching, and forced entry.
  The [[append-only-event-chain]] + [[reconciliation]] controls still apply; the emphasis moves
  from "catch the cashier" to "trust the automated record + detect tampering."
 - **Host-in-the-loop entry becomes mandatory, not optional.** With no person to hand over a ticket
  or wave a car through, the machine must own the whole flow: detect arrival → issue ticket / read
  plate → open. This is exactly why the [[access-controller-button-flow]] blocker matters and why
  a controller whose input does **not** auto-fire the relay (see [[dingtian-relay]]) is required.
 - **Reliability / fail-state get more critical** ([[fail-state-safety]]). No operator to recover a
  stuck barrier or a trapped car ⇒ watchdogs, **exit-fails-open**, and hardware manual override
  stop being nice-to-haves. Unattended uptime is a hard requirement.
 - **Payment goes unmanned.** Pay-station / pay-on-foot or in-lane unmanned terminal rather than a
  booth P2PE + cash drawer — sharpens [[open-questions]] #3 toward the unmanned option (PCI scope
  still kept out of the app via a certified terminal).
 - **Identity leans on automation.** Plate recognition ([[lpr-camera]]) and permit reads become the
  primary identity sources, since there's no one to issue/inspect a paper ticket by hand.
 ## Near-term stance
 Build for the unmanned target but don't over-engineer ahead of it. Current concrete step: the
 **[[dingtian-relay]]** controller over **HTTP** (device pushes input events to the host; host
 commands relays) — see [[dingtian-vs-mqtt]] for why HTTP over a message bus for now.
 ## Open
 Lane topology, payment subsystem, and reconciliation channel ([[open-questions]]) should all be
 (re)evaluated through the **unmanned** lens before procurement.
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
 ---
 type: decision
 tags: [parking, decision, devices, transport]
 sources: []
 updated: 2026-06-15
 status: settled
 ---
 # Transport for the Relay Controller: HTTP/UDP now, MQTT parked
 **Decision (2026-06-15): use direct HTTP + UDP for the [[dingtian-relay]] controller now. MQTT is
 deliberately skipped, but kept on the radar** for when the system scales.
 ## Options the device supports
 The Dingtian relay board speaks several protocols: Dingtian string (UDP/TCP), Dingtian binary
 (UDP, optional multicast/password), **HTTP CGI**, **HTTP input-link push** (`input_link_url`),
 **Modbus** (RTU/TCP/ASCII), and **MQTT**.
 ## Why not MQTT (yet)
 - **A broker is new infrastructure** on a deliberately **single-purpose hardened appliance**
  ([[disk-os-hardening]]) — another service to install, secure, supervise, and keep alive.
 - **Extra failure mode on the critical path.** Today host→UDP→relay. MQTT inserts a broker on both
  control and event paths; if it stalls, the lane stalls — and there are 3 processes to debug, not 2.
 - **Doesn't fit [[offline-first]] for this scale.** MQTT earns its keep with *many* devices/consumers
  and intermittent links. Here it's **one host + a few devices on one isolated LAN, metres apart** —
  request/response control + a single input event, no fleet.
 - **The device's MQTT input publish is periodic** ("default every 30 s"), so it's not even a clean
  on-press event without relying on unverified on-change behaviour.
 ## Why HTTP/UDP fits
 - **Relay control:** direct **UDP string protocol** (port 60001) — `11`=relay1 on, `21`=off,
  `T1`=toggle, `11*`=jog/pulse. No deps, no broker.
 - **Input/button events:** the device's **`input_link_url`** can **HTTP POST to the host backend
  when an input fires** — real push, device calls our existing Fastify server directly, no broker.
  (Polling `00` status over UDP every ~50 ms is the self-contained fallback.)
 - Fewest moving parts; matches the local same-origin model already in use.
 ## When to revisit MQTT
 If the system grows to **many lanes / many controllers**, or multiple subsystems (LPR, payment,
 signage) all need to share events, a broker becomes a worthwhile central event bus. That aligns
 with the [[autonomous-direction|unmanned]] roadmap at multi-lane scale — re-evaluate then. Until
 then, direct HTTP/UDP wins on simplicity and reliability.
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ status: open
   later" currently leaves a disk failure as **total revenue-history loss**.
 6. **Secure-element integration.** Confirm [[atecc608]] wiring/usage on the host (event
   signing). The [[esp32-custom-controller]] command-authentication use is **deferred — not
-   being implemented for now** (access control stays on the [[uhppote-controller]] behind
+   being implemented for now** (access control is the [[dingtian-relay]] behind
   [[network-isolation]]); revisit only if prevention-grade device auth becomes a requirement.
 7. **JWT signing: symmetric vs. asymmetric key.** _(Raised by the commit security review, not the
   source doc.)_ Auth currently uses a symmetric HMAC secret (`@fastify/jwt`, see
@@ -19,10 +19,12 @@ The decisions treated as settled in the design notes. (See [[parking-system-arch
 - **Integrity:** append-only, hash-chained, [[atecc608]]-signed event log
  ([[append-only-event-chain]]); **[[reconciliation]] is the anti-fraud control**; encryption
  protects only at-rest (see [[threat-model]]).
- **Access control:** [[uhppote-controller]] for now, on an **isolated VLAN**
+- **Access control:** the **[[dingtian-relay]]** relay+input controller, on an **isolated VLAN**
-  ([[network-isolation]]); event log used as a tamper-evident audit source with host-side index
+  ([[network-isolation]]). Chosen because its **inputs are decoupled from its relays**, enabling
-  tracking ([[event-log-ingestion]]). The [[esp32-custom-controller]] is the documented
+  host-in-the-loop ticket-first entry — the resolution to [[access-controller-button-flow]].
-  prevention-grade upgrade path (the [[trust-boundary]] fork).
+  (The [[uhppote-controller]] and [[zkteco-controller]] were evaluated and **rejected** — kept as
  historical record. The [[esp32-custom-controller]] remains the documented prevention-grade
  alternative — the [[trust-boundary]] fork.)
 - **Readers:** prefer [[wiegand]]-into-controller for permit holders (autonomous); host-in-the-loop
  for [[lpr-camera|LPR]]/QR/pure-network readers; both can share a relay (see
  [[entry-exit-readers]]).
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ payment terminal is dictated by the acquiring bank. (See [[parking-system-archit
 | --- | --- | --- |
 | Barrier operator | Magnetic Autocontrol / FAAC / CAME / Nice | Owns physical safety in firmware ([[barrier-not-a-door]]) |
 | Induction loops | Feig / BEA / EMX | Safety + free-exit detection |
-| Access controller | [[uhppote-controller]] now → ZKTeco later | Reader + relay; **isolate the VLAN** ([[network-isolation]]) |
+| Access controller | [[dingtian-relay]] relay+input board | Decoupled inputs (host-in-the-loop); **isolate the VLAN** ([[network-isolation]]). ([[uhppote-controller]]/[[zkteco-controller]] rejected) |
 | Permit readers | Nedap/Kathrein UHF, or Mifare → [[wiegand]] | Hands-free, or autonomous offline decisions |
 | Casual identity | [[lpr-camera]] (Milesight, edge AI) | Plate = ticket + independent record |
 | Ticket dispenser | Custom VKP80 | Parking-grade thermal/ESC-POS |
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
 ---
 type: entity
 tags: [parking, hardware, access-control, relay]
 sources: []
 updated: 2026-06-14
 ---
 # Dingtian Relay Controller
 A network **relay + input** board (the unit on hand is the **4-channel** variant: 4 relays + 4
 inputs). Chosen to drive the entry/exit lane because — unlike the [[uhppote-controller]] — its
 **inputs are independent of its relays**, which solves the [[access-controller-button-flow]]
 blocker (a button on an input does not auto-open a relay; the host decides).
 SDK: `dingtian/4ch/sdk_v2_0_0/` (programming manual, examples). MIT-compatible use; no vendor
 runtime needed.
 ## ⚠️ The one gotcha: `input_link_relay`
 By **default the device links each input to auto-fire its matching relay** (`input_link_relay: 1`,
 `on_action_on: [[0],[1],…]` in the config) — i.e. the *same* auto-open problem as the UHPPOTE.
 The difference: **it is configurable.** Set `input_link_relay: 0` (or clear the action mappings)
 so an input only *reports* and the host commands the relay. **This config step is mandatory** for
 the ticket-first entry flow. See [[autonomous-direction]].
 ## Protocol (Dingtian string — what we use)
 Transport options: UDP/TCP string, UDP binary, HTTP CGI, Modbus, MQTT. We use **HTTP + UDP** —
 see [[dingtian-vs-mqtt]].
 - **Relay control — UDP *binary*, port 60000 (authenticated):** the driver's `pulseOpen` sends a
  binary "write relay with jogging" frame carrying the `relay_pw` (the only relay option with a
  password). Frame (verified on hardware):
  `FF AA <session> 03 <pwLo> <pwHi> <relayByte> <jogLo> <jogHi>` — relayByte bit0=on, bits1-7=
  channel-1; jog is 100 ms units, LSB-first; password 16-bit LSB-first (0 = none). The relay jogs
  ON then auto-releases, so we never time a close ([[barrier-not-a-door]]). *(The simpler string
  protocol — `1`+ch on, `2`+ch off, `11*` jog — works too but has no auth; we use it only for the
  read-only status query.)*
 - **Status / inputs — send `00`** → `「relays」:「inputs」:「count」`, e.g. **`0000:1111:4`** (4ch:
  relays off, inputs high). `0` = OFF/Low, `1` = ON/High. Poll-based.
 - **Input push — `input_link_url`:** device **HTTP POSTs to a host URL on input change** — the
  push path for button events without a broker.
 - **Discovery:** UDP multicast `224.0.2.11:60000`, send `\x05\xAA` (devices reply). Defaults:
  IP `192.168.1.100`, UDP `60000` (binary) / `60001` (string).
 - Binary protocol (port 60000) adds optional **password** + multicast; bitmask relay/input maps.
 ## Driver & config API
 The `dingtian` driver ([[device-registry]]) implements three capabilities:
 `AccessControlDevice` (relay pulse/latch over UDP), `InputDevice` (read inputs + poll-based
 press/release events ~50 ms), and `PreconditionDevice` (below). Config fields include a separate
 **`httpPort`** — the device's web/config API is on a configurable HTTP port (default **80**),
 distinct from the UDP control port 60001.
 ### Precondition: input_link_relay must be OFF
 The driver reads the device's JSON config (`GET /api/v2/config.cgi`) and **checks
 `input_link_relay`**; if enabled it reports a fixable issue, and `fixPreconditions()` writes the
 correction (`POST /api/v2/config_set.cgi`) — setting the flag to 0 and clearing `on_action_on`,
 preserving everything else (network, etc.). This is the generic [[device-registry|precondition]]
 capability: the app doesn't own full device config (that's the vendor web UI), only the few
 settings our flow depends on.
 > **Write gotcha (cost real debugging):** the GET config payload **omits** a `"command"` field, but
 > the set endpoint **requires `"command":"setconfig"`** injected right after `"status"`. Without it
 > the POST returns/looks like success but silently does nothing (and the device may reset). With it,
 > POST returns `{"status":0}` and the change sticks. JSON node order must be preserved.
 ## Input push (no polling) — the chosen architecture
 The device **pushes** button events to the backend; the backend decides. **No polling.** The
 driver's `configureInputPush()` writes the device's `input_link_url` config to point each input at
 the backend: input N HTTP-GETs `…/api/devices/dingtian/<deviceId>/input/<N>/on` (and `/off`) on
 press/release. The backend ([[fastify]] route `routes/devices.ts`) translates each push into an
 internal device event ([[device-input-flow]]); the entry flow then prints a ticket and commands
 the relay via UDP. See [[device-input-flow]] for the full path + trust model.
 > The input-poll path in the driver (`onInput`) remains as a dev/fallback aid, but **push is the
 > real path** — lower latency, and it can be authenticated (the device supports Basic/Digest +
 > HTTPS on the push), unlike the open UDP control direction.
 ## Hardening (`harden()`) — and why HTTP auth is not a boundary here
 On assign the driver runs `harden()` (the [[device-registry|HardenableDevice]] capability):
 1. **`relay_pw`** — set a random relay password so binary relay commands (UDP 60000) need it.
 2. **Disable unused channels** — set `p:255` on rs485/can/tcp×2/mqtt; keep only UDP1 binary
   (relay control) + UDP2 string (status read).
 3. **Rotate the `admin`/`admin` web login** — `GET /userset.cgi?<old_u>&<old_p>&<new_u>&<new_p>&`
   (response `&0&…&` = success, verified on hardware). The new password is stored back in
   config (`webUser`/`webPassword`) so a re-run can rotate again (the device checks the *old*
   creds). This step is **best-effort** — a failure logs and does not fail the assign.
 > ⚠️ **The device CGI API is UNAUTHENTICATED.** Verified on hardware: `GET /api/v2/config.cgi`,
 > `/`, and even `/userset.cgi` all return **200 with no credentials**. The `admin`/`admin` login
 > gates only the interactive **browser UI** — the CGI control plane (read/write full config, fire
 > relays, change the password) bypasses it entirely. The `http` config block has **no** setting to
 > require Basic/Digest on inbound requests; the only inbound gate is `session_en`, which **bricks
 > the config-read API on this firmware** (the factory-reset incident — *do not enable it*). So
 > **rotating the login is cosmetic** (stops a casual browser reaching settings); it is **not** a
 > boundary. On this flat, no-VLAN network the device control plane is effectively open — the
 > **signed event log is the real anti-fraud guarantee**. See [[device-input-flow]].
 > ⚠️ **`session_en` must stay OFF.** Enabling the HTTP CGI session check makes the config-read API
 > drop connections (ECONNRESET), locking out the API the driver depends on — recoverable only by
 > factory reset. `harden()` deliberately never touches it.
 ## Status — VERIFIED on hardware (DT-R004, sw V3.1.5461A, 10.0.10.172)
 - ✅ status read (`0000:1111:4`), relay pulse, input press/release events (active-LOW, idle HIGH).
 - ✅ **`input_link_relay` disabled via the driver** → pressing an input reports the event and
  **fires NO relay** (`0000` after presses). The [[access-controller-button-flow]] blocker is
  **solved**.
 - ✅ **Input HTTP-push end to end** — configured the device via `configureInputPush()`, then real
  button presses (all 4 inputs) **pushed to the backend** (`/input/N/on` + `/off` per press,
  source = the device IP). No polling. Host-in-the-loop entry (`button → backend → ticket →
  backend opens relay`) is real.
 - ✅ **Web-login rotation** — `userset.cgi` rotates `admin`/`admin` (response `&0&/&`; wrong old
  password → `&2&/&`). Confirmed the device validates the old creds. **Also confirmed the CGI API
  needs NO auth** (config dump + `userset.cgi` return 200 unauthenticated) → rotation is cosmetic.
 - ⬜ Next: wire the actual entry flow (input event → signed event + print ticket → `pulseOpen`).
@@ -1,33 +1,37 @@
 ---
 type: entity
-tags: [parking, hardware, access-control, current-choice]
+tags: [parking, hardware, access-control, rejected, historical]
 sources: [parking-system-architecture]
 updated: 2026-06-15
 ---
-# UHPPOTE Controller (current choice)
+# UHPPOTE Controller (rejected — historical)
-The starting access-control hardware: a **UHPPOTE Wiegand 26/34 network controller (4-door)** —
+> **❌ NOT USED. Replaced by the [[dingtian-relay]] controller** (and its driver/test code
-a cheap reader-plus-relay frontend, acceptable **provided you understand its limits**. The plan
+> removed). Kept as the record of *why* — its firmware-fixed push-button blocker
-is UHPPOTE now → ZKTeco later (see [[bom]]). (See [[parking-system-architecture]] §6.)
+> ([[access-controller-button-flow]]) is what drove the switch to a board with decoupled inputs.
 > The transferable lessons below (network isolation, append-only log ingestion, "a barrier is not
 > a door") still apply to any access device.
-> **⚠️ Entry-flow blocker (verified on hardware):** the push-button input **auto-opens the relay
+The original starting hardware: a **UHPPOTE Wiegand 26/34 network controller (4-door)** — a cheap
-> in firmware** — there's no command to make it report-without-opening — so it **cannot** do
+reader-plus-relay frontend. (See [[parking-system-architecture]] §6.)
-> ticket-first entry (`button → print → open`). Fine as a host-**commanded relay** and for
+
-> [[wiegand]]/permit lanes, but **not** the button-driven entry lane as wired. Full detail and
+> **⚠️ The fatal limit (verified on hardware):** the push-button input **auto-opens the relay in
-> options: [[access-controller-button-flow]].
+> firmware** — no command makes it report-without-opening — so it **cannot** do ticket-first entry
 > (`button → print → open`). This is *the* reason it was dropped: full detail and the resolution in
 > [[access-controller-button-flow]].
 >
-> **Verified working on the real unit** (serial 225088491, fw 09120): host-commanded `openDoor`
+> **What was verified on the real unit** (serial 225088491, fw 09120) before retiring it:
-> on doors 1 & 2 (physically actuated, `reason="remote open door"`); button presses captured live
+> host-commanded `openDoor` on doors 1 & 2 (physically actuated, `reason="remote open door"`);
-> (`reason="push button ok"`); [[device-discovery]] scan. Test scripts: `apps/server/scripts/`.
+> button presses captured live (`reason="push button ok"`); UDP-broadcast [[device-discovery]].
 > The driver, `uhppoted` dependency, and test scripts have since been removed from the codebase.
-> **Implementation:** integrated via the official **`uhppoted`** npm package (MIT, by the
+> **Past implementation (removed):** was integrated via the official **`uhppoted`** npm package
-> `uhppoted` org — `github.com/uhppoted/uhppoted-lib-nodejs`), added to `@parking/devices` as the
+> (MIT — `github.com/uhppoted/uhppoted-lib-nodejs`) as the `uhppote` access driver. It exposed
-> `uhppote` access driver ([[device-registry]]). It exposes exactly the protocol commands this
+> exactly the protocol commands the design needs: `openDoor`, `getStatus`, and the event-log set
-> design needs: `openDoor`, `getStatus`, and the event-log set (`getEvent`, `getEventIndex`,
+> (`getEvent`, `getEventIndex`, `setEventIndex`, `recordSpecialEvents`) plus `setListener`/`listen`
-> `setEventIndex`, `recordSpecialEvents`) plus `setListener`/`listen` for auto-push — see
+> for auto-push — see [[event-log-ingestion]]. Transport defaulted to **UDP** (broadcast `…:60000`),
-> [[event-log-ingestion]]. Transport defaults to **UDP** (broadcast `…:60000`), with optional
+> with optional per-call TCP on newer firmware. The driver also implemented **[[device-discovery]]**
 > per-call TCP on newer firmware. The driver also implements **[[device-discovery]]**
 > (`getDevices` broadcast) so the setup wizard can scan for controllers. Note: the lib pulls one
 > trivial extra dep (the npm `os` shim) and uses UDP broadcast, which needs socket broadcast
 > permission on the host.
@@ -1,20 +1,24 @@
 ---
 type: entity
-tags: [parking, hardware, access-control]
+tags: [parking, hardware, access-control, rejected, historical]
 sources: [parking-system-architecture]
 updated: 2026-06-15
 ---
-# ZKTeco Controller
+# ZKTeco Controller (rejected — historical)
-A network access controller (C3 / inBio families) — the documented "UHPPOTE now → ZKTeco later"
+> **❌ NOT USED.** Was considered as the access controller; the **[[dingtian-relay]]** board was
-upgrade in the [[bom]]. A `zkteco` driver **stub** exists in the [[device-registry]] but the
+> chosen instead (decoupled inputs, already verified). The `zkteco` driver **stub** has been
-**real protocol is not implemented** (see below).
+> **removed** from the codebase. Kept for the record of the comparison below.
-## Relevance to the entry-flow blocker
+A network access controller (C3 / inBio families), originally the documented "UHPPOTE now →
 ZKTeco later" upgrade in the [[bom]].
 ## Why it was a contender (vs. UHPPOTE)
 ZKTeco is **better positioned** than the [[uhppote-controller]] for host-in-the-loop entry (the
-[[access-controller-button-flow]] blocker), but this is **unverified on our hardware**:
+[[access-controller-button-flow]] blocker) — but it was **never verified on our hardware**, and the
 Dingtian solved the problem first with less effort:
 - Its **auxiliary inputs** have **programmable linkage** (ZKBioSecurity software / PULL SDK) and
  are **not** hardwired to "open door" — so a button on an *aux* input can raise a host event
@@ -32,12 +32,13 @@ Counts: 1 source · 14 entities · 10 concepts · 2 decision records.
 - [[logto-zitadel-oidc]] — OIDC providers ruled out by offline-first.
 ## Entities — hardware & devices
- [[uhppote-controller]] — current access controller; cheap, tamper-evident, open-UDP, fixed firmware.
+- [[uhppote-controller]] — ❌ rejected/historical; firmware auto-open blocker drove the switch to Dingtian.
 - [[esp32-custom-controller]] — prevention-grade upgrade; device-level auth.
 - [[atecc608]] — secure element; non-extractable signing key (host events + controller auth).
 - [[wiegand]] — reader standard feeding the controller directly (autonomous permit-holder path).
 - [[lpr-camera]] — edge-AI plate recognition; host-side casual-identity source.
- [[zkteco-controller]] — C3/inBio controller; aux-input path may enable host-in-the-loop (driver TBD).
+- [[zkteco-controller]] — ❌ rejected/historical; aux-input path was a contender, not pursued.
 - [[dingtian-relay]] — ✅ CHOSEN access controller; decoupled inputs solve the button blocker (driver verified on hardware).
 - [[bom]] — reference bill of materials (barrier, loops, controller, readers, payment, host, network).
 ## Concepts — foundational forces
@@ -53,7 +54,8 @@ Counts: 1 source · 14 entities · 10 concepts · 2 decision records.
 - [[device-adapter-pattern]] — business logic talks to interfaces; swap hardware → new adapter.
 - [[device-registry]] — catalog of selectable drivers per category (admin-configurable).
 - [[first-run-setup]] — admin assigns devices per lane from the catalog at install.
- [[device-discovery]] — optional driver capability to scan the LAN (UHPPOTE UDP broadcast).
+- [[device-input-flow]] — button → device push → backend decides → relay; backend is source of truth.
 - [[device-discovery]] — optional driver capability to scan the LAN (no current driver uses it; UHPPOTE was the example).
 - [[barrier-not-a-door]] — never timed-close a barrier; safety lives in barrier firmware.
 - [[trust-boundary]] — the core fork: network vs. device; auditable vs. unforgeable.
 - [[fail-state-safety]] — entry fails closed, exit fails open; manual override; watchdog.
@@ -66,7 +68,13 @@ Counts: 1 source · 14 entities · 10 concepts · 2 decision records.
 - [[entry-exit-readers]] — two populations, two integration paths; both can share a relay.
 - [[uhppote-vs-esp32]] — comparison: detection vs. prevention.
 ## Dev environment (reference)
 - [[local-dev-workflow]] — running the stack locally; setup, the dev-hang gotchas, seed:admin.
 - [[wsl-dev-networking]] — WSL2 NAT blocks device broadcast; use mirrored mode + the gotchas after.
 ## Decisions
 - [[standing-decisions]] — settled decisions (stack, platform, integrity, access control, readers).
 - [[open-questions]] — 7 open items (6 procurement + JWT key choice); ESP32 device auth deferred.
- [[access-controller-button-flow]] — ⚠️ BLOCKER: UHPPOTE/ZKTeco on hand can't do ticket-first entry as wired.
+- [[access-controller-button-flow]] — ✅ RESOLVED: Dingtian decoupled inputs enable ticket-first entry (was a UHPPOTE/ZKTeco blocker).
 - [[autonomous-direction]] — roadmap: toward fully unmanned (no booth); reshapes threat model + fail-state.
 - [[dingtian-vs-mqtt]] — transport choice: direct HTTP/UDP now, MQTT parked until multi-lane scale.
@@ -83,3 +83,125 @@ admins. Same-origin via the Vite dev proxy and a new prod nginx config
 (deploy/nginx.conf). Verified end to end (curl + browser): wrong pass→401,
 login→cookies set, me→admin, assign without CSRF→403 / with→201, no cookie→401,
 session persists across reload. Updated [[local-jwt-auth]].
 ## [2026-06-15] lint+docs | Dev-environment pages (WSL networking, workflow)
 Captured hard-won dev knowledge that was only in commit messages: new
 [[wsl-dev-networking]] (WSL2 NAT blocks UDP broadcast → mirrored mode + the
 multi-interface / subnet-broadcast / IPv6-localhost gotchas that remained) and
 [[local-dev-workflow]] (setup, seed:admin, the dev-server-hang from the broken
 strip-types script → tsx, the 127.0.0.1 proxy fix, .env loading). Corrected the
 earlier "broadcast permission (EACCES)" note in [[device-discovery]] — the real
 cause was the lib not enabling SO_BROADCAST for the global 255.255.255.255;
 documented the three verified broadcast gotchas + serialization. Added a `reference`
 page type to the schema; new "Dev environment" index section.
 ## [2026-06-15] decision | Dingtian relay chosen; HTTP over MQTT; unmanned direction
 New relay+input controller on hand (Dingtian 4ch). Its inputs are decoupled from
 relays (configurable via input_link_relay) — solves the [[access-controller-button-flow]]
 blocker the UHPPOTE couldn't. Transport decision [[dingtian-vs-mqtt]]: direct
 HTTP/UDP now (UDP string for relay control on :60001; device input_link_url HTTP
 push for button events), MQTT skipped (broker = infra + failure mode + overkill at
 this scale) but kept for later multi-lane scale. Recorded the stated roadmap to
 **fully unmanned, no-booth** operation in [[autonomous-direction]] and its threat-model
 shift (operator-fraud → unattended-machine threats). New stub [[dingtian-relay]]
 with the full protocol from the SDK. Driver + on-hardware test still to build.
 ## [2026-06-15] driver+test | Dingtian driver built; button blocker RESOLVED
 Built the `dingtian` access driver (AccessControlDevice relay control + InputDevice
 poll-based button events + new PreconditionDevice capability). Verified end to end on
 real hardware (DT-R004 @ 10.0.10.172, HTTP config on :8080, UDP control :60001):
 status read, relay pulse, input press/release. Disabled `input_link_relay` via the
 driver's fixPreconditions (GET config → flag 0 + clear maps → POST config_set), then
 confirmed: pressing inputs now fires NO relay (0000 status) — host-in-the-loop entry
 works. The [[access-controller-button-flow]] blocker is RESOLVED. Gotcha recorded in
 [[dingtian-relay]]: config_set requires injecting "command":"setconfig" after "status"
 (GET omits it) or the write silently no-ops. Added httpPort config field (port 8080 ≠
 default 80). Test script apps/server/scripts/dingtian-test.mjs. Next: input HTTP-push
 endpoint + wiring input→ticket→pulseOpen.
 ## [2026-06-15] cleanup | Remove UHPPOTE/ZKTeco code; wiki → rejected/historical
 Neither UHPPOTE nor ZKTeco is used (Dingtian chosen). Removed their code:
 deleted access-uhppote.ts, uhppoted.d.ts, access.ts (zkteco/esp32 stubs), the
 three uhppote-*.mjs scripts; dropped the `uhppoted` npm dep from both packages;
 unregistered uhppote/zkteco/esp32-relay from the driver registry; updated example
 comments. Catalog access drivers now = dingtian only. Build green.
 Wiki: kept the pages but marked [[uhppote-controller]] + [[zkteco-controller]]
 rejected/historical, [[uhppote-vs-esp32]] historical; re-pointed all "current
 device" framing (standing-decisions, bom, overview, open-questions) to
 [[dingtian-relay]]; noted no current driver uses [[device-discovery]]. Transferable
 concepts (network-isolation, event-log-ingestion, barrier-not-a-door, threat-model)
 kept as-is. Links lint clean; raw source untouched (immutable).
 ## [2026-06-15] feature | Dingtian input HTTP-push → backend (no polling)
 Wired the device's "Input Link URL" feature so it HTTP-pushes button events to
 our backend — no polling. Driver `configureInputPush()` writes input_link_url
 (per-input server/port/path, en=1, active-LOW, plain HTTP) via the config API
 (reusing the #writeConfig + command:setconfig helper). New backend route
 `routes/devices.ts`: public `GET/POST /api/devices/dingtian/:deviceId/input/:n/{on,off}`
 → emits onto an internal device-events bus (device-events.ts, EventEmitter) for
 the entry flow to consume. VERIFIED on hardware: configured device, real presses
 on all 4 inputs pushed to the backend (input N on+off, source = device IP). Trust
 model recorded in [[device-input-flow]]: flat network / no VLAN → backend is source
 of truth, every open is a signed event (out-of-band open = anomaly); push endpoint
 not behind cookie auth (machine call), shared-secret available as defence-in-depth.
 Next: wire signed event + ticket print + pulseOpen.
 ## [2026-06-15] feature | Dingtian push auth via HTTP Digest (hardware-tested)
 Secured the device→backend input push. Empirically tested auth options on the
 device: HTTPS-to-self-signed FAILS, Basic works, **Digest works** → chose Digest
 (MD5, qop=auth): password never on the wire, single-use nonces. Backend
 digest-auth.ts (challenge/verify) + source-IP allowlist on the push route;
 per-device pushUser/pushPassword generated on assign, written to the device and
 stored in lane_devices (admin never types a URL/secret). Driver
 configureInputPush now sets auth=2 + creds; the assign flow auto-configures the
 device and persists the creds (net.ts derives the backend IP on the device's
 subnet). Removed the earlier URL-token approach (token in URL is sniffable/logged).
 TWO HARD-WON DEVICE BUGS fixed: (1) config_set requires an explicit Content-Length
 — the device silently ignores chunked bodies (Node's default), which masqueraded
 as "writes don't apply" all session; (2) the `pass` field caps at 31 chars →
 use a 24-char password. Driver #writeConfig now polls-until-verified (device
 reboots on apply). VERIFIED on hardware: assign auto-configures the device, then
 all 4 inputs push with Digest auth, zero failures. Recorded in [[device-input-flow]].
 ## [2026-06-15] feature | Setup wizard: Test connection + Save & configure
 Two-step device setup UX. New admin-only POST /api/setup/test (healthCheck +
 checkPreconditions, no save / no device change). The assign (Save) step now also
 fixes preconditions (disables input_link_relay) before configuring push — closing
 a gap where assigned devices could still auto-fire relays; fails the save with no
 DB row if device config fails (no orphan rows). SetupWizard wires the config
 fields → Test button (health badge + precondition warnings) → Save & configure
 button. Verified in-browser against the real device: Test shows ● ready +
 preconditions OK; Save persists the row AND writes the device's Input Link URL
 (push path matches the saved device id). Admin never logs into the device web UI.
 Updated [[first-run-setup]].
 ## [2026-06-15] feature | Device hardening: binary relay + relay_pw + disable channels
 Hardened the Dingtian relay control for the flat (no-VLAN) network. Switched
 pulseOpen from the unauthenticated string protocol (:60001) to the **binary
 protocol (:60000) with a relay password** — the only authenticated relay option
 (frame verified on hardware: FF AA <sess> 03 <pwLE> <relayByte> <jogLE>). New
 HardenableDevice capability: harden() sets a random relay_pw + disables unused
 channels (rs485/can/tcp×2/mqtt → p:255, keep UDP binary+string). Folded into the
 assign/Save flow (preconditions → harden → push); relayPassword stored in
 lane_devices. Verified end to end: assign configures + hardens the device, config
 API stays reachable, pulseOpen with the stored password fires the relay, without
 it is rejected.
 ⚠️ LESSON: enabling the device's HTTP CGI session check (session_en) on this
 firmware breaks the config-READ API (ECONNRESET) — locked us out, needed a FACTORY
 RESET to recover. harden() deliberately does NOT touch session_en. The open CGI
 API is accepted as flat-network reality; the signed log is the real guarantee.
 Recorded in [[device-input-flow]] + [[dingtian-relay]].
 ## [2026-06-14] query | Dingtian web-login rotation + CGI API is unauthenticated
 While addressing "change the device's default admin/admin", traced the device web
 UI JS (system.js) → the change-login endpoint is
 `GET /userset.cgi?<old_u>&<old_p>&<new_u>&<new_p>&` (response `&0&/&` = success,
 `&2&/&` = wrong old pw). Added a best-effort `setWebLogin`/`#rotateWebLogin` step
 to `harden()` (new pw stored back as config `webPassword`, stripped from API
 responses). KEY FINDING: the device CGI API needs NO authentication — config dump,
 config write, relay fire, and userset.cgi itself all return 200 unauthenticated
 (verified on 10.0.10.5). admin/admin gates only the browser UI; there is no
 inbound-auth setting (only session_en, which bricks the read API). So rotating the
 login is COSMETIC, not a boundary — the signed event log remains the real
 guarantee. Recorded in [[dingtian-relay]] (new Hardening section).
@@ -29,11 +29,12 @@ deployed on-site at a parking facility. Two forces shape nearly every decision:
  rest ([[disk-os-hardening]]) defends a secondary threat.
 - **Devices** sit behind a [[device-adapter-pattern]] (swap hardware → new adapter only), with
  the [[barrier-not-a-door]] safety principle keeping physical safety in barrier-operator firmware.
- **Access control** hinges on the [[trust-boundary]] fork:
+- **Access control** today is the **[[dingtian-relay]]** relay+input controller behind
-  [[uhppote-vs-esp32|detection vs. prevention]]. Today: [[uhppote-controller]] behind
+  [[network-isolation]] — chosen because its inputs are **decoupled from its relays**, enabling
-  [[network-isolation]], its open [[uhppote-udp-protocol]] contained, its log made trustworthy by
+  host-in-the-loop ticket-first entry (resolving [[access-controller-button-flow]]). The
-  [[event-log-ingestion]]. Upgrade path: the [[esp32-custom-controller]] with
+  [[uhppote-controller]] and [[zkteco-controller]] were evaluated and **rejected** (historical).
-  [[challenge-response-auth]] and [[fail-state-safety]].
+  The deeper fork is still the [[trust-boundary]] ([[uhppote-vs-esp32|detection vs. prevention]]);
  the [[esp32-custom-controller]] remains the prevention-grade alternative.
 - **Readers** split two ways ([[entry-exit-readers]]): permit holders via [[wiegand]]
  (autonomous), casual/transient via host-side [[lpr-camera]] / QR; both can share a relay.
 - A reference [[bom]] lists recommended devices.
@@ -47,6 +48,6 @@ modes (fail-open on exit)**, the **reconciliation channel**, and **backup/durabi
 - *Security-first:* [[threat-model]] → [[append-only-event-chain]] → [[reconciliation]] →
  [[uhppote-vs-esp32]].
- *Hardware-first:* [[bom]] → [[uhppote-controller]] → [[entry-exit-readers]] →
+- *Hardware-first:* [[bom]] → [[dingtian-relay]] → [[access-controller-button-flow]] →
-  [[esp32-custom-controller]].
+  [[entry-exit-readers]].
 - *Stack-first:* [[technology-stack]] → [[offline-first]] → [[device-adapter-pattern]].
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
julian	2a86e578a8	Dingtian harden(): rotate the admin/admin web login (cosmetic) harden() now rotates the device's default admin/admin web-UI login via GET /userset.cgi?<old>&<old>&<new>&<new>& (best-effort: a failure logs and doesn't fail the assign). The new password is stored back in config (webUser/webPassword) so a re-run can rotate again, and is stripped from the assign response like the push secret. Documented the load-bearing caveat: this device's CGI API is fully UNAUTHENTICATED — config read/write, relay fire, and userset.cgi itself all return 200 with no credentials (verified on hardware). admin/admin gates only the browser UI, and there's no inbound-auth setting (only session_en, which bricks the read API). So the rotation is defence-in- depth for the UI, NOT a boundary; the signed event log remains the real anti-fraud guarantee. Verified rotation end-to-end on 10.0.10.5 (success &0&, wrong-old-pw &2&); device left at admin/admin.	2026-06-14 19:00:42 +02:00
julian	382c32f2bc	Setup wizard: show + override the backend push IP (multi-NIC hosts) The backend IP baked into a push-capable device at assign time is auto-derived by subnet-matching a local NIC. That's non-deterministic when two NICs match the device subnet, and null when none does. Surface it: backendIpCandidates() lists all local IPv4 NICs (on-subnet first), GET /api/setup/backend-ips serves them, and the wizard renders an editable Backend push IP dropdown after a successful test (pre-filled with the auto-pick, warns when no NIC is on the device subnet). The chosen IP overrides the auto-pick on assign and is recorded in config.	2026-06-14 18:47:23 +02:00
julian	7fd407ac82	Harden Dingtian: authenticated binary relay + disable unused channels Lock down the relay device for the flat (no-VLAN) network. Relay control: - pulseOpen/setRelay now use the Dingtian BINARY protocol (:60000) with a relay password — the only relay option with auth (string :60001 has none, and is kept only for the read-only status query). Frame verified on hardware. HardenableDevice capability (driver harden()): - set a random relay_pw (1-9999); disable unused channels (rs485/can/tcp x2/mqtt -> p:255), keeping UDP1 binary (control) + UDP2 string (status). - write-verified (device reboots on apply). Assign/Save flow now does: fix preconditions -> harden -> set up input push; the relay password is stored in lane_devices so the runtime device can command the relay. DELIBERATELY NOT touching the device's HTTP CGI session check (session_en): enabling it on this firmware breaks the config-READ API (ECONNRESET) and locked the backend out — required a factory reset to recover. The open CGI API is accepted as flat-network reality; the signed event log is the real guarantee. Verified end to end on hardware: assign hardens + configures the device, config API stays reachable, pulseOpen with the stored password fires the relay, without it is rejected. wiki: device-input-flow + dingtian-relay updated.	2026-06-14 18:34:35 +02:00
julian	0375227a16	Setup wizard: Test connection + Save & configure Two-step device setup so the admin verifies before committing — and never touches the device's own web UI. - POST /api/setup/test (admin-only): healthCheck + checkPreconditions, no save and no device change. Returns device health + precondition issues. - assign (Save) now also runs fixPreconditions (e.g. disables input_link_relay so a button press doesn't auto-fire its relay) before configuring the input push. Closes a gap where an assigned device could still auto-open. Fails the save with no DB row if device configuration fails (no orphan/half-configured rows). - SetupWizard: wires config fields -> Test connection (health badge + precondition warnings) -> Save & configure; editing config resets prior test/save status. Verified in-browser against the real device: Test -> ● ready + preconditions OK; Save -> row persisted AND the device's Input Link URL written (push path matches the saved device id). wiki/first-run-setup updated.	2026-06-14 16:59:36 +02:00
julian	3294f188dd	Dingtian input push: HTTP Digest auth + auto-config on assign Secure the device→backend input push, and configure it automatically when the admin assigns the device (no manual URL/secret entry). Auth — HTTP Digest (chosen by hardware testing: the device can't push to a self-signed HTTPS backend, but does Digest correctly; a URL token is sniffable/ logged): - digest-auth.ts: MD5 qop=auth challenge/verify, single-use nonces (replay resistance). Password never crosses the wire. - push route: Digest + source-IP allowlist; per-device pushUser/pushPassword from lane_devices. Still not behind the SPA cookie/CSRF auth (machine call). The signed event log remains the real anti-fraud guarantee. Auto-config on assign: - setup assign: for push-capable devices, generate Digest creds, call configureInputPush to write them + the push URLs to the device, store the creds (password not echoed back). net.ts derives the backend IP on the device's subnet (BACKEND_HOST_IP override). - driver configureInputPush sets auth=2 + creds; PushConfig carries the creds. - removed the earlier URL-token approach. Two hard-won device-write bugs fixed in the driver: - configApi now sets an explicit Content-Length — the device silently ignores chunked request bodies (Node's default without Content-Length), so every config write looked successful ({"status":0}) but did nothing. This was the root cause of the session's "writes don't apply" mystery. - #writeConfig polls until the change is verified, retrying (the device reboots on apply; back-to-back writes were lost). The `pass` field caps at 31 chars, so the generated password is 24 hex chars. Verified on hardware: assign auto-configures the device; all 4 inputs then push with Digest auth, zero failures. wiki/device-input-flow updated.	2026-06-14 16:39:08 +02:00
julian	23919164ee	Dingtian input HTTP-push to backend (no polling) The device pushes button events to the backend via its Input Link URL feature; the backend decides. No polling — the chosen entry architecture. packages/devices: - dingtian driver: configureInputPush() writes the device's input_link_url config (per-input server/port/path, en=1, active-LOW, plain HTTP) so each input HTTP-GETs the backend on press/release. Extracted #readConfig/#writeConfig (with the required command:setconfig injection + post-write reset tolerance). apps/server: - routes/devices.ts: public GET/POST /api/devices/dingtian/:deviceId/input/:n/{on,off} — translates a device push into an internal device event. Not behind cookie/CSRF (machine call from the device); trust comes from the signed event log, not this request. - device-events.ts: internal EventEmitter bus so the entry flow subscribes to input events without coupling to HTTP. Wired into the server. Verified on hardware: configured the device, then real presses on all 4 inputs pushed to the backend (input N on+off, source = device IP). No polling. wiki: device-input-flow concept (path + trust model for the flat/no-VLAN network); dingtian-relay updated; index + log.	2026-06-14 15:10:50 +02:00
julian	355026dcf7	Remove UHPPOTE/ZKTeco; Dingtian is the only access driver Neither UHPPOTE nor ZKTeco is used — the Dingtian relay controller was chosen and verified. Remove their code and re-scope the wiki. Code: - delete access-uhppote.ts, uhppoted.d.ts, access.ts (zkteco/esp32-relay stubs), and the three uhppote-*.mjs hardware test scripts. - remove the `uhppoted` npm dependency from @parking/devices and @parking/server. - unregister uhppote/zkteco/esp32-relay from the driver registry; drop their exports. Catalog access drivers = dingtian only. Build green (5/5). - refresh now-stale example comments (registry/interfaces/setup/api) to use current examples; keep the two "UHPPOTE blocker" references that explain why the precondition capability exists. Wiki (kept pages, re-scoped): - uhppote-controller, zkteco-controller -> rejected/historical with callouts; uhppote-vs-esp32 -> historical (detection-vs-prevention lens still useful). - re-point all "current device" framing (standing-decisions, bom, overview, open-questions, device-registry, device-discovery, index) to dingtian-relay. - transferable concepts (network-isolation, event-log-ingestion, barrier-not-a- door, threat-model) untouched. Raw source immutable. Links lint clean.	2026-06-14 14:28:52 +02:00
julian	1b55e2034d	Dingtian relay driver — resolves the ticket-first entry blocker The Dingtian board's inputs are independent of its relays (configurable), so a button on an input can report to the host WITHOUT auto-firing a relay — solving the access-controller-button-flow blocker the UHPPOTE/ZKTeco couldn't. packages/devices: - access-dingtian.ts: `dingtian` access driver implementing AccessControlDevice (relay pulse/latch via UDP string protocol :60001), InputDevice (read inputs + poll-based press/release events, active-LOW), and the new PreconditionDevice. - PreconditionDevice capability on the interface: a device can report config it requires for parking and optionally fix it. Dingtian checks input_link_relay via the HTTP config API and can disable it. - httpPort config field — the web/config API port is separate from UDP control (this unit uses 8080, not the default 80). - Register dingtian; export driver objects from the package. Verified on real hardware (DT-R004 @ 10.0.10.172): status read, relay pulse, input events; disabled input_link_relay via the driver, then confirmed pressing inputs fires NO relay (0000) — host-in-the-loop entry works. Config-write gotcha recorded: config_set.cgi requires "command":"setconfig" injected after "status" (GET omits it) or the POST silently no-ops. apps/server/scripts/dingtian-test.mjs: status / watch / pulse hardware test. wiki: dingtian-relay verified; button-flow marked RESOLVED; index + log.	2026-06-14 14:15:00 +02:00
julian	4319fb86dc	wiki: Dingtian relay decision, HTTP-over-MQTT, unmanned direction - dingtian-relay: relay+input controller (4ch on hand). Inputs are decoupled from relays (configurable via input_link_relay) — solves the access-controller-button-flow blocker the UHPPOTE couldn't. Full protocol from the SDK (UDP string control :60001, `00` status parse, input_link_url push, multicast discovery). Driver + hardware test still to build. - dingtian-vs-mqtt: use direct HTTP/UDP now; MQTT skipped (broker = extra infra + failure mode + overkill at one-host/few-devices scale) but kept for later multi-lane scale. - autonomous-direction: record the roadmap to fully unmanned (no booth) and how it reshapes the threat model (operator-fraud -> unattended-machine threats), makes host-in-the-loop entry mandatory, and raises fail-state stakes. - threat-model: note the unmanned shift. index + log. gitignore the vendor SDK (dingtian/, 71MB of binaries/examples) — reference only, protocol captured in the wiki.	2026-06-14 13:27:01 +02:00
julian	dbf1fa17d7	wiki: document dev environment (WSL networking, workflow) Capture hard-won dev knowledge that was only in commit messages: - wsl-dev-networking: WSL2 NAT blocks UDP broadcast (device discovery can't reach the LAN); fix is mirrored networking (.wslconfig, Win11 22H2+), plus the gotchas that remained after — multiple interfaces, subnet-directed broadcast, localhost->IPv6 stall. Alternatives for non-mirrored setups. - local-dev-workflow: first-time setup, pnpm dev, and the gotchas (the strip-types dev-server hang -> tsx, the 127.0.0.1 proxy fix, .env loading, seeding into the right DB). - device-discovery: corrected the old "broadcast permission (EACCES)" note — the real cause was the lib not enabling SO_BROADCAST for global 255.255.255.255; documented the three verified broadcast gotchas + I/O serialization. - schema: add a `reference` page type; new "Dev environment" index section; log. Links lint clean; both new pages well-connected.	2026-06-14 13:09:35 +02:00