3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
julian a68dc23393 fix(i18n): update placeholder text for park name in English and Albanian translations
Build desktop / desktop (push) Successful in 4m14s
Build & push images / images (push) Successful in 2m38s
CI / check (push) Successful in 37s
2026-06-27 12:48:51 +02:00
julian c87dcb2253 fix(deploy): server on host network so it sees the booth LAN / device VLAN
In prod the containerized server sat on the Docker bridge (172.18.0.x) and could
only see eth0 — so the setup backend-IP picker (net.ts networkInterfaces) showed
just the Docker IP, the server couldn't reach the relay or fetch Hikvision ISAPI
snapshots, and push devices (readers/cameras) couldn't reach it. The server is the
ONLY container doing device I/O, so put it on the HOST network namespace.

- docker-compose.prod.yml: server + proxy → network_mode: host (server detaches the
  base `parking` network via `networks: !reset []`). server VISION_URL=127.0.0.1:8089.
  vision stays BRIDGED (it never touches a device — the server hands it JPEG bytes)
  but publishes 8089 on 127.0.0.1 only, so the host-net server reaches it over
  loopback while the ANPR service stays off the LAN.
- docker-compose.yml: VISION_URL is now ${VISION_URL:-http://vision:8089} so dev keeps
  compose-DNS service-name routing; prod overrides to loopback.
- Caddyfile: reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:3000 (was server:3000 — service DNS doesn't
  resolve on host net). Dev doesn't use Caddy, so unaffected.

Merge validated for both envs (booth.sh config, exit 0). Host-net side effect: the
container ping_group_range sysctl is a no-op — the HOST must set it for reader ICMP
liveness (see appliance-provisioning).

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
2026-06-27 12:48:27 +02:00
julian 7eadf71a0b docs(wiki): appliance-provisioning — Komodo deploy is now the primary flow
§6 split: §6 = Docker engine only; new §7 = the Komodo Periphery deploy (PRIMARY,
verified end-to-end on park-buzi 2026-06-27):
- 7a install Periphery (onboarding key, user-mode/outbound, runs as admin, no
  inbound port; core_address = Core's proxy URL)
- 7b deploy the Stack in Core (registry+git accounts, per-booth [[..]] secrets,
  env incl. COOKIE_SECURE=0; seed admin via Komodo's container terminal — no SSH)
- 7b-bis fleet-as-code via komodo/resources.toml + ResourceSync (empty diff =
  in sync)
- 7c break-glass: manual booth.sh when mesh/Core is down

Added Komodo deploy gotchas 7-11 (core_address is the proxy URL not :9120;
git-auth ≠ registry-auth; user-mode vs /etc/komodo root_directory; core_address
singular; empty-diff/disabled-Execute = success). §5b SSH TODO reframed (Komodo
removes SSH from routine ops). Header + date updated; log entry added. Fixed a
stale [[atecc608-secure-element]] alias in the prior log entry.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
2026-06-27 12:30:08 +02:00
8 changed files with 441 additions and 61 deletions
+3 -1
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@@ -9,5 +9,7 @@
# CA / internal cert, use `tls /path/cert.pem /path/key.pem`. # CA / internal cert, use `tls /path/cert.pem /path/key.pem`.
:80 { :80 {
encode gzip encode gzip
reverse_proxy server:3000 # Host network (prod): the server runs on the host's net namespace (to reach the booth LAN /
# device VLAN), so reach it over loopback, not the compose service name `server`.
reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:3000
} }
+1 -1
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@@ -599,7 +599,7 @@ export const en: Catalog = {
save: "Save", save: "Save",
saved: "Saved.", saved: "Saved.",
fieldParkName: "Park name", fieldParkName: "Park name",
fieldParkNamePh: "e.g. Acme Parking", fieldParkNamePh: "e.g. Airport Parking",
fieldOperator: "Operator (legal name)", fieldOperator: "Operator (legal name)",
fieldOperatorPh: "operating company", fieldOperatorPh: "operating company",
fieldNius: "NIUS", fieldNius: "NIUS",
+10 -10
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@@ -308,13 +308,13 @@ export const sq = {
setup: { setup: {
title: "Konfigurimi", title: "Konfigurimi",
intro: intro:
"Shto fillimisht kontrolluesit e barrierave — cakto cili rele është hyrje/dalje dhe në cilin terminal është lidhur butoni i hyrjes. Pastaj shto lexues, kamera dhe printera dhe drejto secilin te barriera që shërben.", "Shto fillimisht kontrollerat e barrierave — cakto cili rele është hyrje/dalje dhe në cilin terminal është lidhur butoni i hyrjes. Pastaj shto lexues, kamera dhe printera dhe drejto secilin te barriera që shërben.",
// Category titles + the singular noun used in buttons/modal titles. // Category titles + the singular noun used in buttons/modal titles.
catControllers: "Kontrolluesit (barrierat + butoni i hyrjes)", catControllers: "Kontrollerat (barrierat + butoni i hyrjes)",
catReaders: "Lexuesit (QR / RFID)", catReaders: "Lexuesit (QR / RFID)",
catCameras: "Kamerat (foto + targë)", catCameras: "Kamerat (foto + targë)",
catPrinters: "Printerat (bileta / vouchera)", catPrinters: "Printerat (bileta / vouchera)",
nounController: "kontrollues", nounController: "kontroller",
nounReader: "lexues", nounReader: "lexues",
nounCamera: "kamerë", nounCamera: "kamerë",
nounPrinter: "printer", nounPrinter: "printer",
@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ export const sq = {
addAnother: "+ Shto edhe një {{noun}}", addAnother: "+ Shto edhe një {{noun}}",
addTitle: "Shto {{noun}}", addTitle: "Shto {{noun}}",
editTitle: "Ndrysho {{noun}}", editTitle: "Ndrysho {{noun}}",
needControllerFirst: "Shto fillimisht një kontrollues — {{noun}} drejtohet te një prej releve të tij.", needControllerFirst: "Shto fillimisht një kontroller — {{noun}} drejtohet te një prej releve të tij.",
failedToLoad: "Ngarkimi i konfigurimit dështoi: {{error}}", failedToLoad: "Ngarkimi i konfigurimit dështoi: {{error}}",
loadingCatalog: "Duke ngarkuar katalogun e pajisjeve…", loadingCatalog: "Duke ngarkuar katalogun e pajisjeve…",
// Direction labels (relay direction + inherited binding). // Direction labels (relay direction + inherited binding).
@@ -344,9 +344,9 @@ export const sq = {
// Device form. // Device form.
noDrivers: "Asnjë drejtues i regjistruar.", noDrivers: "Asnjë drejtues i regjistruar.",
chooseDevice: "Zgjidh një pajisje…", chooseDevice: "Zgjidh një pajisje…",
scan: "Skano për kontrollues", scan: "Skano për kontroller",
scanning: "Duke skanuar…", scanning: "Duke skanuar…",
noControllersFound: "Asnjë kontrollues në LAN.", noControllersFound: "Asnjë kontroller në LAN.",
use: "Përdor", use: "Përdor",
test: "Testo lidhjen", test: "Testo lidhjen",
testing: "Duke testuar…", testing: "Duke testuar…",
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ export const sq = {
noNicOnSubnet: "⚠ asnjë NIC në subnetin e pajisjes — pajisja mund të mos arrijë backend-in", noNicOnSubnet: "⚠ asnjë NIC në subnetin e pajisjes — pajisja mund të mos arrijë backend-in",
backendIpHint: "Adresa te e cila kjo pajisje do të dërgojë eventet e hyrjes.", backendIpHint: "Adresa te e cila kjo pajisje do të dërgojë eventet e hyrjes.",
// Relay editor. // Relay editor.
relaysTitle: "Relet në këtë kontrollues", relaysTitle: "Relet në këtë kontroller",
relaysHint: relaysHint:
"Çdo rele hap një barrierë. Cakto drejtimin e saj; për hyrje kalimtare, cakto në cilin terminal hyrës është lidhur butoni i hyrjes.", "Çdo rele hap një barrierë. Cakto drejtimin e saj; për hyrje kalimtare, cakto në cilin terminal hyrës është lidhur butoni i hyrjes.",
outputsTitle: "Daljet — relet (barrierat + drita)", outputsTitle: "Daljet — relet (barrierat + drita)",
@@ -432,10 +432,10 @@ export const sq = {
alarmFieldPort: "Porta", alarmFieldPort: "Porta",
// Binding picker. // Binding picker.
whichBarrier: "Cilën barrierë shërben kjo pajisje?", whichBarrier: "Cilën barrierë shërben kjo pajisje?",
controller: "Kontrolluesi", controller: "Kontrolleri",
choose: "Zgjidh…", choose: "Zgjidh…",
relayLabel: "Rele {{relay}} ({{direction}})", relayLabel: "Rele {{relay}} ({{direction}})",
noRelaysConfigured: "Ky kontrollues nuk ka rele të konfiguruar.", noRelaysConfigured: "Ky kontroller nuk ka rele të konfiguruar.",
}, },
lab: { lab: {
title: "Lab Tarife", title: "Lab Tarife",
@@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ export const sq = {
save: "Ruaj", save: "Ruaj",
saved: "U ruajt.", saved: "U ruajt.",
fieldParkName: "Emri i parkimit", fieldParkName: "Emri i parkimit",
fieldParkNamePh: "p.sh. Acme Parking", fieldParkNamePh: "p.sh. Parking Aeroport",
fieldOperator: "Operatori (emri ligjor)", fieldOperator: "Operatori (emri ligjor)",
fieldOperatorPh: "kompania operuese", fieldOperatorPh: "kompania operuese",
fieldNius: "NIUS", fieldNius: "NIUS",
+31 -18
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@@ -7,24 +7,25 @@
# See wiki/decisions/container-deployment.md. # See wiki/decisions/container-deployment.md.
services: services:
# Reverse proxy: :80 → server:3000 (WebSocket /api/ws upgrades pass through natively). # Reverse proxy: :80 → server (127.0.0.1:3000). On the HOST network (see the server note),
# Caddy is a single static binary with a one-line proxy config; swapping http:// for the # so it reaches the host-net server over loopback and publishes :80 directly on the host.
# site's real hostname later enables automatic HTTPS. The booth is reached at # WebSocket /api/ws upgrades pass through natively. Swapping http:// for the site's real
# http://<name-or-ip>/ (the name set via hosts/DNS on-site — NOT baked into any image). # hostname later enables automatic HTTPS. Reached at http://<name-or-ip>/ (name via hosts/DNS
# on-site — NOT baked into any image).
proxy: proxy:
image: caddy:2-alpine image: caddy:2-alpine
restart: always restart: always
ports: # Host network: Caddy listens on the host's :80 and proxies the host-net server on
- "80:80" # 127.0.0.1:3000. (No `ports:` mapping — host mode publishes directly.)
# - "443:443" # uncomment when moving to TLS (and set a real hostname in Caddyfile) network_mode: host
# host mode is mutually exclusive with a named network; the base file doesn't attach proxy,
# so nothing to null here (server does — see below).
volumes: volumes:
- ./Caddyfile:/etc/caddy/Caddyfile:ro - ./Caddyfile:/etc/caddy/Caddyfile:ro
- caddy-data:/data - caddy-data:/data
- caddy-config:/config - caddy-config:/config
depends_on: depends_on:
- server - server
networks:
- parking
logging: logging:
driver: json-file driver: json-file
options: options:
@@ -33,14 +34,22 @@ services:
server: server:
restart: always restart: always
# No published port — only the proxy reaches the server, over the private network. # HOST NETWORK — the crux of the appliance. The server is the ONLY container doing device
expose: # I/O (camera ISAPI snapshots, relay control, receiving reader/alarm pushes), all on the
- "3000" # booth's LAN / isolated device VLAN (10.0.10.x). On a bridge network it sees only the Docker
# Let the server ICMP-ping push-only readers (Dingtian/GEE QR) for an honest # subnet (172.18.0.x) — it can't reach the relay, can't be reached by push devices, and the
# online/offline status WITHOUT CAP_NET_RAW: opening ping_group_range to all gids # backend-IP picker (net.ts networkInterfaces) only sees eth0. Host mode puts it on the real
# enables `/bin/ping` in unprivileged SOCK_DGRAM mode for the non-root runtime user. # NICs. Vision stays bridged (it never touches a device — the server hands it JPEG bytes).
# (The reader exposes no TCP port, so a connect-probe can't work — see reader.ts / network_mode: host
# wiki/entities/dingtian-qr-reader.md.) # host mode is mutually exclusive with a named network — detach the base file's `parking`
# attachment (compose errors otherwise: "network_mode and networks cannot both be set").
networks: !reset []
# Listens on :3000 directly on the host (Caddy proxies it). Loopback to vision:
environment:
VISION_URL: http://127.0.0.1:8089
# Reader liveness ping (Dingtian/GEE QR push-only readers): on host net the server uses the
# HOST's net.ipv4.ping_group_range — ensure the host sets it (see appliance-provisioning).
# The container-level sysctl below is a no-op under host net but kept as documentation.
sysctls: sysctls:
- net.ipv4.ping_group_range=0 2147483647 - net.ipv4.ping_group_range=0 2147483647
logging: logging:
@@ -52,9 +61,13 @@ services:
vision: vision:
restart: always restart: always
# The real ANPR engine. The image baked the model weights at build (offline-first). # The real ANPR engine. The image baked the model weights at build (offline-first).
# Stays on the bridge network (isolated — it makes NO outbound device calls), but PUBLISHES
# 8089 on the host LOOPBACK ONLY so the host-net server can reach it. 127.0.0.1 binding keeps
# it off the booth LAN — nothing on the network can hit the ANPR service.
environment: environment:
VISION_RECOGNIZER: fast_alpr VISION_RECOGNIZER: fast_alpr
# No published ports — vision is reached only by the server over the private network. ports:
- "127.0.0.1:8089:8089"
logging: logging:
driver: json-file driver: json-file
options: options:
+5 -2
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@@ -13,8 +13,11 @@ services:
restart: unless-stopped restart: unless-stopped
environment: environment:
DATABASE_URL: /data/parking.sqlite DATABASE_URL: /data/parking.sqlite
# Reach the vision service over the private compose network by service name. # Reach the vision service. DEV: the private compose-network service name (`vision`).
VISION_URL: http://vision:8089 # PROD: the server runs on the HOST network (to see the booth LAN / device VLAN — it's the
# only container doing device I/O), where compose DNS doesn't resolve, so the prod override
# sets VISION_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8089 and vision publishes 8089 on the host loopback.
VISION_URL: ${VISION_URL:-http://vision:8089}
VISION_ENABLED: ${VISION_ENABLED:-1} VISION_ENABLED: ${VISION_ENABLED:-1}
# JWT signing secret MUST be provided at deploy (no insecure default — see auth.ts). # JWT signing secret MUST be provided at deploy (no insecure default — see auth.ts).
JWT_SECRET: ${JWT_SECRET:?set JWT_SECRET in the env/.env} JWT_SECRET: ${JWT_SECRET:?set JWT_SECRET in the env/.env}
+238
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@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
# i18n long-sentence review — EN vs SQ
Generated 2026-06-24. Source: `apps/web/src/lib/i18n/en.ts` + `sq.ts`. Threshold: strings ≥ 80 chars in either language (35 keys).
Review each pair for MEANING (does SQ say the same as EN?). Mark your decision in the **Verdict** line: `OK` / `FIX: <new text>` / `?`.
Keys with an automated note are tagged **⚑ NOTE**.
---
## 1. `badgeOverstayTitle` ⚑
- **EN** (en.ts:138, 86 ch): Paid session. The customer failed to exit during the grace period. A new period began.
- **SQ** (sq.ts:140, 93 ch): Sesion i paguar. Klienti nuk doli brenda afatit kohor. Ka filluar një periudhë e re tarifimi.
- **⚑ NOTE:** Spelling: "brënda" → standard is "brenda" (no ë).
- **Verdict:**
## 2. `activeSince`
- **EN** (en.ts:254, 133 ch): Active since {{date}} · {{count}} version(s) in history. Publishing creates a new version; past sessions keep their original pricing.
- **SQ** (sq.ts:257, 137 ch): Aktive që nga {{date}} · {{count}} version(e) në histori. Publikimi krijon një version të ri; sesionet e kaluara ruajnë çmimin origjinal.
- **Verdict:**
## 3. `rateBlocksHint`
- **EN** (en.ts:263, 256 ch): Each band lasts a number of hours and bills at its own price; bands are consumed in order (the first hours, then the next hours). The last band is \"thereafter\" (open-ended) — its price applies once the ladder is exhausted. Price is per billing increment.
- **SQ** (sq.ts:266, 251 ch): Çdo brez zgjat një numër orësh dhe faturohet me çmimin e tij; brezat konsumohen me radhë (orët e para, pastaj orët në vijim). Brezi i fundit është \"më pas\" (i hapur) — çmimi i tij zbatohet pas mbarimit të shkallës. Çmimi është për interval faturimi.
- **Verdict:**
## 4. `defaultCardHint`
- **EN** (en.ts:275, 98 ch): The base rate applied when no time/seasonal tier matches. This alone is enough for most car parks.
- **SQ** (sq.ts:278, 116 ch): Çmimi bazë i zbatuar kur asnjë nivel kohor/sezonal nuk vlen. Kjo e vetme është mjaftueshëm për shumicën e parkimeve.
- **Verdict:**
## 5. `steppedHint`
- **EN** (en.ts:280, 210 ch): Set the TOTAL price for a stay up to a given time (e.g. up to 3h = 500). The first row whose limit ≥ the duration wins (the limit is inclusive). The last row's total repeats as a per-day price for longer stays.
- **SQ** (sq.ts:283, 233 ch): Vendos çmimin TOTAL për një qëndrim deri në një kohë të caktuar (p.sh. deri 3 orë = 500). Fiton rreshti i parë me kufi ≥ kohëzgjatjes (kufiri përfshihet). Totali i rreshtit të fundit përsëritet si çmim ditor për qëndrime më të gjata.
- **Verdict:**
## 6. `steppedTiersConflict`
- **EN** (en.ts:285, 235 ch): ⚠ Time/seasonal tiers do NOT apply when the base rate is 'By duration (up-to)' — the engine ignores them entirely. Remove the tiers, or switch the base rate to 'Hourly ladder' or 'Flat price'. Publishing is blocked until this is fixed.
- **SQ** (sq.ts:288, 244 ch): ⚠ Nivelet kohore/sezonale NUK zbatohen kur tarifa bazë është 'Sipas kohëzgjatjes (deri-në)' — motori i shpërfill plotësisht. Hiqi nivelet, ose ndrysho tarifën bazë në 'Shkallë orësh' a 'Çmim fiks'. Publikimi bllokohet derisa kjo të rregullohet.
- **Verdict:**
## 7. `tiersHint`
- **EN** (en.ts:287, 174 ch): Optional. Add tiers that apply only at certain hours/days/dates or for a category (e.g. happy hour, night rate, weekend, bus). With no tiers, just the base rate is published.
- **SQ** (sq.ts:290, 182 ch): Opsionale. Shto nivele tarifore që vlejnë vetëm në orë/ditë/data ose kategori të caktuara (p.sh. orë e lirë, tarifë nate, fundjavë, autobus). Pa nivele, publikohet vetëm tarifa bazë.
- **Verdict:**
## 8. `intro`
- **EN** (en.ts:526, 160 ch): Admin-defined plans the operator sells from — the price is looked up, never typed. Editing a plan publishes a new version; past sales keep their recorded price.
- **SQ** (sq.ts:537, 193 ch): Planet i përcakton admini; operatori vetëm shet prej tyre — çmimi merret automatikisht, nuk shkruhet. Ndryshimi i një plani publikon një version të ri; shitjet e mëparshme ruajnë çmimin e tyre.
- **Verdict:**
## 9. `relaysHint`
- **EN** (en.ts:361, 124 ch): Each relay opens one barrier. Set its direction; for transient entry, set which input terminal the entry button is wired to.
- **SQ** (sq.ts:370, 130 ch): Çdo rele hap një barrierë. Cakto drejtimin e saj; për hyrje kalimtare, cakto në cilin terminal hyrës është lidhur butoni i hyrjes.
- **Verdict:**
## 10. `outputsHint`
- **EN** (en.ts:364, 175 ch): Relays are OUTPUTS: each opens a barrier (or drives the button lamp). Set the relay number and direction. The input terminals (button, sensor) are in the Inputs section below.
- **SQ** (sq.ts:373, 178 ch): Relet janë DALJE: secila hap një barrierë (ose ndez dritën e butonit). Cakto numrin e relesë dhe drejtimin. Terminalet hyrëse (butoni, sensori) janë te seksioni Hyrjet më poshtë.
- **Verdict:**
## 11. `pulseOpenHint`
- **EN** (en.ts:366, 75 ch): How long a barrier relay is held open (jog). Applies to all barrier relays.
- **SQ** (sq.ts:375, 85 ch): Sa kohë mbahet rele e barrierës e hapur (jog). Vlen për të gjitha relet e barrierave.
- **Verdict:**
## 12. `inputsHint` ⚑
- **EN** (en.ts:369, 152 ch): Inputs are TERMINALS the host READS: the entry button and the presence/radar sensor. Each belongs to an entry barrier — it triggers or gates that relay.
- **SQ** (sq.ts:378, 153 ch): Hyrjet janë TERMINALE që hosti i LEXON: butoni i hyrjes dhe sensori i pranisë/radari. Secila i përket një barriere hyrëse — e gateron ose e nis atë rele.
- **⚑ NOTE:** "e gateron" is an anglicism ("gates it"). Native: "e kushtëzon" / "e lejon".
- **Verdict:**
## 13. `inputsIdleHighHint`
- **EN** (en.ts:371, 62 ch): This board idles inputs HIGH (status 1111); a press pulls LOW.
- **SQ** (sq.ts:380, 80 ch): Kjo pllakë i mban hyrjet HIGH në pushim (statusi 1111); një shtypje e ul në LOW.
- **Verdict:**
## 14. `inputsNoEntryRelay`
- **EN** (en.ts:373, 87 ch): No entry relay — add an 'Entry' or 'Entry + exit' relay in Outputs to assign terminals.
- **SQ** (sq.ts:382, 97 ch): Asnjë rele hyrëse — shto një rele 'Hyrje' ose 'Hyrje + dalje' te Daljet që të caktosh terminalet.
- **Verdict:**
## 15. `presenceInputHint` ⚑
- **EN** (en.ts:378, 290 ch): Input terminal the vehicle-presence sensor (induction loop or radar) is wired to. When set, exactly ONE ticket issues per car: the button prints only while a car is present, and no second ticket issues until the sensor clears (the car drove in) and a new car re-occupies it. Preferred mode.
- **SQ** (sq.ts:387, 275 ch): Terminali hyrës ku është lidhur sensori/laku i pranisë së automjetit. Kur vendoset, lëshohet vetëm NJË biletë për automjet: butoni printon vetëm kur ka makinë, dhe nuk lëshon biletë të dytë derisa laku të lirohet (makina hyri) dhe një makinë e re ta zërë. Mënyra e preferuar.
- **⚑ NOTE:** EN names "induction loop OR radar"; SQ "sensori/laku i pranisë" omits radar explicitly.
- **Verdict:**
## 16. `entryCooldownHint`
- **EN** (en.ts:381, 175 ch): When there's no presence sensor: repeat button presses are suppressed for this many seconds after a ticket. A fallback (not a guarantee) — a determined abuser can wait it out.
- **SQ** (sq.ts:390, 165 ch): Kur nuk ka sensor pranie: shtypjet e përsëritura të butonit shtypen për kaq sekonda pas një bilete. Zgjidhje rezervë (jo garanci) — një abuzues mund ta presë afatin.
- **Verdict:**
## 17. `presenceActiveLowHint`
- **EN** (en.ts:387, 178 ch): Tick if the presence sensor (e.g. a radar) idles HIGH and goes LOW on detection — the opposite of the button. This inverts that terminal's reading so 'present' is read correctly.
- **SQ** (sq.ts:396, 184 ch): Shëno nëse sensori i pranisë (p.sh. radari) qëndron HIGH në pushim dhe shkon LOW kur detekton — e kundërta e butonit. Kjo përmbys leximin e atij terminali që 'prania' të lexohet saktë.
- **Verdict:**
## 18. `buttonLightHint`
- **EN** (en.ts:391, 152 ch): The button's 12 V light on a spare relay. Blinks when the radar detects but the camera doesn't confirm a car; solid on when both confirm; off otherwise.
- **SQ** (sq.ts:400, 160 ch): Drita 12V e butonit e lidhur në një rele rezervë. Pulson kur radari detekton por kamera s'konfirmon makinë; ndizet fiks kur të dy konfirmojnë; përndryshe fiket.
- **Verdict:**
## 19. `anprHint` ⚑
- **EN** (en.ts:398, 203 ch): Enable to scan plates on this camera: the vision service reads the plate from a snapshot and feeds it as a read (advisory only — it never opens a barrier on its own). Requires the vision service running.
- **SQ** (sq.ts:408, 185 ch): Aktivizo që ky aparat të skanojë targat: shërbimi i vizionit lexon targën nga pamja dhe e dërgon si lexim (vetëm këshillues — nuk hap vetë barrierën). Kërkon shërbimin e vizionit aktiv.
- **⚑ NOTE:** SQ uses "aparat" for camera; elsewhere camera = "kamerë" (see testAnprHint). Inconsistent.
- **Verdict:**
## 20. `testAnprHint`
- **EN** (en.ts:402, 143 ch): Takes a live snapshot from this camera and tries to read a plate, reporting the result and the time it took. Point a plate at the camera first.
- **SQ** (sq.ts:412, 169 ch): Merr një pamje të drejtpërdrejtë nga kjo kamerë dhe përpiqet të lexojë një targë, duke raportuar rezultatin dhe kohën e nevojshme. Vendos një targë para kamerës më parë.
- **Verdict:**
## 21. `curveHint`
- **EN** (en.ts:443, 88 ch): Fee from entry at several durations — see where the daily cap flattens or windows shift.
- **SQ** (sq.ts:454, 96 ch): Tarifa nga hyrja për disa kohëzgjatje — shih ku rrafshohet kufiri ditor ose ndryshojnë dritaret.
- **Verdict:**
## 22. `versionHint`
- **EN** (en.ts:465, 128 ch): Move this subscriber to another version of the same plan. The price stays as billed; only the access hours change going forward.
- **SQ** (sq.ts:476, 139 ch): Zhvendos këtë abonent në një version tjetër të të njëjtit plan. Çmimi mbetet siç u faturua; ndryshon vetëm orari i lejuar nga këtu e tutje.
- **Verdict:**
## 23. `deleteInUse`
- **EN** (en.ts:550, 68 ch): Can't delete — subscriptions still use this plan. Retire it instead.
- **SQ** (sq.ts:561, 80 ch): S'mund të fshihet — abonime ende e përdorin këtë plan. Tërhiqe në vend të kësaj.
- **Verdict:**
## 24. `newVersionHint`
- **EN** (en.ts:553, 84 ch): This publishes a NEW version of the plan — existing sales keep their original price.
- **SQ** (sq.ts:564, 86 ch): Kjo publikon një version TË RI të planit — shitjet ekzistuese ruajnë çmimin origjinal.
- **Verdict:**
## 25. `timeframesHint`
- **EN** (en.ts:570, 168 ch): A scan outside the allowed window is charged the normal transient tariff for the out-of-window minutes (early entry is deferred to exit; late exit is gated until paid).
- **SQ** (sq.ts:581, 184 ch): Një skanim jashtë intervalit të lejuar tarifohet me tarifën normale kalimtare për minutat jashtë intervalit (hyrja e hershme shtyhet në dalje; dalja e vonuar bllokohet derisa paguhet).
- **Verdict:**
## 26. `reserveSubsHint` ⚑
- **EN** (en.ts:582, 164 ch): Hold a spot for each active subscriber's car(s) even when they're not parked — transients see 'full' sooner. Off: only cars inside count (handle overflow by valet).
- **SQ** (sq.ts:593, 198 ch): Mban një vend për makinat e çdo abonenti aktiv edhe kur nuk janë të parkuar — kalimtarët e shohin 'plot' më shpejt. Joaktiv: numërohen vetëm makinat brenda (mbingarkesa menaxhohet me parkim manual).
- **⚑ NOTE:** EN "handle overflow by valet" → SQ "parkim manual" (manual parking) — meaning shift; valet ≠ manual parking.
- **Verdict:**
## 27. `anprEntryHint`
- **EN** (en.ts:584, 195 ch): When on, a subscriber's plate read by a lane camera opens the barrier through the normal subscription gate. Off: subscribers must use their card/QR. Plate snapshots are still recorded either way.
- **SQ** (sq.ts:595, 207 ch): Kur është aktiv, targa e një abonenti e lexuar nga kamera e korsisë hap barrierën përmes portës normale të abonimit. Joaktiv: abonentët duhet të përdorin kartën/QR-në. Fotot e targave regjistrohen gjithsesi.
- **Verdict:**
## 28. `voucherHint`
- **EN** (en.ts:659, 128 ch): A receipt (Mandat Arkëtimi) adds cash; a disbursement (Mandat Pagese) removes it. The float only moves with an admin's sign-off.
- **SQ** (sq.ts:671, 97 ch): Mandat Arkëtimi shton para; Mandat Pagese heq para. Arka lëviz vetëm me autorizimin e një admini.
- **Verdict:**
## 29. `xReportHint`
- **EN** (en.ts:667, 83 ch): View only — nothing is recorded. These figures are signed when the shift is closed.
- **SQ** (sq.ts:679, 85 ch): Vetëm për shikim — asgjë nuk regjistrohet. Këto shifra nënshkruhen kur mbyllet turni.
- **Verdict:**
## 30. `gateBody`
- **EN** (en.ts:691, 80 ch): No shift is open. Open your shift so payments and exits are recorded against it.
- **SQ** (sq.ts:703, 95 ch): Asnjë turn nuk është i hapur. Hap turnin tënd që pagesat dhe daljet të regjistrohen te ky turn.
- **Verdict:**
## 31. `gateOtherBody`
- **EN** (en.ts:694, 120 ch): {{operator}} has an open shift. Only one shift may be open at a time — they must close theirs before you can open yours.
- **SQ** (sq.ts:706, 140 ch): {{operator}} ka një turn të hapur. Vetëm një turn mund të jetë i hapur njëkohësisht — ai duhet të mbyllë turnin para se ti të hapësh tëndin.
- **Verdict:**
## 32. `overstayHint` ⚑
- **EN** (en.ts:813, 155 ch): Earlier session paid. The customer failed to exit during the grace period. Payment for the new period is required. The total below is the new period's fee.
- **SQ** (sq.ts:827, 151 ch): Sesion i mëparshëm i paguar. Klienti nuk doli brënda afatit kohor. Kërkohet pagesë për periudhën e re. Totali më poshtë është tarifa e periudhës së re.
- **⚑ NOTE:** Spelling: "brënda" → standard is "brenda" (no ë).
- **Verdict:**
## 33. `subAssistHint`
- **EN** (en.ts:837, 101 ch): Prepaid subscription. Open the barrier to assist the exit (faulty reader / missing card). No payment.
- **SQ** (sq.ts:851, 108 ch): Abonim i parapaguar. Hap barrierën për të ndihmuar daljen (lexues me defekt / kartë e munguar). S'ka pagesë.
- **Verdict:**
## 34. `windowChargeHint`
- **EN** (en.ts:842, 154 ch): This subscriber parked outside their plan's allowed hours. They owe the transient tariff for the out-of-window time — take payment, then open the barrier.
- **SQ** (sq.ts:856, 153 ch): Ky abonent parkoi jashtë orarit të lejuar të planit. Detyrohet të paguajë tarifën kalimtare për kohën jashtë orarit — merr pagesën, pastaj hap barrierën.
- **Verdict:**
## 35. `cancelTicketHint`
- **EN** (en.ts:852, 115 ch): Cancels a wrongly-printed ticket. A signed record is kept (operator + reason); the original entry is never deleted.
- **SQ** (sq.ts:866, 129 ch): Anulon një biletë të printuar gabimisht. Ruhet një gjurmë e nënshkruar (operatori + arsyeja); hyrja origjinale nuk fshihet kurrë.
- **Verdict:**
---
## Summary of flagged items
- `badgeOverstayTitle` — Spelling: "brënda" → standard is "brenda" (no ë).
- `inputsHint` — "e gateron" is an anglicism ("gates it"). Native: "e kushtëzon" / "e lejon".
- `presenceInputHint` — EN names "induction loop OR radar"; SQ "sensori/laku i pranisë" omits radar explicitly.
- `anprHint` — SQ uses "aparat" for camera; elsewhere camera = "kamerë" (see testAnprHint). Inconsistent.
- `reserveSubsHint` — EN "handle overflow by valet" → SQ "parkim manual" (manual parking) — meaning shift; valet ≠ manual parking.
- `overstayHint` — Spelling: "brënda" → standard is "brenda" (no ë).
_All other pairs: meaning judged faithful in automated review; confirm during your read._
+135 -28
View File
@@ -2,17 +2,18 @@
type: reference type: reference
tags: [parking, deployment, appliance, hardening, runbook, offline-first] tags: [parking, deployment, appliance, hardening, runbook, offline-first]
sources: [] sources: []
updated: 2026-06-23 updated: 2026-06-27
status: settled status: settled
--- ---
# Appliance provisioning runbook (booth PC) # Appliance provisioning runbook (booth PC)
Step-by-step to take a booth PC from factory Windows to a hardened, encrypted, container-running Step-by-step to take a booth PC from factory Windows to a hardened, encrypted, container-running
parking appliance. Written from the **first real provisioning, 2026-06-23**, on the actual hardware parking appliance. Written from the **first real provisioning, 2026-06-23** (hardening) +
below — every command here was run and verified on that machine, including the firmware-specific **first Komodo deploy, 2026-06-27** (the runtime) — every command here was run and verified on the
workaround. Companion to [[disk-os-hardening]] (the *why*), [[tpm]] (TPM analysis), and actual hardware, including the firmware-specific workaround. Companion to [[disk-os-hardening]] (the
[[container-deployment]] (the images this runs). *why*), [[tpm]] (TPM analysis), [[container-deployment]] (the images), and
[[fleet-deployment-komodo]] (the deploy control plane this runbook's §7 uses).
> ⚠ This box is the [[threat-model|outsider-with-the-box]] defence. The load-bearing anti-fraud > ⚠ This box is the [[threat-model|outsider-with-the-box]] defence. The load-bearing anti-fraud
> control is still [[reconciliation]] over the [[append-only-event-chain|signed chain]] — disk > control is still [[reconciliation]] over the [[append-only-event-chain|signed chain]] — disk
@@ -171,50 +172,140 @@ default) — `admin`+sudo IS the root path; enabling root adds risk, no gain.
## 5b. Further hardening (TODO — not yet done) ## 5b. Further hardening (TODO — not yet done)
- **Key-based SSH only** (disable password auth) if SSH is enabled at all. - **Key-based SSH only** (disable password auth) if SSH is enabled at all. Routine ops no longer
need SSH — Komodo Periphery (§7) drives deploys + gives a container terminal over the mesh — so
SSH can be locked down hard or disabled, leaving the mesh + Komodo as the management path.
- **No/locked-down desktop + kiosk autostart** — single-purpose; the operator never reaches a shell - **No/locked-down desktop + kiosk autostart** — single-purpose; the operator never reaches a shell
([[desktop-shell-tauri]]). ([[desktop-shell-tauri]]).
- Consider moving the host **event-signing key into the TPM** (non-extractable) — [[tpm]], [[open-questions]] #12. - Consider moving the host **event-signing key into the TPM** (non-extractable) — [[tpm]], [[open-questions]] #12.
- `sudo apt autoremove` the leftover old kernel once the new one is proven. - `sudo apt autoremove` the leftover old kernel once the new one is proven.
## 6. Runtime — Docker stack (VERIFIED 2026-06-23) ## 6. Runtime — Docker engine (VERIFIED 2026-06-23)
Install Docker Engine + compose (as `admin`). NB Ubuntu 26.04 codename is **`resolute`**, which Install Docker Engine + compose (as `admin`). NB Ubuntu 26.04 codename is **`resolute`**, which
download.docker.com may not yet publish — pin the repo line to `noble`, OR use Ubuntu's `docker.io`. download.docker.com may not yet publish — pin the repo line to `noble`, OR use Ubuntu's `docker.io`.
Add only `admin` to the `docker` group (root-equivalent — NEVER the operator). Add only `admin` to the `docker` group (root-equivalent — NEVER the operator).
Deploy from a standalone dir (hand-copied; no repo on the appliance), e.g. `/opt/parking_solution`: This gives the appliance the engine. **How the stack gets ONTO it is step 7** — and as of
`docker-compose.yml` + `docker-compose.prod.yml` (the Caddy/prod override) + `Caddyfile` + a `.env` 2026-06-27 the primary path is **Komodo (remote, no-SSH)**, not a hand-copied dir. The manual
(chmod 600). The `.env` (driven into the containers by the base compose): `docker compose` flow survives as a **break-glass fallback** (§7c).
``` ## 7. Deploy the stack — Komodo Periphery (PRIMARY, 2026-06-27)
JWT_SECRET=<openssl rand -hex 32> # server REFUSES to boot without (>=32, no insecure default)
EVENT_SIGNING_KEY=<a DIFFERENT openssl rand -hex 32> The booth is driven by a central **Komodo Core** over the **NetBird** mesh. The appliance runs a
COOKIE_SECURE=0 # CRITICAL on plain-http or the auth cookie never sends → no login small **Periphery** agent that *dials out* to Core; Core then deploys the same compose files. No
WS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=http://<name-or-ip> # any REMOTE origin admins use (same-origin always passes) inbound port on the booth, no SSH for routine ops. Full rationale + threat model:
VISION_ENABLED=1 [[fleet-deployment-komodo]]. Verified end-to-end on the first booth (`park-buzi`) 2026-06-27.
# REGISTRY/TAG default to git.infra.msai.al/mca/parking_solution + dev; set TAG=main to pin.
``` ### 7a. Install Periphery (on the booth, as `admin`)
Prereq: the booth is on the **NetBird** mesh and can reach Core's reverse-proxy URL
(`https://komodo.infra.msai.al`).
1. In Core: **Settings → Onboarding → + New Onboarding Key** (Name = the booth, e.g. `park-buzi`;
Expiry ~1 day; Pre-Existing Key empty). Copy the one-time `O-…` key. **Single-use** — delete it
after the agent connects.
2. On the booth, install Periphery in **user mode** (runs as `admin`, who is in `docker`; NO root
daemon; **outbound** → opens no inbound port):
```bash ```bash
docker login git.infra.msai.al # a read-only package token, not the account password curl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/moghtech/komodo/main/scripts/setup-periphery.py | python3 - --user \
docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.prod.yml config # dry-run: verify the merged env --core-address="https://komodo.infra.msai.al" \
docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.prod.yml pull --connect-as="park-buzi" \
docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.prod.yml up -d --onboarding-key="O-…"
# Seed the FIRST admin (DB starts empty → nobody can log in until this runs; idempotent): sudo loginctl enable-linger admin # so the user service starts at boot without a login
docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.prod.yml exec \
-e ADMIN_USER=admin -e ADMIN_PASS='<strong-pw>' server node scripts/seed-admin.mjs
``` ```
Healthy startup logs: vision `Initialized LicensePlateDetector …` with NO "Downloading" (baked - `--connect-as` is the **Server name in Core** — unique, stable, site-meaningful (the fleet's
weights), server `[migrate] done` → `SPA static serving enabled` → `Server listening`. The transient primary key). Booth #2 = a different name (e.g. `park-durres`); never reuse one.
- `--core-address` is Core's **reverse-proxy URL** (the URL you load the Core UI at over the mesh),
NOT `:9120` — Core's container port `9120` is exposed-not-published; the agent reaches it through
the proxy. (Gotcha #7 below.)
- Config lands at `~/.config/komodo/periphery.config.toml`. The key field is **`core_address`**
(singular); `root_directory` must be a path `admin` can write (user-mode default is fine — a
`/etc/komodo` default from a system install would `Permission denied` for the user service).
Verify: `systemctl --user status periphery` → active; the server **`park-buzi`** appears and goes
**OK/green** in Core → Servers. Then **delete the onboarding key**.
### 7b. Deploy the Stack (in Core — by hand once, then code)
Add **Registry Account** + **Git Account** for `git.infra.msai.al` (user `komodo`, tokens) in Core
so Periphery can clone the repo AND pull the private images. Two distinct credential types — the
git clone working does NOT imply the image pull is authed (gotcha #8). Per-booth secrets
(`park_<booth>_jwt_secret`, `park_<booth>_event_signing_key` — distinct values, `openssl rand -hex
32`) live in Core's **Variables/Secrets** store, referenced from the Stack as `[[…]]`.
Create a **Stack** (UI → Stacks → New), name = the booth (`park-buzi`):
- **Server:** `park-buzi` · **Source:** repo `mca/parking_solution`, branch `dev`, files
`docker-compose.yml` + `docker-compose.prod.yml` · **Registry account:** `komodo` (else the pull
is anonymous → `no basic auth credentials`).
- **Environment** (Komodo writes this to a `.env` on the booth at deploy, substituting `[[…]]`):
```
REGISTRY=git.infra.msai.al/mca/parking_solution
TAG=dev # moving tag (staging). PIN to dev-<sha> for a live booth.
COOKIE_SECURE=0 # CRITICAL on plain-http or the auth cookie never sends → no login
VISION_ENABLED=1
WS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS= # browser at the booth URL is same-origin; leave empty (the
# Tauri desktop app needs its origin here — separate task)
JWT_SECRET=[[park_buzi_jwt_secret]]
EVENT_SIGNING_KEY=[[park_buzi_event_signing_key]]
```
Deploy → Periphery pulls + `compose up`s. All containers (`proxy`/Caddy, `server`, `vision`) green.
Seed the FIRST admin (DB starts empty → nobody can log in until this runs; idempotent) **via
Komodo's terminal on the `server` container** (no SSH):
```bash
docker exec -it -e ADMIN_USER=admin -e ADMIN_PASS='<strong-pw>' \
park-buzi-server-1 node scripts/seed-admin.mjs
```
> **Secrets-on-disk note.** The generated `.env` lands on the booth with **cleartext** secrets
> (compose needs real values). That's why the disk is LUKS-encrypted (§3–4) and keys are per-booth
> — the encryption is the control, and a single-booth compromise leaks only that booth's key. See
> [[fleet-deployment-komodo]] (the `EVENT_SIGNING_KEY`-in-Core blast-radius caveat; ATECC608 is the
> intended long-term signer).
### 7b-bis. Fleet-as-code (`resources.toml`) — optional but recommended
The repo's `komodo/resources.toml` mirrors the working Stack. Pointing a Core **ResourceSync** at
it makes the fleet **git-managed**: booth #N is a copy-pasted `[[stack]]` block; an image bump is a
one-line `TAG=` edit + push + Execute; every change is an auditable commit; a rebuilt Core
re-creates everything from the file. Keep the sync **Unmanaged** + **Delete-Unmatched OFF** until
trusted. An **empty diff / disabled Execute = the file already matches the live Stack** (success,
not an error). See `komodo/README.md` and [[fleet-deployment-komodo]].
### 7c. Break-glass — manual compose (mesh/Core down)
When the mesh or Core is unreachable, the same compose files run locally via `scripts/booth.sh`
(or raw `docker compose`). Needs a local `.env` and a `docker login git.infra.msai.al` (a
read-only package token). This is the FALLBACK, not the routine path:
```bash
docker login git.infra.msai.al
ENV=prod ./booth.sh config # dry-run the merged env
ENV=prod ./booth.sh up
```
`booth.sh` runs from wherever it sits next to the compose files (the booth deploys them flat, e.g.
`/opt/parking_systems/`). See [[container-deployment]].
### Healthy startup + web-access
Healthy logs: vision `Initialized LicensePlateDetector …` with NO "Downloading" (baked weights),
server `[migrate] done` → `SPA static serving enabled` → `Server listening`. The transient
`vision-service -> offline` at boot then `-> ready (fast_alpr)` ~8s later is normal (monitor polls `vision-service -> offline` at boot then `-> ready (fast_alpr)` ~8s later is normal (monitor polls
before vision finishes loading). Reach the UI at **`http://<name-or-ip>/`** (Caddy on :80). before vision finishes loading). Reach the UI at **`http://<name-or-ip>/`** (Caddy on :80).
**Web-access gotchas (all fixed in the images/compose — see [[container-deployment]] "Web access"):** **Web-access gotchas (all fixed in the images/compose — see [[container-deployment]] "Web access"):**
the SPA uses a RELATIVE `/api` base (works from any host; do NOT bake a domain) + a Caddy proxy gives the SPA uses a RELATIVE `/api` base (works from any host; do NOT bake a domain) + a Caddy proxy gives
the clean port-80 URL; the domain (`parksystems.msai.al`) is pointed at the booth's LAN IP via the clean port-80 URL; the domain (`parksystems.msai.al`) is pointed at the booth's LAN IP via
`hosts`/DNS ON-SITE, never an image rebuild. `hosts`/DNS ON-SITE, never an image rebuild. The **Tauri desktop app** is hardcoded to
`localhost:3000` (CSP + endpoints) and can't reach a remote booth without code changes — a browser
works; the desktop app is a separate workstream.
## Quick-reference: the gotchas, in order they bit us ## Quick-reference: the gotchas, in order they bit us
@@ -225,3 +316,19 @@ the clean port-80 URL; the domain (`parksystems.msai.al`) is pointed at the boot
5. Always keep the **password slot** + an off-machine copy of the passphrase (TPM is never the only key). 5. Always keep the **password slot** + an off-machine copy of the passphrase (TPM is never the only key).
6. GRUB password MUST be **edit-only** (`--unrestricted` on entries) or it prompts on EVERY boot → 6. GRUB password MUST be **edit-only** (`--unrestricted` on entries) or it prompts on EVERY boot →
breaks unattended reboot. Verify `grep -c unrestricted /boot/grub/grub.cfg` ≥1 before rebooting. breaks unattended reboot. Verify `grep -c unrestricted /boot/grub/grub.cfg` ≥1 before rebooting.
### Komodo deploy gotchas (2026-06-27)
7. Periphery `core_address` is **Core's reverse-proxy URL** (`https://komodo.infra.msai.al`), NOT
`100.x:9120`. Core's `9120` is exposed-not-published (`docker ps` shows `9120/tcp` with no `->`)
→ a direct dial gets `Connection refused`. Ping/SSH working over the mesh does NOT mean `:9120`
is reachable.
8. **Git auth ≠ registry auth.** The repo cloning fine does not mean image pull is authed — they're
separate Komodo credentials. A blank registry account on the Stack → anonymous pull →
`no basic auth credentials`. Set the Stack's **Registry Account** (`komodo`).
9. **User-mode Periphery + `/etc/komodo` `root_directory` = `Permission denied`** writing the agent
key. User-mode (runs as `admin`, no root daemon) must keep `root_directory` under `$HOME`.
10. The config key is **`core_address`** (singular). And `--core-address` derives `wss://` from
`https://` — if Core were plain-HTTP you'd need `http://` (→ `ws://`).
11. ResourceSync **Execute disabled + file shown clean in Info = empty diff = already in sync**
(success). Execute only enables when the file and Core diverge (e.g. you edit `TAG`).
+18 -1
View File
@@ -1695,8 +1695,25 @@ break-glass. Three settled choices: many/growing fleet · deploys **manual + pin
`dev-<sha>` (no webhook — preserves the determinism we chose by pinning) · secrets `dev-<sha>` (no webhook — preserves the determinism we chose by pinning) · secrets
**Komodo-managed, per-booth + unique**. Threat-model caveats recorded: Periphery is a root agent **Komodo-managed, per-booth + unique**. Threat-model caveats recorded: Periphery is a root agent
(bind to NetBird interface only, passkey+TLS, part of the TCB); `EVENT_SIGNING_KEY` in Core is a (bind to NetBird interface only, passkey+TLS, part of the TCB); `EVENT_SIGNING_KEY` in Core is a
fraud-root blast radius → per-booth keys + [[atecc608-secure-element|ATECC608]] as the real fraud-root blast radius → per-booth keys + [[atecc608|ATECC608]] as the real
long-term signer; Core becomes Tier-0. GPL-3.0 OK (external ops tooling, not a shipped dep — same long-term signer; Core becomes Tier-0. GPL-3.0 OK (external ops tooling, not a shipped dep — same
boundary logic as the AGPL vision exception). New page [[fleet-deployment-komodo]]; infra-as-code boundary logic as the AGPL vision exception). New page [[fleet-deployment-komodo]]; infra-as-code
sketch in `komodo/` (`resources.toml` + README + `.env.komodo.example`). Catalogued in `index.md`; sketch in `komodo/` (`resources.toml` + README + `.env.komodo.example`). Catalogued in `index.md`;
`container-deployment` cross-linked + reframed (booth.sh = fallback). `container-deployment` cross-linked + reframed (booth.sh = fallback).
## [2026-06-27] deploy | First Komodo booth deploy VERIFIED end-to-end (park-buzi)
Took the first booth through the whole Komodo flow on real hardware (Core v2.1.2 → agent reported
v2.2): onboarding key → Periphery installed **user-mode** (runs as `admin`, no root daemon,
**outbound** so the booth opens no inbound port) → server `park-buzi` **OK** in Core → Stack
(repo `mca/parking_solution`@`dev`, base+prod compose, registry account `komodo`, per-booth
`[[…]]` secrets) → all containers green → admin seeded via Komodo's container terminal (no SSH).
Then `komodo/resources.toml` rewritten to mirror the **working** Stack (exported from Core, v2.2
field shape, **Stack-only — no `[[server]]`** since onboarding owns the server), committed + pushed
(`dev` 9918f27); a ResourceSync reads it clean — **empty diff / Execute disabled = already in
sync** (success, not error). `booth.sh` fixed for the flat `/opt` layout earlier (83298bc).
Gotchas that bit us (now in [[appliance-provisioning]] §7 + gotchas 7–11): `core_address` is Core's
**proxy URL** not `:9120` (exposed-not-published → Connection refused); **git-auth ≠ registry-auth**
(blank registry account → `no basic auth credentials`); user-mode + `/etc/komodo` root_directory →
`Permission denied`; config key is **`core_address`** singular. [[appliance-provisioning]] §6 split:
§6 = engine, §7 = Komodo deploy (PRIMARY) with §7c manual `booth.sh` break-glass.