# Copy this file to `.env` (same folder: apps/server/.env) and fill it in. # The dev/start scripts load it automatically via Node's --env-file-if-exists. # # cp apps/server/.env.example apps/server/.env # # Required ---------------------------------------------------------------- # The server refuses to start without a strong JWT_SECRET (>=32 chars). # Generate one with: openssl rand -hex 32 JWT_SECRET= # Dedicated HMAC key for signing the append-only event ledger (>=16 chars). # Generate with: openssl rand -hex 32 # If unset, the server falls back to JWT_SECRET (logged as a warning) — fine for # dev, but set a dedicated key before production. Events store the key that signed # them (keyId), so verifyChain still validates a chain that spans a key change. EVENT_SIGNING_KEY= # On-site encrypted DB backup (durability for the signed ledger). A daily timer + an admin # "back up now" button write a consistent, AES-256-GCM-encrypted copy to the target. The # TARGET DIRECTORY is chosen by the admin in the UI (Setup → Backup) and stored in the DB — # NOT here. Only the encryption KEY is an env secret. RESTORE is an out-of-band runbook action, # not a console call. See wiki/concepts/backup-recovery.md. # # Dedicated backup-encryption key (>=16 chars), SEPARATE from EVENT_SIGNING_KEY so it can # rotate without fracturing the signed chain. Generate with: openssl rand -hex 32 # Escrow it offsite (alongside EVENT_SIGNING_KEY) — recovery needs both, and neither is ever # stored inside the backup it unlocks. Backups stay a no-op until BOTH this key and an in-UI # target directory are set. # BACKUP_KEY= # BACKUP_KEEP_LAST=7 # keep this many newest backups always # BACKUP_KEEP_DAILY_DAYS=30 # plus one-per-day within this window # Optional ---------------------------------------------------------------- # PORT=3000 # HOST=0.0.0.0 # interface to bind. 127.0.0.1 = loopback only. # LOG_LEVEL=info # DATABASE_URL=./parking.sqlite # # Auth-cookie Secure flag. FAIL-SAFE: cookies are Secure (HTTPS-only) BY DEFAULT — # you only ever opt OUT, never in. Set COOKIE_SECURE=0 for a plain-HTTP deployment # (e.g. the LAN appliance serving the SPA same-origin over http, where a Secure # cookie would never be sent and would lock operators out). Local dev over # http://localhost MUST set this (the dev .env does). Leave unset in any TLS deploy. # COOKIE_SECURE=0 # Recycle bin retention: a soft-deleted user/role/subscription/plan/tariff is auto-purged # this many days after deletion (a 6-hourly sweep). Default 30. Set 0 to keep deleted # items forever (manual purge only). See wiki/concepts/soft-delete.md. # RECYCLE_BIN_RETENTION_DAYS=30 # First admin (seed once): pnpm --filter @parking/server seed-admin # ADMIN_USER=admin # ADMIN_PASS= # Comma-separated extra origins allowed to open the booth WebSocket (/api/ws). # In dev, set the Vite SPA origin. Same-origin is always allowed without this. # The Tauri DESKTOP shell loads from tauri://localhost (Linux may also send # http://tauri.localhost), which is NOT same-origin with the backend — add both # so the desktop app's live feed connects. See apps/desktop. # To open the dev SPA from another LAN device (phone over wifi), Vite must bind # 0.0.0.0 (vite.config.ts) AND the host's LAN origin must be listed here, e.g. # http://10.0.10.203:5173 — the WS handshake's Origin is that LAN address. WS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=http://localhost:5173,tauri://localhost,http://tauri.localhost # Vision / ANPR (optional) ------------------------------------------------- # OFF by default. The Node SERVER's view of the vision microservice (apps/vision), # which runs as a separate process with its OWN apps/vision/.env. Both sides share the # VISION_ prefix but are different processes — keep the two .env files separate. # See wiki/entities/opencv-anpr-service.md "Configuration". # ANPR rides the entry/exit snapshot (button / QR / RFID triggers it) — no polling. # VISION_ENABLED=1 # master switch — nothing runs without it # VISION_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8089 # must match apps/vision VISION_HOST:VISION_PORT # VISION_TIMEOUT_MS=1500 # per-request cap so a slow call can't hang the lane # VISION_MIN_CONFIDENCE=0.5 # advisory confidence floor; keep in sync with the service # # ANPR subscriber-entry bridge (anpr-entry.ts): a subscriber's plate, read off a lane # camera's vehicle detection, admits them through the gated SubscriptionFlow. Opt-in per # camera (the camera's config.anpr checkbox in Setup); the camera must be BOUND to a relay. # VISION_ENTRY_MIN_CONFIDENCE=0.85 # stricter floor for a BARRIER-driving read (near-miss → falls back to card/QR) # ANPR_DEBOUNCE_MS=12000 # same plate/camera within this window = ONE presentation (camera re-fires ~1Hz)