Files
julian bfe64032d8 Initial scaffold: Turborepo monorepo + design wiki
Turborepo (pnpm workspaces) with all dependencies pinned to latest
mutually-compatible versions: turbo 2.9, TypeScript 6, Fastify 5,
React 19, Vite 8, better-sqlite3 12 + Drizzle ORM 0.45.

Layout:
- apps/server   Fastify backend (local JWT auth + role guard, /health)
- apps/web      React 19 + Vite 8 operator SPA
- packages/db   Drizzle schema on SQLite/WAL; append-only events + users
- packages/devices  reader/printer/relay adapter interfaces (intent-only relay)
- packages/shared   shared domain types

Architecture constraints from the design wiki are encoded in the scaffold:
append-only hash-chained + signed event log, device-agnostic adapters,
"a barrier is not a door" (relay expresses intent only), fully-local
offline-first auth.

wiki/ is an LLM-maintained Obsidian knowledge base (28 pages) ingested
from the architecture & design notes, with its own maintenance schema.

Verified: pnpm install, full turbo build (5/5), server boots and serves
/health, drizzle-kit generates the initial migration.
2026-06-14 00:34:11 +02:00

980 B

type, tags, sources, updated
type tags sources updated
concept
parking
architecture
security
decision
parking-system-architecture
2026-06-14

The Core Fork: Where Is the Trust Boundary?

The pivotal device-layer decision. Two valid architectures, chosen per deployment and mixable per lane. (See parking-system-architecture §5.)

Trust boundary Approach Property
= the network Off-the-shelf controller (uhppote-controller/ZKTeco), contained by network-isolation Auditable — tamper-evident, you don't own firmware
= the device Custom controller whose firmware enforces auth (esp32-custom-controller) Unforgeable — but you own the firmware

This is the detection-vs-prevention choice. With the UHPPOTE path, trustworthiness comes from event-log-ingestion + the append-only-event-chain. With the ESP32 path, it comes from challenge-response-auth. See uhppote-vs-esp32 for the head-to-head.