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parking_solution/wiki/concepts/device-input-flow.md
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julian 23919164ee Dingtian input HTTP-push to backend (no polling)
The device pushes button events to the backend via its Input Link URL feature;
the backend decides. No polling — the chosen entry architecture.

packages/devices:
- dingtian driver: configureInputPush() writes the device's input_link_url
  config (per-input server/port/path, en=1, active-LOW, plain HTTP) so each
  input HTTP-GETs the backend on press/release. Extracted #readConfig/#writeConfig
  (with the required command:setconfig injection + post-write reset tolerance).

apps/server:
- routes/devices.ts: public GET/POST
  /api/devices/dingtian/:deviceId/input/:n/{on,off} — translates a device push
  into an internal device event. Not behind cookie/CSRF (machine call from the
  device); trust comes from the signed event log, not this request.
- device-events.ts: internal EventEmitter bus so the entry flow subscribes to
  input events without coupling to HTTP. Wired into the server.

Verified on hardware: configured the device, then real presses on all 4 inputs
pushed to the backend (input N on+off, source = device IP). No polling.

wiki: device-input-flow concept (path + trust model for the flat/no-VLAN
network); dingtian-relay updated; index + log.
2026-06-14 15:10:50 +02:00

2.7 KiB

type, tags, sources, updated
type tags sources updated
concept
parking
architecture
devices
entry-flow
2026-06-15

Device Input Flow (button → backend → relay)

How a physical button press drives the entry lane. The backend is the source of truth: the device only reports the press; the host decides and commands the relay. This is the host-in-the- loop flow the dingtian-relay makes possible (and the uhppote-controller could not).

The path (no polling)

car arrives → driver presses button (input I_N, dry contact to GND)
  → device HTTP-pushes  GET …/api/devices/dingtian/<deviceId>/input/<N>/on
  → backend: emit internal device event (device-events bus)
  → backend entry flow: create + sign an entry event, print the ticket
  → backend: pulseOpen(N) over UDP  → barrier opens
  → (on release) device pushes …/input/<N>/off
  • Push, not poll. The device's input_link_url feature is configured (by the driver's configureInputPush()) to call the backend on each input edge — see dingtian-relay. The driver's poll path remains only as a dev/fallback aid.
  • Per-input path carries the input number in the URL (…/input/3/on), so routing needs no body parsing. Both edges (on/off) are sent.
  • Internal event bus (device-events.ts, a Node EventEmitter) decouples the HTTP/transport layer from business logic — drivers/pushes emit; the entry flow subscribes. Keeps the app device-adapter-pattern.

Trust model (important — flat network, no VLAN)

The relay-control direction (host → device) is unauthenticated UDP, and the site is a flat network with no VLAN (network-isolation is not yet enforceable here). So we do not trust the device or the network. Instead:

  • Every barrier open is a host decision, recorded as a signed event BEFORE the relay fires (append-only-event-chain). If anyone opens the relay out-of-band (which the flat network allows), there is no matching signed event → a detectable anomaly. The anti-fraud guarantee is the signed log, not device/network auth.
  • The inbound push endpoint is intentionally not behind the SPA's cookie/CSRF auth (it's a machine call from the device). A shared-secret / Basic-auth on the push is available as defence-in-depth (the device supports it) — worth adding, but it is not the security boundary.
  • This sharpens under the autonomous-direction roadmap: with no operator, tamper detection via the signed log matters more than perimeter auth.

Status

Input push verified on hardware (all 4 inputs, real presses reaching the backend). The entry flow itself (signed event + ticket print + pulseOpen) is the next build — see dingtian-relay.