julian
77606da2c9
Brought up the real UHPPOTE controller (serial 225088491, fw 09120) end to end and recorded a procurement-level blocker. Verified on hardware: - discovery (LAN scan), host-commanded openDoor on doors 1 & 2 (physically actuated; reason="remote open door"), and live button capture (reason="push button ok"). Driver/networking fixes (packages/devices/src/drivers/access-uhppote.ts): - broadcast to subnet-directed address (lib doesn't enable SO_BROADCAST for the global 255.255.255.255 -> EACCES); - Config broadcast must match the target's subnet for unicast reply routing (fixes the health-check timeout: 5s -> 24ms ready); - discover across all local subnets, dedupe by serial; - serialize all controller I/O (concurrent calls collided on UDP :60001). Server/UX: - load .env via node --env-file-if-exists (vars weren't being read before); - SETUP_AUTH_BYPASS hardened: env-gated, dev + loopback only, fails closed otherwise; surfaced as catalog.authBypass so the wizard drops the token field; - .env.example documents all vars; inline favicon stops a 404. - apps/server/scripts/: uhppote-listen (live events, restores prior listener) and uhppote-relay (guarded door-open test). BLOCKER (wiki/decisions/access-controller-button-flow.md): the controller's push-button input auto-opens the relay in firmware with no report-without-open mode, so ticket-first entry (button -> print -> open, fail-closed) is impossible as wired. UHPPOTE can't do it on that input; ZKTeco *might* via a programmable aux input + PULL SDK but that's unverified and needs a new driver. Entry-lane hardware decision paused to focus on the business side. wiki: access-controller-button-flow (blocker), zkteco-controller (stub + assessment), uhppote-controller callout, index + log.
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type, tags, updated
| type | tags | updated | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| overview |
|
2026-06-14 |
Index
Content catalog for the wiki. Start at overview. Maintained on every ingest. Counts: 1 source · 14 entities · 10 concepts · 2 decision records.
Overview & navigation
- overview — the top-level synthesis and entry point.
- index — this catalog.
log.md— chronological record of ingests/queries/lints.
Sources
- parking-system-architecture — design notes: stack, threat model, devices, UHPPOTE, ESP32, readers, BOM, open decisions.
Entities — technology stack
- technology-stack — the full stack table; all MIT/Apache/BSD, chosen to avoid lock-in.
- fastify — Node backend; hosts device-driver plugins + auth; serves the SPA.
- sqlite — local single-writer DB (WAL); limits & why it fits.
- drizzle-orm — ORM; schemas port to PostgreSQL for remote sync.
- turborepo — monorepo tool.
- react-vite-spa — React/Vite frontend served by Fastify.
- local-jwt-auth — fully local auth (JWT + bcrypt + role guard); forced by offline-first.
Entities — rejected alternatives
- payload-cms — strong, but rejected over BSL license shift (the rug-pull cautionary case).
- refine — dropped for plain React; UI too simple to justify a framework.
- logto-zitadel-oidc — OIDC providers ruled out by offline-first.
Entities — hardware & devices
- uhppote-controller — current access controller; cheap, tamper-evident, open-UDP, fixed firmware.
- esp32-custom-controller — prevention-grade upgrade; device-level auth.
- atecc608 — secure element; non-extractable signing key (host events + controller auth).
- wiegand — reader standard feeding the controller directly (autonomous permit-holder path).
- lpr-camera — edge-AI plate recognition; host-side casual-identity source.
- zkteco-controller — C3/inBio controller; aux-input path may enable host-in-the-loop (driver TBD).
- bom — reference bill of materials (barrier, loops, controller, readers, payment, host, network).
Concepts — foundational forces
- offline-first — no network dependency in core operation; what it forces (and doesn't).
- threat-model — the operator-at-the-booth reframing; why encryption defends the wrong threat.
Concepts — integrity & anti-fraud
- append-only-event-chain — append-only + hash chain + ATECC608 signing = unforgeable log.
- reconciliation — the real anti-fraud control; what remote sync actually is.
- disk-os-hardening — LUKS/GRUB/Secure Boot; worthwhile but not the main event.
Concepts — device architecture & safety
- device-adapter-pattern — business logic talks to interfaces; swap hardware → new adapter.
- device-registry — catalog of selectable drivers per category (admin-configurable).
- first-run-setup — admin assigns devices per lane from the catalog at install.
- device-discovery — optional driver capability to scan the LAN (UHPPOTE UDP broadcast).
- barrier-not-a-door — never timed-close a barrier; safety lives in barrier firmware.
- trust-boundary — the core fork: network vs. device; auditable vs. unforgeable.
- fail-state-safety — entry fails closed, exit fails open; manual override; watchdog.
Concepts — access control
- uhppote-udp-protocol — open UDP weakness + the unauthenticated commands that undermine the log.
- network-isolation — mandatory VLAN isolation; the network as security boundary.
- event-log-ingestion — host-side index tracking that makes the UHPPOTE log trustworthy.
- challenge-response-auth — asymmetric nonce scheme for the ESP32 (auth + anti-replay).
- entry-exit-readers — two populations, two integration paths; both can share a relay.
- uhppote-vs-esp32 — comparison: detection vs. prevention.
Decisions
- standing-decisions — settled decisions (stack, platform, integrity, access control, readers).
- open-questions — 7 open items (6 procurement + JWT key choice); ESP32 device auth deferred.
- access-controller-button-flow — ⚠️ BLOCKER: UHPPOTE/ZKTeco on hand can't do ticket-first entry as wired.