julian
355026dcf7
Neither UHPPOTE nor ZKTeco is used — the Dingtian relay controller was chosen and verified. Remove their code and re-scope the wiki. Code: - delete access-uhppote.ts, uhppoted.d.ts, access.ts (zkteco/esp32-relay stubs), and the three uhppote-*.mjs hardware test scripts. - remove the `uhppoted` npm dependency from @parking/devices and @parking/server. - unregister uhppote/zkteco/esp32-relay from the driver registry; drop their exports. Catalog access drivers = dingtian only. Build green (5/5). - refresh now-stale example comments (registry/interfaces/setup/api) to use current examples; keep the two "UHPPOTE blocker" references that explain why the precondition capability exists. Wiki (kept pages, re-scoped): - uhppote-controller, zkteco-controller -> rejected/historical with callouts; uhppote-vs-esp32 -> historical (detection-vs-prevention lens still useful). - re-point all "current device" framing (standing-decisions, bom, overview, open-questions, device-registry, device-discovery, index) to dingtian-relay. - transferable concepts (network-isolation, event-log-ingestion, barrier-not-a- door, threat-model) untouched. Raw source immutable. Links lint clean.
2.8 KiB
2.8 KiB
type, tags, sources, updated
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| overview |
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2026-06-14 |
Parking System — Overview
The synthesis / entry point for this wiki. Start here, then follow links. Catalog of every page: index. Source summaries: parking-system-architecture.
What it is
A parking-management web application running on a dedicated, hardened Linux appliance deployed on-site at a parking facility. Two forces shape nearly every decision:
- offline-first — a park may be air-gapped; nothing core may depend on a network.
- threat-model — the primary adversary is the legitimate operator at the booth, not an outsider. The classic fraud is take the cash, delete the record.
The architecture in one pass
- Stack (technology-stack / standing-decisions): turborepo · fastify · react-vite-spa · sqlite + drizzle-orm · local-jwt-auth — all open-licensed to avoid lock-in (cf. rejected payload-cms, refine, logto-zitadel-oidc).
- Integrity is the heart of it: an append-only-event-chain (hash-chained, atecc608- signed) plus external reconciliation — that's what remote sync really is. Encryption at rest (disk-os-hardening) defends a secondary threat.
- Devices sit behind a device-adapter-pattern (swap hardware → new adapter only), with the barrier-not-a-door safety principle keeping physical safety in barrier-operator firmware.
- Access control today is the dingtian-relay relay+input controller behind network-isolation — chosen because its inputs are decoupled from its relays, enabling host-in-the-loop ticket-first entry (resolving access-controller-button-flow). The uhppote-controller and zkteco-controller were evaluated and rejected (historical). The deeper fork is still the trust-boundary (uhppote-vs-esp32); the esp32-custom-controller remains the prevention-grade alternative.
- Readers split two ways (entry-exit-readers): permit holders via wiegand (autonomous), casual/transient via host-side lpr-camera / QR; both can share a relay.
- A reference bom lists recommended devices.
Where it stands
6 open-questions still drive procurement — most critically lane topology, failure modes (fail-open on exit), the reconciliation channel, and backup/durability.
Reading paths
- Security-first: threat-model → append-only-event-chain → reconciliation → uhppote-vs-esp32.
- Hardware-first: bom → dingtian-relay → access-controller-button-flow → entry-exit-readers.
- Stack-first: technology-stack → offline-first → device-adapter-pattern.