parking_solution/wiki/index.md

type, tags, updated

type	tags	updated
overview	parking index	2026-06-14

Index

Content catalog for the wiki. Start at overview. Maintained on every ingest. Counts: 3 sources · 19 entities · 25 concepts · 5 decision records.

Overview & navigation

• overview — the top-level synthesis and entry point.
• index — this catalog.
• log.md — chronological record of ingests/queries/lints.

Sources

• parking-system-architecture — design notes: stack, threat model, devices, UHPPOTE, ESP32, readers, BOM, open decisions.
• gee-qr-er80 — datasheet: GEE QR access reader (QR/DM/1D; Wiegand/RS-232/485/USB/TCP; Linux).
• qrcode-sdk — QRCode SDK v1.6.5: the reader's HTTP-GET-poll protocol + JSON verdict (beep/output).

Entities — technology stack

• technology-stack — the full stack table; all MIT/Apache/BSD, chosen to avoid lock-in.
• fastify — Node backend; hosts device-driver plugins + auth; serves the SPA.
• sqlite — local single-writer DB (WAL); limits & why it fits.
• drizzle-orm — ORM; schemas port to PostgreSQL for remote sync.
• turborepo — monorepo tool.
• react-vite-spa — React/Vite frontend served by Fastify.
• local-jwt-auth — fully local auth (JWT + bcrypt + role guard); forced by offline-first.

Entities — rejected alternatives

• payload-cms — strong, but rejected over BSL license shift (the rug-pull cautionary case).
• refine — dropped for plain React; UI too simple to justify a framework.
• logto-zitadel-oidc — OIDC providers ruled out by offline-first.

Entities — hardware & devices

• uhppote-controller — ❌ rejected/historical; firmware auto-open blocker drove the switch to Dingtian.
• esp32-custom-controller — prevention-grade upgrade; device-level auth.
• atecc608 — secure element; non-extractable signing key (host events + controller auth).
• wiegand — reader standard feeding the controller directly (autonomous permit-holder path).
• lpr-camera — edge-AI plate recognition; host-side casual-identity source.
• gee-qr-er80 — QR access reader on hand; host-side serial → read bus (the QR-ticket scanner).
• zkteco-controller — ❌ rejected/historical; aux-input path was a contender, not pursued.
• dingtian-relay — ✅ CHOSEN access controller; decoupled inputs solve the button blocker (driver verified on hardware).
• rongta-printer — ✅ CHOSEN 80mm thermal printer; ESC/POS over raw TCP 9100; driver written, one unit reachable at 10.0.10.6.
• bom — reference bill of materials (barrier, loops, controller, readers, payment, host, network).

Concepts — foundational forces

• offline-first — no network dependency in core operation; what it forces (and doesn't).
• threat-model — the operator-at-the-booth reframing; why encryption defends the wrong threat.

Concepts — integrity & anti-fraud

• append-only-event-chain — append-only + hash chain + ATECC608 signing = unforgeable log.
• reconciliation — the real anti-fraud control; what remote sync actually is.
• disk-os-hardening — LUKS/GRUB/Secure Boot; worthwhile but not the main event.

Concepts — device architecture & safety

• device-adapter-pattern — business logic talks to interfaces; swap hardware → new adapter.
• device-registry — catalog of selectable drivers per category (admin-configurable).
• first-run-setup — admin adds controllers + binds readers/cameras to relays from the catalog at install.
• device-input-flow — button → device push → backend decides → relay; backend is source of truth.
• device-discovery — optional driver capability to scan the LAN (no current driver uses it; UHPPOTE was the example).
• barrier-not-a-door — never timed-close a barrier; safety lives in barrier firmware.
• printer-roles-failover — ≥2 printers by role; entry ticket falls back outside→booth.
• printer-status-monitoring — live poll of paper/cover/cutter/offline via the device's status page; SSE to the booth UI.
• trust-boundary — the core fork: network vs. device; auditable vs. unforgeable.
• fail-state-safety — entry fails closed, exit fails open; manual override; watchdog.

Concepts — access control

• uhppote-udp-protocol — open UDP weakness + the unauthenticated commands that undermine the log.
• network-isolation — mandatory VLAN isolation; the network as security boundary.
• event-log-ingestion — host-side index tracking that makes the UHPPOTE log trustworthy.
• challenge-response-auth — asymmetric nonce scheme for the ESP32 (auth + anti-replay).
• entry-exit-readers — two populations, two integration paths; both can share a relay.
• entry-exit-points — pool-of-spaces model (no lane); per-relay direction, reader→relay binding, camera snapshots.
• uhppote-vs-esp32 — comparison: detection vs. prevention.

Concepts — business domain

• parking-session — the core domain entity; a projection over the signed log, never a mutable table.
• tariff — fee model; pure, data-driven, offline; pay-on-foot adds a walk-back grace window.
• shift — manned-only accountability period; explicit Start/End (not time-based); End → signed + printed Z-report (cash + POS).
• capacity-occupancy — live count = open sessions; refuse entry + FULL sign when full (soft policy); exit never blocked.
• site-metadata — optional park identity (name, operator, VAT, address, contact) in site_config; feeds the ticket header.
• valet-overcapacity — "full" is soft: operator may valet-accept over capacity (keys handed over, custody). Manned, deferred.
• validation-discounts — merchant validates a ticket → signed discount event applied at fee time.
• reporting-analytics — revenue/occupancy/stay reports + plate-search, all projections over the signed log.
• clock-integrity — fees depend on the host clock; detect/flag backdating on an offline box.
• ticket-encoding — transient ticket id as QR; printed at entry, scanned at pay station + exit; plate-as-ticket alt.
• anti-passback — block/flag one id entering twice without an exit; fold over open sessions.
• device-events — unsigned hardware telemetry (relay/printer/camera/reader/input); separate from the signed ledger.
• permit — subscription; RF/QR or plate identity, registered-cars + max-concurrent, host-in-loop; short-circuits payment.
• opencv-anpr-service — host-side vision microservice: ANPR (plate identity) + vehicle verification (anti-plate-spoofing witness).
• blocklist — barred plates/cards refused at entry (never at exit); signed, attributed.

Dev environment (reference)

• local-dev-workflow — running the stack locally; setup, the dev-hang gotchas, seed:admin.
• wsl-dev-networking — WSL2 NAT blocks device broadcast; use mirrored mode + the gotchas after.

Decisions

• standing-decisions — settled decisions (stack, platform, integrity, access control, readers).
• open-questions — 9 open items (procurement + JWT key + FX + pay-station money corners); ESP32 device auth deferred.
• access-controller-button-flow — ✅ RESOLVED: Dingtian decoupled inputs enable ticket-first entry (was a UHPPOTE/ZKTeco blocker).
• autonomous-direction — roadmap: toward fully unmanned (no booth); reshapes threat model + fail-state.
• dingtian-vs-mqtt — transport choice: direct HTTP/UDP now, MQTT parked until multi-lane scale.
• session-model — business layer start: session = projection; transient-first; pay-on-foot. New event types.
• vision-service — build a host-side ANPR + vehicle-verification service; replaces edge-LPR; scoped AGPL exception.
• event-streams-split — split the signed business ledger (ledger_events) from unsigned device telemetry (device_events).