julian
bfe64032d8
Turborepo (pnpm workspaces) with all dependencies pinned to latest mutually-compatible versions: turbo 2.9, TypeScript 6, Fastify 5, React 19, Vite 8, better-sqlite3 12 + Drizzle ORM 0.45. Layout: - apps/server Fastify backend (local JWT auth + role guard, /health) - apps/web React 19 + Vite 8 operator SPA - packages/db Drizzle schema on SQLite/WAL; append-only events + users - packages/devices reader/printer/relay adapter interfaces (intent-only relay) - packages/shared shared domain types Architecture constraints from the design wiki are encoded in the scaffold: append-only hash-chained + signed event log, device-agnostic adapters, "a barrier is not a door" (relay expresses intent only), fully-local offline-first auth. wiki/ is an LLM-maintained Obsidian knowledge base (28 pages) ingested from the architecture & design notes, with its own maintenance schema. Verified: pnpm install, full turbo build (5/5), server boots and serves /health, drizzle-kit generates the initial migration.
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UHPPOTE Controller (current choice)
The starting access-control hardware: a UHPPOTE Wiegand 26/34 network controller (4-door) — a cheap reader-plus-relay frontend, acceptable provided you understand its limits. The plan is UHPPOTE now → ZKTeco later (see bom). (See parking-system-architecture §6.)
What it is
- Combines reader input (wiegand) and door relays, with an onboard card list enabling autonomous offline decisions for Wiegand lanes.
- Stores an indexed event log (see event-log-ingestion):
get-eventsreturns the stored range + current index; each record has event ID, timestamp, card number, door, access-granted flag, reason code. At the record level it's effectively append-only — no command edits/deletes an individual event.
The catch
It speaks the uhppote-udp-protocol: UDP port 60000, no auth, no encryption. Anyone on
the LAN can open any door — and several unauthenticated commands can blind/reset/skew the log.
So the device is tamper-evident, not tamper-proof, and only trustworthy behind
network-isolation (mandatory). Firmware cannot be customized — the open-source
uhppoted ecosystem is protocol reverse-engineering only; the controller accepts only the
manufacturer's official firmware images.
Make the log trustworthy via event-log-ingestion (host-side index tracking) landing into the append-only-event-chain. For prevention-grade authentication, see the esp32-custom-controller. The choice between them is the trust-boundary decision.