julian
0985b86fa7
Foundation for testing every service. Adds @parking/db/testing — createTestDb() spins a fresh in-memory SQLite and applies the real Drizzle migrations, so server tests run against the production schema with zero live-DB risk. Wires Vitest into apps/server (test script + config; test signing keys via env) and adds the first Phase-1 suites against the anti-fraud core: - signer.test.ts (10): sign/verify round-trip, tamper + forgery rejection, malformed-signature guard, determinism, keyId rotation (buildVerifier). - event-log.test.ts (12): monotonic index, prevHash linkage, payload-in-signature, append serialization, and verifyChain() catching every tamper class — edited payload, deleted row (index gap), broken prevHash, unknown keyId — plus canonicalize byte-stability. Also stops *.test.ts leaking into shipped dist/ (tsconfig exclude in server + shared; shared had been emitting compiled tests all along). server 22/22, shared 87/87 green. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
78 lines
3.0 KiB
TypeScript
78 lines
3.0 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
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import { SoftwareSigner, buildSigner, buildVerifier } from "./signer.js";
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// The signer is half of the anti-fraud chain (the other half is event-log's hashing).
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// These tests pin: a sign/verify round-trip, rejection of any tamper, constant-time
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// length handling, and the keyId rotation contract that lets one chain span keys.
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describe("SoftwareSigner", () => {
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it("verifies its own signature (round-trip)", () => {
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const s = new SoftwareSigner("a-test-secret-key");
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const sig = s.sign("hello world");
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expect(s.verify("hello world", sig)).toBe(true);
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});
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it("rejects a signature over different content (tamper-evidence)", () => {
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const s = new SoftwareSigner("a-test-secret-key");
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const sig = s.sign("amount=100");
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// Flip the signed content — the whole point of signing the payload.
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expect(s.verify("amount=9999", sig)).toBe(false);
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});
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it("rejects a signature made under a different key (forgery)", () => {
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const real = new SoftwareSigner("the-real-host-key");
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const forger = new SoftwareSigner("an-attacker-guess");
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const forged = forger.sign("amount=100");
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expect(real.verify("amount=100", forged)).toBe(false);
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});
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it("rejects a malformed / wrong-length signature without throwing", () => {
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const s = new SoftwareSigner("a-test-secret-key");
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// timingSafeEqual throws on length mismatch; verify() must guard it.
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expect(() => s.verify("x", "deadbeef")).not.toThrow();
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expect(s.verify("x", "deadbeef")).toBe(false);
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expect(s.verify("x", "")).toBe(false);
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});
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it("is deterministic — same key + payload yields the same signature", () => {
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const a = new SoftwareSigner("k").sign("p");
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const b = new SoftwareSigner("k").sign("p");
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expect(a).toBe(b);
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});
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it("defaults to the v2 keyId", () => {
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expect(new SoftwareSigner("k").keyId).toBe("sw-hmac-v2");
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});
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});
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describe("buildSigner", () => {
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// vitest.config.ts sets EVENT_SIGNING_KEY + JWT_SECRET for the whole run.
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it("prefers EVENT_SIGNING_KEY (keyId sw-hmac-v2)", () => {
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const s = buildSigner();
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expect(s.keyId).toBe("sw-hmac-v2");
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const sig = s.sign("x");
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expect(s.verify("x", sig)).toBe(true);
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});
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});
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describe("buildVerifier (key rotation)", () => {
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it("returns a working verifier for the configured v2 key", () => {
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const v = buildVerifier("sw-hmac-v2");
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expect(v).toBeDefined();
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const signer = new SoftwareSigner(process.env.EVENT_SIGNING_KEY!, "sw-hmac-v2");
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expect(v!.verify("x", signer.sign("x"))).toBe(true);
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});
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it("resolves the jwtfallback key when present", () => {
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const v = buildVerifier("sw-hmac-jwtfallback");
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expect(v).toBeDefined();
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const signer = new SoftwareSigner(process.env.JWT_SECRET!, "sw-hmac-jwtfallback");
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expect(v!.verify("x", signer.sign("x"))).toBe(true);
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});
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it("returns undefined for an unknown keyId (key gone, not a false tamper)", () => {
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expect(buildVerifier("atecc608-slot0")).toBeUndefined();
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expect(buildVerifier("nonsense")).toBeUndefined();
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});
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});
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