The dynamic-RBAC management routes are themselves grantable (role:* and
user:*), so a non-admin holding them could self-escalate: edit their own
role to add a permission they lack, mint a privileged role, assign someone
the admin role, or reset/delete a more-privileged account. Found by the
commit security review (2× HIGH).
Fix — enforce the RBAC invariant "you cannot grant beyond yourself":
- roles.ts: role:create/update reject any permission not held by the caller
(escalates()). An admin holds the full set, so it stays unrestricted.
- users.ts: user:create/update reject assigning a role whose permissions
exceed the caller's; update/password-reset/delete reject acting on a user
whose current role exceeds the caller's (exceedsCaller()).
The existing no-lockout + builtin-admin protections are unchanged.
Verified: 10-assertion inject test — manager (role:* + user:* but no
tariff:update, not admin) gets 403 on self-grant, minting a privileged role,
assigning/resetting/deleting an admin; admin stays unrestricted; the manager
can still create peers + in-scope roles (not over-blocked). Full build green.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
julian
ef0ecadff9