julian
727c62da90
- site_config gains optional park identity (park_name, operator_name, nius, address, phone, email); additive Drizzle migration 0001. GET/PUT /api/site-config read/write the full config (PUT partial patch, admin only); SiteSettings + SetupWizard expose the fields. - renderTicket() prints an Albanian header sourced from site_config, the all-numeric 13-digit ticket id (12 random + Luhn) as Code128, large digits, and a lost-ticket footer. CP852 codepage so ë/ç render. - Widen the Code128 module width 2->3 and height 80->100 dots so the short-range "Simple" QR/barcode reader decodes reliably (was barely reading at module width 2 on the 80mm head). See wiki/concepts/site-metadata.md and ticket-encoding.md.
88 lines
3.9 KiB
TypeScript
88 lines
3.9 KiB
TypeScript
import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
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import type { Signer } from "@parking/shared";
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// Concrete signers for the append-only event chain. The Signer interface is the
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// abstraction over the ATECC608 secure element (open-question #6 — chip not yet
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// confirmed wired). Until the chip is present we use a software HMAC signer:
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// it makes the chain self-consistent + tamper-evident, but is NOT unforgeable by
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// someone who owns the host (only the ATECC608's non-extractable key is). The
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// swap to hardware is a new Signer impl — no event-log changes.
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// See wiki/concepts/append-only-event-chain.md and wiki/entities/atecc608.md.
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/** HMAC-SHA256 software signer. Key from env; fail fast if missing in prod. */
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export class SoftwareSigner implements Signer {
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readonly keyId: string;
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readonly #key: Buffer;
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// v2 canonical form: `lane` dropped from the signed array (pool-of-spaces model,
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// 2026-06-16). v1 events used a different field order and won't verify under v2 —
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// that's intentional and gated by the per-event keyId. See event-log canonicalize().
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constructor(secret: string, keyId = "sw-hmac-v2") {
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this.#key = Buffer.from(secret, "utf8");
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this.keyId = keyId;
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}
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sign(payload: string): string {
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return createHmac("sha256", this.#key).update(payload, "utf8").digest("hex");
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}
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verify(payload: string, signature: string): boolean {
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const expected = this.sign(payload);
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// Constant-time compare; bail on length mismatch (timingSafeEqual throws).
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if (expected.length !== signature.length) return false;
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return timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(expected, "hex"), Buffer.from(signature, "hex"));
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}
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}
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/**
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* Build the process signer. Uses EVENT_SIGNING_KEY (HMAC secret). Falls back to
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* the JWT secret only as a last resort so dev works out of the box — logged as a
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* warning, because reusing the auth secret for event signing is not ideal.
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*
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* TODO(atecc608): when the secure element is wired, return an Atecc608Signer here
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* (keyId "atecc608-slotN"); existing events stay verifiable via their stored keyId.
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*/
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export function buildSigner(log?: { warn: (msg: string) => void }): Signer {
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const dedicated = process.env.EVENT_SIGNING_KEY;
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if (dedicated && dedicated.length >= 16) {
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return new SoftwareSigner(dedicated);
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}
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const jwtSecret = process.env.JWT_SECRET;
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if (jwtSecret && jwtSecret.length >= 16) {
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log?.warn(
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"event signing: EVENT_SIGNING_KEY unset — falling back to JWT_SECRET. Set a dedicated key (and wire the ATECC608) before production.",
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);
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return new SoftwareSigner(jwtSecret, "sw-hmac-jwtfallback");
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}
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throw new Error(
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"event signing: no signing key. Set EVENT_SIGNING_KEY (>=16 chars) for the append-only event chain.",
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);
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}
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/**
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* Resolve the signer that can VERIFY an existing event, by its stored `keyId`.
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* Appends always use the one signer from buildSigner(), but a chain can contain
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* events signed under different keys across a rotation (e.g. the JWT_SECRET
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* fallback before a dedicated EVENT_SIGNING_KEY was set, or an ATECC608 swap).
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* Each event stores its own `keyId`, so verifyChain() must check each row against
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* the key that produced it — not the current append-signer. Returns undefined for
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* an unknown keyId (the key is gone / not configured), which verifyChain surfaces
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* as a distinct failure rather than a false "tampered" alarm.
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*
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* TODO(atecc608): add an "atecc608-slotN" case returning a public-key verifier.
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*/
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export function buildVerifier(keyId: string): Signer | undefined {
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switch (keyId) {
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case "sw-hmac-v2": {
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const k = process.env.EVENT_SIGNING_KEY;
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return k && k.length >= 16 ? new SoftwareSigner(k, "sw-hmac-v2") : undefined;
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}
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case "sw-hmac-jwtfallback": {
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const k = process.env.JWT_SECRET;
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return k && k.length >= 16 ? new SoftwareSigner(k, "sw-hmac-jwtfallback") : undefined;
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}
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default:
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return undefined;
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}
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}
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