Files

T

julian d0536da3d7 feat(desktop): Tauri v2 kiosk shell — maximized window, prod right-click block, auto-update + code-signing

Add apps/desktop, a thin Tauri v2 shell wrapping the SAME @parking/web SPA so
the desktop and browser UIs never drift: dev loads the Vite dev server (HMR),
prod bundles the web app's dist/. No business logic in the shell (device/auth/
ledger stay in @parking/server); deny-by-default capabilities.

apps/web (single UI source of truth):
- lib/origin.ts: centralize the backend origin (API_BASE/apiUrl/wsUrl from
  VITE_API_BASE); no-op in the browser, lets the desktop build target Fastify.
- lib/kiosk.ts: block the right-click context menu in PROD only (dev keeps it +
  devtools).
- lib/desktop-updater.ts: prompt-on-update auto-update (no-op in browser/offline)
  → downloadAndInstall + relaunch; i18n update.* keys (sq+en).
- .env.production: VITE_API_BASE wired to the Fastify origin for the bundle.

Desktop:
- window starts maximized (not fullscreen — operator keeps OS access).
- auto-update via tauri-plugin-updater + -process; self-hosted endpoint is a
  PLACEHOLDER to fill in. Updater keypair: pubkey embedded in tauri.conf.json;
  private key + password kept OUTSIDE the repo (~/.parking-updater-keys) and as
  TAURI_SIGNING_* build secrets.
- Turbo build is a no-op; the real signed bundle is `pnpm --filter
  @parking/desktop bundle` (verified → .deb/.rpm/.AppImage + .sig signatures).

Verified: cargo check clean; turbo run build lint 14/14 green; i18n parity holds;
no key/sig/bundle artifacts in the repo.

Wiki (security + desktop analysis recorded alongside):
- new concepts/tpm.md (TPM 2.0: how it works, sealed-LUKS auto-unlock + non-
  extractable signing key, limits — live-root, bus-sniff — TPM-vs-ATECC608 by
  platform).
- new decisions/desktop-shell-tauri.md (Tauri v2 over Electron; best-case Ubuntu
  26.04 LTS, worst-case Windows+WSL → kiosk browser; full as-built).
- pull-the-disk attack trace on append-only-event-chain; ATECC608 not-in-a-PC
  caveat; cross-links from disk-os-hardening / threat-model.
- open-questions #11 (appliance WebKitGTK), #12 (TPM hardening impl), #13
  (startup verifyChain self-check); index/overview/log/standing-decisions.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V

2026-06-21 12:21:49 +02:00

1.5 KiB

Raw Blame History

type, tags, sources, updated

type

Disk / OS Hardening

Worthwhile, but not the main event — it defends against the outsider-with-physical-access, not the operator (see threat-model). (See parking-system-architecture §3.)

Physical-access attacks on Windows are trivial (boot media + password-reset tools), so a dedicated Linux machine is the correct platform — not Windows or WSL. This is a standing-decisions.

LUKS full-disk encryption — defeats boot-from-USB.
GRUB password + Secure Boot — prevents boot-parameter tampering / unsigned loaders.
No desktop environment — single-purpose appliance.
Key-based SSH only.
tpm (recommended, 2026-06-21) — seals the LUKS key to the boot chain so the disk auto-unlocks only on an untampered boot, making encryption-at-rest compatible with unattended reboot (a booth must come back up after a power cut without a human typing a passphrase). Also a candidate home for the non-extractable host event-signing key. Caveats (live-root limit, bus-sniff, PCR brittleness, mandatory recovery passphrase + re-seal runbook) on tpm; implementation is open-questions #12.

With LUKS in place, SQLCipher becomes optional defence-in-depth rather than the critical layer. (The custom controller adds its own: ESP32 flash encryption + secure boot — see esp32-custom-controller.)

1.5 KiB Raw Blame History

Disk / OS Hardening

1.5 KiB

Raw Blame History