julian
bfe64032d8
Turborepo (pnpm workspaces) with all dependencies pinned to latest mutually-compatible versions: turbo 2.9, TypeScript 6, Fastify 5, React 19, Vite 8, better-sqlite3 12 + Drizzle ORM 0.45. Layout: - apps/server Fastify backend (local JWT auth + role guard, /health) - apps/web React 19 + Vite 8 operator SPA - packages/db Drizzle schema on SQLite/WAL; append-only events + users - packages/devices reader/printer/relay adapter interfaces (intent-only relay) - packages/shared shared domain types Architecture constraints from the design wiki are encoded in the scaffold: append-only hash-chained + signed event log, device-agnostic adapters, "a barrier is not a door" (relay expresses intent only), fully-local offline-first auth. wiki/ is an LLM-maintained Obsidian knowledge base (28 pages) ingested from the architecture & design notes, with its own maintenance schema. Verified: pnpm install, full turbo build (5/5), server boots and serves /health, drizzle-kit generates the initial migration.
32 lines
1.8 KiB
Markdown
32 lines
1.8 KiB
Markdown
---
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type: concept
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tags: [parking, comparison, access-control, security]
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sources: [parking-system-architecture]
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updated: 2026-06-14
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---
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# UHPPOTE vs. Custom ESP32 — Detection vs. Prevention
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A head-to-head on the [[trust-boundary]] fork: the off-the-shelf [[uhppote-controller]] versus
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the [[esp32-custom-controller]]. (Synthesized from [[parking-system-architecture]] §6–7.)
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| | [[uhppote-controller]] | [[esp32-custom-controller]] |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| **Trust boundary** | The network | The device |
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| **Security posture** | Tamper-**evident** (detection) | Tamper-**proof** (prevention) |
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| **Command auth** | None — [[uhppote-udp-protocol]] is open UDP | [[challenge-response-auth]] (asymmetric sigs) |
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| **Key mitigation** | [[network-isolation]] (mandatory) + [[event-log-ingestion]] | [[atecc608]] holds non-extractable key; controller stores only a public key |
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| **Firmware** | Manufacturer-only; not customizable | You own it (tiny + auditable) |
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| **Cost / effort** | Cheap, off-the-shelf, available now | Build + firmware reliability, EMC/surge, field maintenance |
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| **Replay/forgery on the wire** | Possible — contained only by isolation | Defeated by fresh per-command nonce |
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| **Safety** | Barrier operator owns it ([[barrier-not-a-door]]) | Same + explicit [[fail-state-safety]] |
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## Bottom line
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- The UHPPOTE is the **current choice**: good enough as a detection/audit layer **when only the
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host can reach it** (isolation) and every event lands in the [[append-only-event-chain]].
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- The ESP32 is the **documented upgrade** when you need a control path that holds even against an
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attacker on the wire. They're **mixable per lane**.
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- Both still rely on host-side integrity ([[append-only-event-chain]]) and external
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[[reconciliation]] as the ultimate anti-fraud control.
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