julian
d0536da3d7
Add apps/desktop, a thin Tauri v2 shell wrapping the SAME @parking/web SPA so the desktop and browser UIs never drift: dev loads the Vite dev server (HMR), prod bundles the web app's dist/. No business logic in the shell (device/auth/ ledger stay in @parking/server); deny-by-default capabilities. apps/web (single UI source of truth): - lib/origin.ts: centralize the backend origin (API_BASE/apiUrl/wsUrl from VITE_API_BASE); no-op in the browser, lets the desktop build target Fastify. - lib/kiosk.ts: block the right-click context menu in PROD only (dev keeps it + devtools). - lib/desktop-updater.ts: prompt-on-update auto-update (no-op in browser/offline) → downloadAndInstall + relaunch; i18n update.* keys (sq+en). - .env.production: VITE_API_BASE wired to the Fastify origin for the bundle. Desktop: - window starts maximized (not fullscreen — operator keeps OS access). - auto-update via tauri-plugin-updater + -process; self-hosted endpoint is a PLACEHOLDER to fill in. Updater keypair: pubkey embedded in tauri.conf.json; private key + password kept OUTSIDE the repo (~/.parking-updater-keys) and as TAURI_SIGNING_* build secrets. - Turbo build is a no-op; the real signed bundle is `pnpm --filter @parking/desktop bundle` (verified → .deb/.rpm/.AppImage + .sig signatures). Verified: cargo check clean; turbo run build lint 14/14 green; i18n parity holds; no key/sig/bundle artifacts in the repo. Wiki (security + desktop analysis recorded alongside): - new concepts/tpm.md (TPM 2.0: how it works, sealed-LUKS auto-unlock + non- extractable signing key, limits — live-root, bus-sniff — TPM-vs-ATECC608 by platform). - new decisions/desktop-shell-tauri.md (Tauri v2 over Electron; best-case Ubuntu 26.04 LTS, worst-case Windows+WSL → kiosk browser; full as-built). - pull-the-disk attack trace on append-only-event-chain; ATECC608 not-in-a-PC caveat; cross-links from disk-os-hardening / threat-model. - open-questions #11 (appliance WebKitGTK), #12 (TPM hardening impl), #13 (startup verifyChain self-check); index/overview/log/standing-decisions. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
55 lines
3.1 KiB
Markdown
55 lines
3.1 KiB
Markdown
---
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type: concept
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tags: [parking, security, foundational]
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sources: [parking-system-architecture]
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updated: 2026-06-20
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---
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# Threat Model
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The **second foundational force** (with [[offline-first]]). The central insight is a
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**reframing of who the adversary is**. (See [[parking-system-architecture]] §3.)
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## The key reframing
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Early thinking focused on protecting the database **at rest** — SQLCipher, LUKS, BitLocker,
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[[tpm|TPM-sealed keys]]. All of that defends against **an outsider who steals the machine or boots
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from external media**.
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That is the **wrong primary threat**. The most likely adversary is the **legitimate operator at
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the booth**. While the app runs, the database is decrypted in memory and the operator has full
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authorised access *through the app*. Encryption does nothing against the classic parking fraud:
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**take the cash, then void/delete the entry/exit record so the books balance.**
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## Consequences
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The controls that actually address insider/operator fraud are different in kind:
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- **[[append-only-event-chain]]** — events appended, never edited/deleted; a "void" is itself a
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recorded event, hash-chained, and **[[atecc608]]-signed** (unforgeable).
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- **[[reconciliation]]** against an authority the operator can't alter — *this is what remote
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sync really is*: a fraud-control mechanism, not just a backup.
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- **[[disk-os-hardening]]** still worthwhile (defeats boot-from-USB) but **not the main event**;
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with LUKS in place, SQLCipher is optional defence-in-depth.
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The same reframing recurs at the device layer: the [[uhppote-controller]]'s real problem is
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unauthenticated commands ([[uhppote-udp-protocol]]), addressed by detection
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([[event-log-ingestion]]) or prevention ([[esp32-custom-controller]]).
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> **Worked example — "store the price" ≠ "account for the sale" (found + fixed 2026-06-20).** Every
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> money-taking action must append a signed `payment` event, or it is invisible to
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> [[reconciliation]]. A concrete miss: selling a [[subscription]] wrote only the mutable
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> `subscriptions` master row (the agreed *price*) and **appended nothing to the ledger**, so the cash
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> the operator collected showed up in the feed/drawer/Z-report **nowhere** — a clean off-book channel
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> (three real sales, 27,000 ALL, untraceable). The fix is the textbook control: append a signed
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> `payment` (`subscriptionSale: true`) at sale time so it folds into the [[shift]] like any taking.
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> **The lesson generalises:** whenever a feature records *an amount* in a mutable table, ask "where is
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> the signed event that says money changed hands?" — a price in master data is not an accountable
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> transaction. See [[subscription]] "Collecting the fee".
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> **Direction shift:** the system is heading toward **fully unmanned operation** — no operator, no
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> booth ([[autonomous-direction]]). That removes the booth-operator as the *primary* adversary, but
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> swaps in **unattended-machine threats** (tailgating, plate spoofing, physical tampering, forced
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> entry). The append-only signed log + reconciliation controls carry over; the emphasis moves from
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> "catch the cashier" to "trust the automated record and detect tampering."
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