julian
d5e41500a8
The backup destination is now chosen by the on-site admin in the UI (Setup -> Backup), not a server env var. An env-pinned target defeats the purpose: the admin can't point backups at a freshly-plugged USB or a NAS mount without editing .env and restarting. The encryption key stays a server secret. Target storage: - New site_config.backup_target_dir (migration 0016, nullable; null = not configured). BackupService reads it fresh each run, so a UI change takes effect with no restart. Only BACKUP_KEY stays env -- a key must never live in the DB it backs up. Routes: - PUT /api/backup/config -- set/clear the target (backup:update; upserts id=1). - POST /api/backup/test -- probe a candidate path server-side (exists / is a directory / writable) so the admin gets feedback before relying on it. - status() now exposes targetDir + keyPresent, so the UI distinguishes 'no target set' from 'BACKUP_KEY missing'. UI (apps/web/src/BackupSettings.tsx): - A Setup -> Backup tab (gated backup:read): an editable target-path field with a Test-target probe (localized ok/missing/not-a-dir/not-writable), Save, the status panel (config state, last-run size/pruned/error, a distinct amber missing-key warning), a Back up now button, and the restore-is-out-of-band note. Full i18n (sq + en); nav.backup. - API client: fetchBackupStatus / setBackupTarget / testBackupTarget / runBackup. Also includes a small in-progress copy trim to the setup-intro i18n strings. Verified live with Playwright: typed a path -> Test reported writable -> Save persisted it -> status reflected it and showed the key-missing warning. Whole monorepo build/lint/test green. Wiki backup-recovery + open-question #5 updated. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
81 lines
4.8 KiB
Bash
81 lines
4.8 KiB
Bash
# Copy this file to `.env` (same folder: apps/server/.env) and fill it in.
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# The dev/start scripts load it automatically via Node's --env-file-if-exists.
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#
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# cp apps/server/.env.example apps/server/.env
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#
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# Required ----------------------------------------------------------------
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# The server refuses to start without a strong JWT_SECRET (>=32 chars).
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# Generate one with: openssl rand -hex 32
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JWT_SECRET=
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# Dedicated HMAC key for signing the append-only event ledger (>=16 chars).
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# Generate with: openssl rand -hex 32
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# If unset, the server falls back to JWT_SECRET (logged as a warning) — fine for
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# dev, but set a dedicated key before production. Events store the key that signed
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# them (keyId), so verifyChain still validates a chain that spans a key change.
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EVENT_SIGNING_KEY=
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# On-site encrypted DB backup (durability for the signed ledger). A daily timer + an admin
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# "back up now" button write a consistent, AES-256-GCM-encrypted copy to the target. The
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# TARGET DIRECTORY is chosen by the admin in the UI (Setup → Backup) and stored in the DB —
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# NOT here. Only the encryption KEY is an env secret. RESTORE is an out-of-band runbook action,
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# not a console call. See wiki/concepts/backup-recovery.md.
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#
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# Dedicated backup-encryption key (>=16 chars), SEPARATE from EVENT_SIGNING_KEY so it can
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# rotate without fracturing the signed chain. Generate with: openssl rand -hex 32
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# Escrow it offsite (alongside EVENT_SIGNING_KEY) — recovery needs both, and neither is ever
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# stored inside the backup it unlocks. Backups stay a no-op until BOTH this key and an in-UI
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# target directory are set.
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# BACKUP_KEY=
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# BACKUP_KEEP_LAST=7 # keep this many newest backups always
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# BACKUP_KEEP_DAILY_DAYS=30 # plus one-per-day within this window
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# Optional ----------------------------------------------------------------
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# PORT=3000
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# HOST=0.0.0.0 # interface to bind. 127.0.0.1 = loopback only.
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# LOG_LEVEL=info
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# DATABASE_URL=./parking.sqlite
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#
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# Auth-cookie Secure flag. FAIL-SAFE: cookies are Secure (HTTPS-only) BY DEFAULT —
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# you only ever opt OUT, never in. Set COOKIE_SECURE=0 for a plain-HTTP deployment
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# (e.g. the LAN appliance serving the SPA same-origin over http, where a Secure
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# cookie would never be sent and would lock operators out). Local dev over
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# http://localhost MUST set this (the dev .env does). Leave unset in any TLS deploy.
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# COOKIE_SECURE=0
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# Recycle bin retention: a soft-deleted user/role/subscription/plan/tariff is auto-purged
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# this many days after deletion (a 6-hourly sweep). Default 30. Set 0 to keep deleted
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# items forever (manual purge only). See wiki/concepts/soft-delete.md.
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# RECYCLE_BIN_RETENTION_DAYS=30
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# First admin (seed once): pnpm --filter @parking/server seed-admin
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# ADMIN_USER=admin
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# ADMIN_PASS=
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# Comma-separated extra origins allowed to open the booth WebSocket (/api/ws).
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# In dev, set the Vite SPA origin. Same-origin is always allowed without this.
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# The Tauri DESKTOP shell loads from tauri://localhost (Linux may also send
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# http://tauri.localhost), which is NOT same-origin with the backend — add both
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# so the desktop app's live feed connects. See apps/desktop.
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# To open the dev SPA from another LAN device (phone over wifi), Vite must bind
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# 0.0.0.0 (vite.config.ts) AND the host's LAN origin must be listed here, e.g.
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# http://10.0.10.203:5173 — the WS handshake's Origin is that LAN address.
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WS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=http://localhost:5173,tauri://localhost,http://tauri.localhost
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# Vision / ANPR (optional) -------------------------------------------------
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# OFF by default. The Node SERVER's view of the vision microservice (apps/vision),
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# which runs as a separate process with its OWN apps/vision/.env. Both sides share the
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# VISION_ prefix but are different processes — keep the two .env files separate.
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# See wiki/entities/opencv-anpr-service.md "Configuration".
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# ANPR rides the entry/exit snapshot (button / QR / RFID triggers it) — no polling.
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# VISION_ENABLED=1 # master switch — nothing runs without it
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# VISION_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8089 # must match apps/vision VISION_HOST:VISION_PORT
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# VISION_TIMEOUT_MS=1500 # per-request cap so a slow call can't hang the lane
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# VISION_MIN_CONFIDENCE=0.5 # advisory confidence floor; keep in sync with the service
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#
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# ANPR subscriber-entry bridge (anpr-entry.ts): a subscriber's plate, read off a lane
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# camera's vehicle detection, admits them through the gated SubscriptionFlow. Opt-in per
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# camera (the camera's config.anpr checkbox in Setup); the camera must be BOUND to a relay.
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# VISION_ENTRY_MIN_CONFIDENCE=0.85 # stricter floor for a BARRIER-driving read (near-miss → falls back to card/QR)
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# ANPR_DEBOUNCE_MS=12000 # same plate/camera within this window = ONE presentation (camera re-fires ~1Hz)
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