julian
bfe64032d8
Turborepo (pnpm workspaces) with all dependencies pinned to latest mutually-compatible versions: turbo 2.9, TypeScript 6, Fastify 5, React 19, Vite 8, better-sqlite3 12 + Drizzle ORM 0.45. Layout: - apps/server Fastify backend (local JWT auth + role guard, /health) - apps/web React 19 + Vite 8 operator SPA - packages/db Drizzle schema on SQLite/WAL; append-only events + users - packages/devices reader/printer/relay adapter interfaces (intent-only relay) - packages/shared shared domain types Architecture constraints from the design wiki are encoded in the scaffold: append-only hash-chained + signed event log, device-agnostic adapters, "a barrier is not a door" (relay expresses intent only), fully-local offline-first auth. wiki/ is an LLM-maintained Obsidian knowledge base (28 pages) ingested from the architecture & design notes, with its own maintenance schema. Verified: pnpm install, full turbo build (5/5), server boots and serves /health, drizzle-kit generates the initial migration.
2.6 KiB
2.6 KiB
type, tags, sources, updated
| type | tags | sources | updated | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| overview |
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2026-06-14 |
Parking System — Overview
The synthesis / entry point for this wiki. Start here, then follow links. Catalog of every page: index. Source summaries: parking-system-architecture.
What it is
A parking-management web application running on a dedicated, hardened Linux appliance deployed on-site at a parking facility. Two forces shape nearly every decision:
- offline-first — a park may be air-gapped; nothing core may depend on a network.
- threat-model — the primary adversary is the legitimate operator at the booth, not an outsider. The classic fraud is take the cash, delete the record.
The architecture in one pass
- Stack (technology-stack / standing-decisions): turborepo · fastify · react-vite-spa · sqlite + drizzle-orm · local-jwt-auth — all open-licensed to avoid lock-in (cf. rejected payload-cms, refine, logto-zitadel-oidc).
- Integrity is the heart of it: an append-only-event-chain (hash-chained, atecc608- signed) plus external reconciliation — that's what remote sync really is. Encryption at rest (disk-os-hardening) defends a secondary threat.
- Devices sit behind a device-adapter-pattern (swap hardware → new adapter only), with the barrier-not-a-door safety principle keeping physical safety in barrier-operator firmware.
- Access control hinges on the trust-boundary fork: uhppote-vs-esp32. Today: uhppote-controller behind network-isolation, its open uhppote-udp-protocol contained, its log made trustworthy by event-log-ingestion. Upgrade path: the esp32-custom-controller with challenge-response-auth and fail-state-safety.
- Readers split two ways (entry-exit-readers): permit holders via wiegand (autonomous), casual/transient via host-side lpr-camera / QR; both can share a relay.
- A reference bom lists recommended devices.
Where it stands
6 open-questions still drive procurement — most critically lane topology, failure modes (fail-open on exit), the reconciliation channel, and backup/durability.
Reading paths
- Security-first: threat-model → append-only-event-chain → reconciliation → uhppote-vs-esp32.
- Hardware-first: bom → uhppote-controller → entry-exit-readers → esp32-custom-controller.
- Stack-first: technology-stack → offline-first → device-adapter-pattern.