julian
c142166972
No secure element is on-site: event signing runs on the software HMAC (EVENT_SIGNING_KEY, an env var on the host disk), so the ledger is tamper-EVIDENT but forgeable by anyone who owns the host. Several pages overstated it as present-tense "ATECC608-signed / unforgeable"; correct them. - NEW concepts/hardware-signer-options.md: four options for a non-extractable signing key (USB HSM / YubiKey / reuse the TPM / plain-dongle trap) + the recommendation (TPM interim → USB-HSM target; ATECC608 stays for the embedded ESP32, wrong part for a PC host). - entities/atecc608.md: UPCOMING-not-present status banner + PC-vs-embedded. - disk-os-hardening.md: fix the live-USB row (BIOS boot-order password is load-bearing, not Secure Boot — a signed live USB runs); add a physical-tamper chain (Dell 7070 CMOS-reset → live-USB → PCR-7 same-signer unseal) + accepted risks (that unseal, unsigned-initramfs evil-maid, operator-USB read TODO). - open-questions #6 reframed; standing-decisions / overview / threat-model / index de-overstated; log query entry. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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3.1 KiB
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2026-06-21 |
Parking System — Overview
The synthesis / entry point for this wiki. Start here, then follow links. Catalog of every page: index. Source summaries: parking-system-architecture.
What it is
A parking-management web application running on a dedicated, hardened Linux appliance deployed on-site at a parking facility. Two forces shape nearly every decision:
- offline-first — a park may be air-gapped; nothing core may depend on a network.
- threat-model — the primary adversary is the legitimate operator at the booth, not an outsider. The classic fraud is take the cash, delete the record.
The architecture in one pass
- Stack (technology-stack / standing-decisions): turborepo · fastify · react-vite-spa · sqlite + drizzle-orm · local-jwt-auth — all open-licensed to avoid lock-in (cf. rejected payload-cms, refine, logto-zitadel-oidc). The operator UI ships as a thin desktop-shell-tauri kiosk shell (chosen over Electron).
- Integrity is the heart of it: an append-only-event-chain (hash-chained, signed) plus external reconciliation — that's what remote sync really is. Signing is software today (key on-disk → forgeable by a host owner); a non-extractable hardware signer (TPM / USB-HSM; the atecc608 is upcoming) is the pending fix — hardware-signer-options. Encryption at rest (disk-os-hardening) defends a secondary threat.
- Devices sit behind a device-adapter-pattern (swap hardware → new adapter only), with the barrier-not-a-door safety principle keeping physical safety in barrier-operator firmware.
- Access control today is the dingtian-relay relay+input controller behind network-isolation — chosen because its inputs are decoupled from its relays, enabling host-in-the-loop ticket-first entry (resolving access-controller-button-flow). The uhppote-controller and zkteco-controller were evaluated and rejected (historical). The deeper fork is still the trust-boundary (uhppote-vs-esp32); the esp32-custom-controller remains the prevention-grade alternative.
- Readers split two ways (entry-exit-readers): permit holders via wiegand (autonomous), casual/transient via host-side lpr-camera / QR; both can share a relay.
- A reference bom lists recommended devices.
Where it stands
6 open-questions still drive procurement — most critically lane topology, failure modes (fail-open on exit), the reconciliation channel, and backup/durability.
Reading paths
- Security-first: threat-model → append-only-event-chain → reconciliation → uhppote-vs-esp32.
- Hardware-first: bom → dingtian-relay → access-controller-button-flow → entry-exit-readers.
- Stack-first: technology-stack → offline-first → device-adapter-pattern.